
Community Resilience Building in Humanitarian Response; Insights from Crises Survivors and First Responders

“The further you leave people to fall, the heavier they are to pick up” (Crises Survivor, 2016)

By Rebecca Murphy, Mark Pelling, Simone Di Vicenz and Emma Visman
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper presents the findings and recommendations developed by the Humanitarian Response Strand of the Linking Preparedness, Response and Resilience in Emergency Contexts (LPRR) project. This paper outlines the recommendation and requests of the LPRR consortium’s local stakeholders, including crises effected beneficiaries, local partners and in country staff. The aim of this research and paper is to present the recommendations and perceptions made by local stakeholders (first responders and crises survivors) for how humanitarian response can be strengthened to enable (and not undermine) long term community resilience building.

The LPRR consortium is led by Christian Aid and includes Action Aid, Concern Worldwide, HelpAge, Kings College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld and World Vision. The countries of focus include Bangladesh, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan and the Philippines and cover a multi-risk profile. The LPRR’s project aim is to inform and improve consortium agency practice; resulting in more resilient communities.

This paper draws upon and takes forward the existing Linking Relief and Development Debate (LRDD) and acknowledges the fact that for decades, academics, practitioners and policy makers alike have grappled with how to better align humanitarian aid and longer term development. Reflecting on the challenges mapped out by the continuum and contiguum theories, this paper supports Macrae’s (2012) argument that resilience offers a new opportunity to bridge the gap and better align interventions.

What is new? What is our contribution to the debate?

Recent calls to re-open the debate and apply research to understand how resilience can offer the answer this ongoing debate has inspired this LPRR project and study.
The LPRR project identified two gaps in existing research:

1. A lack of knowledge that focuses on asking crises survivors and first responders their recommendations
2. A lack of systematic implementation and evaluation of practical recommendations

This paper maps out how the LPRR project has addressed both gaps and has been driven by the need to explore how resilience can be included in humanitarian response programming and what can be done in the preparedness phase to enable this.

Through a rigorous knowledge generation approach designed and implemented by Kings College London University, the LPRR project has critically analysed eight past humanitarian interventions. This specific approach has been designed to directly engage crises survivors and first responders in the debate. This study is one of the rare approaches which has specifically asked 327 crises survivors and first responders to draw upon their own experience and expertise to guide improved humanitarian programming.

Evidence from this research has identified six core recommended principles for strengthened humanitarian response that enables (and does not undermine) long term community resilience. It is important to note that this set of 6 core themes come as a package and should not be viewed independent of one another. Therefore, when putting the LPRR model into practice all core themes must be included. Furthermore, whilst this study explored what can be done in the humanitarian response phase, it also speaks to the preparedness phase to lay the enabling foundations of this approach.

**LPRR Six Core Principles**

1. Allow and enable the community to co-run the response
2. Where feasible, coordinate interventions and work with the government
3. Support community cohesion and establish effective two-way communication between crises survivors and implementing organisations
4. Address underlying causes of vulnerability: protect and prepare
5. Recognise psycho social support and
6. Livelihoods and savings

Consequently, these crises survivor and first responder driven themes guide a newly informed, practical model for utilising resilience to link preparedness, response and long term development. This paper discusses where these findings have come from.

*Beyond the humanitarian intervention*

Lastly, two additional recurring recommendations have been identified. These two recommendations include the need for a longer intervention timeframe and improved infrastructure and access to risk exposed communities.

Therefore, this paper also advocates for:
1. A longer amount of time working in the community for resilience informed humanitarian response. Humanitarian response should be informed by a previous period of preparedness and development intervention that lays the foundations to enable these six core findings to be implemented in an emergency response.

2. Government and development programmes to work together to improve infrastructure (particularly roads) to access to vulnerable and exposed communities and enable communities to be able to evacuate quickly and safely when risk exceeds capacity to adapt.

**Glossary**

**Absorb:** the ability to withstand shock (cope with shock(s))

**Adapt:** the ability to change behaviour and way of life with ever changing risk

**Capacity:** The combination of all the strengths, skills and resources to manage and reduce disaster risks and strengthen resilience (UNISDR).

**Crises Survivor:** an individual who lived through and experienced the specific crises that the LPRR project studied

**Community:** a collective group of at risk, exposed residents.

**Community Cohesion:** a feeling of ‘togetherness’, inclusion and unity felt by the community

**Disaster/Crises:** A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts (UNISDR)

**First Responder:** a (I)NGO worker responding to the crises and implementing the intervention

**Local knowledge:** Local and indigenous knowledge refers to the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings. For rural and indigenous peoples, local knowledge informs decision-making about fundamental aspects of day-to-day life (UNESCO).

**(I)NGO worker:** an individual employed by an (international) non-government organisation

**Preparedness:** The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current disasters. (UNISDR)

**Recovery:** The restoring or improving of livelihoods and health, as well as economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities, of a disaster-affected community or society, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better”, to avoid or reduce future disaster risk. (UNISDR)
Rehabilitation: The restoration of basic services and facilities for the functioning of a community or a society affected by a disaster (UNISDR)

Resilience: the capacity of a group of people - usually at the community level - to monitor, anticipate, respond to and manage both known risks and future uncertainties. It is the ability of a community or society, through incremental and transformational change, to absorb shocks, adapt to stresses and ‘bounce back better’ from both. (LSE, 2012)

Social Values: Values are a collection of ideas held by individuals and groups that guide behaviour and are a product of the culture they find themselves within. Values can be tied to religious, cultural and political beliefs.

Transform: the ability to radically change systems, structures and behaviour.

Vulnerability: the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards (UNISDR).

Acronyms
AAT Absorb, Adapt, Transform
CCA Climate Change Adaptation
DEPP Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Programme
DFID Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
EWS Early Warning Systems
FGD Focus Group Discussion
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
LPSS Linking Preparedness Response and Resilience
(I)NGO (International) Non-Government Organisation
KCL Kings College London University
LNGO (Local non-government organisation)
LRRD Linking Relief Response and Development
LSE London School of Economics and Political Science
1. Introduction

This paper presents the findings and recommendations of the Humanitarian Response Strand of the Linking Preparedness, Response and Resilience in Emergency Contexts (LPRR) project. It presents the recommendations and requests of the crises-affected people, local partners and in-country staff with whom the LPRR consortium agencies work. The overall objective of this research and paper is to present the recommendations and perceptions made by local stakeholders (first responders and crises survivors) for how humanitarian response can be strengthened to enable (and not undermine) long term community resilience building. The aim of this paper is to present and discuss the core learnings from the study conducted by the humanitarian strand of the LPRR project. It aims to communicate these findings to the LPRR consortium and wider humanitarian and development sector. Lastly, the six core themes mapped out in this paper aim to guide two pilot interventions in 2017. These two pilot interventions will attempt to practically implement the six core thematic areas and will be closely monitored and critically reflected on to evaluate the impact this approach can have on strengthening community resilience.

LPRR is a START Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP), Department for International Development (DfID) funded 3-year, consortium-led project, aimed at strengthening humanitarian programming for more resilient communities. The LPRR consortium is led by Christian Aid and includes Action Aid, Concern Worldwide, HelpAge, Kings College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld and World Vision. The countries of focus include Bangladesh, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan and the Philippines and cover a multi-risk profile. The LPRR’s project aim is to inform and improve consortium agency practice; resulting in more resilient communities.

