



National Coordinator for Security and
Counterterrorism
Ministry of Security and Justice

National Manual on Decision-making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands



Foreword

This brochure consists of two parts.

The first part contains the full text of the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee Establishment Order 2013, approved by the Cabinet and which is in force per 25 April 2013. The Order sets the current agreements on the organisation and operation of the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (MCCb). The Commission shall decide on a coherent approach to the whole range of measures and facilities provided by central government working together with other organisations - in readiness for, during and as a follow-up up to intersectoral crises in which national security is at risk.

The second part contains the full text of the National Manual on Decision-making in Crisis Situations (NHC), as adopted by the Cabinet. The National Manual is a further implementation of the Establishment Order and presents the main points of central government's generic crisis management policy and the national management structure in place to respond to crises.

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**Order of the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs, of 12 April 2013,
no. 3122643, establishing the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee**

(Government Gazette 24 April 2013, no. 11207)

The Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs,
acting in accordance with the view of the Cabinet;
taking into account article 25, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure for the Cabinet,

Orders:

Article 1

A Ministerial Crisis Management Committee is to be established.

Article 2

The task of the committee is the coordination of intersectoral crisis management and decision-making on a coherent approach to it.

Article 3

1. The Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs and the Minister of Security and Justice are permanent members of the committee.
2. The Minister of Security and Justice is chair, unless the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs decides to occupy that role.
3. After consulting with the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs, the chair will determine on the basis of the situation and if necessary the meeting at hand, which of the other ministers concerned will be members of the committee.
4. The state secretaries may participate in meetings of the committee in an advisory capacity, where the matters at hand directly concern their responsibilities.
5. The committee will not appropriate any powers from any minister and will not take decisions on matters that particularly concern a minister who is not present at the meeting.
6. In the event of a minister's temporary absence from the committee the deputisation arrangement will apply.
7. If the Minister of Security and Justice and the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs are unable to be present, the Deputy Prime Minister will chair the committee.

Article 4

1. If it is necessary to take a decision by vote, the decision will be based on a simple majority, in which each minister in attendance has a single vote. In the event of a tie, the chair will have the casting vote.
2. The secretary will ensure that a list of decisions requiring the approval of the Cabinet is drawn up as quickly as possible. With regard to decisions that need to be implemented without delay, no prior approval of the list of decisions is required.

Article 5

On the recommendation of the chair the committee will appoint a civil servant working at the Ministry of Security and Justice as its secretary.

Article 6

The Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (Establishment) Order 2012 (Government Gazette 2012, 9310) is repealed.

Article 7

This order will enter into force one day after the date of publication of the Government Gazette in which it is published with explanatory notes.

Article 8

This order may be cited as the: Ministerial Crisis Management Committee Establishment Order 2013.

This Order will be published in the Government Gazette with explanatory notes.

The Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs,

M. Rutte

Explanatory notes

General

Pursuant to article 25, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure for the Cabinet, the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (MCCb) can meet in situations in which the coordination of intersectoral crisis management and decision-making on a coherent approach to it at political/governmental level are necessary. The organisation and procedures of the Ministerial Committee and arrangements for advice and support from the civil service are elaborated and described in further detail in the National Manual on Decision-Making in Crisis Situations, which was adopted by the Cabinet at the same time as this order establishing the Ministerial Committee.

Article 2

The Ministerial Committee will decide on a coherent approach to the whole range of measures and facilities provided by central government working together with other organisations – in readiness for, during and as a follow-up to intersectoral crises in which national security is at risk. National security is at risk if the vital interests of the State and/or society are threatened to the extent that there is actual, or potential, disruption to society. This may involve disruption to vital infrastructure (e.g. electricity, IT, telecommunications, water), floods, infectious diseases, animal diseases, a nuclear incident or an actual or threatened terrorist attack.¹ A coherent approach is necessary because the uncoordinated exercise of powers can be inefficient and even counterproductive.

The ministers concerned will exercise their powers in accordance with the decisions of the Ministerial Committee. The Committee will not appropriate any powers from any minister or take decisions on matters that particularly concern a minister who is not present at the meeting. For instance, no decisions will be taken on defence personnel or equipment in the absence of the Minister of Defence. Decisions will be implemented by the minister or ministers who is/are entirely or primarily responsible.

If there is reason to do so, the Ministerial Committee will coordinate the preparation of a plan of action as a follow-up to an intersectoral crisis. The Minister of Finance will be involved in drawing up such a plan. Decision-making on the plan will take place in the Cabinet.

The Ministerial Committee may decide to announce the application of 'GRIP Rijk' in situations in which national security is or may be at risk and central government control is required.²

¹ National Security Strategy, Parliamentary Papers II, 2006-2007, 30 821, nos. 1 and 3.

² A table setting out the Coordinated Regional Incident Management Procedure (GRIP) system along with explanatory notes is incorporated as Annexe B to the National Manual on Decision-Making in Crisis Situations.

Article 3

In situations in which the coordination of intersectoral crisis management and decision-making on a coherent approach to it are necessary, the Ministerial Committee can meet. Having consulted the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs, the chair will invite other ministers to take part in the committee meeting if their presence is essential or particularly desirable in view of the nature of the crisis. If the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs has already decided to occupy the role of chair, he will ask the Minister of Security and Justice to issue the invitations.

The chairing of the Ministerial Committee by the Minister of Security and Justice stems from the Crisis Management Policy Plan 2004-2007 (Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 668, nr. 1), in which the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations was appointed as the coordinating minister for crisis management. The Ministerial Reorganisation (Security) Order of 14 October 2010 (Government Gazette 2010, 16528) transferred this responsibility to the Minister of Security and Justice. This minister is responsible for the organisation, functioning and coherence of crisis management policy, and for coordinating an integrated approach to it and the associated system.

Article 4

The Ministerial Committee was established to improve the effectiveness and clarity of crisis decision-making at national level. Article 4 ensures that the decision-making referred to in article 2 proceeds as efficiently as possible. In the event of a tie the chair will have the casting vote. Like the list of decisions of a cabinet subcommittee, the list of decisions of the Ministerial Committee requires the approval of the Cabinet. Since decisions of the Ministerial Committee often cannot be delayed, it is provided that approval in such cases will not be a condition for implementation of the decisions that have been taken. The Ministerial Committee receives advice at senior civil service level from the Interdepartmental Crisis Management Committee (ICCB), chaired by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). The ICCB advises the chair of the MCCB on convening the committee on a case-by-case basis and then on the preparation for, response and follow-up to intersectoral crises and decision-making on a coherent approach to such crises.

The Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs,
M. Rutte

National Manual on Decision-making in Crisis Situations

I Introduction

1. It is the task of the government to safeguard and promote the independence, integrity, safety, stability and prosperity of society. Accordingly, one of its duties is to prevent crises where possible, and to act quickly and effectively when a crisis does occur.
2. The Government has appointed the Minister of Security and Justice as coordinating minister for crisis management. He is responsible for devising and implementing a coherent, integrated crisis management policy and crisis management system.
3. This National Manual on Decision-Making in Crisis Situations (*Nationaal Handboek Crisisbesluitvorming*, NHC) presents the main points of central government's crisis management policy and the national system in place to respond to crises. It outlines the powers, responsibilities and core tasks of the main players in the national crisis structure. This structure consists of three interministerial bodies: the Advisory Team (*Adviesteam*, AT), the Interdepartmental Crisis Management Committee (*Interdepartementale Commissie Crisisbeheersing*, ICCb) and the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (*Ministeriële Commissie Crisisbeheersing*, MCCb). This structure is mobilised flexibly where necessary. In principle, the AT-ICCb-MCCb sequence is followed unless otherwise warranted.
4. The Manual applies to all intersectoral crisis situations or imminent crisis situations that require a coordinated, interministerial response from central government. The main actors in the crisis management system (and the relationship between them) are shown schematically in Annexe A.
5. The Manual has been approved by the cabinet.
6. The Manual will be reviewed and re-approved regularly. If amendments are necessary in the light of changed circumstances or new information – for example, as a result of lessons learned from actual crises or exercises – the Ministry of Security and Justice will submit the necessary proposals to the cabinet.
7. The Manual is distributed to:
 - ministers and state secretaries;
 - King's Commissioners;
 - mayors;
 - heads of the safety regions;
 - the Presidents of the Senate and House of Representatives of the States General;
 - the President of the Court of Audit;
 - the Deputy President of the Council of State;
 - chairs of the Safety Regions Council, Association of Provincial Authorities, Association of Netherlands Municipalities, Association of Water Authorities, the chief commissioner of the National Police Force, the head of the Dutch Fire Service (*Brandweer Nederland*) and the chair of the Public Health and Safety Association.
8. The National Manual is the central government's policy framework, providing guidance for all crisis planning and preparations at national level. It is intended to serve as a basis for specific agreements on certain types of crisis and how to prepare for them, to be laid down in ministerial crisis management manuals and specific national crisis plans.
9. Separate crisis management arrangements have been made regarding the Caribbean part of the Netherlands.

II Definitions

1. Crisis management encompasses the whole range of measures taken and provisions made by central government working together with other organisations – in preparation for, during and after intersectoral crises – with a view to safeguarding national security.³
2. In this National Manual an intersectoral crisis is understood to mean: an incident which puts national security at risk because one or more vital interests are affected, and in which the regular structures and/or resources are inadequate to maintain stability. The structures set out in the National Handbook on Decision-Making in Crisis Situations will then come into operation.
3. National security is at risk if the vital interests of the state and/or society are threatened to the extent that there is actual, or potential, disruption to society. Those vital interests are:
 - Territorial security: the Netherlands' ability to function without disruption as an independent state in the broad sense, or territorial integrity in the restricted sense.
 - Economic security: the Netherlands' ability to function without disruption as an effective and efficient economy.
 - Ecological security: the capacity of the environment to recover adequately and spontaneously from damage.
 - Physical security: the ability of people and their surroundings to function normally, without disruption, in the Netherlands.
 - Social and political stability: the continued existence of a social climate in which groups of people can live together successfully, without disruption, within the framework of the rule of law and shared values.

These five areas cannot be taken in isolation, as they are usually closely interconnected.
4. At central government level, each ministry is responsible for organising and financing the crisis management measures (preparation, response and recovery) to be taken within its own policy field. Individual ministries are also responsible for ensuring that crisis management measures are put in place for the vital industries, organisations and installations that fall within their mandate.
5. In most instances, a local or regional crisis will be dealt with by the tier of government (e.g. municipality, water authority or safety region) and organisations operating at that level. Depending on the nature and scale of the incident, other organisations may be called in (horizontal and/or vertical expansion). A national, uniform GRIP system⁴ is in place for that purpose (see Annexe B). If the effects of a crisis have implications beyond a particular region, the head of the source region will be responsible for maintaining public order and general public safety.
6. Central government can play three roles in a crisis:
 - facilitate;
 - navigate;
 - steer.

A. *Central government facilitation*

Regardless of the GRIP level, central government can assist the competent authorities in the general or functional sector. Assistance can be provided at the request of the competent authorities in the general or functional sector or on central government's own initiative.

Central government provides:

 - administrative or operational expertise, advice, information or knowledge (e.g. advice on crisis communication or lessons learned from previous, similar disasters and crises);
 - opportunities to coordinate the parties involved (e.g. interministerial or international harmonisation);
 - facilities for operational processes, information technology and crisis communication;
 - resources (e.g. communication facilities such as www.crisis.nl or the public information line 0800-1351);
 - liaison facilities: contact and exchange of information with neighbouring regions (e.g. liaising with a neighbouring region if there are not enough local or regional crisis communication officers).

In most cases, of course, the region or functional sector will accept or use the facilities requested from central government, though it should be noted that the advice received is not formally binding and can be rejected in whole or in part. Responsibility for addressing the crisis lies entirely with the authorities being facilitated.

³ This definition is broader than that of the Safety Regions Act (*Wet veiligheidsregio's*, WVR), which defines crisis management as maintaining public order (WVR, section 1). A disaster is a particular form of crisis. Disaster management is therefore part of crisis management.

⁴ 'GRIP' is a Dutch acronym that stands for Coordinated Regional Incident Management Procedure. The system consists of a series of levels: local (1-3), regional (4), interregional (5) and GRIP Rijk (central government).

B. Central government navigation

Central government intervenes in situations in which some form of coordination and/or harmonisation of management is desirable or necessary. It does so by providing urgent advice to safety regions and/or municipalities.

Central government can give such advice regardless of the GRIP level.⁵ The advice is intended principally to ensure that the regional and/or municipal parties concerned adopt the same strategy for the crisis and/or reconcile conflicts of interest. The advice can be given at the request of the competent authorities in the general or functional sector or on the initiative of central government itself. It can relate to one or more aspects of the crisis strategy. The competent authorities must provide feedback on what they do with the urgent advice. They may depart from central government's advice only with good reason.

Examples of coordination include

- the agreement of tolerance levels;
- principles for standard national measures to maintain public order.

C. Central government steering

Central government can steer one or more aspects of the crisis strategy by giving instructions and/or by declaring GRIP Rijk in effect – the highest level of the GRIP hierarchy.

C.1. *Instructions* Central government (in the person of the competent line minister) can give an instruction to the relevant parties if, for example, they ignore its urgent advice on the crisis strategy. When it gives binding instructions, central government does not assume responsibility for their implementation but enables the parties concerned to carry them out.

C.2. *GRIP Rijk* If national security is or may be at risk and requires management by central government, the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (MCCb) can declare GRIP Rijk effective. It may do so at any GRIP level (0-5). The GRIP Rijk level is a newer addition to the GRIP system (see details in Annex B). Via the National Crisis Centre, the chair of the Ministerial Committee will inform the competent authority in the general or functional sector of the declaration by the Committee of *GRIP Rijk* and the consequences.

Examples of *GRIP Rijk* situations⁶ include:

- category A nuclear incidents;
- terrorist threats or attacks;
- large-scale flooding (depending on the scale of disruption);
- pandemics (A diseases);
- large-scale cyber crises;
- protracted scarcity.

C.1 and C.2 Instructions and GRIP Rijk

The following applies in both cases (instructions and GRIP Rijk) unless otherwise stated.

The legal bases for these forms of government intervention are:

- the power to issue instructions or specific powers;
- emergency legislation/powers in exceptional circumstances⁷ (with the ultimate remedy of unwritten emergency law).

