

DISCUSSION PAPER ON

ENHANCING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE TO NATURAL DISASTERS: LIVES OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN ACEH



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IN ACEH

UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Bangkok
2008

ST/ESCAP/2509

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Preface

The earthquake and subsequent tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004 caused an unprecedented human catastrophe in affected countries of the Asian and Pacific region. The northern part of the Indonesian island of Sumatra was most affected, especially the province of Aceh. Rehabilitation and reconstruction processes were developed by national Governments, with support from the international community. It was evident that there was a need to promote sustainable and coordinated approaches in order to effectively mitigate the impact of the tsunami as well as that of future natural disasters. This was especially the case with regard to vulnerable groups and communities.

In this context, the UNESCAP project “Building community resilience to natural disasters through partnership: Sharing experience and expertise in the region” came about. In the component of the project concerned with Aceh, emphasis was on partnerships involving national and local governments, community organizations and other stakeholders in early warning systems, livelihood recovery and social protection of children. More specifically, in Aceh attention was directed to building community capacity to care for orphans and separated children and youth (OSCY) so as to provide them with optimal opportunities for their development. To this effect, a wide variety of issues relevant to OSCY were covered in training workshops which were undertaken in Aceh with members of tsunami-affected communities as well as in policy advocacy meetings which took place in Jakarta.

This discussion paper considers the main issues and challenges that OSCY and their communities face; it also highlights the proceedings and discussions of the workshops and meetings in addition to shedding light on lessons learnt and putting forward recommendations.

Acknowledgements

The project “Building community resilience to natural disasters through partnership: Sharing experience and expertise in the region”, from where this discussion paper comes, and the discussion paper itself would not have been possible without the generous support of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

Acknowledgement is also made to the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs, the Social Service Office of Aceh and ChildFund Indonesia for their collaborative and supportive efforts in implementing the component of the project focussing on Aceh.

The UNESCAP staff responsible for coordinating the project were Ms Kim Xuan Thi Nguyen and Mr. Marco Roncarati of the UNESCAP Emerging Social Issues Division (ESID), under the guidance of the Division Director Ms Thelma Kay. Administrative assistance on the project was provided by Ms Lawan Schneider, Ms Sunee Chutiniyomkarn, Ms Ployparn Khunmuang and Ms Preeyamas Mayura, all of ESID.

The report for the discussion paper was produced by the ESID consultants Mr. Rusydi Syahra and Mr. Nathan Knoll. Revisions and editorial work were undertaken by Mr. Marco Roncarati. Cover photography is by Mr. Nathan Knoll.

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Abbreviations

BRR	<i>Badan Pelaksana Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi</i> (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias)
CCs	Child Centres
CCSs	Child Centered Spaces
DEPSOS	<i>Departemen Sosial</i> (Social Department, Ministry of Social Affairs, Indonesia)
DINSOS	<i>Dinas Sosial</i> (Social Service Office at the provincial or district levels)
EAP	Emergency Action Plan
ESID	Emerging Social Issues Division (of UNESCAP)
IDPs	internally displaced persons
INGOs	international NGOs
MOSA	Ministry of Social Affairs (of Indonesia)
OSCY	orphans and separated children and youth
PTSD	post-traumatic stress disorder
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

Executive Summary

The occurrence of natural disasters, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, are largely unpredictable. With advancements in science and technology, early warning systems can be implemented to help save people's lives. However, even with such systems in place, the impact of natural disasters can be enormous; both in terms of loss of life and property, and the trauma experienced by the victims, which may last throughout their lives. While man-made disasters, such as conflict, can be prevented, natural disasters can only be mitigated in order to minimize the losses and hardship suffered, not only during disasters but also in the process of restoration and rehabilitation.

In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia, the activities of hundreds of national and international organizations were directed toward mitigating the impact of the catastrophe and helping to restore the essential living conditions of the survivors. Some three years after the disaster, physical reconstruction of housing and public facilities has nearly come to completion. The process of social rehabilitation, in regard to capacity development and empowerment to enhance community resilience, will take much longer. The loss of religious and community leaders, who provided moral and social guidance in many communities, has significantly reduced people's ability to face personal loss and taken away the social support they need to face adversity as a unified, cohesive group. It will take years for a community to nurture potential leaders to replace those who were tragically taken by the tsunami.

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) works to mitigate the impact of natural disasters in Aceh and other areas of the Asia-Pacific region by exploring ways in which partnerships among stakeholders can be strengthened in order to enhance community resilience. This can help international and local agencies to improve their disaster response mechanisms, in terms of both physical and psychological restoration, and enable Governments in Asia and the Pacific to improve their technical capacity to recover from natural disasters through community-based partnerships. In this discussion paper and the component of the project from where it comes, special emphasis is given to orphans, separated children and youth (OSCY) since they are among the most vulnerable to the direct impact of natural disasters and the subsequent course of events that take place following disasters. In addition to issues related to separation from parents and relatives, child neglect, abuse and trafficking are problems that may occur in the aftermath of a tsunami or other natural disasters. Therefore, child protection is an important strategy for local governments, international aid agencies and NGOs to incorporate into their disaster response policies and practices.

Working in cooperation with the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs and other stakeholders, UNESCAP conducted two training workshops in Banda Aceh and two policy advocacy meetings in Jakarta to develop a comprehensive approach to meet the needs of OSCY during and after disasters and to help formulate government policies and practices that would effectively respond to these needs. The workshop participants shared their field experiences and lessons learned from the 2004 Aceh tsunami. Their thoughts, ideas and suggestions from the workshop discussions contributed to the information in this discussion paper. The same is so with regard to participants from government agencies, the judiciary, academia, civil society and the media who took part in the meetings in Jakarta.