This project is necessitated by the rising challenges of addressing the ever-increasing complexities of humanitarian crises. Evidence from this study illustrates that:

1. Resilience-informed approaches, which recognise and seek to address both structural and more immediate concerns, and consider risks across timeframes and decision making levels, can support practical linkages between long-term development and short term emergency response, and
2. A crisis can create opportunities to initiate or strengthen community-based, transformational resilience building.

This paper speaks to both the preparedness and humanitarian response phase of an intervention and presents the recommendations made by crises survivors and first responders on what approach should be taken and what activities should be included to harness these opportunities. If effectively operationalised, it is argued that this newly informed set of recommendations have the potential to bridge the gap between short term and long term interventions and pave the way for transformational community resilience building.

The contribution of this paper. What’s new?

- LPRR asks Crises Survivors and First Responders

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1 The LPRR project recognises the term ‘community’ as a collective group of at risk, exposed residents.
Through a rigorous knowledge generation approach designed and implemented by Kings College London University, the LPRR project has critically analysed eight past humanitarian interventions. This study is one of the rare approaches which has specifically asked 327 crises survivors and first responders to draw upon their own experience and expertise to guide improved humanitarian programming.

Evidence from this study has identified six core thematic areas:

1. Allow and enable the community to co-run the response
2. Where feasible, coordinate interventions and work with the government
3. Support community cohesion and establish effective two-way communication between crises survivors and implementing organisations
4. Address underlying causes of vulnerability: protect and prepare
5. Recognise psycho social support and
6. Livelihoods and savings

Consequently, these local stakeholder (crises survivor and first responder) driven themes guide a newly informed, practical method for employing a resilience framework to link preparedness, response and long term development. This paper will discuss where these recommendations come from and why they are so important to take forward.

It is important to note that this set of six core themes come as a package and should not be viewed independent of one another. Therefore, when putting the LPRR approach into practice all core themes must be included.

Furthermore, it is important to note that this paper recognises the ongoing disaster cycle and the process of the phases of development, response, recovery and rehabilitation. Humanitarian and development interventions are not linear and this paper aims to speak to both humanitarian response and the preparedness phase of development interventions. Therefore, whilst this paper speaks directly to the preparedness and humanitarian response phases, it is argued that these six themes should be kept in mind for all phases of the disaster cycle.
2. EXISTING LITERATURE: THE ACADEMIC & POLICY DEBATE

To successfully offer something new and practical to the debate, it is first important to critically review the existing body of work around the Linking Relief, Response and Development (LRRD) debate.

For decades, practitioners, academics and policy makers alike have struggled with how to better align short term humanitarian aid and longer term development to reduce vulnerability and chronic poverty (Mosel and Levine, 2014). This debate has shifted from perceiving disasters and humanitarian response as a linear progression, to understanding the cyclical nature of the disaster cycle. It has been a moral and technical debate spanning more than thirty years. Emergencies cost lives and livelihoods, they disrupt development and entail long periods of rehabilitation. Therefore, the idea of aligning development and humanitarian assistance seems to be simple and sensible (Buchanan & Smith, 1994). However, in practice the concept has proven to be very complex.

The debate began to gain significant attention in the 1980’s. Here, both practitioner and academics voiced the concern of a ‘grey zone’ between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development (European Parliament, 2001). Increasing critique around the humanitarian aid sector raised awareness that interventions had the potential to do harm as well as good. Combined with growing concern around dependency on aid, the sector began questioning the way in which humanitarian aid is delivered. In response to this, the LRRD debate explored this ‘grey zone’ or ‘gap’ between short term humanitarian response and longer term development initiatives. The idea that “better development can reduce the need for emergency relief; better relief can contribute to development; and better rehabilitation can ease the transition between the two” (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994:2) became increasingly popular throughout the sector.

Further to this a paradigm shift away from understanding disasters as ‘natural’ phenomena out of human control and towards the idea that disasters are socially and politically constructed by society’s failure to adapt to environmental risk introduced the ideas of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) (Pelling, 2011). Here, the idea of reducing community vulnerability through preparedness and adaptation reaffirmed the argument that international assistance had an obligation to ensure initiatives are sustainable and facilitate long term resilience building.

The current debate has had three traditional schools of thought and has transitioned from the relief continuum, the relief contiguum to the securitization of humanitarian interventions. However, this project supports a new school of thought, first presented by Macrae (2012) that community resilience building can be used underpin the entire disaster cycle, to practically link short term response and longer term development.

Continuum

The relief continuum is a ‘linear’ conceptualisation that focuses on developing methods for handing humanitarian aid over to development programmes. The continuum focused on a select event or crises and how to hand relief efforts directly over to longer term development initiatives (Lewis, 2001). However, challenges around what should be handed over, to whom and when led to the linear conceptualisation of the continuum being criticised for being
too simplistic and unsympathetic to the complexities and cyclical nature of such programming (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994).

**Contiguum**

In response to this critique, a paradigm shift introduced the idea of relief *contiguum*; which explores a more comprehensive and holistic model. The contiguum looks at going beyond just responding to a single shock. It focused on all disasters, all stages of post disaster response and recognised that linking relief and development needs to be about all events and non—events as well. It takes a Human Rights based approach and explores the idea of applying this more holistic approach to protracted crises, violent conflict and post conflict contexts.

**Securitization**

Critiquing the contiguum approach, Harmer and Macrae (2004) go on to introduce a new era of discussion around the LRRD debate where the increasing securitization of the aid sector resulted in more humanitarian actors engaging in protracted, ongoing crises. For example, the World Bank began receiving pressure to deliver assistance to ‘failed states’ and the global security context began to rapidly change with a greater focus on terrorism and increased amounts of aid funds supporting military humanitarian interventions (EC, 2001).

Here it is argued that the increasing focus on security policy and the need to bring together humanitarian aid and development has created a new environment for international assistance. An environment where the ever-increasing politicization of aid has increased scrutiny of the principle of humanitarian neutrality, impartiality and independence, compromising humanitarian actor security. For example, the Sphere humanitarian standards highlight the idea that the principle of impartiality should underpin all humanitarian work (Sphere, 2013). However, there also remains recognised difficulties in undertaking and consistently acting on objective needs assessment (Darcy and Hoffman, 2003). Further to this, whilst a greater focus on working in protracted crises has seen increasing innovation and cross disciplinary work; significant tactical and systemic problems still exist (Harmer and Macrae, 2004).

**Resilience**

In direct response to these challenges Macrae (2012) introduced the idea that resilience could offer a new opportunity to bring together the two types of international assistance. Resilience is thought to provide the opportunity for development initiatives to be designed to be flexible and innovative enough to include disasters, shocks, and preparedness and even integrate response in their country strategies. However, Macrae (2012) states that not enough research has been done to identify how this might work in practice.

It is important to note that in response to this ongoing debate, donors have sought to support aid agencies in improving their approach to humanitarian response, to enable flexibility to programming to allow emergency response to support longer term resilience building. For example DfID’s Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programmes, USAID’ flexible funding mechanisms and the ECHO/EU

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REAGIR program, to name a few, all understand the cyclical nature of crises and attempt to provide the flexible funding mechanisms to support preparedness as well as humanitarian response.

**Addressing a Significant Gap in Existing Work**

Recent calls to re-open the debate and apply research to understand how resilience can support a way of addressing this ongoing debate has inspired this LPRR project and study.

**The LPRR project identified two gaps in existing knowledge:**

1. A lack of knowledge that focuses on asking crises survivors and first responders their recommendations
2. A lack of systematic implementation and evaluation of practical recommendations

LPRR has addressed both gaps and has been driven by the need to explore how resilience can be included in humanitarian response programming as well as the preparedness phase. Addressing the first gap, the LPRR knowledge generation approach has been designed to directly engage crises survivors and first responders in the debate. Addressing the second gap, in May and August of 2017 the recommendations mapped out in this paper will be piloted; systematically rolled out and evaluated in two crises affected contexts.