With due regard for the relevant legislation, central government takes measures to safeguard national or international interests, such as:

- state security;
- the public interest;
- the five vital interests of national security.⁸

Central government can take steering measures on the understanding that:

- a) statutory requirements are satisfied (e.g. an announcement has been made in the form of a Royal Decree); and/or
- b) the competent central government authority informs the local authorities in advance of the power of instruction and the area to which it relates;
- c) points a) and b) apply unless time constraints prevent this, or unwritten emergency law is necessary.

Central government steering relates to one or more aspects of the crisis strategy. Measures are taken in respect of only those aspects that prompt the intervention.

When exercising specific powers or powers of instruction, central government decides on how local authorities will use their powers; this is not the same as assuming those powers.⁹ Exceptions are permitted in exceptional circumstances and cases of neglect of official duties.

⁵ King's Commissioners can still issue directions pursuant to the Safety Regions Act and the King's Commissioner's Official Instructions.

⁶ A list of the most likely examples of *GRIP Rijk* situations can be found at www.nctv.nl.

⁷ Exceptional circumstances are those in which a vital national interest is threatened or harmed and in which normal powers are inadequate.

⁸ This definition limits the power in so far as the power itself does not do so.

⁹ Example: in the event of a pandemic, central government (the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport) can decide to close schools; the chairs of the safety regions then take the appropriate action (e.g. if necessary by taking administrative decisions). Associated public order measures may also need to be taken.

Responsibility for issuing instructions (C.1) lies with the line minister exercising the power of instruction. In the case of GRIP Rijk (C.2) competence at national level lies with the legally authorised ministers. They coordinate the exercise of power in the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (MCCb). In the case of GRIP Rijk, the heads of the safety regions retain their autonomous powers in so far as they do not conflict with the ministerial powers.

Responsibility for implementing the crisis strategy remains with the authorities in the general or functional sector even if a line minister issues instructions or the Ministerial Committee declares *GRIP Rijk* in effect. In the case of disasters and crises in the general sector that affect public order and public safety, the competent authority is the mayor or the head of the safety region.

Central government's steering of certain aspects of the crisis strategy does not prejudice the Regional Policy Team's necessary coordination of the coordinating region.

Situations may arise in which central government also assumes responsibility for implementing one or more aspects of the crisis strategy, for example a large-scale evacuation.

III Decision-making at civil-service level in the event of crises

1. In the event of a crisis, speed of response and flexibility of action are essential. When a crisis or threat occurs in a particular sector, the minister responsible for the relevant policy field will respond. One of his responsibilities is to deal effectively with the situation and inform the Minister of Security and Justice as soon as a sectoral crisis, or threat of one, becomes apparent in his policy field. Resultant measures and communication are closely coordinated.
2. A ministry's response within its own sector is implemented and coordinated by the relevant ministry's Coordination Centre (*Departementaal Coördinatiecentrum, DCC*). If it is necessary to involve other policy sectors, the initiative will always be taken by the line ministry responsible for the sector in question. Communication with and provision of information to all layers of government about the decisions taken will go through the Minister of Security and Justice (by way of the National Crisis Centre (*Nationaal Crisiscentrum, NCC*)), unless the law states otherwise, in which case the individual ministers concerned must notify the Minister of Security and Justice.
3. In the face of a crisis, or impending crisis, which may involve the policy areas or interests of multiple ministries, an Advisory Team (AT) can be convened at the NCC on the initiative of a director of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid, NCTV*) or at the request of a ministry crisis coordinator. The composition of the AT is not fixed but flexible. Its objectives are 1) to identify dilemmas in the ministerial recommendations; 2) to propose various courses of action, identify their expected effects, advantages and disadvantages, and link them to the dilemmas. The Interdepartmental Crisis Management Committee (ICCb, see below) can then take decisions on the dilemmas.

The AT's composition is determined by the chair. Appropriate members include:

 - the chair (a director of the NCTV);
 - crisis policy advisers from relevant ministries;
 - information manager (NCC or NCTV/Risks and Threats Department (*Directie Risico's en Dreigingen, DRD*));
 - crisis coordination adviser (NCC);
 - crisis communication adviser (NCC or National Core Team for Crisis Communication (*Nationaal Kernteam Crisiscommunicatie, NKC*));
 - operational adviser (National Operational Coordination Centre (*Landelijk Operationeel Coördinatiecentrum, LOCC*)/possibly scaled up to the National Operational Staff (*Landelijke Operationele Staf, LOS*));
 - secretary/minute taker (NCC);
 - legal and other experts, as appropriate.
4. The AT's duties are to:
 - exchange information;
 - contribute to the understanding of the situation and the assessment made of it;
 - agree and coordinate measures in its own field;
 - examine whether there is a need to mobilise an Interdepartmental Crisis Management Committee (ICCb, see below) and/or Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (MCCb, see Chapter IV);
 - decide on organising and preparing for the ICCb and/or MCCb's interministerial crisis-related decision-making;
 - advise the ICCb on the measures to be taken during the preparation, response and follow-up stages.
5. If a crisis, or impending crisis, has implications beyond a single sector or if crisis communication may be scaled up to national level, an ICCb will be mobilised at senior civil service level (i.e. Director-General/Inspector-General/Secretary-General) and will meet at the NCC.
6. The ICCb's duties are to:
 - exchange information and identify information gaps;
 - gain an overview of the situation and make an assessment of it;
 - take measures related to preparation, response and aftercare;
 - advise the Prime Minister (= the Minister of General Affairs) and the Minister of Security and Justice on convening the MCCb;
 - advise on the mobilisation of the National Operational Staff;
 - advise the ministerial committee and/or other government bodies on the coordination of intersectoral crisis management (preparation, response, follow-up) and decision-making on the measures' coherence;
 - advise on the national and international political consequences of the proposed measures;
 - establish strategic frameworks;
 - draw up instructions for the civil service;
 - establish policy frameworks for public information material and announcements;
 - determine the structure and frequency of meetings.
7. The ICCb has a number of permanent members. Its composition is determined by the chair (NCTV) in consultation with the permanent members and staff at DG/IG/SG level at the ministry most closely involved, and comprises:
 - the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (permanent chair);
 - senior adviser, Ministry of General Affairs;
 - representatives at DG/IG/SG level from the ministries most closely involved (delegates representing the minister) and, at most, one adviser.

The following individuals also participate in the meeting:

- the chair of the Advisory Team (to explain the AT's advice);
- the head of the National Core Team for Crisis Communication (Information Director at the Ministry of Security and Justice or the policy ministry most closely involved);
- the Information Director/spokesperson at the ministry most closely involved;
- the chair or representative of the National Operational Staff (if mobilised), at the invitation of the chair of the ICCb;
- where appropriate, experts, at the invitation of the chair of the ICCb;
- secretary (NCC).

8. The ICCb can be mobilised by one or more of the permanent members, or at the request of DG/IG/SG-level staff of a line ministry.