Some of the key lessons learnt and recommendations that came about as a result of the project are as follows:

1. In Aceh, poor disaster-response coordination among stakeholders was a main factor which caused delays in distributing emergency assistance to a large number of victims since there was a lack of clear policies in place regarding the process. This also contributed to unequal and unjust distribution of assistance. For example, some people who were not eligible for housing assistance received more than one house from different aid agencies, while many legitimate victims were still living in temporary shelters. As a consequence, greater efforts are needed to establish more effective partnerships and strategies as well as communally-accepted perceptions of fairness.
2. The voices of youth should be heard and their participation encouraged in the process of social reconstruction, community rebuilding and community empowerment. Young people, especially girls and young women, have shown great potential in this regard; they provided very insightful ideas during the project workshop discussions. Unless opportunities are created to transform their energy into action, through supporting youth organizations and other means, this valuable potential will remain idle and social problems could be exacerbated.
3. Comprehensive information systems and data bases need to be established so that reliable information is available to avoid unnecessary panic and dedicated programmes can cater for the needs of children and youth. In addition, comprehensive referral and support systems are required to ensure the most effective family tracing and reunification procedures possible and address the problems young people face.
4. Sharing of traditional and modern knowledge about why natural disasters occur and training on what can be done to prepare for future calamities are needed. Such things can not only improve preparedness for disasters, but, more importantly, give people greater serenity of mind with the knowledge that they can better protect themselves. This knowledge can also help people recover from the psychological trauma caused by the tsunami.
5. There is a need to develop frameworks that enable effective action when natural disasters strike. This can be done through participatory risk assessment and risk management entities as well as clear action plans which are put into effect during and following disastrous events.
6. Given the challenges related to child centres, it is important to enhance the capacity of family and community care as well as enhance the training of social workers and the provision of services to best offer protection for children and youth in distress. Clear assessments are required to determine the need for additional child centres. Moreover, teachers and health-care workers should be sensitized to the need to increase the access of children and youth to “friendly spaces”, where young people are not exposed to risks, such as drugs and violence, and can develop in a positive manner, physically, intellectually and socially.
7. Social workers and community groups should be trained in how to promote and protect the rights of children and youth, while general awareness of such issues should be increased among all stakeholders. Furthermore, mechanisms to prevent violence and abuse as well as to improve reporting when they happen should be enhanced.

8. In Aceh, many young people are at risk of drug use, dropping out of school, crime and other anti-social behaviour; there are also cases of exploitation and employment of child labour. Work should be undertaken to engage greater community participation, including that of religious and customary leaders, in order to increase awareness of the negative consequences of such behaviour.

9. More opportunities should be provided for counselling, access to education, livelihood development and skills and entrepreneurship training so as to empower young people and benefit the communities they are from.

10. The media, research institutions and other relevant parties should play an active role in disseminating accurate information and conducting studies on the most effective ways to engender greater community resilience and enhance effective responses to natural disasters for the benefit of young people as well as other community members.

11. Aid agencies and international NGOs (INGOs) should carefully plan their exit strategies with local affiliates and other local stakeholders so as to transfer relevant knowledge and technology in order to reduce dependence on external assistance and empower communities to be better able to respond to disasters.

I. Introduction

There has been significant progress in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh three years after the 2004 tsunami devastated coastal areas. Many homes, schools, and health facilities have been rebuilt. Children are back in school, economic growth has accelerated throughout the region and key sectors, from tourism to fisheries, are on the rebound. Although the construction of houses has not totally been completed, 69,000 have been constructed with another 7,000 to go according to Dr. Ir. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Director of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR).¹ In addition, most internally displaced persons (IDPs) have moved into their new homes which were built for them on the sites of their previous homes or in newly created communities, others are still waiting for permanent homes. It is anticipated that the reconstruction of Aceh will be completed by the end of 2009.

Many international aid agencies are now gradually pulling out of Aceh and moving on to help disaster victims in other corners of the world, leaving local government agencies and NGOs to complete the immense task of helping bring the disaster victims back to normal life. The international aid agencies have implemented many activities to help to ease the insurmountable problems faced by OSCY, their families and communities. These activities have ranged from providing psychosocial and livelihood support to restoring health and sanitation services, family tracing and reunification, and construction of temporary shelters, permanent homes and public facilities. However, there still remains much work to be done to help Aceh communities build up their resilience which has been so significantly weakened by the double catastrophes of a 30-year civil conflict and the tsunami.

It is difficult to determine how long the psychosocial rehabilitation of the Aceh people will take. With a multidimensional approach and a concerted effort by all concerned stakeholders, the time needed to restore Aceh communities back to normal will be significantly shortened. Nevertheless, unrealistic expectations could lead to potential conflicts, especially if there are different mandates and procedures related to partnerships. Difficulties could arise with multi-level partnerships and with multiple roles and responsibilities of partners at various levels engaged in planning, policy making, service provision, monitoring and resourcing. The local government has the most important role in partnering with communities as service providers in the effort to decentralize responsibilities.²

¹ Presentation by Dr. Ir. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto at an Interagency Meeting in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, 4 June 2007.

² Report of the National Meeting on Policy Advocacy for Enhancing Community Resilience to Natural Disasters Focusing on Children and Youth, UNESCAP, Jakarta, Indonesia, 21-23 March 2007.



Figure 1: While physical damage is obvious, the psychological effects due to losses from the tsunami are often harder to assess and manage.

The Emerging Social Issues Division (ESID) of UNESCAP, in partnership with national and local government agencies, civil society and community organizations, implemented a project to mitigate the impact of natural disasters on vulnerable groups and specifically, to strengthen community support to OSCY and their families in Aceh. Two similar projects on building community resilience to natural disasters were implemented in India and Sri Lanka by other Divisions of UNESCAP. Whereas much work was accomplished by a large number of aid agencies to help restore the life of disaster victims in Aceh, both physically and psychologically, UNESCAP focused primarily on mitigating the impact of natural disasters in the community context. The main objectives of this project were to learn from the vast experience of people working in the field in response to the Aceh disaster and to discover the extent to which partnerships among stakeholders, especially in enhancing community resilience to natural disasters, were practised in Aceh. This information is expected to help improve disaster response mechanisms in the future. Another expected benefit of this project is that Governments in the Asia-Pacific region will be able to improve their technical capacity to recover from natural disasters through community-based partnerships.

Special focus has been directed toward OSCY since these groups are the most vulnerable to the impact of natural disasters and the subsequent course of events that take place following a disaster. In this context, it is important for local governments, international aid agencies and NGOs to incorporate child protection strategies – which address the needs of child and youth separated from parents and relatives, as well as child neglect, abuse and trafficking – into their disaster response policies. It is also important for Governments to recognize problems related to child abuse, trafficking and child labour

and enforce the legal regulations that seek to protect children from criminal acts. Two years before the tsunami the Government of Indonesia promulgated a special law on child protection,³ which has become the reference for subsequent regulations and policies regarding child protection in the country.

Three years after the disaster, life in Aceh is going on but the people are still striving to return to normalcy. Financial, technical and material support from disaster relief agencies, business organizations and caring individuals has helped many Acehnese disaster victims out of their economic difficulties. Many organizations have offered skills trainings in agriculture, machinery, sewing and other income generating activities. Thousands of tsunami survivors in Banda Aceh also received motorized *becaks* (tricycles), a popular form of public transport. Cash-for-work has been another form of financial aid offered by relief organizations to help people meet their basic daily needs, and micro-finance programmes, such as micro-credit and Grameen-style banks, have made it possible for a large number of tsunami survivors to start small businesses.

