The Nepal floods re-destroyed a repaired hydropower plant following contractual siting lock-in
This paper suggests that reoccupation of the Nepal mountains can be explained at least in part by the governing instruments under which the asset was licensed, contracted and financed. The Rasuwagadhi hydropower plant that was destroyed by the 26 August 2026 Nepal flood had failed 14 months earlier in a similar event, but was reopened at the same site. This paper argues that the governance and financing set-up binds low-carbon infrastructure to hazardous sites. Similar contracts are in place elsewhere and could lead to similar outcomes of repeated catastrophe. The authors argue that contractual reforms are urgently required to allow relocation of infrastructure exposed to high risk.
A catastrophic ice and rock avalanche in Nepal led to at least 1000 deaths and left thousands more missing. In addition to the human tragedy, the debris that entered the Lhende Khola river valley on 26 August 2026 generated a surge down the Bhote Koshi river that removed 431 MW of operating electricity generation from Nepal’s grid, close to a tenth of national installed capacity. The flood also damaged a further 470 MW under construction, and destroyed the 220 kV Trishuli 3B hub substation that serves much of the basin. The disaster should not have come as a surprise. The same tributary had produced a comparable event just fourteen months earlier, on 8 July 2025, destroying the bridge at the Rasuwagadhi crossing and the headworks of the 111 MW Rasuwagadhi hydropower plant. In response to the 2025 destruction, the plant was repaired at the same intake and returned to partial service in December 2025.