2. **Knowledge Generation Approach**

To ensure academic rigour, the LPRR knowledge generation approach has been designed and implemented by the Centre for Integrated Research on Risk and Resilience (CIRRR) based at Kings College London University.

Here, two perspectives on resilience have been integrated; Bene et al’s (2012) Absorb, Adapt, Transform (AAT) resilience framework and the Interagency Resilience Working Group’s (2012) principles of resilience. Data collection applied a mixed method, purposive sampling approach. All data were thematically analysed through the qualitative data analysis software NVivo.

**Theoretical Framework**

LPRR defines resilience as: “*the capacity of a group of people - usually at the community level - to monitor, anticipate, respond to and manage both known risks and future uncertainties. It is the ability of a community or society, through incremental and transformational change, to absorb shocks, adapt to stresses and ‘bounce back better’ from both.*” (LSE, 2015).

Bene et al’s (2012) framework outlines a resilient system as one which is stable, flexible and able to cope with change and argues that resilience has three scales, the AAT: the ability to absorb shock (cope), the ability to adapt with risk and ability to transform. We use these categories to describe the intention and outputs of humanitarian actions. The IRWG (2012) propose 10 principles for resilience which describe mechanisms for delivering resilience that can encompass these three possibilities. For this project IRWG’s work has been focused into five core principles:

1. There is community involvement, incorporating social values and appropriation of local knowledge in resilience building projects
2. There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion and recognising that resilient systems take a cross-scalar perspective

3. The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is accepted with preparedness activities enabling flexibility to a range of future anticipated and unexpected hazards

4. There are spaces and places for continuous learning

5. A high degree of social and economic equity exists in systems. The non-equilibrium dynamics of a system are acknowledged to support ‘bouncing forward and better’. Any approach to building resilience should not work with an idea of restoring equilibrium because systems do not have a stable state to which they should return after a disturbance.

This background work sets the context within which resilience is understood as a set of aims and practical actions and was the basis for guiding conversations with survivors.

Methods

Data collection deployed three methods which allowed for triangulation of findings to draw out consistent messages:

1. Semi-structured interviews with key informants (8-10 respondents per case study)
2. Household interviews with community members (5-10 respondents per case study)
3. Focus group discussions (FGDS) with community members. The FGD’s included risk and resilience mapping as the primary data collection methods. (2 per case study including 8-12 respondents in each).

Sampling

The selection of eight past humanitarian crises was based on a number of criteria outlined in Table 1. Potential cases were gathered in consultation with consortium members who also made the final decision on case selection to provide a diverse portfolio of different types of crises (both natural hazards and conflict), contexts, timeframes (from recent humanitarian interventions to interventions implemented over a decade ago), length of interventions (from 6 months to 4 years), levels of media attention and geographic locations. The aim of exploring such a diverse range of case studies was to be able to develop a set of practical guidance that can be applied globally regardless of the context, location and type of humanitarian crises.

Within each case study, purposive sampling was adopted to identify and target specific respondents for interviews and FGDS. For the semi-structured interviews with field staff, respondents were selected based on who had worked directly on the humanitarian response. For the interviews and FGDS with crises survivors and community members, participants were selected to achieve a diverse mix of respondents which included beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (where a blanket approach of aid had not been taken), as well as a mixture of gender, age, (dis)ability and, if contextually appropriate, different ethnicities, castes and tribes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Hazard</th>
<th>Additional crises drivers</th>
<th>Year &amp; duration of humanitarian intervention</th>
<th>Context and impact of crises Variables</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines, Manila</td>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>Typhoon Ketsana</td>
<td>Marginalisation of urban poor, Lack of land rights</td>
<td>2010: 3 years</td>
<td>Context: Urban Crises Impact: Displacement, loss of housing, loss of livelihoods, loss of land rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines, Ormoc</td>
<td>HelpAge</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>Remote location, Poor access to area for emergency response, Livelihoods reliant on one crop (coconuts)</td>
<td>2014: 2 years</td>
<td>Context: Rural Crises Impact: Large scale loss of life, loss of housing, loss of livelihoods</td>
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<td>Kenya, Nairobi</td>
<td>World Vision &amp; Concern Worldwide</td>
<td>Food Insecurity</td>
<td>Poor seasonal rains and political insecurity surrounding the elections (2011-2012) pushed food prices up</td>
<td>2012: 6 months</td>
<td>Context: Urban, informal settlement Crises Impact: Increased malnutrition, in particular child malnutrition, increased rates of violent crime, prostitution and school drop outs</td>
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<td>Indonesia, Banda Aceh</td>
<td>Muslim Aid</td>
<td>Tsunami</td>
<td>Ongoing conflict between the government and GUM rebel group</td>
<td>2004: 4 years</td>
<td>Context: Peri – urban &amp; rural, protracted conflict Impact: Large scale loss of life, destruction of housing, infrastructure and livelihoods</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan, Sindh</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Floods</td>
<td>Government control over which locations international agencies were allowed to work in</td>
<td>2012: 3 years</td>
<td>Context: Rural Crises impact: Loss of life, loss of housing, loss of livelihoods</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia, Cacarica</td>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>Conflict &amp; Displacement</td>
<td>Lack of land rights</td>
<td>1998 – present 3-year project within long term, 20 year</td>
<td>Context: Rural, protracted conflict, Crises Impact: Loss of life, displacement, loss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Marginalisation of Afro Colombians
Ongoing conflict between government, paramilitary and rebel groups

Bangladesh, Patuakhali
Action Aid
Cyclone
Reoccurrence of seasonal floods and cyclones
2013: 3 year project
Context: Rural, women led response
Crisis Impact: loss of life, loss of housing, loss of livelihoods

DRC, South Kivu
Christian Aid
Conflict & Displacement
Ongoing conflict between government and rebel groups
Continuous displacement
2012: 9 months
Context: Rural, protracted conflict
Crisis Impact: Loss of life. Ongoing and recurrent displacement; loss of homes and livelihoods

Data Analysis
As previously explained, thematic results were obtained by testing transcribed data against the project’s core resilience principles and pathways derived from the IRWG (2012) and Bene et al (2012). Thematic areas that emerged from the data through recurring responses were also captured.

Challenges & Limitations
Several limitations were logged throughout the knowledge generation approach including:

1. A rapid knowledge generation approach (2-3 weeks of primary data collection per case study). This enabled a broad range of cases to be analysed and was a trade-off over depth of analysis. The sample size and breadth of respondents has allowed an indicative set of findings for each study.
2. The researcher’s affiliation with an (I)NGO(s) may have led respondents to edit their views. This was minimised by speaking with a range for stakeholders using mixed methods.
3. Language and cultural barriers are difficult to overcome, sensitive methods such as discussion were used when possible, structured interview guides also helped to minimise bias introduced by translation.
4. High staff turn-over and the loss of memory from local organisations.
5. Logistical issues such as accessing remote sites and obtaining visas has meant some of the most vulnerable populations were not as easy to include and may have been left out of the study.
These five constraints were felt across the studies and most severely in the DRC leading to a lack of data. This has resulted in less understanding of the intervention, community perception of resilience and meant that fewer recommendations and challenges were captured in the DRC, compared to the other case studies. For a more detailed and nuanced case by case reflection on the study’s limitations please refer to each individual case study.³

5. **WHAT HAVE WE LEARNT?**

This section presents local stakeholder⁴ views on:

1. The intention and direction of the humanitarian interventions
2. The quality of resilience programming within the humanitarian interventions
3. Core recommendations and challenges for resilience programming

This combined approach to the analysis of past humanitarian interventions is crucial because it allows the project to:

1. Understand how and where humanitarian interventions are already including principles of community resilience building in an immediate response,
2. Identify the gaps and map out what interventions are failing to do, and
3. Identify the recurring recommendations and challenges shared by respondents across the case studies

Table 2 and 3 describe the quality of resilience experienced in each case study. This is indicated by the extent of coverage for each resilience core principle derived from the IRLG work.

