Mpox
Mpox, previously known as monkeypox, is a viral illness caused by the monkeypox virus, a species of the genus Orthopoxvirus. There are two distinct clades of the virus: clade I (with subclades Ia and Ib) and clade II (with subclades IIa and IIb). Mpox can be fatal in some cases (adapted from WHO, 2024).
Primary reference(s)
WHO, 2024. Mpox. World Health Organization. Accessed 26 May 2025.
Annotations
Additional scientific description
Mpox is caused by the monkeypox virus (MPXV). It is an enveloped double-stranded DNA virus of the Orthopoxvirus genus in the Poxviridae family, which includes variola, cowpox, vaccinia and other viruses. There are two distinct clades of the virus: clade I (with subclades Ia and Ib) and clade II (with subclades IIa and IIb) (WHO, 2024a).
The natural reservoir of the virus is unknown, but various small mammals such as squirrels and monkeys are susceptible. Mpox can be transmitted through close contact with someone who has mpox, with contaminated materials, or with infected animals. During pregnancy, the virus may be passed to the foetus, or to the newborn during or after birth (WHO, 2024a).
Mpox causes signs and symptoms which usually begin within a week but can start 1-21 days after exposure. Symptoms typically last 2-4 weeks but may last longer in someone with a weakened immune system. Common symptoms include rash, fever, sore throat, headache, muscle aches, back pain, low energy and swollen lymph nodes. The mpox rash often begins on the face and spreads over the body, extending to the palms of the hands and soles of the feet. It can also start on other parts of the body where contact was made, such as the genitals (WHO, 2024a).
The monkeypox virus was discovered in Denmark (1958) in monkeys kept for research. The first reported human case of mpox was a nine-month-old boy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1970). Following the eradication of smallpox in 1980 and the end of smallpox vaccination worldwide, mpox steadily emerged in central, east and west Africa. Since then, mpox has been reported sporadically in central and east Africa (clade I) and west Africa (clade II). In 2003, an outbreak in the United States of America was linked to imported wild animals (clade II). Since 2005, thousands of cases have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo every year. In 2017, mpox re-emerged in Nigeria and continues to spread between people across the country and in travellers to other destinations. In May 2022, an outbreak of mpox appeared suddenly and rapidly spread across Europe, the Americas and then all six WHO regions. In 2022, outbreaks of mpox due to clade I occurred in refugee camps in the Republic of the Sudan (WHO, 2024a).
Since 2022, there has also been an upsurge in mpox cases and deaths in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In some areas of the country, a new offshoot of clade I, called clade Ib, has been spreading person-to-person. As of mid-2024, the clade has also been reported in other countries (WHO, 2024a). Over 120 countries have reported mpox between Jan 2022 - Aug 2024, WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has declared mpox a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) twice, the first time in May 2022 and the second time in August 2024 (WHO, 2024a).
There are vaccines for mpox. Vaccination should be considered along with other public health interventions (WHO, 2024a). WHO recommends confirmation of MPXV infection based on nucleic acid amplification testing (NAAT), using real-time or conventional polymerase chain reaction (PCR) on lesion material for detection of unique sequences of viral DNA. PCR can be used alone or in combination with sequencing for clade, (WHO, 2024b).
Rope squirrels, tree squirrels, Gambian pouched rats, dormice, non-human primates and other animal species have been identified as susceptible to monkeypox virus (WHO, no date).
Metrics and numeric limits
The World Health Organization and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have published guidance on surveillance, case investigation and contact tracing, diagnostic testing, clinical management, infection prevention and control and vaccine and immunization (CDC, 2024; WHO, 2019; 2022a;.2022b; 2024b; 2024c).
Key relevant UN convention / multilateral treaty
International Health Regulations (2005), 3rd ed. (WHO, 2016).
Drivers
Exposure to body fluids or skin lesions or eating inadequately cooked meat of infected animals is a possible risk factor (WHO, 2017).
Secondary, or human-to-human, transmission can result from close contact with infected respiratory tract secretions, skin lesions of an infected person or objects recently contaminated by patient fluids or lesion materials. Transmission occurs primarily via respiratory droplets or mucous membranes, usually requiring prolonged face-to-face contact, which puts household members of active cases at greater risk of infection. Transmission can also occur by inoculation or via the placenta as in congenital pox (WHO, 2017).