Children who lost loved ones in the disaster are often being cared for by single surviving parents, siblings or relatives. Some have ended up in 'children's homes',⁴ either because they lack caregivers or simply for economic reasons since their primary caregivers cannot afford to look after them. The management of hundreds of 'child centres',⁵ previously implemented by aid agencies, is now being transferred to communities. This process has its own set of problems, due to insufficient financial resources and a lack of human resources with appropriate skills and expertise to assume responsibility for these centres. Such problems may constrain the smooth operation of the centres in the future. Accordingly immediate steps should be taken to increase the awareness of senior community members on the importance of their roles in helping to raise the children in their communities into self-reliant and responsible adults.

The gradual phasing out of direct service activities, reducing the number of staff and fieldworkers to a minimal level and transferring ownership of child centres to communities are all part of the exit strategies of many aid organizations. Accordingly there is an urgent need to design and implement a sustainable strategy for communities with OSCY to anticipate the absence of the INGOs. Despite the reduction of direct livelihood and psychosocial support for tsunami survivors, a number of disaster relief organizations are still playing an advisory role in community rebuilding and strengthening. Some NGOs, for example, have been actively involved in training families and other caregivers with OSCY on good practices in child rearing and protection. In addition, a number of local

³ Directorate of Social Services for Children, Ministry of Social Affairs (2002): (*Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 2002 tentang Perlindungan Anak* (Republic of Indonesia Law No. 23 Year 2002).

⁴ A children's home or *Panti Sosial Asuhan Anak* (PSAA) is literally a social institution for the fostering of children, sometimes called an 'orphanage' which follow the understanding of an institution for neglected children as defined above by the Ministry of Social Services, though it is also clear that these homes care primarily for children who still have one or both parents, some actually living in the vicinity of the institutions (Martin and Sudrajat, 2006).

⁵ Child centres (CCs) differ from children's homes in that the former are mostly temporary buildings constructed by helping organizations immediately after the tsunami to provide children with psychosocial support, and with all facilities needed to carry out their age related activities. Child centre is a generic term for all institutions that provide such services. Unlike a children's home a CC does not provide accommodation or boarding for the children. The children stay with their parents or relatives within the vicinity of a child centre.

and international NGOs are involved in formulating national child protection policies by joining the interagency group coordinated by DINSOS (*Dinas Sosial* or Social Service Office at the provincial or district levels) to draft the *qanun* (local law) on child protection. Articles on how to protect children from trafficking, abuses and child labour are also being included in the *qanun*.

The *Departemen Sosial* (Social Department) of the Ministry of Social Affairs (DEPSOS) and DINSOS government agencies at the provincial level display the capacity to fulfil their duties in helping tsunami survivors in general, and the families with OSCY in particular. However, due to the many problems related to child protection and child development in post-tsunami Aceh that have not been adequately addressed, DEPSOS needs to increase both human and financial resources to tackle these problems. The mobilization of more than 200 trained *petugas kesejahteraan sosial kecamatan* (PKSK),⁶ or sub-district social welfare workers, in Aceh should contribute significantly to addressing these issues at the community level.

Social reconstruction involves the application of many of the social sciences, including anthropology, sociology, social psychology and related disciplines. Social reconstruction is part of the total effort to improve human security and necessitates awareness on the part of the communities of the importance of acquiring knowledge and skills derived from these disciplines in order to be able to serve the best interest of OSCY.

The 2004 tsunami gave rise to a new appreciation of the critical importance of disaster risk reduction. Aceh is a disaster prone area and according to some experts, it will experience a major earthquake on average once every 22 years. Although future earthquakes may not cause a tsunami equivalent to the one in 2004 for some time, Aceh still remains highly susceptible to more devastating events in the years to come.

⁶ In the Aceh context the use of the term PKSK is preferable to PSM (*Petugas Sosial Masyarakat*, Community Social Worker) or PSK (*Petugas Sosial Kecamatan*, Sub-district Social Worker). The latter abbreviation is avoided for its already bad connotation as *Pekerja Seks Komersial* (Commercial Sex Worker).

II. Methodology

This discussion paper is a compilation of a series of project reports commissioned by UNESCAP to document project activities aimed at enhancing community resilience to natural disasters, focusing on children and youth in Aceh. These activities included two training workshops in Banda Aceh, in which the majority of participants were representatives from some of the communities worst hit by the tsunami, and two policy advocacy meetings in Jakarta in which the participants were mainly representatives from Government ministries and civil society organizations whose programmes were focused on child protection.

Other sources of data, information and documentation contained in this discussion paper are listed at the end of the report. In addition, the knowledge and lessons learned by the UNESCAP consultants who have worked with disaster relief in Aceh are also included in this discussion paper.

III. Perspectives on Community Resilience

Resilience in the context of natural disasters may be defined as the ability of an individual, household, community or eco-system to withstand external shocks. From a social perspective, this ability may be based on the entitlement, enfranchisement, empowerment and or capabilities of the individual, household or community. The Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs defines social resilience as the capacity of a community to manage the risks that may result from social, economic and political changes. Some indicators to measure this capacity include:

- The ability of a community to provide protection to its vulnerable population and to those experiencing social problems;
- The level of community participation in social organizations;
- The ability of community members to prevent, manage and/or control social conflict and acts of violence; and
- The ability of a community to preserve local wisdom and to manage natural and social resources.

Social policy as a strategy, while being particularly concerned with the most disadvantaged groups in society, has the broader objective of constructing societies with greater social cohesion, equity and confidence. Community empowerment as a strategy to enhance resilience requires an emphasis on personal and collective responsibility, citizenship and participation. This does not remove the need for institutions and programmes, but it changes the focus of their mission. Institutions can ensure participation of members of the community by focusing on their strengths. This will not happen without major changes on the part of the receivers as well as the providers of social services; or without adequate levels of resources.⁷

Generations of exclusion, dependency and helplessness has created a culture (and an economy) of victimization, based on rights and entitlements, that will not transform overnight into a culture of responsibility, participation and contribution. Institutions have built internal cultures based on problem management that will need to adapt to new ways of doing things. Moreover, making the right level of resources available to assist excluded persons and groups to participate actively in society will only happen if society is persuaded of the value of their contribution.

