Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2013
From Shared Risk to Shared Value: the Business Case for Disaster Risk Reduction


background image
202 Part III - Chapter 13
Governments are critical determinants of the role that insurance markets can play in managing disaster risk. Their interpretation of the social contract of the society they govern shapes the landscape of risk financing and risk management. To develop the insurance market, many governments play the role of regulator, framing how the market works, acts as reinsurer and, in some cases, directly sells insurance to citizens and companies. The latter has the potential to distort premiums, for example, when insurance is subsidised to increase penetration rates. Underpriced premiums that do not reflect risk levels do not provide incentives to invest in disaster risk reduction. When, in addition, governments act as insurers of last resort, this may encourage moral hazard and perverse incentives in favour of investment in hazard-exposed areas (GAR 13 paperNguyen, 2012

GAR13 Reference Nguyen, T. 2012.,Insurability of Catastrophe Risks and Government Participation in Insurance Solutions., Background Paper prepared for the 2013 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction., Geneva,Switzerland: UNISDR..
Click here to view this GAR paper.
). In addition, it exposes governments and ultimately taxpayers to losses, as in the case of the US National Flood Insurance Programme (NFIP), outlined in Box 13.1.
But there are also other successful insurance products where the premium does not directly reflect expected loss. For example, in the case of parametric insurance, the payout from insurance companies is related to the scale of a predetermined event, such as the severity of a storm and not to the
scale of the loss. Insurers can instantly calculate total payout amount after the trigger event and do not have to evaluate individual loss claims. Parametric insurance gives the insured incentives to invest in risk reduction, given that if losses are reduced they still receive the same payout. It also lets the insured decide how much risk they want to transfer.
If comprehensive risk, exposure and vulnerability models do not exist, as is often the case in many low and middle-income countries, parametric insurance may be easier to implement than conventional insurance. However, it still requires investment in the infrastructure to monitor hazard levels in a way that can produce credible and transparent estimates of the severity of each event. This investment is a prerequisite for the expansion of insurance penetration in low-income economies.
Regional approaches to disaster insurance can offer a solution by pooling not only risks but also resources across a greater area and number of actors. For example, in south-eastern Europe, the South Eastern Europe and Caucasus Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (SEEC CRIF) provides homeowners, farmers, enterprises and governments with access
Box 13.2 Catastrophe insurance in China
China’s insurance penetration is still comparatively low, particularly outside the agricultural sector. This is despite almost two decades of rapid economic growth, usually associated with significant growth in the insurance market (Ranger and Williamson, 2011

Ranger, N. and Williamson, S. 2011.,Forecasting non-life insurance demand in the BRICS economies: a preliminary evaluation of the impacts of income and climate change., Working Paper n°70. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy., Leeds and London,UK.. .
). Earthquake insurance penetration is only 3 percent across China (Wang et al., 2009

Wang, Z., Lin, T. and Walker, G. 2009.,Earthquake Risk and Earthquake Catastrophe Insurance for the People's Republic of China., Sustainable Development Working Paper Series, No. 7., Manila: Asian Development Bank.,. .
) and with typhoons and floods rises to only 5 percent (Swiss Re., 2008). Consequently, insured losses are usually low even following major disasters. After the Huaije and Yangtze River flooding in 2007, insurance claims only amounted to 6 percent of total estimated loss. And during the Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008, payouts made by the insurance industry only equalled about 1 percent of total losses (Lloyds, 2012

Lloyds. 2012.,Lloyd's Global Underinsurance Report., October 2012., London: Lloyds.,. .
).

Insurance regulation can trigger growth in insurance markets, but there are also other types of public policies and regulatory mechanisms that can result in increasing demand and facilitate the effective capital markets required for insurance to operate (Ranger and Surminski, 2011

Ranger, N. and Surminski, S. 2011.,A preliminary evaluation of the impact of climate change on non-life insurance demand in the BRICS economies., Working Paper n°72. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy., Leeds and London,UK.. .
). In China, although public policy is seen as a means to promote insurance in the agricultural sector, no similar approach exists to support development of insurance for the property sector. However, this may change in the coming years owing to continued and growing urbanisation—today, more than 44 percent of the country’s population lies in urban areas (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2009

Kamal-Chaoui, L., Leman, E. and Rufei, Z. 2009.,Urban Trends and Policy in China., OECD Regional Development Working Papers, 2009/1, OECD publishing, © OECD. doi: 10.1787/225205036417.. .
). In 2010, industrial and service sectors accounted for 89 percent of total GDPiii , which means that public policies on insurance and reinsurance as part of overall risk governance arrangements can be expected to change.

(Source: Surminski in GAR 13 paperOrie and Stahel, 2012

GAR13 Reference Orie, M. and Stahel, W.R. 2012.,UNISDR Case Study Report., Background Paper prepared for the 2013 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction., Geneva,Switzerland: UNISDR..
Click here to view this GAR paper.
)
Contact us  |  Disclaimer  |  Our Partners  |  References  |  Acknowledgements  |  PreventionWeb |  The Global Platform  |  © United Nations 2011.