A structural response to pandemic threats

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Preparedness is essential for pandemic response. However, evidence abounds that the appropriate funds and resources have not been allocated to properly handle an unexpected outbreak.

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The goal of the Contingency Fund for Emergencies is to have $100 million on hand and to replenish that fund with $25 million to $50 million annually. However, between 2015 and 2018, only $69 million has been contributed, and almost all of that—precisely $53,696,054—has been disbursed in that same time period. Financial structures have, thus far, been depleted by relatively small outbreaks; they would likely not have sufficient funds to allocate in response to a more severe outbreak.

Moreover, the existence of a protocol or infrastructure to respond to public health crises is no guarantee of an adequate response to a sudden outbreak. A June 2016 report written as a retrospective on the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Ebola response found that many existing protocols and response frameworks were either ignored or poorly suited for a rapid response.

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Beyond governmental protocols, global supply chains also pose a risk to pandemic prevention. “The most common lifesaving drugs all depend on long supply chains that include India and China—chains that would likely break in a severe pandemic,” writes science writer Ed Yong in The Atlantic.