GAR 2015 Main Report

188

Part III - Chapter 9

like Denmark can exceed US$12,000 per inhabitant, in many low-income countries it is less than US$5 per inhabitant (Satterthwaite and Dodman, 2013

Satterthwaite, David and David Dodman. 2013,Towards resilience and transformation for cities within a finite planet, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 25, No. 2: 291-298.. .

). This implies that weak local governance is both a poverty factor and a driver of risk.

While the impact of disaster on poverty has been documented repeatedly, what is missing is the recognition that disaster risk, and particularly extensive risk, is part of the DNA of poverty and inequality. In other words, it is rooted within poverty and not an externality.

Studies on the geography of risk often still present disasters and climate change impacts as a simple function of the hazard exposure of lowincome populations. For example, a recent projection states that 325 million extremely poor people will be living in the 49 countries most prone to hazards in 2030, and therefore eliminating poverty cannot be achieved without addressing disasters (Shepherd et al., 2013

Shepherd, Andrew, Tom Mitchell, Kirsty Lewis, Amanda Lenhardt, Lindsey Jones, Lucy Scott and Robert Muir-Wood. 2013,The geography of poverty, disasters and climate extremes in 2030, Overseas Development Institute, MetOffice and RMS. October 2013.. .

). However, this logic can be explored from a different angle. If poverty could be reduced, so would disaster losses and impacts. Disaster risk, and extensive risk in particular, is intrinsic to poverty.

9.2 Inequality and disaster risk

The social processes that drive the disaster risk– poverty nexus are permeated with inequality. Inequality increases income poverty and creates processes of social and political exclusion. The result is a lack of social cohesion that contributes to disaster risk by eroding accountability and enabling corruption.

In Turkey, an upper middle-income country, income inequality has been decreasing over the last 30 years. However, this decrease began from a high starting point, and today the country still ranks second among OECD countries in terms of income inequality.7 While the number of people

living below the poverty line has decreased dramatically over the last 10 years, the poverty threshold for Turkey has continuously risen. In 2013, it was calculated at US$509 per month, which is significantly higher than the official poverty line.8

Inequality and poverty are highest in the southern and eastern regions of the country, which are less populated than the urbanized north and western coast. With the exception of losses associated with the large earthquake in Izmit in 1999, disaster losses in general reflect the distribution of inequality (Figure 9.4).

The social processes and power dynamics that drive the disaster risk–poverty nexus are permeated with inequality. Inequality (Box 9.2) drives

Figure 9.4 Inequality and disaster losses in Turkey

(Source: UNISDR with data from the Turkish Disaster

Data Bank (TABB) and OECD.)

	188 Part III - Chapter 9 like Denmark can exceed US$12,000 per inhabitant, in many low-income countries it is less than US$5 per inhabitant (Satterthwaite and Dodman, 2013 x Satterthwaite, David and David Dodman. 2013,Towards resilience and transformation for cities within a finite planet, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 25, No. 2: 291-298.. . ). This implies that weak local governance is both a poverty factor and a driver of risk. While the impact of disaster on poverty has been documented repeatedly, what is missing is the recognition that disaster risk, and particularly extensive risk, is part of the DNA of poverty and inequality. In other words, it is rooted within poverty and not an externality. Studies on the geography of risk often still present disasters and climate change impacts as a simple function of the hazard exposure of lowincome populations. For example, a recent projection states that 325 million extremely poor people will be living in the 49 countries most prone to hazards in 2030, and therefore eliminating poverty cannot be achieved without addressing disasters (Shepherd et al., 2013 x Shepherd, Andrew, Tom Mitchell, Kirsty Lewis, Amanda Lenhardt, Lindsey Jones, Lucy Scott and Robert Muir-Wood. 2013,The geography of poverty, disasters and climate extremes in 2030, Overseas Development Institute, MetOffice and RMS. October 2013.. . ). However, this logic can be explored from a different angle. If poverty could be reduced, so would disaster losses and impacts. Disaster risk, and extensive risk in particular, is intrinsic to poverty. 9.2 Inequality and disaster risk The social processes that drive the disaster risk– poverty nexus are permeated with inequality. Inequality increases income poverty and creates processes of social and political exclusion. The result is a lack of social cohesion that contributes to disaster risk by eroding accountability and enabling corruption. In Turkey, an upper middle-income country, income inequality has been decreasing over the last 30 years. However, this decrease began from a high starting point, and today the country still ranks second among OECD countries in terms of income inequality.7 While the number of people living below the poverty line has decreased dramatically over the last 10 years, the poverty threshold for Turkey has continuously risen. In 2013, it was calculated at US$509 per month, which is significantly higher than the official poverty line.8 Inequality and poverty are highest in the southern and eastern regions of the country, which are less populated than the urbanized north and western coast. With the exception of losses associated with the large earthquake in Izmit in 1999, disaster losses in general reflect the distribution of inequality (Figure 9.4). The social processes and power dynamics that drive the disaster risk–poverty nexus are permeated with inequality. Inequality (Box 9.2) drives Figure 9.4 Inequality and disaster losses in Turkey (Source: UNISDR with data from the Turkish Disaster Data Bank (TABB) and OECD.)	Page 1 Page 10 Page 20 Page 30 Page 40 Page 50 Page 60 Page 70 Page 80 Page 90 Page 100 Page 110 Page 120 Page 130 Page 140 Page 150 Page 160 Page 170 Page 178 Page 179 Page 180 Page 181 Page 182 Page 183 Page 184 Page 185 Page 186 Page 187 Page 188 Page 189 ->Page 190 Page 191 Page 192 Page 193 Page 194 Page 195 Page 196 Page 197 Page 198 Page 199 Page 200 Page 201 Page 202 Page 210 Page 220 Page 230 Page 240 Page 250 Page 260 Page 270 Page 280 Page 290 Page 300 Page 310