⁷ Collin, Dominique (2005). "Resilience, Social Action and Inclusion: The Philia Perspective" *Philia Electronic Magazine*.

Given the above perspective, community resilience to natural disasters can be viewed in two dimensions, namely (1) the preparedness of a community in anticipating the coming of a natural disaster, and (2) the capacity of a community to regain normalcy in the aftermath of a disaster. These two dimensions of resilience are equally important, but in the aftermath of the 2004 Aceh tsunami, a large emphasis has been placed on the second dimension of community resilience in order to help people regain normalcy.

IV. Improving the Resilience of Communities with OSCY

Three years after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, the people of Aceh are gradually returning to a sense of normalcy. The improvement in living conditions and the development of child protection of the communities with OSCY should be considered in the framework of three phases, as follows:

A. Emergency Phase

This phase lasted eight months, from immediately after the tsunami to August 2005. During this phase, psychosocial support for children, youth and adults was one of the main areas of focus. Psychosocial support services took the form of counselling for children, youth and adults and were targeted toward reducing traumatic stress caused by the tsunami. Other activities included informal learning facilities for children and youth. For several months children and youth could not attend school because most of their school buildings had been either wiped out or badly damaged by the tsunami. Educational activities were provided directly in the temporary camps and in barracks and tents where the tsunami survivors took shelter after their homes and property were destroyed. Health care and minimal livelihood support were made available to help the survivors recover both physically and mentally.

During the emergency period attention was given equally to both psychological problems and physical needs, such as food, shelter, health and sanitation. As time passed the emphasis on trauma reduction was diminished as was the number of organizations providing psychosocial support. Table 1 below contains a general list of organizations providing psychosocial support for OSCY in Aceh and the duration of their projects which reflects a gradual reduction in psychological support for survivors of the tsunami.

Child protection in general and psychosocial support activities for children in Aceh started long before the area was hit by the double catastrophes of the earthquake and tsunami on that fateful morning of 26 December 2004. A number of international organizations, such as UNICEF and Save the Children, had been operating in the area since 1976 to help reduce the trauma experienced by thousands of children as a result of the 30-year armed conflict between the Indonesian military forces and the Aceh separatist movement. The tsunami brought an immediate influx of hundreds of other organizations along with voluntary social workers because of the magnitude of the destruction and the urgent needs of the survivors. In spite of the influx, it has been beyond the capability of the limited number of organizations to provide protection and psychosocial support for the tens of thousands of children who became victims of the disaster.

Table 1: Organizations that provide psychosocial support for OSCY in Aceh

Name of organization	Kinds of Psychosocial Programmes	Duration
UNICEF	Educational activities, psychosocial structured activities	January 2005 – December 2008
Save the Children	Restoring physical and emotional well-being of children through traditional games, dance, songs and stories	Long-term
World Vision	Child Friendly Spaces, training for children facilitators	Long-term
International Medical Corps (IMC)	Talking groups, psychosocial activities, psycho-education, individual counselling	January 2005 – December 2005
Yayasan Rebana Indonesia	Sport activities, team building, providing toys for children's activities	July 2005 – June 2008
ChildFund Indonesia	Creative activities about how children protect themselves as they move from barracks to permanent housing	Long-term
Church World Services	Fun and educational activities and early child development activities	January 2005 – ongoing
American Red Cross	Training of teachers and community facilitators, community-based psychosocial support	September 2005 – December 2008
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Belgium	Talking groups, psychosocial activities, psycho-education, individual counselling	January 2005 – December 2005

In addition to the child protection and psychosocial support programmes operated by international aid agencies and NGOs, the local government and private institutions have also been providing protection to thousands of OSCY, both those who are victims of civil conflict and survivors of the tsunami. Table 2 below lists 174 orphanages (or *Panti Asuhan*) which are currently caring for more than 14,000 OSCY. The districts of Aceh Utara and Pidie contain the highest number of orphanages and clients. Most of the OSCY who get protection and live in these orphanages are victims of the conflict. The OSCY who are tsunami survivors are being taken care of by orphanages in the tsunami hit areas, such as Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Aceh Barat and Aceh Jaya.

In addition to the orphanages that have been registered by the Office of Social Affairs as shown in Table 2, there are some small scale orphanages, each run by well-to-do families, who provide housing and daily necessities for less than 20 OSCY. These smaller institutions offer English and computer courses to provide extra-curricular activities for the OSCY under their care and as additional sources of income.

Basically almost all areas in Aceh affected by the earthquake and tsunami have been provided with humanitarian aid. Banda Aceh, considered by some as overcrowded with both national and international aid agencies and NGOs with headquarters in the city, received the most benefits. Soon many organizations set up and operated child centres in many areas outside Banda Aceh. Organizations, such as ChildFund, closed down its Child Centered Spaces (CCSs) in Banda Aceh and concentrated its psychological support services in 20 CCSs located in other districts, including Aceh Besar, Aceh Barat, Aceh

Table 2: Number of orphanages and clients in Aceh Province as of March 2006

Location: District/ Municipality	No. of Institutions that are		Total no. of Institutions	No. of Clients in Institutions that are		Total no. of Clients
	Govt.	Private		Govt.	Private	
1. Banda Aceh	2	5	7	205	170	375
2. Sabang	-	1	1	-	30	30
3. Aceh Besar	1	9	10	80	871	951
4. Pidie	1	25	26	125	1,855	1,980
5. Bireuen	-	9	9	-	680	680
6. Aceh Utara	1	66	67	60	5,693	5,753
7. Aceh Timur	-	2	2	-	205	205
8. Langsa	-	3	3	-	240	240
9. Aceh Tamiang	-	1	1	-	40	40
10. Aceh Barat	1	3	4	160	125	285
11. Aceh Jaya	-	1	1	-	80	80
12. Aceh Tengah	1	8	9	60	615	675
13. Bener Meuriah	-	2	2	-	110	110
14. Aceh Tenggara	1	13	14	80	760	840
15. Gayo Lues	-	8	8	-	370	370
16. Aceh Selatan	1	7	8	90	350	440
17. Aceh Singkil	-	1	1	-	100	100
18. Lhok Seumawe	-	10	10	-	1,078	1,078
19. Aceh Barat Daya	-	4	4	-	455	455
Total	9	178	187	860	13,827	14,687

Source: Office of Social Affairs, Aceh Province, 2006.

Jaya, Bireuen, Pidie and Meulaboh. Agencies and their local partners operating child centres up to 2006 can be seen in Table 3 below.