IV Decision-making at political/governmental level in the event of crises

1. Under article 25, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure for the cabinet¹⁰ (*Reglement van orde voor de ministerraad*) the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (MCCb) can be convened if a situation requires intersectoral coordination at political/governmental level and decision-making on the coherence of the measures.¹¹
2. The MCCb's responsibility for preparation, response and aftercare in the case of intersectoral crises includes:
 - gaining an overview of the crisis, or an impending crisis, and making an assessment of it;
 - taking decisions based on the ICCb's recommendations;
 - considering the political consequences, at home and abroad, of the proposed measures;
 - discussing recommendations for the cabinet or other tiers of government;
 - establishing strategic frameworks;
 - briefing the States General;
 - drawing up instructions for the civil service;
 - establishing policy frameworks for public information material and announcements;
 - determining the structure and frequency of meetings.
3. The Prime Minister (= the Minister of General Affairs) and the Minister of Security and Justice are permanent members of the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee.
4. The Minister of Security and Justice acts as chair, unless the Prime Minister decides to occupy that role.
5. A request to mobilise the MCCb is addressed to the Minister of Security and Justice, who then confers with the Prime Minister on issues related to mobilisation, composition and chairmanship.
6. Having consulted the Prime Minister, the chair determines which of the other ministers will be MCCb members. This will vary depending on the situation at hand, and in some cases the configuration will differ from meeting to meeting. In consultation with the Prime Minister the chair invites other ministers to join the committee if their presence is necessary or particularly desirable given the nature of the crisis. If the Prime Minister has already decided to act as chair, he will ask the Minister of Security and Justice to issue the invitations.
7. State Secretaries can participate in the meetings in an advisory capacity in so far as the matters discussed are directly related to their duties.
8. The MCCb will not assume any powers from a minister or take a decision on any matter that concerns a minister who is not present.
9. In the event of a minister's temporary absence from the MCCb, the deputation arrangement will apply.¹² In the event of the absence of the Minister of Security and Justice and of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister will chair the committee.
10. The MCCb meets at the National Crisis Centre (NCC) and will decide whether the committee structure is appropriate, given the nature of the crisis (or impending crisis), or whether the situation can best be handled by the ICCb or the minister with primary responsibility.
11. If it is necessary to take decisions by vote, they are taken by majority vote, with each minister present casting one vote. In the event of a tie, the chair has the deciding vote.
12. The chair of the ICCb and an official at DG/SG level from the ministry most closely involved participate in MCCb meetings as permanent advisers. A director/spokesperson from the ministry in question and/or the head of the National Core Team for Crisis Communication, and the chair of the National Operational Staff (if mobilised, at the request of the chair of the MCCb) will also attend the meeting.¹³
13. The MCCb is supported by a secretary and, if required, a deputy secretary, drawn from the NCC pool.
14. The secretary drafts a list of decisions as quickly as possible. The list must be approved by the cabinet. In cases when decisions cannot be delayed, prior approval of the list is not required. The Minister of Security and Justice is responsible for monitoring implementation of the decisions taken by the MCCb and for keeping the cabinet informed of this and of any problems encountered along the way. Implementation by the individual ministries is the responsibility of the minister in question and is coordinated by the Ministry Coordination Centres.
15. If the situation becomes serious enough to warrant it, the MCCb will meet at the emergency bunker.
16. Where necessary, the MCCb may depart from the provisions in this National Manual, unless such action is contrary to the Rules of Procedure for the cabinet and/or the Order establishing the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee.

¹⁰ Last amended by decree of 28 April 1998, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 305.

¹¹ Order establishing the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (Government Gazette 2013, 11207).

¹² Order of 5 November 2012 establishing the deputisation arrangement in the event of temporary absence of a minister (Government Gazette 2012, 23054). At the Prime Minister's request, an adviser from the Ministry of General Affairs takes his place at the committee's meetings.

¹³ At the Prime Minister's request, a representative of the Government Information Service (*Rijkvoorlichtingsdienst*) may attend MCCb meetings.

17. As the minister responsible for coordinating counterterrorism, the Minister of Security and Justice is entitled to perform the tasks and exercising the associated powers of another minister if immediate action is required to prevent a terrorist offence or to limit, in advance, its impact, or if it is impossible for the Minister of Security and Justice and the other minister to consult or agree on the measures in the time available. He may, for example, block or restrict access to some areas of Dutch airspace by civil aircraft or block mobile telephone communications. These powers have been granted provisionally by Royal Decree¹⁴ pending the passage of a bill by Parliament.

If time is of the essence, the Minister of Security and Justice can exercise his extended powers even if the MCCb is convened in response to a terrorist threat or attack. He is, however, bound by the committee's decisions, which may also affect his extended powers.

These additional powers will be operationalised, as far as possible, through regular, existing channels. In most instances, this means that the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) will contact the line ministry's Coordination Centre on behalf of the Minister of Security and Justice.

¹⁴ Decree on the temporary reallocation of ministerial tasks in the event of a terrorist threat of an urgent nature (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2005, 662), effective as of 21 December 2005.

V The National Crisis Centre (NCC)

1. The National Crisis Centre (NCC), which is staffed round the clock, is housed at the Ministry of Security and Justice and acts as an interministerial coordination centre and a hub for the intergovernmental exchange of information on crisis situations. The NCC is a support unit, which undertakes preparatory work for interministerial decision-making at civil-service and political/governmental level in the event of crises.
2. When preparing interministerial decisions made at civil-service level (by the ICCb) and at political/governmental level (by the MCCb), the following four key areas are considered:
 - Information: The assembling (monitoring, collection and initial assessment) of factual information, including situation-specific information. What is actually happening?
 - Measures: What does the factual information mean? What measures are being taken? What measures should be taken? By whom? This involves combination of administrative and operational measures.
 - Communication: How should information be communicated to the public at large? How are the media portraying the situation? What does the public believe is happening? See Chapter VII for further details on the National Core Team for Crisis Communication (NKC).
 - Scenarios: How might the situation develop in the future?
3. These four key areas are interdependent. Officials of the ministries concerned cooperate and interact closely to take the action required. Other relevant organisations and government and external experts may also be brought in. Decisions on the organisation and methods to be used to prepare for interministerial crisis-related decision-making by the ICCb and/or the MCCb are taken by the Advisory Team, and approved retroactively by the ICCb.
4. The NCC acts as the direct contact between central government (including the LOCC) and the safety regions. In the 'warm phase', the region can contact the NCC to request support in specific areas of expertise. The NCC puts the requests for support to the national expertise and advisory networks. The NCC does not represent an unnecessary layer of management: the regions may request assistance, expertise, support and advice directly in urgent cases. The NCC is informed both of the request (by the regions) and the response (by the networks providing expertise and advice).

The NCC acts as a go-between between the generic and the functional sectors and makes agreements on the coordination of measures, the exchange of information (net-centric operation) and the notification of all local, regional and national agencies involved in crisis situations.

VI The National Operational Coordination Centre (LOCC) and the National Operational Staff (LOS)

A. The National Operational Coordination Centre (LOCC)¹⁵

1. The National Operational Coordination Centre (LOCC) is staffed by the public order and security sectors (police, fire service, medical services, Ministry of Defence and municipalities). In actual or imminent incidents, disasters, crises and large-scale events, it operates round the clock, under the authority of the NCTV of the Ministry of Security and Justice.
2. The LOCC's duties are to:
 - a. during national scaling-up:
 - (1) submit a multidisciplinary National Operational Overview;
 - (2) assess the operational feasibility of administrative dilemmas and potential actions;
 - (3) devise potential operational actions (advice);
 - b. advise the organisations concerned about regional and supraregional operational matters;
 - c. organise or contribute to operational planning;
 - d. update an overview of planned events and deployable capabilities (people, resources, knowledge) of the public order and security sectors;
 - e. analyse the multidisciplinary National Operational Overview;
 - f. coordinate national and, at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, international requests for assistance;
 - g. act in its international capacity as the National Training Coordinator (NTC) for the EU civil protection mechanism;
 - h. establish, prepare and maintain the National Operational Staff (LOS).