Key to table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Positive: included in project</td>
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<td>✗</td>
<td>Negative: Not included in project</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>Inconclusive: either not enough data or conflicting response leading to inconclusive result</td>
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³ Links to each case study can be found in the references.

⁴ Local stakeholders refer to the crises survivors, (I)NGO disaster responders and other local actors such as local government officials
Table 1: A visualisation of whether or not each principle was included in each case study

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<td>6. Pakistan</td>
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<td>7. Philippines: Haiyan</td>
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<td>8. Philippines: Ketsana</td>
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Table 2: Local stakeholders’ response to each principle

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bangladesh</td>
<td>Strong Component of project based on 37 respondents</td>
<td>1 disagreed</td>
<td>Perceived as negative &amp; challenged for transformation Based on 16 respondents. 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Inconclusive results 2 stated yes, 2 stated no</td>
<td>Strong and strengthened by project based on 34 respondents 2 respondents felt more could be done</td>
<td>Offered a little support based on 34 respondents 3 respondents stated government offered no support</td>
<td>Project Strengthened dialogue between community and government based on 29 respondents 5 state still poor relationship</td>
<td>Relationship between NGO and government is very limited Based on 8 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Prepared before crises but not for the scale of the crises The community is now very aware The project strengthened preparedness Based on 30 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Access to information has increased Based on 31 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Strong component of project Based on 37 respondents 1 disagreed</td>
<td>Respondents felt that the community has not yet returned to the conditions before the cyclone, particularly in terms of livelihood However: female position and opportunities in community improved Preparedness, awareness and access to information improved Based on 33 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Colombia</td>
<td>Strong Component of project</td>
<td>Based on 34 respondents</td>
<td>1 stated varying levels throughout the community</td>
<td>Integrated into project Based on 16 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Integrated into project Based on 26 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Strong and strengthened by project Based on 31 respondents 1 stated some tension within community</td>
<td>Strong and strengthened by project Based on 29 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Negative and cause of crises Based on 29 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Improved with project (national but not local) Based on 34 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Improved with project Based on 5 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Not Prepared before crises The community is now very aware The project strengthened preparedness Based on 14 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Access to information has increased 14 respondents 0 challenged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colombia

Strong Component of project
Based on 34 respondents
1 stated varying levels throughout the community

Integrated into project
Based on 16 respondents
0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.

Integrated into project
Based on 26 respondents
0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.

Strong and strengthened by project
Based on 31 respondents
1 stated some tension within community

Strong and strengthened by project
Based on 29 respondents
0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.

Negative and cause of crises
Based on 29 respondents
0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.

Improved with project (national but not local)
Based on 34 respondents
0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.

Improved with project
Based on 5 respondents
0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.

Not Prepared before crises
The community is now very aware
The project strengthened preparedness
Based on 14 respondents
0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.

Access to information has increased
14 respondents
0 challenged

Strong component of project
Based on 31 respondents
0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.

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<tr>
<td>3. DRC</td>
<td>Inconclusive Not enough data collected</td>
<td>Inconclusive Not enough data collected</td>
<td>Inconclusive Not enough data collected</td>
<td>Strong and strengthened by project Based on 5 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Strengthened by project Based on 5 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>No support other than army presence Based on 7 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion.</td>
<td>Inconclusive Not enough data collected</td>
<td>Inconclusive Not enough data collected</td>
<td>Low preparedness before crises Project increased awareness and preparedness Based on 12 respondents 4 challenge this disagreeing</td>
<td>Inconclusive Not enough data collected</td>
<td>Strong component of project Based on 16 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Unable to bounce back due to protracted conflict However, preparedness and awareness increased, women regained dignity and positively changed their position in society Based on 16 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Indonesia</td>
<td>Strong component of project</td>
<td>Strong component of Social Values</td>
<td>Strong component of Local Knowledge</td>
<td>Strong component of Community Cohesion</td>
<td>Strong component of Community Leaders</td>
<td>Strong component of Government Support</td>
<td>Strong component of Government Relationship with Community</td>
<td>Strong component of Government Relationship with (I)NGO’s</td>
<td>Strong component of Preparedness &amp; Aware</td>
<td>Strong component of Access to information</td>
<td>Strong component of Learning</td>
<td>Strong component of Bounce Back Better</td>
<td>Strong component of Bounce Back Better</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Kenya</td>
<td>Strong component of project</td>
<td>Strong component of project</td>
<td>Strong component of project</td>
<td>Strengthened by project</td>
<td>No support other than allowing NGO to work there</td>
<td>Strengthened by project</td>
<td>Strengthened by project</td>
<td>High awareness low agency to prepare</td>
<td>High access low agency to put into action</td>
<td>Strong component of project Based on 10 respondents</td>
<td>Unable to bounce back as project was too short (6 months) However, within project</td>
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### Case Study

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<tr>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
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<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
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#### 6. Pakistan

- **Strong component of project** Based on 34 respondents, 2 respondents challenge this disagreeing

- **Perceived as negative & challenged for transformation** Based on 28 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Included in project due to participation** Based on 9 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Strengthened by project** Based on 26 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Strengthened by project** Based on 7 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Government support available** Based on 11 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Government support available** Based on 7 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Relationship between community and government strengthened by project** Based on 26 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Communication between but does not support work other than permit organisation to work there** Based on 5 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Not prepared before flood. More aware and prepared now due to project** Based on 37 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Project increased access to information** Based on 7 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Strong component of project** Based on 32 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Bounced back better** Based on 30 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion

- **Situation improved with stronger community cohesion, reduced crime, reduced prostitution, reduced school drop outs, reduced hunger. However, when project stopped community slipped back** Based on 36 respondents, 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion
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<tr>
<td>7. Philippines: Haiyan</td>
<td>Low in immediate response but strong in rehabilitation Based on 5 respondents 1 disagreed and stated participation was low</td>
<td>Inconclusive Not enough data</td>
<td>Inconclusive Not enough data</td>
<td>Strong and strengthened by project Based on 21 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Strongened by project based on 5 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Provided some support 2 based on 9 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Project strengthened links between government and community Based on 8 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Prepared before crises but not for scale Project increased preparedness and awareness Based on 8 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Inconclusive Not enough data</td>
<td>Project increased access to information Based on 4 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Strong component of project based on 6 respondents 0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Not yet bounced back (too short time 2 years) However, role and position of elderly in the community improved. Old people’s access to health, income opportunities and social interactions</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Philippines: Ketsana</td>
<td>Strong component of project based on 37 respondents</td>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Strong component of project based on 28 respondents</td>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Strong and strengthened by project based on 10 respondents</td>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Strong and strengthened by project based on 6 respondents</td>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Complex; supportive local and non-supportive national (blamed community for crises, blocked community in for 3 months and revoked land rights) 24 respondents 7 no support from government</td>
<td>Project strengthened relationship through advocacy work based on 3 respondents</td>
<td>0 respondents challenged this with an alternative opinion</td>
<td>Project strengthened relationship through investment of government in information and climate forecasting based on 27 respondents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What does this show?