Many of the child centres in Table 3 are no longer operational due to the fact that their presence is no longer needed. Immediately after the tsunami most of the centres were established in the vicinity of temporary shelters provided for disaster victims. When the IDPs and their families moved to permanent houses built by aid agencies in their original home locations, many centres lost their clients and closed down. Therefore, most of the child centres that are still operational are located in the permanent settlement areas.

A number of international agencies and NGOs, depicted in Table 4 below, operated their child centres jointly with government agencies and local NGOs due to limited human resources to manage the child centres that were widely scattered in the many disaster areas. For example, Pusaka Indonesia, which runs five child centres, is an affiliate of UNICEF. ChildFund Indonesia also shared the operation of their child centres with a number of local NGOs, and Save the Children worked in cooperation with Dinas Sosial in the management of their centres. Muhammadiyah, one of the biggest Islamic organizations that has long established educational institutions, health centres and orphanages in many provinces of Indonesia, joined together with other stakeholders in providing psychosocial support for children in their seven child centres. Some of the financial resources needed to establish and run the centres were made available through cooperation with Youth of the Street (YOTS), an Australian NGO.

Table 3: Child Centres (CCs) operated by international agencies and local partners

Agency	Number of CCs	Location (District) & No. of CCs
Save the Children	26	Banda Aceh (4), Aceh Besar (2), Aceh Utara (3), Lhok Seumawe (2), Bireuen (5), Pidie (9)
ChildFund Indonesia	20	Aceh Besar (10), Aceh Barat (1), Bireuen (7), Aceh Jaya (2)
UNICEF	20	Banda Aceh (2), Aceh Besar (5), Aceh Barat (3), Pidie (3), Aceh Utara (2), Aceh Jaya (2), Nias (2), Nagan Raya (1)
World Vision	11	Aceh Besar (6), Aceh Barat (3), Aceh Jaya (2)
PLAN International	9	Aceh Besar (9)
Enfants Refugies du Monde/Adista	4	Banda Aceh (1), Aceh Besar (3)
ILO-IPEC and YAS	3	Banda Aceh (2), Aceh Besar (1)
PKPA and Partners	3	Banda Aceh (1), Aceh Besar (1), Aceh Barat (1)
Islamic Relief	2	Banda Aceh (1) Aceh Besar (1)
Children of the Earth (COTE)	1	Aceh Besar

Source: UNICEF, Updated September 2006.

Table 4: Child Centres (CCs) operated by national agencies and NGOs

Agency	Number of CCs	Location (District) & No. of CCs
Dinas Sosial (DINSOS) Aceh	5	Aceh Besar (3), Pidie (1), Aceh Barat (1)
Meneg PP (State Ministry for Women Empowerment)	5	Aceh Besar (1), Pidie (1), Aceh Utara (1), Aceh Jaya (1), Nagan Raya (1)
Muhammadiyah	7	Aceh Besar (2), Aceh Barat (3), Aceh Utara (1), Pidie (1)
Pusaka Indonesia	4	Banda Aceh (1), Nias (2), Aceh Jaya (1)

Source: UNICEF, Updated April 2006.

While the primary function of child centres is to provide psychosocial support and temporary educational activities for tsunami survivors, the surrounding communities also benefited by their presence. Box 1 depicts the many ways that World Vision's Child Friendly Spaces (CFSs) helped parents and communities in protecting their children. The same is also true for child centres operated by other organizations.

Immediately following the earthquake and tsunami, a number of organizations held a series of discussions to design guiding principles to be observed by all organizations, both national and international, when engaging in programming psychosocial interventions.

Box 1: World Vision's Child Friendly Spaces

Child Friendly Spaces (CFSs) is an intervention that World Vision uses for children who have experienced complex humanitarian emergencies. CFSs offer children a safe place to play, make friends, learn and do homework. At the same time, they provide staff with a chance for interaction and importantly the opportunity to identify children who are not responding well to interventions and need additional support. Playing is healing for children. Providing a safe space is instrumental in helping children deal with their grief.

While CFSs provide children with a space to play, they are also a doorway to rebuilding communities. CFSs serve as centres for educational campaigns, ranging from child rights to nutritional awareness. CFSs also allow parents to return to work, as they know their children are being safely taken care of. This affects families and communities positively as it helps parents return to routines, earn income to provide for their children, and restores a sense of dignity and hope. Psychosocial support is also important as it provides a sensitive and supportive response to traumatized children by engaging them in interactive settings – such as schools, homes and play areas. Psychosocial support is an essential component for children to experience healing through engaging in creative activities.

By taking a holistic approach to child protection, World Vision believes its strategy for protecting children will be effective in target communities. The strategy involves prevention of abuse through effective policies, links with government interdisciplinary task forces and community awareness. It involves rapid response to abuse cases through the implementation of clear and precise protocols and it also involves the participation of children and communities in understanding and owning the articles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Source: World Vision Asia Tsunami 12 Months Anniversary.htm. Accessed: 11 June 2006.

These psychosocial support principles were developed collaboratively as early as January 2005 by the Interagency Psychosocial Working Group.⁸ However, primary responsibility for following the guiding principles lied within each organization. Unfortunately, not all of the organizations were aware of the guiding principles or respected them. Coordination amongst the various agencies implementing psychosocial programmes was problematic due to differences in terminology and no clear indication of who was in charge of coordinating the psychosocial endeavours. Organizations which were experienced in providing child protection elsewhere in the world participated in formulating the guiding principles and consistently followed them while others used their own guidelines in their operations. ChildFund was one of the few organizations which were actively engaged in awareness-raising with community and temporary camp members on the issues of child protection during relocation and resettlement activities. They also trained other organizations, both local NGOs and INGOs, on how to establish protection measures.

There are some notable differences between the programmes run by the international aid agencies and NGOs and local institutions. The international agencies conduct their activities in specially designed buildings under various names, such as child centres, child

⁸ Interagency Psychosocial Working Group (Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Health, UNICEF, WHO, Save the Children, Turkish Red Cross, MSF Holland and Belgium, CARE, IOM, ICMC, North West Medical Team, PULIH, and RPUK). *Psychosocial Support Principles*, January 2005.

friendly spaces, and child centred spaces. These are places where children can come to play, read, draw, receive counselling and take part in a host of other activities run by the organizations. The children themselves live with their families, relatives, or caregivers in nearby barracks or in newly constructed housing. Local institutions, which are mostly run by religious organizations, operate their activities in more traditional ways. They provide children with food, boarding and other daily necessities, but the children must help out with cleaning, cooking and the maintenance of their boarding houses. The income to run these orphanages usually comes from many sources, including the Ministry of Social Affairs, regular donors, and from religious alms and charities.