B. The National Operational Staff (LOS)¹⁶

3. The chair of the MCCb can, if necessary at the request of another minister, mobilise the National Operational Staff (LOS). The LOS, which resembles LOCC but at a higher level, consists – at the very least – of representatives of the police, fire service, medical services, the Ministry of Defence and municipalities.
4. By way of the Advisory Team and the ICCb, the LOS provides operational advice to the MCCb on the deployment and availability of people and resources to deal with national disasters and crises and maintain public order. The advice is based in part on operational feasibility and consequences. The chair or a representative of the LOS participates in the ICCb and MCCb at the invitation of the respective chairs and if requested will explain the advice.
5. At the request and under the responsibility of another minister, representatives of other operational services can also participate in the LOS in the event of a disaster or crisis, in so far as the services are active in the field for which the minister is responsible. The ministers retain full responsibility for the actual deployment and management of their own operational services.
6. The National Operational Staff is responsible for communicating with the operational services and coordinating the decisions taken by the ICCb and MCCb.

¹⁵ Ministry of Security and Justice Organisation Order 2011.

¹⁶ Order establishing the National Operational Staff (Government Gazette 2010, 20060).

VII The National Core Team for Crisis Communication (NKC)

1. Communication in the event of a crisis (or impending crisis) is a responsibility principally of the competent local or regional authority and the Communications Departments of the ministries concerned. If required, they are supported in this task by the National Crisis Centre (Communication Unit) with advice, resources (www.crisis.nl, 0800-1351, public surveys) and a network of practical experts.
2. The aim of crisis communication is to respond to the public's need for information, limit damage and explain the situation. The approach to crisis communication must be conducive to crisis management.
3. In the event of a local/regional crisis that has national implications or involves several ministries, crisis communication can be coordinated at national level by the National Core Team for Crisis Communication (NKC).
 - 3.1. The NKC acts as a hub for information from central government in the form of press releases and public information.
 - 3.2. The NKC can be scaled up if an incident may have national implications and/or involve several ministries. (In this case powers are still exercised locally.) The NKC decides the initial information strategy at national level and enables the minister/state secretary/central government to explain the situation to the public. It also sets the communication frameworks and key messages in respect of national powers and coordinates them with the safety region. The NKC is the contact point for national, regional and local partners.
 - 3.3. The NKC's duties are to:
 - 3.3.1. monitor the media, internet and public perceptions (by means of analyses by the NCTV's Risks and Threats Department);
 - 3.3.2. advise the AT, ICCb and MCCb on the communication strategy to be followed and the impact of decisions on communication;
 - 3.3.3. develop, coordinate and communicate government information to the press and public;
 - 3.3.4. inform other government bodies about central government communication activities and coordinate such activities with them.
 - 3.4. The NVC is mobilised on the instructions of the NCTV or the Information Director of the Ministry of Security and Justice (or that of the policy ministry most closely involved). The head of the NCC's Communication Unit plays an advisory role. The Ministry of Security and Justice's Information Director and/or the Information Director of the ministry most closely involved represents the NKC in the ICCb and the MCCb.
 - 3.5. The NKC is headed by the Ministry of Security and Justice's Information Director and/or the Information Director of the policy ministry most closely involved. It also includes the head of the NCC's Communication Unit and the coordinator of the press and public team. The press and public team comprises crisis communication specialists from the NCC/Communication Unit and spokespersons and speechwriters from the Ministry of Security and Justice. The coordinator of the press and public team acts as the contact point for management. This role can be filled by, for example, a head of press relations, a coordinating minister or state secretary from the Ministry of Security and Justice or the ministry most closely involved.
 - 3.6. If one or more other ministries are involved, speechwriters and spokespersons from the most closely involved ministries also form part of the press and public team. If necessary, the team is rounded out by communication specialists from executive organisations or other parties involved in the crisis.
 - 3.7. On the basis of analyses of public attitudes and media interest, the NKC formulates an integrated advisory report on the content and organisation of the crisis communication, identifying dilemmas and decision points that can be put to the ICCb/MCCb. Together with the ICCb/MCCb's decisions, the advice is adapted into talking points, web content, press releases, scripts and frequently asked questions (FAQs). The above-mentioned analyses continually monitor the communication operation's impact in terms of information needs, conduct of those concerned and criticism of or support for the approach to the crisis.
 - 3.8. If there is a need to increase capacity or relieve the burden on the NKC, the national crisis communication pool can be called upon.
 - 3.9. A communications liaison officer from the NCC/Communication Unit can be delegated to the safety region. National and local/regional levels are then coordinated locally by the liaison officer. The liaison officer is seconded as soon as there is a national need/requirement for close coordination with the local crisis managers or if a mayor/head of the safety region makes a specific request for national coordination of crisis communication. The decision of whether to delegate a liaison officer is discussed by the NCTV with the head of the safety region.
 - 3.10. The NKC does not assume responsibility for communication on regional crises; this responsibility is retained by the competent authority in the region.

VIII Legal aspects

1. The main principle of crisis management is to use only the legislation required by the situation at hand, adhering to the normal powers laid down in existing legislation for as long as possible.¹⁷
2. As the term implies, emergency legislation is intended for use in situations in which normal statutory powers give the government insufficient scope to take effective action in an exceptional situation.
3. The Exceptional Emergencies (Coordination) Act and the renewal of the Civil Authority Special Powers Act and the War Act for the Netherlands mean that emergency powers can be exercised in line with the current philosophy on crisis management, i.e. in a manner that is proportionate and flexible, in keeping with the nature and gravity of the situation.
4. Under the system, the entry into force of emergency powers is in principle linked to two different levels of emergency: a restricted state of emergency and a general state of emergency, which may be declared 'if unusual circumstances make such a step necessary in order to safeguard internal or external security'.
5. A state of emergency is declared and extraordinary powers are made operative by Royal Decree on the recommendation of the Prime Minister (= the Minister of General Affairs). The States General decide in a joint session whether they should be prolonged. Sections of emergency legislation can be activated even when there is no state of emergency – though special circumstances must apply – again by Royal Decree on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and extended by separate legislation. Such separate application is permissible only in relatively small-scale crises in which it would be inappropriate to declare a state of emergency. Emergency powers that infringe fundamental rights can be used only if a general state of emergency has been declared.

¹⁷ For a summary see: *Crisis en recht. Schema's bevoegdheden en verplichtingen tijdens crises 2008*, The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2008.

