GAR 2015 Main Report

178

Part III

On 26 July 2005, Mumbai was brought to a halt by severe flooding. Water supply, drainage and sewerage, all forms of public transport, power and telecommunications collapsed across wide areas (Revi, 2005

Revi, Aromar. 2005,Lessons from the Deluge Priorities for Multi-Hazard Risk Mitigation, Economic and Political Weekly (September 3, 2005): 3911-3916.. .

). Some 1,150 people died (Carpenter, 2006

Carpenter, Guy. 2006,Natural Hazards Review 2005, Instrat Briefing. February 2006.. .

), trains were derailed and parts of the city were submerged under the heaviest rainfall recorded in Mumbai’s history (Hallegatte et al., 2010

Hallegatte, Stéphane, Nicola Ranger, Sumana Bhattacharya, Murthy Bachu, Satya Priya, K. Dhore, Farhat Rafique, P. Mathur, Nicolas Naville, Fanny Henriet, Anand Patwardhan, K. Narayanan, Subimal Ghosh, Subhankar Karmakar, Unmesh Patnaik, Abhijat Abhayankar 2010,Flood Risks, Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Benefits in Mumbai: An Initial Assessment of Socio-Economic Consequences of Present and Climate Change-Induced Flood Risks and of Possible Adaptation Options, OECD Environment Working Papers No. 27. Paris: OECD Publishing.. .

; Ranger et al., 2011

Ranger, Nicola, Stéphane Hallegatte, Sumana Bhattacharya, Murthy Bachu, Satya Priya, K. Dhore, Farhat Rafique, P. Mathur, Nicolas Naville, Fanny Henriet, Celine Herweijer, Sanjib Pohit and Jan Corfee-Morlot. 2011,An assessment of the potential impact of climate change on flood risk in Mumbai, Climatic Change, Vol. 104, Issue 1: 139-167.. .

; Dossal, 2005

Dossal, Mariam. 2005,A Master Plan for the City: Looking at the Past, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 36 (Sep. 3-9, 2005): 3897-3900.. .

Mumbai’s 150-year-old municipal government was unprepared and unable to organize an effective response. Many administrative and political institutions were paralysed, seemingly in a state of shock (ibid.). And yet city life continued, no riots broke out, and Mumbaikars soon organized themselves for a speedy response and recovery.1 The event and its immediate aftermath highlighted not only limitations but also the existence of a civic culture.

The 2005 floods affected a city of around 13 million people.2 Mumbai has now grown to more than 20 million (UNDESA, 2014b

UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). 2014b,World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 Revision. Highlights. United Nations, New York.. .

), and this rapid growth continues to be characterized by high levels of inequality. Informal settlements and markets with weak public infrastructure exist side by side with a dynamic economy and a strong middle

class. By 2020, the city is projected to have the highest population density in the world (ibid.).

Mumbai is no stranger to risk management challenges. At the end of the nineteenth century, failures in urban planning, regulation and public investment resulted in a devastating outbreak of the bubonic plague (Gandy, 2008

Gandy, Matthew. 2008,Landscapes of disaster: water, modernity, and urban fragmentation in Mumbai, Environment and Planning A, 40 (1): 108-130.. .

; Christakos et al., 2007). The risks exposed by the 2005 floods were constructed in a very similar manner.

In 1908, Arthur Crawford, Municipal Commissioner from 1865 to 1871, published plans for urban renewal that provided for adequate housing, water supply, drainage and waste management systems (Crawford, 1908

Crawford, A.T. 1908,The Development of New Bombay: A Pamphlet, Bombay.. .

). He had already suggested similar plans during his time in office, but they had been opposed by wealthy landowners and officials with vested interests. As a result, the bubonic plague that raged in the city for almost a decade until 1906 led to a heavy death toll and severely impacted the city’s economy, social cohesion and self-image (Dossal, 2005

Dossal, Mariam. 2005,A Master Plan for the City: Looking at the Past, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 36 (Sep. 3-9, 2005): 3897-3900.. .

Mumbai continued to grow rapidly in the twentieth century at the same time as being exposed to a multitude of physical and technological hazards, including earthquake, cyclone, storm surge, landslide, rainstorm and local flooding, sea level rise, drought, and nuclear and industrial accidents. With the 2005 floods, the strategic and competitive advantages provided by location, history, and the resulting concentration of capital, human resources and technology seemed to have been overtaken by a dramatic accumulation of both systemic and idiosyncratic risks (Revi, 2005

Revi, Aromar. 2005,Lessons from the Deluge Priorities for Multi-Hazard Risk Mitigation, Economic and Political Weekly (September 3, 2005): 3911-3916.. .

Today, more than half of the population lives in informal settlements (Bertaud, 2011

Bertaud, Alain. 2011,Starving Mumbai from infrastructure investments and new floor space: A critique of Mumbai’s Malthusian urban policy over the last 40 years, Mumbai FAR/FSI Consortium.. .

). Public investments in infrastructure have been playing catch-up. Basic services and utilities such as uninterrupted energy and water supply, wastewater management and garbage collection are non-existent or sub-standard in many parts of the

(Source: Bartholomew, 1908

Bartholomew, J.G. 1908,City of Bombay, Imperial gazetteer of India. New edition, published under the authority of His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India in Council. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907-1909. Vol. 8. Available from http:// dsal.uchicago.edu/maps/gazetteer/.. .

