We must embrace complexity to tackle climate change, conflict and environmental degradation

Climate change and conflict are inextricably linked – yet solutions rarely address the multifaceted nature of these complex, intractable problems.

Our ongoing research in northern Kenya and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) shows how conflict, climate change and environmental degradation create a vicious cycle of constraints on livelihood choices that should impact how we respond.

Importantly, this research counters the increasingly popular narrative that there is a linear cause and effect between climate change and conflict. Instead, we have found a web of vulnerability, which cannot be solved with a single-issue focus on climate change alone.

We need to break away from simplistic narratives on crisis drivers

There is no doubt that climate change is already impacting lives and livelihoods in Kenya and DRC. In eastern DRC, increasingly frequent heavy rainfall events and dry spells are causing severe flash floods and landslides that damage infrastructure, cause fatalities, and further deepen food insecurity and displacement in a region already suffering from prolonged violence.

In Turkana county in Kenya meanwhile, rising temperatures and increasingly irregular rainfall patterns, including recurring droughts, combined with the recession of good pasture and water, are forcing herders to change their behaviours. This includes moving further afield in search of resources, which is not only exposing communities to further insecurity — such as cattle rustling and sexual violence — but is also exacerbating tensions between different ethnic groups, who compete for increasingly scarce resources.

Yet while flooding and drought make headlines, these climate-related events are not the whole story. A deeper look at DRC and Kenya shows that the impacts of climatic and environmental changes are both widespread and deeply rooted in each country’s political, economic and social context.

In eastern DRC, hazards like flooding and landslides often lead to disasters, but the reasons why lie in the region’s prolonged conflict. Decades of insecurity and conflict have created huge displacement, leading to an influx of people in areas reliant on resource-intensive livelihoods such as mining, extensive agricultural practices and charcoal production. These activities, driven by necessity as conflict restricts alternatives, contribute to deforestation and soil erosion, which in turn increase exposure to climate risks. The outcome can be seen in the tragic case of the Kalehe territory, South Kivu, where steep terrain and fragile soils – the result of increased settlement and resource overuse – have resulted in recurrent and catastrophic landslides and floods.

For many, this increased exposure to climate risks is combined with economic vulnerability and inequality. In places with high levels of violence and conflict, local armed groups have created a business of providing 'security services' to elites and businesses, imposing taxes, and setting up roadblocks. This system exacerbates economic vulnerability and inequality, leaving those unable to pay exposed to increased violence, and forcing them to concentrate in villages along major roads and in cities for safety: actions which further degrade the land and intensify risks.

Similarly, in northwest Kenya, pastoralists’ vulnerability to climate change has been shaped by far more than the weather events themselves. Increasing levels of politically motivated land grabbing, border wars and movement restrictions – such as Uganda’s 2023 Executive Order – are impacting these nomadic herders’ ability to use historical livestock routes, or access water or pasture. This is combined with an increase in large-scale, commercialised cattle raiding which can see thousands of cattle stolen in one go, as well as a greater availability of cheap weapons. These dynamics are precipitating cycles of deadly violence and forcing more and more pastoralists to rely on coping mechanisms – some of which further increase the risks of conflict and others that have negative impacts on the environment, such as burning charcoal as a means of livelihood, intensive fishing and having to graze livestock on smaller areas of pasture. As in DRC, these activities – borne of necessity and limited options – only serve to further degrade critical areas of fertile land and exacerbate vulnerability to future climate shocks.

Strengthening adaptation alone is not enough to build resilience in fragile settings

Both Kenya and DRC show the cyclical relationship between climate vulnerability and conflict vulnerability. In both places, ongoing insecurity forces people to depend more on natural resources for survival, which worsens environmental degradation and their exposure to climate risks. As a result, people are left with increasingly limited options: they can move to areas where they risk violence or stay in areas that are vulnerable to climate hazards. Over time, these options start to merge, as conflict and resource exploitation worsen environmental damage, including deforestation, soil erosion, and overgrazing.

Far from there being a clear, causal link between climate change and increased conflict – as the increasingly popular climate security narrative would have it – these cases show that conflict and climate are more of a vicious cycle. The international climate community needs to be careful to avoid an over-simplified interpretation of the interplay between climate and conflict, which is leading to policy responses that are either insufficient by themselves, or that actively lead to maladaptation.

Ultimately, in conflict-affected settings, climate adaptation investments are needed, but they are not enough on their own. Building resilience requires investments that tackle the structural factors driving fragility—such as socio-economic inequalities, governance failures, and historical patterns of exclusion—which are amplifying both climate risks and violent conflict. Without this systemic perspective, interventions risk addressing symptoms rather than tackling the interconnected drivers of crises.

Embracing the complexity of resilience

Tackling these interconnected issues is difficult, but it is possible. There is much to learn from programmes like the Humanitarian Action and Recovery after Crisis (HARC) in DRC, which highlights the need for integrated action between different actors, combining protection and support to build resilience against both security and climate shocks. More generally, actors working in fragile and conflict settings – from humanitarians to development practitioners, peacebuilders and climate programmes – must work together on projects that support a shared vision and set of goals for building holistic resilience in each country.

Kenya and DRC are not isolated examples. It is only when we move away from a single-issue focus on climate change that we can support people in breaking the web of vulnerability, caused by interconnected crises, that constrain livelihood choices.