IX Crises outside the Netherlands

1. Crises abroad may impact on the Netherlands. For example, the country may be threatened, or there may be public order problems or public concern in the event of large numbers of casualties. The Ministry of Security and Justice, together with other ministries for specific sectoral measures, is responsible for the measures to be taken within the Netherlands in response to crises abroad.
2. Policy responsibility for international assistance in the European Union lies with the Minister of Security and Justice. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has policy responsibility for international assistance outside the European Union.
3. Requests for assistance and/or information from abroad regarding civil protection are made to the Netherlands through the NCC. As the single point of contact, the NCC directs requests for assistance from the European Union Monitoring and Information Centre (EU-MIC) and the NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the LOCC. It directs requests for assistance from the United Nations directly to the foreign ministry. At the request of the foreign ministry, the LOCC tests the operational aspects of a request for assistance. Within the set term and subject to the directions of the foreign ministry, the NCC passes on the Netherlands' response to a request to the EU-MIC and the EADRCC.
4. Where a political/governmental assessment leads to a positive decision on a request for assistance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs can decide to pass on the request to other line ministries. The line ministry in question will assess the availability and operational feasibility of deploying its expertise (human and other resources). If assistance is requested from the fire, police, ambulance or other medical services, the foreign ministry may, through the NCC, ask the LOCC to identify whether the assistance requested is available in the Netherlands. Human and other resources are offered only as long as the Netherlands' own needs do not suffer as a result.
5. If Dutch citizens are caught up in a disaster, accident or crisis, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its representatives abroad are responsible for consular follow-up action. In the event of a disaster, accident or crisis where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates an evacuation to the Netherlands, the Ministry brings in the NCC and the line ministries to coordinate reception in the Netherlands. It does so with a view to offering assistance to victims returning to the Netherlands and dealing with possible responses in the Netherlands to the consequences of the crisis. In such events, the foreign ministry is responsible for repatriation up to the moment the people concerned step foot on Dutch soil; the Ministry of Security and Justice is responsible for the assistance provided in the Netherlands. The criterion for the scale of assistance is the social impact, regardless of the number of casualties. Assistance is provided by the LOCC in close cooperation with the operational and governmental partners concerned.
6. International humanitarian aid abroad (leadership, coordination and communication) falls within the policy remit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If interministerial coordination is necessary, timely consultation will take place with the NCC, the ministries concerned, the relevant embassies, the authorities of the country affected and relevant international organisations.

X Follow-up stage


1. Preparations for the follow-up stage to a crisis – the recovery and aftercare stage – commence during the response. By identifying – at local and/or regional level – the victims and persons directly involved and estimating the damage and other consequences as early as possible, the relevant parties can determine what tasks need to be undertaken. The transition from the acute stage to the follow-up and aftercare stage is a gradual process.
2. As soon as a crisis occurs, the ICCb or the MCCb decides on the timely establishment of a follow-up team. This team, consisting of representatives of the ministries involved, prepares a general action plan for the follow-up stage.
3. For the purposes of this Manual, the follow-up stage comprises all actions taken after an intersectoral crisis has been addressed. The purpose of such follow-up actions is to prevent or alleviate social disruption and resume normal activity as quickly as possible. The Minister of Security and Justice is responsible for general coordination and organisation of the follow-up stage. Line ministries are responsible for the specific themes. The follow-up stage can cover a wide range of themes. A list of such themes, prepared by several ministries, is presented in Annexe C. The list is not exhaustive; it is intended as guidance to prepare the joint action plan for the follow-up stage.
4. The ICCb presents the general action plan for the follow-up stage to the MCCb. The Minister of Finance is involved in the preparation of the plan. Decisions on the plan are taken by the cabinet.
5. The Minister of Security and Justice is responsible for monitoring progress. Progress reports are discussed by the ICCb and then submitted – in some cases through the ministers involved in the MCCb – to the cabinet.
6. The involvement of the ICCb and the MCCb in the crisis declines with the passage of time, and the progress of ongoing follow-up actions is monitored by the responsible policy ministries and discussed in the cabinet within the regular structure.

XI Evaluation

1. It is important to evaluate government performance in crises. The evaluation is launched by the minister primarily responsible. If the crisis involves more than one ministry, the Minister of Security and Justice will initiate the evaluation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for evaluating the response to an international disaster or crisis.
2. An excellent way of evaluating policy is to stage exercises. The Minister of Security and Justice, being responsible for coordinating crisis management, encourages regular interministerial exercises. The Netherlands also takes part in international exercises.
3. The ministers concerned are responsible for the timely revision of ministerial crisis management manuals. Every minister encourages exercises as a way of improving the ministry's own crisis decision-making structure and procedures.

Annexe A

Overview crisis management structure in The Netherlands



Annexe B

GRIP system¹⁸

Reference: Safety Regions Act (WVR) and Safety Regions Decree (BVR)	Situation	Operational crisis team	Operational management under WVR	Competent authority	Support and advice for the competent authority	Calamity coordination at control centres	Party via which NCC contacts operational crisis team	Competent authority to be contacted by minister or NCTV
GRIP 0	Normal daily routine	Informal consultation at incident scene	None	Mayor	Commanding officers Art. 2.1.2-1 of BVR	No	-	
GRIP 1	Need for multidisciplinary coordination at the incident scene	Incident Scene Command (CoPi) Art 2.1.2-2 of BVR	CoPi manager Art 2.3e of Safety Region Personnel Decree (BPV); Safety Region Personnel order (RPV), annexe c-e	Mayor	CoPi manager Art 2.1.2-1a of BVR	Yes, Calamity Coordinator (CaCo) Art 2.2.2 of BVR	Initially through CaCo, then by agreement	Mayor
GRIP 2	Need for multidisciplinary coordination greater than only at the incident scene or to prepare for a potential incident	Regional Operational Team (ROT) possibly with one or more CoPis - Art 2.1.4-2 of BVR	Regional Operational Manager (ROL) Art 2.1.4-1a of BVR; Art 2.3g of BPV; RPV, annexe c-g	Mayor	ROL Art 2.1.4-1a of BVR	Yes, CaCo (only in actual incidents) Art 2.2.2 of BVR	Initially through CaCo, then by agreement	Mayor
GRIP 3	Need for multidisciplinary coordination where orders by the mayor require support from a Municipal Policy Team (GBT)	ROT, possibly with one or more CoPis Art 2.1.4-2 of BVR	ROL Art 2.1.4-1a of BVR; Art 2.3g of BPV; RPV, annexe c-g	Mayor	ROL and GBT Art 2.1.4-1a of BVR; Art 2.1.5 of BVR	Yes, CaCo Art 2.2.2 of BVR	Initially through CaCo, then by agreement	Mayor
GRIP 4	Need for multidisciplinary and governmental coordination and management in a disaster or crisis of more than local significance or serious fear of occurrence	ROT, possibly with one or more CoPis Art 2.1.4-2 of BVR	ROL Art 2.1.4-1a of BVR; Art 2.3g of BPV; RPV, annexe c-g	Safety region head (WVR 39 by definition in effect, to be enforced by the region head)	ROL and RBT Art 2.1.4-1a of BVR; Sec 39-2 of WVR	Yes, CaCo Art 2.2.2 of BVR	Initially through CaCo, then by agreement	Safety region head
GRIP 5 (interregional)	Need for multidisciplinary and governmental coordination in a disaster or crisis of more than local significance or serious fear of occurrence, where the safety region heads take decisions together when necessary ¹⁹	ROTs in each region concerned, as required, possibly with one or more CoPis. Heads jointly appoint a coordinating ROT (in principle the head of the source region)	Coordinating ROL appointed by safety region heads (in principle the source region)	Safety region heads, each in his/her own region. (WVR 39 in effect in all regions concerned, following a decision by each individual head.) Heads together decide on coordinating head (in principle the head of the source region)	ROls and RBTs in all regions concerned. with one appointed coordinating ROL and coordinating RBT (in principle the head of the source region) Art 2.1.4-1a of BVR; Sec 39-2 of WVR	Yes, CaCo Art 2.2.2 of BVR	Initially via CaCo, then by agreement	Safety region head appointed as coordinator (in principle the head of the source region)
GRIP Rijk	Need for management by central government in situations where national security is or may be at risk	ROT coordinating region	ROL coordinating region	Ministers / MCCb	ICCb and Advisory Team	NCC	CaCos	Competent authority in general or functional sector

¹⁸ The system and the explanation are derived from: Eenheid in verscheidenheid. *Uitwerking Advies Bestuurlijke Werkgroep Bovenregionale Samenwerking* (Parliamentary Paper, House of Representatives, 2012-2013, 26 956, no. 148).