Table 1 gives a clear illustrative account of whether the five resilience principles were successfully included or present in each case study. Table 2 goes onto outline more detail around what respondents said, the number of respondents who said this, how many respondents disagreed and why some principles are harder to integrate into humanitarian response programming.

Both tables demonstrate that most of the resilience building principles have and are already being successfully integrated into humanitarian programming (principle 1, part of 2, 3 and 4). However, there are two core principles that appear more challenging to successfully implement. These include: (part of principle 2) working with the government and strong government support and (principle 5) the ability to ensure communities bounce back better.

Government Engagement and Support

It is felt by respondents that (I)NGOs fail to work with or through the government. Respondents felt that it is the government who should be protecting and preparing local stakeholders for future crises. Therefore, if the (I)NGO’s fail to include the government, they effectively take over the government’s role, allow the government to diminish their responsibility and fail to take the opportunity to strengthen governance systems. Therefore, respondents felt that (I)NGO’s can block the relationship between the community and government and worry that governments will not improve with (I)NGO’s taking on their responsibilities for them.

Considering this, respondents call for the need to work with and through the government in future humanitarian programming; to guide good governance and build government capacity; in both natural hazard and conflict contexts. In conflict contexts, respondents felt that humanitarian agencies have a responsibility to intervene and remind the government of their responsibility to civilians and their human rights. For example, in the DRC whilst the local government were involved in the intervention, the local government staff worked on a volunteer basis, lacking the capacity to properly support the project and lacking the ability to directly communicate to other levels of government. Furthermore, in Colombia, one of the major successes of the intervention was seen in the way in which Christian Aid and partners were able to record the human rights violation, hold the government to account in the international human rights courts and then go on to work towards repairing the relationship between the government and community members. It is felt that whilst each context is different and needs to adhere to the do no harm standards, humanitarian interventions can no longer hide behind their status of neutrality and have a moral obligation to engage with the government in all contexts.

Building Back Better

Secondly, except for Indonesia and Pakistan, respondents felt that past humanitarian crises response programmes have failed to enable the community to bounce back better. Whilst most projects had a positive impact on the community it failed to ensure long lasting improvements. Respondents identified two core reasons for this failure; a lack of time and a failure to address root causes of vulnerably. Firstly, respondents felt that more time was needed to embed and cement the positive impact that the intervention was having. Secondly, respondents felt that the
underlying root causes of vulnerability and exposure to risk had not been effectively identified or tackled. Here, respondents recommended the need to identify the core issues and advocate for them to be addressed through protection and human rights. In addition, respondents felt that it is important to do this from the very start of any humanitarian intervention and where possible in the preparedness phase before a crisis strikes. It is important to note here, that the majority of first responder and INGO staff and local partner staff respondents felt that it is a significant benefit to work in the area before a crisis hits to be able to implement preparedness activities and acquire a thorough understanding of the context and root causes of vulnerability.

Further to this, in the examples where respondents felt the community had effectively bounced back better, respondents felt that this was because the core power dynamics in the community had been addressed and marginalised groups had been empowered by the project. This had enabled the programme to support the marginalised to challenge and (re)shape their position and role in society (Women in Pakistan and Bangladesh, elderly in Ormoc, Philippines, rebel groups in Indonesia and the Afro-Colombian communities in Colombia). This had either increased equality and cohesion in the community (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines) stabilized conflict and displacement (Colombia) or shifted the context from conflict to peace (Indonesia). Therefore, respondents felt that taking an inclusion approach with a focus on gender, age (dis)ability and the excluded has been identified as a ‘way in’ for bouncing/building back better and strengthening long term community resilience.

AAT

Next, in Table 2, the intention or perhaps unintended direction of resilience programming from the perspective of local actors is presented. This is structured in relation to Bene et al’s (2012) Absorb, Adapt, Transform (AAT) conceptualisation of resilience. Ultimately, Bene et al (2012) outline a resilient system as one which is stable, flexible and able to cope with change. A resilient community is one which can absorb shock (cope) adapt to and transform with changes.
This table demonstrates that each case study has shown examples of where the community have absorbed shock and adapted to change. However, with the exception for the Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines’ Haiyan case study, there appears to be a lack of signs of transformational resilience building. It could be argued that this links directly to the previous table; where the respondents felt that there is a need to address root causes of power inequality, marginalisation and vulnerability. It also links to the idea that taking an inclusion based approach,
identifying root causes of vulnerability and advocating for change can provide the ‘way in’ and opportunity for long term, transformational resilience building.\(^5\)

**Crises Survivors and First Responders’ Perception of Resilience**

Next, to gain an understanding of what resilience means to local stakeholders, the study asked crises survivors for their perception of what it means to be a resilient community. The factors that underpinned resilience varied depending on the context and individual (for example the need for flood walls, secure income, land rights, early warning systems etc.) however, in 7 of the case studies (with the only exception being the DRC where there was a lack of data to verify) the crises survivors felt that resilience meant both independence and support when needed. Whether discussing community, household or individual resilience, crises survivors felt that resilience means having the skills and capacity to look after yourself whilst knowing how and where to ask for support when needed. It is important to note that respondents felt independence to be free from international support; not their own government. Good governance and a strong local and national government capacity are two aspects that respondents felt are required to become independent.

For a more nuanced understanding of each case study and communities’ perception of resilience please refer to the individual case study papers.\(^6\)

**Crises Survivors and First Responders’ Recommendations & Challenges**

Next, 327 crises survivors and first responders were directly asked what challenges they felt prevented the humanitarian intervention from building long term community resilience and what recommendations they think could strengthen future humanitarian interventions. Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the core recurring recommendation and challenges shared by respondents. It is important to note that this table only shows the recommendations and challenges that span over multiple case studies and by a large number of respondents. Whilst a much larger number of recommendations and challenges have been made throughout each individual case study; the fact that these specific recommendations and challenges have been shared in multiple contexts and by multiple respondents is the reason that they have been taken forward to shape the LPRR model.

It is important to note that when analysing the data sets, there was no distinct difference between crises responders and community members. Whilst the language used different slightly, both groups’ challenges and recommendations aligned. It could be thought that the high level of community participation in each intervention could be the cause of this. ‘Local stakeholder’ refers to both community members, first responders and other local actors who participated in the study such as local government officials.

Furthermore, it is also important to note that whilst the recommendations clearly reoccur across the case studies, there are fewer recurring challenges. This is felt to be due to a number of reasons. First, the challenges seem to be more context specific. Second, respondents where more reluctant to share negative opinions and explain challenges.

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\(^5\) This also links to the Christian Aid BRACED project where opportunities for transformation are being considered regarding gender and climate information services.

\(^6\) Links to each case study can be found in the references.
Respondents preferred giving recommendations. Further to this, it is felt that the challenges that do recur across the case studies, directly speak to the recommendations.

