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Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2013
From Shared Risk to Shared Value: the Business Case for Disaster Risk Reduction |
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Patra, 2012 Patra, J. 2012.,Coasts, Ports and Communities: The Emerging Dynamics of Investment-Risk Interactions in Odisha, India., Coasts, Ports and Communities., Odisha,India.. Click here to view this GAR paper. Box 14.5 Investment-risk interactions in coastal India
Only six years after the occurrence of a category 5 cyclone in 1999, the Government of Orissa designated the coastal district of Jagatsinghpur to be the site for the largest FDI project in the history of India: a deal was signed with a South Korean company for the development of a major steel plant, mines, railway links and a captive port to exploit the state’s rich iron ore and coal deposits. The Memorandum of Understanding provided investors with a 100 percent tax exemption for five years—part of a recent initiative to further boost FDI inflows. Without a clear risk-sharing framework in place, the Government of Orissa was potentially taking on unlimited liabilities for future disaster losses. In addition to the social and environmental costs associated with the relocation of existing communities, the clearing of forests and farmlands and the loss of livelihoods for landless and fishing communities, the project would increase hazard exposure and probably act as a magnet for further risk-increasing development in the area. The controversial project has ignited protests from communities, the National Human Rights Commission and environmental agencies, forcing several reviews to be undertaken, most recently, in August 2012 by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The review resulted in environmental clearance for the project to be temporarily suspended; but the project remains a priority for both state and federal governments. in the country. As Figure 14.4 shows, this led to a significant increase of FDI flows starting in the mid1980s (Brimble, 2002
Brimble, M. 2002.,Foreign Direct Investment: Performance and Attraction. The Case of Thailand., Paper prepared for Workshop on Foreign Direct Investment Opportunities and Challenges for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in Hanoi, August 16-17, 2002., The Broer Group, PLC,. . But as Box 14.3 shows, success in attracting this investment led to a rapid increase in exposure of economic assets in flood-prone regions of the country (
Thampanishvong, 2012 Thampanishvong, K. 2012.,The Case of Thailand., Background Paper prepared for the 2013 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction., Geneva,Switzerland: UNISDR.. Click here to view this GAR paper. In Guangzhou, China, public incentives to attract investment have also contributed to increasing hazard exposure and disaster risks (Box 14.4).
On the western coast of India, in Jagatsinghpur District, more than 8,000 lives were lost and 230,000 homes destroyed during the 1999 Orissa Super Cyclone (
Patra, 2012 Patra, J. 2012.,Coasts, Ports and Communities: The Emerging Dynamics of Investment-Risk Interactions in Odisha, India., Coasts, Ports and Communities., Odisha,India.. Click here to view this GAR paper. In some countries, therefore, the role of governments has been contradictory to the stated objective of the HFA to achieve substantial reduction in disaster risk. This paradox reflects a broader tradeoff between rapid economic growth and risk reduction, which ultimately reflects national political priorities. If perceived additional costs of disaster risk reduction have been considered a barrier to invest-
ment flows, then many governments have prioritised growth over risk reduction. In other countries where vigorous economic growth has meant that expected annual losses from disaster (AAL) represent only a small proportion of annual capital formation (GFCF), governments may calculate that they have the capacity to absorb the risks. In this case, the implementation of policies to reduce disaster risks may be postponed until growth has lead to a high level of economic development.
At the same time, there is little evidence from any of the HFA progress reports since 2007 of the engagement of investment boards, trade ministries and private investors in national disaster risk governance frameworks. As a result, coordination between economic promotion and growth policies, on the one hand, and disaster risk management strategies, on the other hand, is absent.
This lack of coordination may be exacerbated by a limited capacity for assessing the costs and benefits of disaster risk reduction. For example, while 56 countries reporting through the HFA Monitor in 2013 note that costs and benefits of disaster risk and risk reduction are taken into account in the planning and operation of major development projects, only one third confirm that national science agendas and
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