International aid agencies and NGOs joined hands with their local partners to provide help for tsunami victims during the emergency period and subsequent phases. Box 2 below describes the extent of assistance that UNICEF offered tsunami victims in cooperation with local partners. This caption shows that the tracing of families or relatives of children and youth who became separated from each other by the catastrophe and reuniting them were important undertakings during the emergency phase. Government and non-government agencies worked together to set up a registration and tracing system for children who were unaccompanied or looking for their families. The Family Tracing and Reunification (FTR) Network was established and it registered 2,831 children unaccompanied or separated from their parents (January 2005 – May 2006).

**Box 2: The extent of UNICEF's immediate assistance
for Aceh tsunami victims**

Immediately after the tsunami, UNICEF rushed in to deliver medical supplies and since then has continued to support basic health care for children. In this massive effort, 1,113,494 children under 15 have been immunized against measles, 493,699 children have received vitamin A supplements, 26,040 pregnant women have been supplied with iron tablets, and 199,924 women and children have received insecticide-treated bed nets to protect them against malaria. UNICEF has also provided 14 ambulances to 11 districts in Aceh, and 2,000 midwives are being supported with training or supplies to help ensure safe deliveries in temporary encampments. UNICEF was then helping to construct new village health posts that would enable the people of Aceh to achieve a level of care they had never experienced before.

UNICEF has been working closely with local education officials and communities in affected areas to construct hundreds of temporary schools, incorporating 'child-friendly' standards that include stronger foundations to protect against earthquakes, separate water/sanitation facilities for girls and boys, improved access for disabled students, and better classrooms and playgrounds. UNICEF has also been assisting the Government of Indonesia to develop systems of foster care for separated children.

Working with local partners, UNICEF opened and continues to operate 21 special children's centres that offer learning, counselling and play activities in the temporary encampments. Nearly 20,000 children have participated in games and recreational activities designed to help them cope with trauma. UNICEF and its partners have registered 2,242 separated and unaccompanied children and reunited 376 children with their families. To protect children from violence and abuse, 140 policewomen were trained and deployed at the community level.

Source: UNICEF, 2006, Building Back Better.

About 700 of these children and youth had lost both parents and another 1,301 did not know the whereabouts of both parents, indicating that they were orphans.⁹

While there are differences in the numbers of children reportedly in need of help, these numbers are tragically huge. A detailed list released by DINSOS Aceh (Aceh Provincial Social Service Office) in February 2007 shows the number of vulnerable children having various kinds of problems caused by the tsunami and other sources.

It can be inferred from the data in Table 5 below, which is drawn from the DINSOS list, that natural and manmade disasters have created significant problems in Aceh which are beyond the capacity of the local government to tackle. This highlights the need for serious attention from all concerned stakeholders. Among the difficulties encountered by DINSOS in implementing its programmes are a lack of professional social workers and the absence of government social institutions at the sub-district level. These difficulties have resulted in the delay in information flow and shortcomings in data collection and registration of people with social welfare problems. Social institutions at the sub-district level in the form of social service centres are urgently needed to mobilize social workers at the village level.¹⁰

Table 5: List of disadvantaged children in Aceh

No.	Category	Total
1	Children lost one or both parents from the tsunami	5,653
2	Separated children and youth	852
3	Children lost of one or both parents from other causes	68,181
4	Neglected children	15,919
5	Children with disabilities	19,546
6	Children victims of household violence	5,909
7	Street children	590
8	Children victims of narcotics and other addictive substances	1,487
	Total	118,137

Source: PowerPoint Presentation of Child Protection Program DINSOS-NAD, 2007.

A former head of DINSOS Aceh stated that the total number of unaccompanied children could be as large as 40,000, owing to the fact that the tsunami survivors in remote areas had not been covered by the registration system. He suggested that the establishment of a comprehensive referral system from the village level up to the provincial level was needed in order to effectively trace the whereabouts of all the affected children. Otherwise some children victimized by both the armed conflict and the tsunami might go unnoticed and become a serious security problem in the future.

⁹ Martin, Florence and Tata Sudrajat (2006). *A Rapid Assessment of Children's Homes in post-Tsunami Aceh*. Jakarta: Ministry of Social Affairs, Republic of Indonesia and Save the Children.

¹⁰ DINSOS Provinsi NAD (2007). Program DINSOS Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dalam Bidang Perlindungan Anak (DINSOS Aceh Province Programme for Child Protection), PowerPoint presentation on *The Role of Community in Caring for Separated Children*, Banda Aceh, 20 April 2007.

B. Rehabilitation Phase

In this phase, which lasted approximately one year, IDPs gradually returned to their previous dwelling places by moving from temporary shelters to newly constructed houses built on their own land, mostly by international agencies, NGOs and BRR. Some survivors were able to go back to work and earn money to support their families. Moreover, some children, whose school buildings had been rebuilt, were able to resume normal educational activities. Others had to travel a long distance from their homes for schooling, either because a replacement school in their community had not yet been built or because it was not deemed to be feasible to build a school on the former site.

During this phase a number of child centres were built all over Aceh to provide extra curricular activities for children since a large number of children had not yet been able to return to normal schooling. The main focus of these activities shifted gradually from providing psychosocial and basic livelihood support to transferring the responsibility for child protection to parents and relatives with affected children and youth and their communities. The parents were organized in *Komite Perlindungan Anak* or child protection committees and children and youth who were active participants at the child centres were given the opportunity to help manage their own activities. The committees, composed of children and youth, were called *Komite Anak* or child committees.

In order to provide a more holistic approach to family-based care, the focus of aid agencies shifted to livelihood support for tsunami survivors and their communities, which targeted OSCY and their caregivers. A large amount of money was made available by the Government and aid organizations to run programmes with this focus. Box 3 below summarizes the type of assistance provided by ChildFund during the rehabilitation phase and its plan into the next phase.

The micro-financing programmes launched by ChildFund and other agencies were not without their problems. According to a manager of one child centre who was responsible for disbursing micro-credit loans, the outstanding debt from these loans was as high as 50 per cent. There were mixed reasons for this; some beneficiaries had no intention of repaying loans because they perceived the money to be a charitable donation, like what was provided during the emergency phase. Others were not able to repay loans because their small business initiatives were not successful and they did not accrue the profits that they were hoping for. Others still spent their profits on material goods. World Vision had similar experiences in providing financial assistance, and said in their 2005 tsunami report “Moving away from cash assistance to loans for long-term sustainability is difficult in some circumstances because many individuals do not have the necessary collateral to receive a loan. Individuals also want and need to use resources for short-term needs, rather than long-term investments”.¹¹ Another reason is the lack of knowledge of running a business or, in the case of some of those who used the money for farming, a lack of knowledge and skills in agriculture.