Lastly, it is also important to explain that whilst a snap shot of narrative and justification is presented, this paper cannot map out the extent of the nuances, examples and reasons surrounding each challenge or recommendation presented. This level of detail can be found in the individual case study reports.7

Table 3: Recurring Challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Number of case Studies</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Narrative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation or lack of power of a specific group in society</td>
<td>4 case studies</td>
<td>56 respondents</td>
<td>Respondents felt that unequal overall power and specific decision making power in society meant communities could not build back better: whether women, elderly or marginalised ethnic or economic group (Afro Colombian or informal settlers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict or insecurity in the community / area</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18 respondents</td>
<td>Respondents felt that a lack of security or ongoing conflict is a significant challenge for humanitarian response teams to access communities and implement projects in a participatory way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor access in and out of community and poor roads</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46 respondents</td>
<td>Respondents felt that remote location of communities and poor roads means humanitarian teams cannot access communities quickly or efficiently. Respondents also felt this increased the communities vulnerabilities because they cannot quickly evacuate when needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of trauma / the emotional, mental and spiritual impact of the disaster</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66 respondents</td>
<td>Respondents felt that the level of emotional, spiritual and mental impact means that community members are less likely to successfully participate in project activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents felt that the level of emotional, spiritual and mental impact meant that the community were
Lack of livelihoods and savings | 3 case studies | 54 respondents | Respondents felt that the lack of ability to earn and save a sustainable and secure income meant communities were unable to feel independent or look after themselves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Narrative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure psycho-social support is included in the response</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>118 respondents</td>
<td>Respondents felt that there is a need to ensure psycho-social support to address emotional, spiritual and mental impact of a crises and enable communities to actively take forward the opportunity that a disaster and intervention creates to be able to build back better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure response projects include a focus on livelihoods, secure income and savings</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>109 respondents</td>
<td>Respondents felt that livelihoods, secure income generating activities and the ability to save are crucial for resilience and are lacking in humanitarian response</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase the level of community participation and strengthen communication between (I)NGO’s and communities to build and not undermine community togetherness</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48 respondents</td>
<td>Respondents felt that strong participation, community togetherness and communication can reduce levels of stress, anxiety, feelings of powerlessness and tension throughout the community in a humanitarian response</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enable and allow the community to become organised and run the response</td>
<td>5 case studies</td>
<td>56 respondents</td>
<td>Respondents would like the community to run the response. Respondents felt that (I)NGO’s should prepare the community before a crisis occurs to be able to be the first responders and run the response themselves. This includes strong community organising and allows the community to be independent whilst sourcing out skills and resources to (I)NGO’s. This also addresses the communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Request to be Independent and where to ask for support</td>
<td>Tackle the root causes taking a ‘Rights based’ protection approach</td>
<td>4 case studies</td>
<td>35 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work closer with the government, build bridge between government and community and strengthen government’s capacity to protect and prepare the community for future crises</td>
<td>Work with the government, build bridge between government and community and strengthen government’s capacity to protect and prepare the community for future crises</td>
<td>5 case studies</td>
<td>42 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include a focus on DRR and preparedness training and over-all education</td>
<td>Include a focus on DRR and preparedness training and over-all education</td>
<td>4 case studies</td>
<td>35 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do the project for longer</td>
<td>Do the project for longer</td>
<td>3 case studies</td>
<td>24 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve roads and access to the community</td>
<td>Improve roads and access to the community</td>
<td>3 case studies</td>
<td>24 respondents</td>
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</table>
Taking this learning forward

LPRR has acknowledged all the challenges shared, reflected on the case study analysis and aims to take forward the recommendations that have been overwhelmingly identified in multiple case studies.

The case studies have allowed the LPRR project to:

1. Identify and assess a number of commonly-shared weaknesses of humanitarian interventions, which include (1) the lack of interventions ability to work with the government and (2) the lack of ability to build back better or demonstrate signs of transformational resilience.
2. Draw upon the strengths of interventions particularly where bouncing back better was achieved, and,
3. Identify a number of recurring recommendations made by crises survivors and first responders for how the resilience-building potential of humanitarian response could be strengthened.

In reflection of all the resilience principles, AAT framework and recurring recommendations and challenges, 6 core thematic areas for humanitarian interventions that can build long term community resilience have been identified.

Six principles

1. Allow and enable the community to co-run the response
2. Where feasible, coordinate interventions and work with the government
3. Support community cohesion and establish effective two-way communication between crises survivors and implementing organisations
4. Address underlying causes of vulnerability: protect and prepare
5. Recognise psycho social support and
6. Livelihoods and savings

It is felt that these six themes directly address the recommendations and challenges mapped out by the respondents. Whilst these six areas are by no means revolutionary, the combination of themes, applied to an immediate humanitarian response, whilst speaking to the preparedness phase, is new. Again, it is important to note that this set of 6 core themes come as a package and should not be viewed independent of one another. Therefore, when putting the LPRR approach into practice all core themes must be included.

5. DISCUSSION

In reflection of the findings, this section aims to outline some of the nuances and discussion around each thematic area.

i. **Allow and enable the community to co-run the response**

First, moving beyond community participation, respondents felt that humanitarian interventions should be run by those living at risk. The case studies have demonstrated that community participation and involvement is often weak at the start of a humanitarian response but increases throughout the intervention. A lack of participation
means risking fragmenting social cohesion, increasing survivors’ stress and anxiety and inappropriate or untimely aid being received.

Crisis survivors explain that they would like to be involved from the offset and empowered to run the intervention themselves, with the support of the international non-government organisations (INGO’s) and local non-government organisations (LNGO’s). Respondents felt that this would increase efficiency, ensure appropriate support and allow the community to take charge of their own future. This links directly to communities’ perception of resilience to have the capacity to be independent, whilst knowing how and where to ask for help. It also links directly to the Core Humanitarian Standards (1, 2, 3, 4, 7)\(^8\) which call for timely and effective response that does not create dependency but enables a culture of participation, communication and ongoing feedback. Respondents call for shift in roles and systems to allow the local stakeholders (community) to run the response whilst including participation from the (I)NGO’s.

For example, in the Philippines, the survivors explained that they had already started responding to the crises long before the INGO and LNGO partners arrived and felt if they had been allowed to be in control of running the response project then it would not have suffered the long delays that they experienced in receiving aid. Secondly, field staff in Indonesia explained that the way in which the INGO’s and LNGO’s disseminated aid after the 2004 Tsunami has created a culture of dependence to the point where community members will not even participate in a community meeting without some form of financial incentive. Furthermore, respondents felt that if an intervention can enable the community to prepare before a crisis and organise preparedness through an inclusion approach, the opportunity for the most vulnerable and marginalised in a community to challenge their position in society can be created. Once the root causes and issues that (re)produce vulnerability have been identified, local actors can work together to strategize how these vulnerabilities can be directly addressed immediately after a crisis. This recognises the social and political space a disaster creates to challenge societal inequality and calls for preparedness and human right protection to align to utilise this opportunity for the community to bounce back better.

For example, in the Bangladesh case study, the way in which women were empowered to lead the humanitarian response enabled them the opportunity to challenge the social norms that (re)enforced their marginalisation and they effectively recreated their role and place in the community. In addition, including both inclusion and preparedness enables the six core themes to address the full disaster cycle; before, during and after a crisis.

\(\text{ii. Where feasible, coordinate interventions and work with the government}\)

Next, respondents felt that interventions should be coordinated better. A number of participants called for just one organisation to work in the community, avoiding the confusion, anxiety and duplication that multiple actors can create. Respondents differed on whether this coordinating body should be one humanitarian agency or their own government. For example, this can be seen in the Indonesian case study where, after the 2004 case study, the

\(^8\) The CHS can be found in appendix 1
government set up a regional disaster response unit which now coordinates all humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, this directly links to the previous request for survivor communities to be allowed to run the response themselves and supports the call to shift the roles and systems to enable communities to lead the response, with participation from (I)NGO’s.