¹⁹ Under the Safety Regions Act (section 42), should the heads of the safety regions concerned fail to reach agreement on GRIP 5 during a particular incident, the Minister of Security and Justice can have the King's Commissioners give relevant instructions.

Annexe Ba

Explanation of the GRIP system

1st column: 'Reference: WVR and BVR' (GRIP levels)

- GRIP 0 is not an official system level, but simply an expression referring to the daily routine of the emergency services.
- GRIP 1-4 are the existing system levels.
- GRIP 5 (interregional) refers to situations where an actual or imminent disaster or crisis occurs simultaneously in several regions.
- GRIP Rijk refers to situations where central government steering is necessary.

2nd column: 'Situation'

This column provides a qualitative description of the general reasons that an incident may warrant a particular GRIP level. The focus here is not on the source and impact areas but rather on the type of coordination (operational or administrative). This better reflects the difference in operational scaling-up and administrative coordination.

- GRIP 0: The normal routine of the emergency services.
- GRIP 1: The emphasis is on operational, multidisciplinary coordination at the scene of the incident and on activities that can be managed from the scene.
- GRIP 2: The emphasis is still on operational coordination but not all processes can be managed from the scene. In this instance, the scene may not even be clearly defined.
- GRIP 3: The instructions given to the competent authority mean that a GBT should be set up to support the mayor. This can occur when, for example, non-operational emergency services must provide care and information to the public on a *large scale*. Other kinds of management instructions may also be relevant.
- GRIP 4: Need for administrative coordination and management in the event of a disaster/ crisis of more than local significance. This can occur if a disaster or crisis exceeds (or threatens to exceed) the mayor's authority on account of its impact or social implications and there is a need for a single acting authority.
- GRIP 5: The same as GRIP 4 but several regions are affected. Since the WVR does not provide for the transfer of power, the heads concerned must take a joint decision on this matter. In principle, the source region will take the lead. The chair of the source region does not assume the powers of the other safety region chairs. Rather, the latter will simply accept the decisions of the chair of the source region. If the source is uncertain or the chairs together so decide, this principle need not be followed.
- GRIP Rijk: At central government level, the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (MCCb), chaired by the Minister of Security and Justice or the Prime Minister, is responsible for

coordinating intersectoral crisis management and decision-making on a coherent strategy.²⁰ The MCCb can declare GRIP Rijk effective if there is a need for management by central government when national security is or may be at risk, e.g. if the vital interests of the state and/or society are under such threat that there is actual or potential social disruption.

3rd column: 'Operational crisis team'

This column shows which operational crisis teams are formed to provide the multidisciplinary coordination necessary at each GRIP level. In GRIP 2 and higher, 'possibly with one of more CoPis' means that an Incident Scene Command (CoPi) may or may not be involved, in certain cases several CoPis will work in tandem.

- GRIP 0: There is no formal team.
- GRIP 1: A CoPi is formed at the scene, headed by a single operational manager. An Incident Scene Command is responsible for operational management, coordinating with other parties, as referred to in section 16 (2) of the WVR, and advising the Regional Operational Team (ROT).
- GRIP 2: A ROT is responsible for operational management, coordinating with other parties involved in the disaster or crisis and advising the Municipal or Regional Policy Team. The ROT manages and coordinates all crisis management procedures. If the nature and scale of the incident so warrant, measures can be taken at the scene by one or more CoPis coordinated by the ROT.
- GRIP 3: See GRIP 2 above.
- GRIP 4: See GRIP 2 above.
- GRIP 5: See GRIP 2 above. As a matter of principle, however, several regional operational teams are involved. The ROT of the region whose chair acts as coordinator also acts as the coordinating ROT.
- GRIP Rijk: See GRIP 5 above.

4th column: 'Operational management under WVR'

This column shows which team (and the respective managers/ chairs) report pursuant to the WVR to the competent authority regarding operational coordination.

- GRIP 0: Under the WVR there is no senior operational manager.
- GRIP 1: Under the Safety Regions Decree (BVR), the CoPi is led by the CoPi manager, who is thus the senior operational manager.

²⁰ Order establishing the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (Government Gazette 2013, 11207).

- GRIP 2: Under the BVR, the Regional Operational Manager (ROL) heads the ROT and is thus the senior operational manager.
- GRIP 3: See GRIP 2 above. At this level, the municipal policy team plays an advisory role.
- GRIP 4: See GRIP 2 above.
- GRIP 5: See GRIP 2 above. In principle, however, several regional operational teams are involved. The ROT in the region whose head has coordinating authority acts as the coordinating ROT. As a result, the ROL of that region is also the coordinating ROL, or Coordinating Operational Leader (COL).
- GRIP Rijk: See GRIP 5 above.

5th column: 'Competent authority'

This column shows which public body has the highest authority and exercises the corresponding emergency powers. Pursuant to the WVR, there are two options: the mayor (in normal circumstances and in GRIP 1-3) or the chair of the safety region (GRIP 4 and 5). At GRIP 5 level, too, the highest authority and emergency powers are exercised in the regions concerned by their chairs only, on the understanding that one of the chairs (in principle the one from the source region) coordinates the other chairs' administrative management actions (see note to GRIP 5 in the second column). At GRIP Rijk level, the competent authorities at national level are the ministers concerned or the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (MCCb).

6th column: 'Support and advice for the competent authority'

This column shows who in any event advises the competent authority.

- GRIP 0: The commanding officer and other managers of the services concerned independently advise the mayor of the performance of their duties.
- GRIP 1-2: the senior manager referred to in column 4 advises the mayor on how to tackle the incident.
- GRIP 3: See above. In addition, the municipal policy team (GBT) plays an advisory role.
- GRIP 4: See GRIP 1-2 above. To prevent duplication of management, GBTs are not involved.
- GRIP 5: See above. In principle, all Regional Operational Managers (ROLs) and Policy Teams (RBTs) retain their advisory duties for their own competent authorities. The ROL and RBT of the region whose chair acts as coordinator are thus in a special position.
- GRIP Rijk: The MCCb is supported and advised by the ICCb, which is chaired by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and the Advisory Team (AT).

7th column: 'Calamity coordination at control centres'

This column shows whether there is a single manager (Calamity Coordinator, CaCo) in the control centre, as referred to in article 2.2.2 of the BVR. This is the case in all GRIP situations. In GRIP 5, it is the case at all control centres. There is therefore no coordinating CaCo. At GRIP Rijk level the National Crisis Centre (NCC) acts as CaCo at national level.

8th column: 'Party via which NCC contacts operational crisis team'

This column shows the NCC's contacts in the safety regions. At each GRIP level the contact is initially the CaCo, who can then put the NCC in touch with the relevant bodies that comprise the regional crisis organisation. In a later stage, specific agreements can be made about other contact points. At GRIP 5 and GRIP Rijk level, those contacts are the CaCos of the control centres that work for the region concerned. As already noted, there is no calamities coordinator, not even nationally.