Children, pregnant people and people with weak immune systems, including people living with HIV that is not well controlled, are at higher risk for serious illness and death due to complications from mpox (WHO, 2024a).
The global outbreak has affected primarily (but not only) gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men and has spread person-to-person through sexual networks.
Groups that may be at high risk of mpox include:
- health and care workers at risk of exposure,
- people in the same household or close community as someone who has mpox, including children,
- people who have multiple sex partners, including men who have sex with men; and
- sex workers of any gender and their clients.
Impacts
Some people with mpox become very sick. For example, the skin can become infected with bacteria, leading to abscesses or serious skin damage. Other complications include pneumonia; corneal infection with loss of vision; pain or difficulty swallowing; vomiting and diarrhoea causing dehydration or malnutrition; and infections of the blood (sepsis), brain (encephalitis), heart (myocarditis), rectum (proctitis), genital organs (balanitis) or urinary passages (urethritis). Mpox can be fatal in some cases (WHO, 2024a).
Stigma and discrimination against any disease are never acceptable. Stigma linked to mpox can undermine public health efforts or prolong a disease outbreak, as people may be more reluctant to come forward and seek care and treatment. For mpox, stigma, discrimination and racism have been particularly directed against communities initially most affected by the disease, namely men who have sex with men, trans people and gender-diverse communities (WHO, 2024a).
Multi-hazard context
The natural reservoir of the Mpox virus is unknown, but various small mammals such as squirrels and monkeys are susceptible. Mpox can be transmitted through close contact with someone who has mpox, with contaminated materials, or with infected animals. During pregnancy, the virus may be passed to the foetus, or to the newborn during or after birth (WHO, 2024a).
In May 2022, an outbreak of mpox appeared suddenly and rapidly spread across Europe, the Americas and then all six WHO regions. The global outbreak has affected primarily (but not only) gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men and has spread person-to-person through sexual networks. More information on the global outbreak is available here, including information on community responses to control the outbreak. (WHO, 2024a).
In 2022, outbreaks of mpox due to clade I occurred in refugee camps in the Republic of the Sudan.
Since 2022, there has also been an upsurge in mpox cases and deaths in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In some areas of the country, a new offshoot of clade I, called clade Ib, has been spreading person-to-person. As of mid-2024, the clade has also been reported in other countries. (WHO, 2024a).
Over 120 countries have reported mpox between Jan 2022 – Aug 2024, with over 100,000 laboratory-confirmed cases reported and over 220 deaths among confirmed cases (WHO, 2024a).
Risk Management
Getting an mpox vaccine can help prevent infection (pre-exposure prophylaxis). It is recommended for people at high risk of getting mpox, especially during an outbreak. The vaccine can also be administered after a person has been in contact with someone who has mpox (post-exposure prophylaxis). In these cases, the vaccine should be given less than 4 days after contact with someone who has mpox. The vaccine can be given for up to 14 days if the person has not developed symptoms (WHO, 2022a).
To prevent the spread of mpox to others, people with mpox should isolate at home following guidance from their health care provider, or in hospital if needed, for the duration of the infectious period (from onset of symptoms until lesions have healed and scabs fall off). Covering lesions and wearing a well-fitting mask when in the presence of others may help prevent spread. Using condoms during sex will help reduce the risk of getting mpox but will not prevent spread from skin-to-skin or mouth-to-skin contact. If having sex, use condoms as a precaution for 12 weeks (about 3 months) after you have recovered. Taking a break from sexual activity with new partners during periods of increased transmission can reduce the risk of getting mpox. Those who have had contact with someone with mpox should monitor for signs and symptoms for 21 days (3 weeks) and take precautions such as avoiding sexual activity during this period (WHO, 2024a).
Some antivirals have received emergency use authorization in some countries and are being evaluated in clinical trials. To date, there is no proven effective antiviral treatment for mpox. It is a priority to continue the evaluation of therapeutics in robust clinical trials and to focus on optimizing supportive care for patients. Conservative treatment of rash lesions is recommended depending on their stage, with aims to relieve discomfort, speed healing and prevent complications, such as secondary infections or exfoliation (WHO 2022b; 2024a).
Surveillance and rapid identification of new cases is critical for outbreak containment (WHO, 2017). The key objectives of surveillance and case investigation for mpox are to rapidly identify cases and clusters of infections as well as the sources of infection as soon as possible in order to: provide optimal clinical care; isolate cases to prevent further transmission; identify, manage and follow-up contacts to recognize early signs of infection; identify risk groups for infection and for severe disease; protect frontline health workers; and tailor effective control and prevention measures (WHO, 2024c).
