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Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011
Revealing Risk, Redefining Development
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1.4 Climate change adaptation


The challenge of adapting to climate extremes gives increased urgency to addressing underlying risk drivers, reducing vulnerability and strengthening risk governance capacities. If disaster risks can be reduced, then the magnifying effect of climate change will also be reduced, and adaptation will be facilitated. The contemporary tendency to characterize all weather-related disasters as manifestations of climate change underplays the role of the underlying risk drivers, and may point policy and planning in the wrong direction.


Climate change is gradually altering average temperature, sea level, and the timing and amount of precipitation, with potential for more drastic changes if carbon emissions are not successfully limited and reduced. Climate change also contributes to more frequent, severe and unpredictable weather-related hazards such as droughts, tropical cyclones, floods and heat waves (IPCC, 2007

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IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2007. Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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). Therefore, climate change adaptation can be understood as: (a) adapting to gradual changes in average temperature, sea level and precipitation; and (b) reducing and managing the risks associated with more frequent, severe and unpredictable extreme weather events, including those for which there may be no historic precedent.

Adapting to gradual changes in climate averages is a medium- to long-term process, involving long-term planning of investments in strategic infrastructure that take into account changing climatic conditions. For example, new hydroelectric plants and urban drainage systems need to account for future changes in rainfall, and investments in both urban and agricultural development need to take into account expected changes in water availability and rising sea levels.

However, the degree to which any society is adapted to its climate is socially constructed rather than environmentally determined (Berger and Luckmann, 1966

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Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. 1966. The social construction of reality. A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. Garden City, USA: Anchor Books.
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). Countries that may find it most difficult to adapt are likely to have fewer resources to invest in new infrastructure and technologies, have limited social protection systems in place, and experience food insecurity, high vulnerability to disasters and extreme trade limitations (GAR 11 paperCorrales, 2010

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GAR11 Corrales Leal, W. 2010. Overcoming trade and development limitations associated to climate change and disaster risk. Background paper prepared for the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR.

Click here to view this GAR paper.
).

As Box 1.4 highlights, it is worth remembering that until the 19th century, much of the population of pre-industrial Europe was maladapted to its climate, and as a result, suffered devastating famines. It was only with the technological and material changes that accompanied the industrial revolution that Europe became adapted.

Box 1.4 Adaptation and climate variability

Until the industrial revolution, the material and technological basis of agricultural production in Europe barely supported the subsistence needs of most households, even in years with good harvests. Climate variations such as colder and damper summers typically led to lower yields and crop losses, and were rapidly reflected in drastic increases in mortality, and decreases in marriages and births rates.

Agricultural productivity increased by approximately 60–65 percent between the 13th and 19th centuries (Braudel, 1979

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Braudel, F. 1979. Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme : XVe-XVIIIe siècle. Volume 1. Les structures du quotidien: le possible et l'impossible. Paris, France: A. Colin.
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, pp131-132), but Europe was still constantly devastated by famines. France, for example, experienced 89 major famines between the 10th and 18th centuries (Braudel, 1979

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Braudel, F. 1979. Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme : XVe-XVIIIe siècle. Volume 1. Les structures du quotidien: le possible et l'impossible. Paris, France: A. Colin.
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, p74), not including the likelihood of many hundreds of localized famines. Technological limitations meant that it was impossible to transport large volumes of food and energy over long distances (Harvey, 1996

x

Harvey, D. 1996. Justice, nature, and the geography of difference. Cambridge, USA: Blackwell Publishers.
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), and most urban centres were therefore dependent on their immediate hinterland for food and firewood. This not only limited their growth but made them as vulnerable as rural areas to shortfalls in agricultural production.

The failure of cereal harvests associated with climate variability had drastic demographic impacts. It is estimated that the population of France fell by 1.3 million in 1693-94, after several years with cold and wet summers devastated cereal production (Le Roy Ladurie, 2004

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Le Roy Ladurie, E. 2006. Histoire humaine et comparée du climat. Volume II. Disettes et révolutions (1740-1860). Paris, France: Fayard.
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, p480). The following century, 196 days of rain between December 1769 and November 1770 had equally disastrous impacts. The number of births in rural France fell from 896,000 in 1769 to 829,000 in 1771, the number of marriages fell from 232,000 to 175,000, and there were at least 100,000 famine-related deaths (Le Roy Ladurie, 2006

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Le Roy Ladurie, E. 2004. Histoire humaine et comparée du climat. Volume 1. Canicules et glaciers (XIIIe-XVIIIe siècle). Paris, France: Fayard.
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, pp48-49).

From the latter half of the 18th century onwards, famine risk was reduced by European industrialization and urbanization. Between 1772 and 1775, for example, British cereal imports increased by a factor of 26 (Le Roy Ladurie, 2006

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Le Roy Ladurie, E. 2004. Histoire humaine et comparée du climat. Volume 1. Canicules et glaciers (XIIIe-XVIIIe siècle). Paris, France: Fayard.
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, p75), buffering the impact of local production shortfalls.

The year of 1816 was the “year without a summer” in the Northern Hemisphere. On 10 April 1815, the Tambora volcano erupted in Indonesia. The resulting cold summer in Europe provoked failures in cereal production comparable with previous crises. However, the demographic impact in industrializing France was minimal, if compared to that of 1693-1694 or 1770-1771. In France, the number of deaths in 1817 was only 18,500 greater than in 1816 or 1818. In contrast, the increase in mortality in less industrialized regions of Europe may have been as high as 40 percent (Le Roy Ladurie, 2006

x

Le Roy Ladurie, E. 2004. Histoire humaine et comparée du climat. Volume 1. Canicules et glaciers (XIIIe-XVIIIe siècle). Paris, France: Fayard.
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, p303).


In the short term, however, climate risk will be shaped by existing risk patterns and increasing exposure of people and their assets, as much as by climate change itself (ECA, 2009

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ECA (Economics of Climate Adaptation). 2009. Shaping climate adaptation: A framework for decision-making. New York, USA: McKinsey & Company.
Available at http://www.mckinsey.com/App_Media/Images/Page_Images/Offices/SocialSector/PDF/ECA_Shaping_Climate%20Resilent_Development.pdf.
). From that perspective, the contemporary tendency to characterize weather-related disasters as manifestations of climate change underplays the role of the underlying risk drivers, and may point policy and planning in the wrong direction.

As with disaster risk management in general, the challenge of adapting to climate extremes requires increased attention to underlying risk drivers, reducing vulnerability, and strengthening risk governance capacities. If disaster risks can be reduced, then the magnifying effect of climate change will also be reduced and adaptation facilitated.


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