Cash-for-work programmes were another form of financial aid offered to help thousands of people to earn money. This was originally intended as a temporary solution to fill the basic needs of tsunami survivors and was made available only until construction projects were finished. Tens of thousands of men and women in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar and

¹¹ World Vision. (2005). Asia Tsunami Response: Anniversary Report, <http://www.wvi.org/wvi/publications/publications.htm>.

Box 3: ChildFund's activities during the rehabilitation phase

During the second year after the tsunami, ChildFund Indonesia conducted numerous activities including: initiating monitoring and referral mechanisms in 110 camps and host communities for orphaned and separated children that included family tracing and reunification; making provisions for essential water, food and sanitation facilities; initiating cash-for-work activities assisting more than 6,030 people; and training more than 300 youths in carpentry skills which helped in the construction of 28 jambos (community centres) with plans for building 8 additional sites in the subsequent year. ChildFund staff conducted training of 2,360 community animators, mobilizers, social workers and Child Well-Being Committee (CWBC) members in child protection issues and protocols. Thirty self-help groups formed for 707 vulnerable families in 23 villages and were trained in micro-finance. Staff from three local partner NGOs received training in social mobilization, accounting skills and monitoring and evaluation of projects.

Future Direction for Year-Three: ChildFund Indonesia is set to focus on three major initiatives: child protection, livelihood interventions and peace building. ChildFund is to continue to form new Child Well-Being Committees and train Committee Members in child protection standards and the needs of women in local communities. Community Facilitators are to be trained in each community to assess local needs and to implement programmes to assist children and women. ChildFund is to launch sustainable livelihood programmes in micro-enterprise development, with the intent to create sustainable income generating activities and increase the capacity of tsunami survivors to find sustainable employment or start their own small businesses. The peace building initiative is to centre on children and women from families formerly involved in what was a lengthy conflict between the Government and the separatist movement.

Source: ChildFund\InterAction.org Media.htm. Accessed: 24 February 2007.

other districts benefited from cash-for-work projects that were offered by a number of organizations. Box 4 below depicts Oxfam's cash-for-work projects in Aceh Besar and highlights the extensiveness of cash-for-work projects and the benefits they offered for a large number of people and their communities.

Women who took part in the projects used their earnings to meet the daily needs of their families. In most cases it was not possible to single out families with OSCY who received cash-for-work assistance since every able bodied person who was made jobless by the tsunami was eligible to receive money to support themselves and their families. However, in many cases helping the OSCY and their families also helped their communities as a whole. This community-based approach should be considered in designing all programmes which are intended to support the livelihoods of OSCY and their caregivers. The same also holds true for micro-financing programmes and revolving-fund programmes, which were offered in the form of micro-credit and Grameen-style banks that made it possible for a large number of tsunami survivors to start small businesses.

Special cash assistance was provided for families with OSCY by UNICEF over the three month period of February-March 2006 for basic necessities, including food, health and education. However, despite the good intentions of this organization, there were some local conditions which hampered the effectiveness of such assistance. A supervisor under this programme pointed out that since many OSCY were still living in temporary shelters and not yet able to attend normal schooling, they were not eligible for the

Box 4: Oxfam's cash-for-work concept: How it works

Cash-for-work programmes allow participants to make an investment in the communities they plan to return to while also giving people an immediate source of income. The projects have spin-off benefits, too. They inject money into the economy at the grassroots level, and they contribute to providing psychosocial care in the aftermath of disasters.

Many of Oxfam's cash-for-work programmes involve ridding villages of the debris and mud dumped across them by the tsunami. Oxfam provides the tools for the job – the shovels, wheelbarrows, hoes, hats, gloves and chainsaws – while the villagers provide the labour. To launch the projects, an Oxfam field team meets with leaders from villages to discuss what types of projects would benefit their communities most, and to encourage the participation of women. Often when the team suggests that women elect one of their own who could represent women's interests during the project planning, the idea is well-received by everybody.

Supervised by village leaders and monitored by Oxfam field teams, projects last 15 days or longer, if the scope of the work requires it. During the 15-day period, communities develop a three-month plan, which becomes the basis of a broader community action plan. Oxfam also helps support the cash-for-work projects with extra services. For example, the agency might provide pots and pans so that women can cook in the communities where the work is being carried out. Oxfam also helps pay for transportation to the work site.

Source: http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/emergencies/asian_floods_2004/latest_news/feature_story.2005-04-15.5930499889. Accessed: 4 September 2007.

assistance because it was only provided to OSCY and their families who had moved from tents and barracks to permanent houses. In Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar these programmes started as early as September 2005, with an average of Rp 450,000 (US \$50) given per family as a revolving fund, or under a Grameen-style bank or Islamic profit sharing bank (*bank muamalat*).

C. Reconstruction Phase

This phase started approximately one year after the rehabilitation phase began and is considered the most critical phase for both aid agencies and affected communities. In this period, most of the NGOs are transferring all matters related to child protection to the families and their communities. The communities are responsible for the operation of the child centres in order to give the most benefit for children and youth. An employee of a local NGO expressed concern about the ability of communities to manage these child centres, due to a lack of a feeling of ownership and awareness among community members, which could contribute to the failure of sustainability of child and youth centres in the future. A World Bank report also stated that effective participation of community members would take time and necessitated facilitators working with the communities to guide them in these processes.¹² This inevitably leads to a difficult trade-off between wanting swift reconstruction and ensuring that communities truly are leading the effort, with all members of the community having a voice in it.

¹² World Bank (2005). *Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias*, The World Bank Group, 25 June 2005, <http://www.worldbank.org>.

Two factors may have contributed to this situation. First, some community members have not yet fully recovered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by the tsunami. This may be overcome by effective psychosocial programmes, while some experts have found that the failure to address it may lead to trans-generational transmission of trauma, in the sense that the adults may transmit the trauma they have experienced to the younger generation, both through words and behaviour.¹³

A second factor may be related to the many years of armed conflict, which resulted in a high degree of uncertainty in the lives of many people of Aceh. This has caused people to principally look after themselves and have a low level of trust toward others. In a community with many members having such psychological problems and needs, systems of mutual help and cooperation are difficult to establish.

