We need to look beyond climate disasters if we are to help the world's most vulnerable people

Climate security narratives are encouraging us to focus on the symptoms, not the causes, of climate vulnerability in conflict-affected countries.

The recent news that Somalia was elected to become a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council has generated headlines. As one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world, Somalia's accession offers an important opportunity for the country to bring a more hopeful narrative on climate and security.

Somalia is viewed as a tentative but emerging success story in the increasingly fragile Horn of Africa. But at a time when the links between climate change and conflict are gaining increasing attention, it will need to combat an unhelpful - and increasingly commonplace - narrative about the relationship between the two things.

In recent years, we have seen the rise of a popular story: one in which climate change is increasing the probability of violent conflict and insecurity in some of the world's poorest regions. In this narrative, climate impacts undermine social stability, lead to mass migration, and drive recruitment to armed groups.

Somalia is no stranger to this way of presenting the causal relationship between climate change and conflict. In May, a widely syndicated piece from Nation Africa linked the rise of terrorist group al-Shabab to climate change; the same piece also raised the "regional security challenge" of climate-induced migration by nomadic herders. And a recent guest editorial in the Economist cites extremist groups in the Horn of Africa as an example of how climate change "increases the risk of conflict."

"Once we accept that it is our bad governance and development choices which expose people to the worst impacts of climate change, the policy options available to us change."

But while this understanding of the relationship between climate change, environmental degradation, and conflict is increasingly influential, it also conveniently ignores a far more complicated reality. Insecurity and fragility arise from many complex, deep-rooted structural drivers that generally have little to do with climate change or natural hazards.

In its Sixth Assessment Report published in 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reflected broad scientific consensus when it concluded that, "compared to other socioeconomic factors, the influence of climate on conflict is assessed as relatively weak." While extreme weather and climate events may have "a small, adverse impact" on the length, severity, and frequency of conflicts, the nature of these interactions is unclear, variable, and highly context-specific.

To put it another way: If we are serious about building climate resilience in conflict-affected countries, we would do better to look more closely at relationships in the opposite direction. In fact, it is conflict and fragility which drive vulnerability to climate change.

People in fragile and conflict-affected places are vulnerable to climate change because they lack the institutions, capacities, and government support needed to adapt to climate shocks. Displacement, infrastructure destruction, erosion of social ties, institutional fragility, financial instability, and insufficient state support all erode people's ability to anticipate, absorb, and adapt to hazards such as floods and droughts.

It is this, and not geographic bad luck, which explains why more than half of the world's 25 most climate-vulnerable countries are also affected by armed conflict, violence, or institutional fragility.

Once we accept that it is our bad governance and development choices which expose people to the worst impacts of climate change, the policy options available to us change.

Climate change is a critical issue, and mitigating it and adapting to its impacts is very important - particularly in fragile countries which have contributed some of the least to the problem. But in conflict-affected countries, climate projects need to be pursued alongside, and complement, actions which tackle the deeper structural drivers of vulnerability and fragility - not as a substitute.

It is only by tackling the indirect, messy, systemic, and often political issues - including unequal development, political marginalization, and governance - which drive fragility and vulnerability to climate and other hazards that we can support people to build their resilience to shocks. Climate change adaptation alone will not help manage these systemic issues nor build long-term climate resilience.

Encouragingly, Somalia's political leadership is clear that building climate resilience begins with security and socioeconomic development. In conversation with this author, Somalia's Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre said that the country is emerging from the clan warfare and instability of previous years, from recovering swaths of territory from al-Shabab to its recent historic debt relief and ascension to both the East Africa Community and the U.N. Security Council. He added that "this positive momentum must be seized, with accelerated support and investment in our climate-resilient infrastructure" - implying a focus on investing in Somalia's future, rather than simply dealing with present-day climate disasters.

Over the next two years in the U.N. Security Council, Somalia has a chance to change the narrative on climate change and conflict - encouraging a focus on peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and socioeconomic development as a way to reduce climate vulnerability. The time is critical. If we don't act now to address the real drivers of vulnerability, we risk making the narrative of "climate change as a threat multiplier" a self-fulfilling prophecy.

We should focus on these causes of conflict and fragility, and not natural hazards, if we are serious about addressing climate vulnerability in some of the world's most vulnerable places.