Linking to this, respondents felt that all interventions should be designed to coordinate and work with all levels of the government. Respondents felt that the reason they were faced with a disaster is because their government were unable or unwilling, for whatever reason, to uphold their responsibility of protecting them. Therefore, to build long term resilience, humanitarian interventions should both encourage governments to take responsibility and support governments to build their capacity to do so. It is important to note that the approach and level of government involvement differed depending on the case study and relationship between the government and the community. On the one side, respondents felt that a lack of capacity in the local and national government should be supported by humanitarian interventions. On the other, where governments are the cause of the crises and are deliberately marginalising specific groups in society, respondents felt that the humanitarian intervention should support the community to document human rights violations and remind the government of international human rights. This approach was particularly successful in Christian Aid’s Colombia case study and can also be seen through the ICRC’s approach to humanitarian intervention.

iii. Support community cohesion and establish effective two way communication between crises survivors and implementing organisations

Respondents felt that social cohesion and community togetherness is something that has been perceived in all case studies as an essential attribute required for resilience. Respondents also felt that both the disaster itself and humanitarian interventions have the potential to change social dynamics, whether temporarily disrupted, strengthened or undermined. For example, in the Philippines’ Ketsana case study, whilst the initial community response to the crises was felt to increase social cohesion, as people came together to help one another, the humanitarian intervention was felt to reinforce community divisions that existed before the crises. For example, there were two ‘rival’ housing associations receiving different humanitarian support from different humanitarian interventions. Tension between the two programmes was highlighted by a number of participants. Furthermore, Indonesia social cohesion is thought to have weakened because people no longer felt like they need to support each other. Alternatively, in Colombia the way in which the project was run is felt to have increased social cohesion, community organisation and political power.

In addition, respondents have pinpointed poor communication as a cause of some of the negative impact on community cohesion caused by a humanitarian intervention. Therefore, respondents felt that effective, two-way communication between the community and humanitarian organisations is an essential aspect of a humanitarian response. Respondents felt that clear, consistent, two-way communication would reduce the risk of programmes creating tension, reducing social cohesion and creating feelings of confusion and disempowerment throughout the community.
For example, in both case studies in the Philippines, crises survivors explained that they did not know when the INGO’s and LNGO’s were coming, what they were going to do, how long they were going to be there or who in the community they would support and why. This was felt to lead to increased levels of anxiety and stress. Survivors would continuously look out for visitors, be afraid of missing the day that aid workers came to the community and be afraid of being excluded from the project. This was felt to impact on community cohesion, cause fractions in communities and create feelings of competitiveness and distrust. This again, links to, and calls for a shift in roles and systems to allow the community to prepare for and run the response. In addition to this, the need to involve all actors in communication: local and national government, local organisations and international organisations is also recognised.

Furthermore, linked to community cohesion and good communication, respondents have identified a second opportunity for inclusion and challenging the social dynamics that (re)enforce marginalisation. Whilst, respondents felt that disasters and humanitarian work have the potential to challenge and change the power dynamics of a marginalised group within society (whether gender, age, (dis)ability or a specific ethnic group); how this is done is felt by respondents to have a significant impact on social cohesion. If done sensitively and inclusively this can be very positive. However, if done without care this can cause fractions and divisions within the community and household.

For example, in Bangladesh the way in which the intervention was designed and implemented allowed women to safely challenge their position in society. In the Philippines, the Haiyan response allowed elderly people to safely challenge their position in society and in Colombia, the community-run conflict response has allowed the Afro-Colombian people to denounce abuse and demand human rights.

Finally, in the DRC, field staff specifically included cohesion strengthening activities in the project design through community activities such as football matches and meetings which could bring everyone together.

iv. Address underlying causes of vulnerability: protect and prepare

Next, respondents called for the need to tackle root causes of vulnerability from the offset. These root causes differ in each case study depending on the context. However, whether the root cause is felt to be a lack of land rights, lack of preparedness, lack of sustainable livelihoods or lack of ability to save surplus in preparation of a crises, to name a few; respondents felt that a lack of independence or empowerment and societal inequalities (re)produce vulnerability and limit resilience building. Ultimately this is felt to focus on challenging the unequal power dynamics within society that (re)produce and (re)enforce poverty. Specifically, power mapping and advocacy to challenge inequalities is recommended.

Therefore, respondents felt that transformational resilience requires tackling these root causes and the power structures that (re)enforce them. Field staff explained that the most effective way to approach this is by advocating for protection and human rights directly after a crisis. The disaster creates a new opportunity, a political space for crises survivors’ protection and human rights to be reviewed, reflected on and fought for. It is felt to be a moral obligation for all interventions to utilise this opportunity and improve crises survivors’ fundamental quality of life
and it could be argued that this focus on preparedness and protection provides the strongest opportunity to align preparedness, response and longer term development interventions.

In the case studies where this has been successful, advocacy meant providing support for local groups to come together, organise and carry out their own campaign (Colombia and the Philippines, Ketsana) again enabling the community to run their own intervention.

Furthermore, it is important to note that this thematic area speaks directly to the World Humanitarian Summits’ 2016 Grand Bargain which recognizes the need to enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors, to ‘shrink humanitarian needs’ and ‘invest in durable solutions’ while not ‘deviating from humanitarian principles’.

v. **Recognise psycho social support**

Next, wellbeing and mental health have been highlighted by respondents as an essential component of individual, household and community resilience. Respondents felt that the emotional, spiritual and mental impact of the crises can significantly limit the ability for communities to bounce back better after a crisis.

For example, in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, respondents explained that the level of distress that the survivors had experienced meant that a high number of survivors struggled to speak or partake in reconstruction and livelihood programs. Furthermore, survivors felt that the most valued piece of aid received were the psycho-social support mechanisms. This was echoed in the Philippines post typhoon Haiyan. Whilst in Nairobi survivors of sexual abuse and rape explained that the lack of psycho-social support and lack of a faith leader meant that they struggle to come to terms with why they were attacked. This, in turn is felt by respondents to have impacted their self-worth and lead to a high number of survivors turning to prostitution to make enough money to feed their families.

It is noticeable that both conflict response interventions in Columbia and the DRC already had psycho-social support as a fundamental component and was identified by respondents as a core strength of both programs. It is important to note that this study has not asked respondents why they think humanitarian interventions in conflict contexts already include psycho-social support in programming and humanitarian response to natural hazards do not.

However, in reflection of this fact, it is felt that this could be linked to the level of protection work that occurs in conflict response contexts and the focus this has on international human rights laws which is arguably stronger in a conflict context than emergencies triggered by natural hazards.

vi. **Livelihoods and savings**

In addition, respondents strongly argued for the importance of capacity building on livelihoods and savings. Respondents explained that a focus on sustainable livelihoods is often something missed in humanitarian response programs. Respondents felt that communities cannot bounce back better unless there can independently earn enough to save a surplus of money and resources which can act as a safety net in the event of a future crisis.

For example, in one community in Banda Aceh it is felt by survivors that the community are worse off economically as their livelihoods have never recovered. The survivors were unable to return to their previous livelihood of farming
as the land had been contaminated by the tsunami and the coastal road that brought trade to their community has been diverted. It is felt by respondents that the humanitarian interventions had failed to support them to find an alternative income.

In Colombia, DRC, Kenya and the Philippines crises survivors felt that livelihoods are the most important aspect of building back post crises and want to be able to save money and food surplus in-order to reduce the stress and anxiety of being faced with a future disaster.

