Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015
Making development sustainable: The future of disaster risk management


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between 1990 and 2002 found that high rates of corruption-related crimes in Mississippi, Florida and South Dakota were correlated to large numbers of disaster events and related losses in the same three states and throughout America (Leeson and Sobel, 2008

Leeson, Peter T. and Russell S. Sobel. 2008,Blame the Weather? Natural Disasters, FEMA, and Corruption in America, Article containing material from: Peter T. Leeson and Russell S. Sobel, 2008. Weathering Corruption, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 51, No. 4: 667-681.. .
). There was some causality to this correlation in that opportunity for corruption in those states was bred by the inflow of large sums of relief funding and lucrative postdisaster construction contracts (ibid.).
In contrast, the different ways in which corrupt practices shape patterns of vulnerability and exposure and determine levels of risk are not as well understood. In sectors and localities, corrupt practices can increase disaster risk by corroding a culture of compliance that is key to the effectiveness of codes, standards and similar regulatory mechanisms. The construction industry is one of the sectors most critical to disaster risk management and also one of the most prone to corruption (Transparency International, 2005

Transparency International. 2005,Global Corruption Report 2005: Special focus - Corruption in Construction and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Foreword by Francis Fukuyama. London: Pluto Press.. .
). An estimated US$4 trillion per year is spent on government procurement for construction worldwide, and a
significant part of this expenditure is lost to corruption, accounting for an estimated 10-30 per cent of every project’s value (ibid.).
Corruptpracticesinhazard-proneareascontribute directly to increasing the vulnerability and exposure of assets and people (Lewis, 2011

Lewis, James. 2011,Corruption: The hidden perpetrator of under-development and vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters, Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2011.. .
). For example, following the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008, the depletion of funds for school buildings reportedly led to compromised design standards and regulatory codes (Pei, 2007

Pei, Minxin. 2007,Corruption Threatens China’s Future, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Policy Brief 55. October 2007.. .
; Lewis, 2011

Lewis, James. 2011,Corruption: The hidden perpetrator of under-development and vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters, Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2011.. .
). While many older buildings survived the earthquake relatively unscathed, over 7,000 more recently built classrooms collapsed, resulting in high mortality; one local school reported the death of 900 children in the earthquake (Lewis, 2011

Lewis, James. 2011,Corruption: The hidden perpetrator of under-development and vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters, Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2011.. .
).
Given that disaster risk is configured by hazard and exposure as well as vulnerability, there is no direct correlation between disaster risk and levels of corruption (Figure 6.4). For example, Japan and Eritrea or Grenada and Haiti are pairs of countries with similar relative levels of disaster risk (AAL as a proportion of exposed assets).
(Source: UNISDR based on data from Global Risk Assessment and the World Bank.)
Figure 6.4 Control of corruption and disaster risk
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