Infection in people can be reduced by raising awareness of the risk factors and educating people about measures they can take to reduce exposure to the virus. Control measures include isolation of affected persons, good respiratory and hand hygiene, and other personal protective measures. Those at highest risk, such as health workers or laboratory personnel, can be protected through vaccination. A vaccine against mpox was licensed in 2019 (WHO, 2019; 2020).
Health workers caring for patients with suspected or confirmed monkeypox virus infection, or handling specimens from them, should implement standard and droplet infection control precautions (WHO, 2024a).
WHO, Member States and partners work together to prevent and respond to outbreaks of mpox. This includes coordinating research on vaccines and treatments, strengthening country health systems, and working to facilitate equitable access to vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics and other tools (WHO, 2024a).
Monitoring
The section and the table below offer an overview of monitoring for mpox. This information can be used for forecasting within a national early warning system (EWS). Since EWS capacities and processes differ across countries, the most current and specific information regarding EWS should be obtained from the appropriate national or regional agency/authority responsible for disaster management.
| Which institution(s) produce(s) Disaster Risk Data/Information? | WHO, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Livestock, FAO Reference Centres, WOAH Reference Centres |
| How is the Hazard Observed/Monitored/Forecast? | WHO supports countries to conduct all-hazards strategic risk assessment in the contexts of health emergencies and disasters, which results in the development of a country risk profile. Empowered with the country risk profile, inclusive of a seasonal risk calendar, countries can anticipate potential emergencies before they occur to trigger early alerts and inform early actions (WHO, 2021). WHO's Early Warning, Alert and Response System (EWARS) has been designed to improve disease outbreak detection in emergency settings, such as in countries in conflict or following a natural disaster. It is a simple and cost-effective way to rapidly set up a disease surveillance system. EWARS is deployed during an emergency as an adjunct to the national disease surveillance system. WHO works with Ministries of Health and health sector partners to train local health workers to use the system. After the emergency, EWARS should re-integrate back into the national system (WHO, 2023) Through its global early warning system, FAO has been supporting Members with risk monitoring, assessment and forecasting for animal health threats, to enhance preparedness and response to animal health threats:
FAO empres-i+ https://empres-i.apps.fao.org/diseases WOAH WAHIS https://wahis.woah.org/#/event-management |
References
CDC, 2003. Appendix: Case definitions for human monkeypox outbreak, Wisconsin, 2003. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Accessed 13 December 2019.
WHO, 2016. International Health Regulations (2005), 3rd ed. World Health Organization (WHO). Accessed 26 May 2025.
WHO, 2017. Monkeypox: Current status in West and Central Africa. World Health Organization (WHO). Accessed 26 May 2025.
WHO, 2019. WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research. Report of the Twentieth Meeting, 26-27 September 2018, Geneva, Switzerland. World Health Organization (WHO). Accessed 26 May 2025.
WHO, 2020. OpenWHO course. Monkeypox. Introduction. World Health Organization (WHO). Accessed 26 May 2025.
WHO, 2021. Strategic toolkit for assessing risks (STAR): a comprehensive toolkit for all-hazards health emergency risk assessment. World Health Organization (WHO). Accessed 26 May 2025.
WHO, 2022a. Vaccines and immunization for Mpox: interim guidance (Geneva, WHO, Work Health Organization, 16 November 2022). Accessed 02 September 2024.
WHO, 2022b. Clinical management and infection prevention and control for monkeypox: interim rapid response guidance, 10 June 2022. World Health Organization. License: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. Accessed 02 September 2024.
WHO, 2023. Early Warning, Alert and Response System (EWARS). World Health Organization (WHO). Accessed 26 May 2025.
WHO, 2024a. Mpox fact sheet World Health Organization (WHO). Accessed 26 May 2025.
WHO, 2024b. Diagnostic testing for the monkeypox virus (MPXV): interim guidance, 10 May 2024. World Health Organization (WHO) License: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. Accessed 26 May 2025.
WHO, 2024c. Surveillance, case investigation and contact tracing for mpox (monkeypox): Interim guidance, 20 March 2024. Accessed 26 May 2025.
WHO, no date. R&D Blueprint. Mpox (monkeypox). Accessed 1 April 2025.