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short-term projects or programmes which may not be sustainable.

As currently defined, preparedness also seems challenged to address the increasingly complex multi-hazard and concatenated risks that now characterize large urban areas and regions (IASCWFP, 2014). The reality of risk in many contexts is now one of multi-dimensionality, which cannot be addressed through single-hazard contingency plans.

Finally, as highlighted in Chapter 6, with notable exceptions such as Mexico’s National Disaster Prevention Fund and dedicated budget lines in countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, most disaster management agencies rely heavily on emergency funding. As such, they are usually under-resourced for preparedness activities.

8.3 Business as usual or building

back better?

Even though recovery and reconstruction after disasters are an integral part of the disaster management cycle and of disaster risk reduction, the HFA does not provide detailed guidance to countries in this area. In comparison to other aspects of the HFA, global progress has been limited.

Improvements can be observed in integrating disaster risk reduction into post-disaster needs assessments and recovery frameworks. But in many situations, the willingness to build back better is quickly replaced by business as usual.

Post-disaster recovery: a continuing challenge

Most of the citizens of Guiuan were still asleep when a heavy storm hit the small city in the Eastern Samar province of the Philippines at 4.40 a.m. on 8 November 2013. Typhoon Haiyan was the strongest tropical cyclone in recorded history to make landfall in the Philippines; and landfall it made, a total of five times across the islands of Samar, Leyte, Cebu and Iloilo (Figure 8.3).10

Box 8.8 Disasters and simulacra: the experience of the Indian Ocean tsunami

That national plans don’t often match local realities is nothing new. However, in disaster response as in broader disaster risk management, the local diversity of conditions and needs are regularly overlooked as national visions can be skewed towards achieving humanitarian targets, including the distribution of assets such as boats (TEC, 2007

TEC (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition). 2007,Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report, Expanded Summary. John Cosgrave, ed. January 2007. London.. .

). After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, highly politicized or socially contentious issues such as land rights, tax laws and gender relations were poorly understood by relief agencies. These agencies often had no effective mechanisms in place to ensure local ownership and frequently treated affected countries as “failed states”, undermining local and national capacities by offering unsolicited and often badly designed support programmes (TEC, 2006

TEC (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition). 2006,Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report, J. Telford, J. Cosgrave and R. Houghton, eds. July 2006. London.. .

).

In contrast, international action was most effective in cases where local actors led response efforts and received appropriate support (TEC, 2007

TEC (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition). 2007,Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report, Expanded Summary. John Cosgrave, ed. January 2007. London.. .

). Unfortunately, the allocation of funds and staff was more often than not “driven by politics and funds, not by assessment and need” (ibid.). These politics were not only international; the international response to the tsunami was also severely hampered by indecisive and protective national and regional leadership (TEC, 2006

	165 short-term projects or programmes which may not be sustainable. As currently defined, preparedness also seems challenged to address the increasingly complex multi-hazard and concatenated risks that now characterize large urban areas and regions (IASCWFP, 2014). The reality of risk in many contexts is now one of multi-dimensionality, which cannot be addressed through single-hazard contingency plans. Finally, as highlighted in Chapter 6, with notable exceptions such as Mexico’s National Disaster Prevention Fund and dedicated budget lines in countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, most disaster management agencies rely heavily on emergency funding. As such, they are usually under-resourced for preparedness activities. 8.3 Business as usual or building back better? Even though recovery and reconstruction after disasters are an integral part of the disaster management cycle and of disaster risk reduction, the HFA does not provide detailed guidance to countries in this area. In comparison to other aspects of the HFA, global progress has been limited. Improvements can be observed in integrating disaster risk reduction into post-disaster needs assessments and recovery frameworks. But in many situations, the willingness to build back better is quickly replaced by business as usual. Post-disaster recovery: a continuing challenge Most of the citizens of Guiuan were still asleep when a heavy storm hit the small city in the Eastern Samar province of the Philippines at 4.40 a.m. on 8 November 2013. Typhoon Haiyan was the strongest tropical cyclone in recorded history to make landfall in the Philippines; and landfall it made, a total of five times across the islands of Samar, Leyte, Cebu and Iloilo (Figure 8.3).10 Box 8.8 Disasters and simulacra: the experience of the Indian Ocean tsunami That national plans don’t often match local realities is nothing new. However, in disaster response as in broader disaster risk management, the local diversity of conditions and needs are regularly overlooked as national visions can be skewed towards achieving humanitarian targets, including the distribution of assets such as boats (TEC, 2007 x TEC (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition). 2007,Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report, Expanded Summary. John Cosgrave, ed. January 2007. London.. . ). After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, highly politicized or socially contentious issues such as land rights, tax laws and gender relations were poorly understood by relief agencies. These agencies often had no effective mechanisms in place to ensure local ownership and frequently treated affected countries as “failed states”, undermining local and national capacities by offering unsolicited and often badly designed support programmes (TEC, 2006 x TEC (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition). 2006,Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report, J. Telford, J. Cosgrave and R. Houghton, eds. July 2006. London.. . ). In contrast, international action was most effective in cases where local actors led response efforts and received appropriate support (TEC, 2007 x TEC (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition). 2007,Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report, Expanded Summary. John Cosgrave, ed. January 2007. London.. . ). Unfortunately, the allocation of funds and staff was more often than not “driven by politics and funds, not by assessment and need” (ibid.). These politics were not only international; the international response to the tsunami was also severely hampered by indecisive and protective national and regional leadership (TEC, 2006 x TEC (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition). 2006,Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report, J. Telford, J. Cosgrave and R. Houghton, eds. July 2006. London.. . ).	Page 1 Page 10 Page 20 Page 30 Page 40 Page 50 Page 60 Page 70 Page 80 Page 90 Page 100 Page 110 Page 120 Page 130 Page 140 Page 150 Page 155 Page 156 Page 157 Page 158 Page 159 Page 160 Page 161 Page 162 Page 163 Page 164 Page 165 Page 166 ->Page 167 Page 168 Page 169 Page 170 Page 171 Page 172 Page 173 Page 174 Page 175 Page 176 Page 177 Page 178 Page 179 Page 180 Page 190 Page 200 Page 210 Page 220 Page 230 Page 240 Page 250 Page 260 Page 270 Page 280 Page 290 Page 300 Page 310