Within the focus on livelihoods, a combination of cash for work, cash transfers and cash loans were the majority recommended method proposed by respondents. However, again, it is felt important to allow the community to decide the style of cash based intervention and then support the community to implement it in this way. For example, in the Philippines Ketsana response, respondents stated that at the time of the response they wanted the cash to be given to them as a loan that could be paid back, instead of an unconditional grant. Respondents felt that households would have taken the livelihoods trainings and capacity building more seriously and developed more sustainable livelihoods if they thought that they would have to pay the grant back. However, respondents said that the local partner explained how the donor could not implement on a loan basis. The community went on to establish a community bank whereby those who could pay the money back, paid into a communal fund for future crises. However, it was felt that more would have paid it back if it was communicated as a loan from the offset; thus strengthening longer term community resilience to future risk.

**Beyond the humanitarian intervention**

Lastly, two additional recurring recommendations were presented in the results tables and have been made by crises survivors and first responders. It is felt that these two additional recommendations fall under recommendations for the donor and development side of intervention yet have the potential to create the conditions required for humanitarian interventions to effectively build long term community resilience. These two recommendations include the need for a longer intervention timeframe (including preparedness) and improved infrastructure and access to risk exposed communities.

Therefore, this paper also advocates for:

3. A longer amount of time working in the community for resilience informed humanitarian response. Humanitarian response should be informed by a previous period of preparedness intervention.

4. Government and development programmes to work together to improve infrastructure (particularly roads) to access to vulnerable and exposed communities and enable communities to be able to evacuate quickly and safely when risk exceeds capacity to adapt.

**Reflections**

Whilst this paper sets out the findings are core challenges and recommendations made by crises survivors and first responders, it is felt important to reflect on a number of challenges that will need to be addressed in putting these recommendations into action.
First, in allowing the community to run the response, interventions need to first understand how the community works, the existing power dynamics and marginalisation and design a method which can allow the community to run the response whilst ensuring inclusion, do no harm and adherence to the Core Humanitarian Standards. Exactly how interventions can do this will be guided by the Local 2 Global protection initiative.\(^9\)

Secondly in working with the government it is important to distinguish the difference levels of government and ways of working depending on the context. Clearly, conflict contexts have a heightened sensitivity of working with the government and whether or not the interventions can directly integrate the government into an intervention and build capacity or whether the focus is on protection and human rights advocacy to the government, will differ case by case. Here, this humanitarian approach seeks to integrate the LPRR conflict strand methodology and adopt the micro and macro conflict analysis before project implementation.

Next, how preparedness and protection can be integrated to link longer term development work and humanitarian interventions needs to be better understood. Again linking to the conflict strand of the LPRR project, it is felt that an initial micro and macro conflict analysis can map both preparedness and protection actions that need to take place before, during and after a crises.

Lastly, the different levels of psycho-social support need to be identified and awareness throughout the UK humanitarian sector needs to be built. When exploring what crises survivors and first responders meant by psycho-social support; responses varied. From small scale community self-help groups, to psychological first aid and referrals for more clinic trauma based support. It has been observed that the humanitarian sector shows a level of wariness towards psycho-social support and it is felt important to break down what is meant by psycho-social support and explain that humanitarian interventions can include this in their response even if they do not have in house expertise on psychological support.

**Conclusions**

In conclusion, this paper offers a practical approach for initiating or strengthening community resilience in an immediate humanitarian response and better link to longer term development. This new approach has been informed by the local stakeholders, specifically the consortiums’ crises survivors (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) and first responders (field staff and local partners). Whilst the six individual thematic areas are by no means revolutionary, the combination of themes, applied to an immediate humanitarian response, whilst also speaking to the preparedness phase is new.

Through a rigorous knowledge generation approach, developed and implemented by Kings College London University, 329 crises survivors, first responders and key stakeholders have been engaged with.

This study has presented local stakeholders’\(^{10}\) views on:

1. The intention and direction of the humanitarian interventions

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\(^9\) [http://www.local2global.info/](http://www.local2global.info/)

\(^{10}\) Local stakeholders refer to the crises survivors, (I)NGO disaster responders and other local actors such as local government officials
2. The quality of resilience programming within the humanitarian interventions
3. Core recommendations and challenges for resilience programming

Further to this, the combined approach to the analysis of past humanitarian interventions allowed the project to:

1. Understand how and where humanitarian interventions are already including principles of community resilience building in an immediate response,
2. Identify the gaps and map out what interventions are failing to do, and
3. Identify the recurring recommendations and challenges shared by respondents across the case studies

Ultimately, in doing so, six core recommendations have been made for how future interventions should be designed and implemented to build transformational community resilience and link short term humanitarian response with longer term development.

**Six LPRR principles**

1. Allow and enable the community to co-run the response\(^\text{11}\)
2. Where feasible, coordinate Interventions and work with the government
3. Support community cohesion and establish effective two-way communication between crises survivors and implementing organisations
4. Address underlying causes of vulnerability: protect and prepare
5. Recognise psycho social support and
6. Livelihoods and savings.\(^\text{12}\)

Furthermore, whilst these speak directly to the preparedness and response phases, they should be included in all phases of the disaster cycle. Ultimately this paper argues that the gap between short term and longer term programming can be addressed and the conditions required for transformational resilience building can be created by preparing at risk communities and existing first responders to have the capacity to run a response through this newly informed approach and set of activities.

Furthermore, two additional recommendations have been identified for longer term development. First, the need for a longer amount of time working in the community for resilience informed humanitarian response is required. Humanitarian response should be informed by a previous period of preparedness and development intervention. Secondly, for this to work efficiently, government and development programmes need to ensure roads are developed and maintained to enable vulnerable communities and external access to travel in and out of the area.

**Next Steps & Pilots**

Next, the LPRR consortium will work with existing experts in these thematic areas to develop a training package on this model. Then the project aims to pilot this in two crises-prone contexts: in Myanmar, ahead of the principal rainy season, and in Kenya ahead of the drought season and following poor preceding rains.

\(^{11}\) One organisation already piloting this is Local 2 Global: [http://www.local2global.info/](http://www.local2global.info/)

\(^{12}\) One initiative already addressing this is the EMMA toolkit: EMMA [http://www.emma-toolkit.org/](http://www.emma-toolkit.org/)

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These two sites have been selected due to Christian Aid’s ongoing work here, the seasonal, cyclical nature of the crises in these locations and the level of available funding that Christian Aid and the LPRR project has for these two countries. Initial proposals for this training package involved partnering with Local 2 Global Protection¹³ and Church of Sweden¹⁴ to strengthen the LPRR technical capacity. A separate paper will be developed outlining, monitoring and evaluating this pilot phase. It is important to recognise that this piloting phase is limited due to the amount of time and resources available for the final phase of the LPRR project and assumption that a humanitarian crisis will occur in the timeframe. Therefore, a further period of piloting, across multiple scales and a longer timeframe is recommended. For more information on this pilot phase please contact the LPRR project team.¹⁵

Lastly, a final training package will be developed based on a critical evaluation of the pilots and rolled out throughout the consortium and beyond.

¹³ http://www.local2global.info/
¹⁴ https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/churchofsweden/what-we-do
¹⁵ Becky Murphy at rmurphy@christian-aid.org or Simone Di Vicenz at sdivicenz@christian-aid.org
Appendix 1: Core Humanitarian Standards

Communities and people affected by crisis

1. Humanitarian response is appropriate and relevant.
2. Humanitarian response is effective and timely.
3. Humanitarian response strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects.
4. Humanitarian response is based on communication, participation and feedback.
5. Complaints are welcomed and addressed.
6. Humanitarian response is coordinated and complementary.
7. Humanitarian actors continuously learn and improve.
8. Staff are supported to do their job effectively, and are treated fairly and equitably.
9. Resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended purpose.
REFERENCES


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