Adapting MHEWS in response to a tsunami threat in Ecuador
After a 2016 earthquake that struck off the coast of Pedernales, Ecuador, exposed the limits of the country's ability to monitor and respond to seismic hazards, the Government of Ecuador responded with a Program to Strengthen the National Early Warning System, funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The project, which was completed in May 2023, sought to strengthen the national monitoring and forecasting network and the country’s alert dissemination and community response capacity. While the project started in 2017, it built on the foundations of a regional early warning system for the Cotopaxi volcano that was being developed in 2015. The IDB project extended oceanographic monitoring and established protocol-based alert levels, multichannel communication, and preventive actions across the country to address tsunami and riverine flooding. The multichannel communication system is described in a formal “Protocol for Activating Alert Dissemination Mechanisms for the Evolution of Threats and Hazardous Events”. The protocol sets out the roles and responsibilities of partners under the Secretaría Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos (SNGR, the national disaster management agency). It also provides details of how to disseminate alerts using 13 different mechanisms, including audible sirens, Cell Broadcast (CB), and community-based channels that deliver messages via loudspeakers and beacons.
In July 2025, the MHEWS was tested by a magnitude 8.8 earthquake near the Kamchatka Peninsula that generated a basin-wide tsunami threat. The quake occurred at 6:24 p.m. local time on 29 July. By 7:30 p.m., the Instituto Oceanográfico y Antártico de la Armada (INOCAR, the Oceanographic and Antarctic Institute of the Ecuadorian Navy) had issued two bulletins based on international data from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii and the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The first indicated that the Hawaii centre was evaluating the threat of a potential tsunami, while the bulletin from NOAA indicated a high probability of a tsunami with maximum wave heights up to 1.5 metres reaching the Ecuadorian coast around 9:45 a.m. the following morning. Technical staff at the SNGR assessed the available data and at around 10:30 p.m., SNGR activated the warning system for the Galápagos, the expected first point of impact. However, SNGR had to adjust its messages as the system was designed for a larger, local tsunami and its pre-recorded messages called for immediate evacuation, which was not appropriate for this event. Based on experience from the 2022 Tonga submarine volcanic eruption, which produced only minor disturbances in Ecuador many hours after the event, authorities instead broadcast a cautionary message over public address systems. These messages, which were repeated three times, informed people of the distant earthquake and announced the suspension of maritime activities. The public were also advised to keep away from beaches, docks, and coastal areas, and directed to consult official information sources for further updates and advice. The word ‘tsunami’ was deliberately omitted to avoid provoking panic overnight. Community alert systems carried the same message through loudspeakers, beacons, and megaphones across the islands.
SNGR and INOCAR situation rooms remained active through the night, verifying international bulletins and monitoring sea conditions using coastal camera feeds. At 8:30 a.m. authorities began precautionary evacuations in high-risk areas of the Galápagos and used CB to send messages to devices on the state-owned carrier’s network, resulting in the evacuation of over 2,300 people. Around midday, waves approximately 1.3 metres high reached the shore. Having issued seven bulletins, INOCAR informed the public that the threat had passed and cancelled the alert status around 2:00 p.m. on 30 July, allowing people to return to their homes.
Although no major damage was reported, the experience demonstrates a comprehensive early warning chain from start to finish. This includes: detection and scientific assessment of the threat; institutional analysis and decision-making; dissemination of alerts through multiple communication channels; pre-emptive evacuation; coordinated action by national, provincial, and local authorities; continuous monitoring; and management of the return to normal activities. It also underscores that MHEWS are most effective when scientific information is translated into clear, actionable messages, supported by pre-established protocols – including pre-planned and practised evacuation routes and safe zones – and coordinated institutional response capabilities.
Several factors contributed to the successful test of the system in 2025, including well-defined protocols for assessing threats and disseminating alerts, effective coordination across stakeholders and well-practised preparedness. Tsunami threat levels are assessed against the Technical Protocol for the Assessment and Definition of Tsunami Alerts, developed with the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Japan Meteorological Agency, and are periodically revised based on regional and local operational experience. A separate protocol governs how alerts are disseminated and what each institution’s roles and responsibilities are. For example, SNGR runs weekly tests of system performance alongside national and local drills. To ensure a coordinated response, scientific and technical agencies, the SNGR, local governments, the Governing Council of the Galápagos Special Regime, and agencies responsible for security, transport, and maritime activity are connected through standing arrangements that allow scientific information to be translated into operational decisions within hours. Finally, safe zones and evacuation routes had been identified in advance, which is why the movement of more than two thousand people, including vulnerable individuals, proceeded without major difficulty.
Legislative frameworks are also in place. Under the new Organic Law for Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management, the SNGR will lead the establishment of a National Early Warning Centre, which will, among other things, work to integrate multiple dissemination channels to improve the effectiveness and coverage of alerts. SNGR will also take the lead in preparing for new tsunami scenarios, including less frequent submarine volcanic eruptions and landslides. However, continued progress will depend on sustained financing and maintaining institutional and political commitment over time.