Figure III.1 Mumbai in the early twentieth century

	178 Part III On 26 July 2005, Mumbai was brought to a halt by severe flooding. Water supply, drainage and sewerage, all forms of public transport, power and telecommunications collapsed across wide areas (Revi, 2005 x Revi, Aromar. 2005,Lessons from the Deluge Priorities for Multi-Hazard Risk Mitigation, Economic and Political Weekly (September 3, 2005): 3911-3916.. . ). Some 1,150 people died (Carpenter, 2006 x Carpenter, Guy. 2006,Natural Hazards Review 2005, Instrat Briefing. February 2006.. . ), trains were derailed and parts of the city were submerged under the heaviest rainfall recorded in Mumbai’s history (Hallegatte et al., 2010 x Hallegatte, Stéphane, Nicola Ranger, Sumana Bhattacharya, Murthy Bachu, Satya Priya, K. Dhore, Farhat Rafique, P. Mathur, Nicolas Naville, Fanny Henriet, Anand Patwardhan, K. Narayanan, Subimal Ghosh, Subhankar Karmakar, Unmesh Patnaik, Abhijat Abhayankar 2010,Flood Risks, Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Benefits in Mumbai: An Initial Assessment of Socio-Economic Consequences of Present and Climate Change-Induced Flood Risks and of Possible Adaptation Options, OECD Environment Working Papers No. 27. Paris: OECD Publishing.. . ; Ranger et al., 2011 x Ranger, Nicola, Stéphane Hallegatte, Sumana Bhattacharya, Murthy Bachu, Satya Priya, K. Dhore, Farhat Rafique, P. Mathur, Nicolas Naville, Fanny Henriet, Celine Herweijer, Sanjib Pohit and Jan Corfee-Morlot. 2011,An assessment of the potential impact of climate change on flood risk in Mumbai, Climatic Change, Vol. 104, Issue 1: 139-167.. . ; Dossal, 2005 x Dossal, Mariam. 2005,A Master Plan for the City: Looking at the Past, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 36 (Sep. 3-9, 2005): 3897-3900.. . ). Mumbai’s 150-year-old municipal government was unprepared and unable to organize an effective response. Many administrative and political institutions were paralysed, seemingly in a state of shock (ibid.). And yet city life continued, no riots broke out, and Mumbaikars soon organized themselves for a speedy response and recovery.1 The event and its immediate aftermath highlighted not only limitations but also the existence of a civic culture. The 2005 floods affected a city of around 13 million people.2 Mumbai has now grown to more than 20 million (UNDESA, 2014b x UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). 2014b,World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 Revision. Highlights. United Nations, New York.. . ), and this rapid growth continues to be characterized by high levels of inequality. Informal settlements and markets with weak public infrastructure exist side by side with a dynamic economy and a strong middle class. By 2020, the city is projected to have the highest population density in the world (ibid.). Mumbai is no stranger to risk management challenges. At the end of the nineteenth century, failures in urban planning, regulation and public investment resulted in a devastating outbreak of the bubonic plague (Gandy, 2008 x Gandy, Matthew. 2008,Landscapes of disaster: water, modernity, and urban fragmentation in Mumbai, Environment and Planning A, 40 (1): 108-130.. . ; Christakos et al., 2007). The risks exposed by the 2005 floods were constructed in a very similar manner. In 1908, Arthur Crawford, Municipal Commissioner from 1865 to 1871, published plans for urban renewal that provided for adequate housing, water supply, drainage and waste management systems (Crawford, 1908 x Crawford, A.T. 1908,The Development of New Bombay: A Pamphlet, Bombay.. . ). He had already suggested similar plans during his time in office, but they had been opposed by wealthy landowners and officials with vested interests. As a result, the bubonic plague that raged in the city for almost a decade until 1906 led to a heavy death toll and severely impacted the city’s economy, social cohesion and self-image (Dossal, 2005 x Dossal, Mariam. 2005,A Master Plan for the City: Looking at the Past, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 36 (Sep. 3-9, 2005): 3897-3900.. . ). Mumbai continued to grow rapidly in the twentieth century at the same time as being exposed to a multitude of physical and technological hazards, including earthquake, cyclone, storm surge, landslide, rainstorm and local flooding, sea level rise, drought, and nuclear and industrial accidents. With the 2005 floods, the strategic and competitive advantages provided by location, history, and the resulting concentration of capital, human resources and technology seemed to have been overtaken by a dramatic accumulation of both systemic and idiosyncratic risks (Revi, 2005 x Revi, Aromar. 2005,Lessons from the Deluge Priorities for Multi-Hazard Risk Mitigation, Economic and Political Weekly (September 3, 2005): 3911-3916.. . ). Today, more than half of the population lives in informal settlements (Bertaud, 2011 x Bertaud, Alain. 2011,Starving Mumbai from infrastructure investments and new floor space: A critique of Mumbai’s Malthusian urban policy over the last 40 years, Mumbai FAR/FSI Consortium.. . ). Public investments in infrastructure have been playing catch-up. Basic services and utilities such as uninterrupted energy and water supply, wastewater management and garbage collection are non-existent or sub-standard in many parts of the (Source: Bartholomew, 1908 x Bartholomew, J.G. 1908,City of Bombay, Imperial gazetteer of India. New edition, published under the authority of His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India in Council. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907-1909. Vol. 8. Available from http:// dsal.uchicago.edu/maps/gazetteer/.. . .) Figure III.1 Mumbai in the early twentieth century	Page 1 Page 10 Page 20 Page 30 Page 40 Page 50 Page 60 Page 70 Page 80 Page 90 Page 100 Page 110 Page 120 Page 130 Page 140 Page 150 Page 160 Page 168 Page 169 Page 170 Page 171 Page 172 Page 173 Page 174 Page 175 Page 176 Page 177 Page 178 Page 179 ->Page 180 Page 181 Page 182 Page 183 Page 184 Page 185 Page 186 Page 187 Page 188 Page 189 Page 190 Page 191 Page 192 Page 200 Page 210 Page 220 Page 230 Page 240 Page 250 Page 260 Page 270 Page 280 Page 290 Page 300 Page 310