9th column: 'Competent authority to be contacted by minister/NCTV'

This column shows whom the minister (or staff of the NCTV on the minister's behalf) should approach in order to harmonise administrative coordination. This is the competent authority (mayor, safety region chair or possibly the designated chair at GRIP 5 level). At GRIP Rijk level, it is the competent authority in the general or functional sector.

Annexe C

Themes in the follow-up stage

The following list of themes²¹ was prepared in consultation with the various ministries. The list is not exhaustive and is intended only as guidance when planning joint actions in the follow-up stage. Other themes and parties can be added if required.

Theme	Note	Most closely involved ministry/ministries
1. Coordination and organisation of the follow-up stage by specific authority (planning, agreement, allocation of resources, coordination)	Establish multidisciplinary project organisation (regional and national), responsible for the planning, prioritisation and coordination of activities and the allocation of resources in the follow-up stage (one-stop shop).	Security and Justice (general coordination of the follow-up stage), line ministries (specific themes)
2. Continuity and restoration of vital infrastructure	Ensuring that vital infrastructure (especially utility services) remains in operation or returns to normal as quickly as possible to enable recovery and aftercare.	Economic Affairs (especially the Directorate-General for Energy and Telecommunications / IT)
3. Registering and monitoring refugees/ evacuees	To localise evacuees and victims/casualties for aid provision, victim/casualty registration, family reunification, repatriation and damages payments. The municipal personal records database is important on account of the services and systems linked to it.	Interior and Kingdom Relations (municipalities); Security and Justice (safety regions); Health, Welfare and Sport; Foreign Affairs (in the case of disasters abroad)
4. Rehousing, recovery and reconstruction	Housing refugees. Organising temporary or semi-permanent accommodation for refugees. Cleaning up and restoring the area, buildings and other facilities (physical environment). Long-term isolation/guarding of disaster area. Redevelopment of disaster area.	Infrastructure and the Environment; Interior and Kingdom Relations (regions and municipalities)
5. Food supply	Supplying food to evacuees and the rest of the population.	Economic Affairs; Health, Welfare and Sport
6. Health care	Medical screening and health monitoring. Need to prevent infectious diseases. Ensure continuity of regular medical care (e.g. for the chronically ill). Organise continuity of care.	Health, Welfare and Sport (including RIVM)
7. Psychosocial care/help	Short- and long-term treatment of psychosocial problems (both carers and the public).	Health, Welfare and Sport (including the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM); Security and Justice (care providers)
8. Strengthen social cohesion	Social cohesion, monitoring social unrest, solidarity, mutual help, stability.	General Affairs (NGOs, civil society organisations)
9. Emergency social security measures	Dealing with benefit payments, exceptional medical expenses, etc.	Social Affairs and Employment
10. Monitoring/redressing environmental and landscape damage	Monitoring leaks of hazardous substances in the environment. Monitoring threats to public health due to disaster-related environmental damage, etc.	Infrastructure and the Environment; Health, Welfare and Sport
11. Waste/sewage treatment	A large number of refugees means more waste. Waste and sewage treatment plans may fail, creating environmental and health problems.	Infrastructure and the Environment
12. Continuity of public administration, the judiciary, police, etc.	Guaranteeing the operation of public services. Continuity of democratic legal order.	Security and Justice, Interior and Kingdom Relations
13. Continuity of transport (including vital infrastructure)	Important for maintaining communication with the outside world. Goods transport (emergency aid and resumption of economic activity). Public transport. Private transport.	Infrastructure and the Environment

²¹ Taken from: *Richting geven aan de laatste schakel: de nafase. Rijksbrede versterking van herstel en nazorg bij rampen en crises*, The Hague, Ministry of Security and Justice, 2012.

Theme	Note	Most closely involved ministry/ministries
14. Continuity of economic life/market forces	Limit economic damage through rapid resumption of economic activities. Business continuity. Fall back arrangements (IT). Emergency credit. Tax measures. Establish benefit desk (one desk for multidisciplinary back office).	Economic Affairs (Chambers of Commerce); Finance; Social Affairs and Employment
15. Continuity of education	Prevent disruptions/educational backlog due to disaster (long-term investment in continuity of knowledge economy).	Education, Culture and Science, line ministries
16. Secure cultural heritage	Evacuation, restoration and temporary storage of cultural heritage.	Education, Culture and Science; Defence
17. Damage assessment	Estimate the scale of the disaster. Estimate the cost of the disaster.	Security and Justice; Economic Affairs (National Service for Implementation of Regulations)
18. Reconstruction	Post-incident reconstruction, e.g. by means of blueprints of public-private partnerships. Spatial planning (reconstruction vs. innovation).	Public-private partnerships
19. Payment of damages and financial arrangements	Introduce damages scheme, coordinate settlement of damages, pay financial compensation.	Security and Justice; Finance
20. Register and monitor evacuated livestock	Secure livestock.	Economic Affairs
21. Animal health and animal welfare		Economic Affairs; Health, Welfare and Sport
22. Organise temporary/semi-permanent facilities for evacuated livestock	Shelter for evacuated livestock.	Economic Affairs
23. Continuity of emergency services	Reconstruction of emergency services (back-up facilities). Evacuation of aid workers' families. Leave arrangements for aid workers. Logistical support. Staff rotation. Psychological counselling for aid workers.	Security and Justice; Health Welfare and Sport; Social Affairs and Employment
24. Public information	Establish means of mass communication (e.g. an information and advice centre). Public information channels. Communication plans to reach target groups.	Security and Justice (NCC, NKC)
25. Funerals, bereavement and commemoration	Organisation of national commemoration for large-scale national and international disasters and support for local communities.	Security and Justice in cooperation with Interior and Kingdom Affairs; Foreign Affairs for a disaster abroad
26. Criminal and other investigations and liability	Public Prosecution Service, police and businesses in disaster area.	Security and Justice (Public Prosecution Service), line ministries
27. Official oversight (by central government and other authorities)	Inspection, region, (e.g. issuing permits).	Joint inspectorates
28. Investigation	Investigation of the causes of the disaster and evaluation of the performance of the emergency services.	Government inspectorates, Dutch Safety Board
29. Rendering account/political accountability	Ministers/state secretaries/politicians concerned, media, parliament	Line ministries; Security and Justice; General Affairs

Annexe D

List of abbreviations

AT	Advisory Team
BVR	Safety Regions Order
BPV	Safety Regions Personnel Decree
CaCo	Calamity coordinator
COL	Coordinating Operational Leader
CoPi	Incident Scene Command
DCC	Departmental Coordination Centre
DG	Director General
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
EU-MIC	European Union Monitoring and Information Centre
GBT	Municipal Policy Team
GRIP	Coordinated Regional Incident Management Procedure
ICCb	Interdepartmental Crisis Management Committee
IG	Inspector General
LOCC	National Operational Coordination Centre
LOS	National Operational Staff
MCCb	Ministerial Crisis Management Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	National Crisis Centre
NCTV	National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
NKC	National Core Team for Crisis Communication
RBT	Regional Policy Team
RIVM	National Institute for Public Health and the Environment
ROL	Regional Operational Manager
ROT	Regional Operational Team
RPV	Safety Region Personnel Order
SG	Secretary General
WVR	Safety Regions Act



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