¹³ Gutlove, Paula and Gordon Thompson (2004). *Psychosocial Healing and Post-Conflict Social Reconstruction in the Former Yugoslavia*, Medicine, Conflict & Survival, Vol. 20, Number 2. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd. 2004.

V. Community Resilience Policy: Emphasis on OSCY Protection

The *Departemen Sosial* (Social Department) of the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs (DEPSOS) has developed policies and a plan of action to help children overcome problems caused by the tsunami. Some of these policies were implemented immediately in the aftermath of the disaster and some are still being implemented under the current phase of reconstruction. Most of the international agencies and NGOs which had their primary focus on psychosocial and livelihood support for children and youth during the two years after the tsunami, have begun to shift their policies and activities from direct involvement in psychosocial healing to transfer knowledge regarding child protection to community members so that they can assume responsibility for the management of hundreds of child centres located in many tsunami devastated areas in Aceh.

The Government of Indonesia has taken into account problems related to child abuse, child trafficking and child labour. Laws and regulations to protect children from criminal acts have been developed and enforced. For example, two years before the tsunami the Government of Indonesia promulgated a special law concerning child protection which was issued during the presidency of Megawati Soekarno Putri.¹⁴ This document has become the reference for subsequent regulations and policies regarding child protection. In 2003 a Presidential Decree was issued to establish the Indonesian Child Protection Commission, whose function was to implement a number of articles included in the law. Article 3 of the Presidential Decree reads: “The functions of the Commission include disseminating all stipulations in the Laws regarding child protection, to collect data and information, to receive public complaints, to conduct studies, monitoring, evaluation and control the implementation of child protection”.¹⁵ In addition, it has the task to present reports, suggestions, inputs and considerations to the President regarding child protection. However, a lack of institutional capacity in terms of human and financial resources has constrained the ability of this Commission to contribute very significantly in the rehabilitation and reconstruction processes in Aceh and other places where natural disasters have struck.

¹⁴ Directorate of Social Services for Children, Ministry of Social Affairs (2002): (*Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 2002 tentang Perlindungan Anak* (Republic of Indonesia Law No. 23 Year 2002).

¹⁵ Directorate of Social Services for Children, Ministry of Social Affairs (2003): (*Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Tahun 2003 tentang Perlindungan Anak* (Republic of Indonesia Law Year 2003).

After considering the different scenarios experienced by children and youth following the tsunami, DEPSOS outlined a special policy that took into account all possible measures to help OSCY affected by the tsunami. This policy was implemented in four phases of activities, as follows:

Phase I: Early identification. This activity was undertaken to collect information on OSCY identities using a standardized format. This activity was conducted in the living areas of victims who still had their homes after the tsunami and in the refugee camps.

Phase II: Assessment of OSCY problems. DEPSOS continuously deployed a number of social workers wherever OSCY in need could be found to detect the nature of the problems encountered by them (both physical and psychosocial).

Phase III: Temporary care. Temporary care for OSCY affected by the disaster was undertaken in trauma centres and in child protection areas which were constructed in the refugee centres.

Phase IV: Referral system. Referral systems are the most important part of the policy designed to tackle the problems of OSCY and have been implemented since the emergency phase. The referral systems take into account all possible options that are in the best interests of children and youth. DEPSOS stipulated five levels of referral, from the best option to the least favoured way of handling OSCY matters.

1. **Reunification:** This method of referral should be prioritized for the best interests of children. Parents are primarily responsible for nurturing and protecting their children.
2. **Family care:** Child care by direct or extended families is the second best referral system because such people are more likely to be concerned about the provision of children's basic rights and in protecting children from separation from their own cultures and families.
3. **Children's homes or institution care:** Temporary child care in children's homes is opted for when reunification (with members of nuclear families) has not yet been successful. This option is meant to ensure the protection of children's basic rights and to avoid the disengagement of children from their own cultures and families.
4. **Custodianship:** This mode of referral is used when biological parents have been determined by law for a number of reasons (such as death, mental impairment and abuse) as no longer being capable of taking care of their children.
5. **Adoption:** Adoption is the last option for OSCY and should be used only when one of the first four modes of referral is not possible. Adoptions should observe the existing laws regarding child protection and other related regulations.

The implementation of referral systems for OSCY has had some success up to the present. The reunification work conducted by the Family Tracing and Reunification (FTR) Network has been able to return more than 200 children to their biological parents and relatives. Some OSCY have been taken care of by close neighbours within their communities of origin. However, the most workable referral option up to this point has been to place thousands of OSCY in children's homes. Despite the belief of DEPSOS and its counterparts in Aceh that placing children in institutions is far from ideal, this option proved to be the most viable one after the tsunami struck. Since it is

assumed that there are still thousands of unregistered children who lost all members of their families and relatives and have been left neglected by other interventions, there is an inevitable need for the construction of more institutions and/or the expansion of the capacity of the existing ones. A Rapid Assessment of Children's Homes in Post-Tsunami Aceh, conducted by Martin and Sudrajat in 2006, reported that "since the tsunami 17 new children's homes were established in 2005 and two more are in the process of being established". These were expected to be completed and running by mid-2006.¹⁶ In addition, a number of organizations have reported plans for the building of many more institutions for 'tsunami orphans' and neglected children in the near future and/or an expansion of the capacity of the institutions they already run. A new large-capacity children's home named *Rumah Sejahtera Darussa'adah* was opened in Banda Aceh early in 2007.



Figure 2. Reunification is the most favoured option, given the best interests of children and youth.

¹⁶ Martin, Florence, and Tata Sudrajat (2006). *A Rapid Assessment of Children's Homes in post-Tsunami Aceh*. Jakarta: Ministry of Social Affairs, Republic of Indonesia and Save the Children.

VI. Transfer of Responsibility in Programme Management

Most aid organizations will leave Aceh in a matter of months or years, and many have already left. Their departure and the subsequent reduction of project activities are due partly to the exhaustion of funds or to the limited available resources that must be shared or allocated to help people in other parts of the world who are also suffering from both natural and man-made disasters. In Indonesia some of the resources from Aceh have already been shifted to help the victims of a strong earthquake that hit the city of Yogyakarta and the surrounding areas in the early morning of 27 May 2006. The impact of the quake, that took place in this densely populated area of Java, left more than 6,000 people dead, more than 10,000 others wounded, and more than 200,000 houses levelled to the ground.

Thus, for the aid organizations that are winding down their operations in Aceh, the challenge is to formulate the best exit strategy, while for the tsunami survivors and their families the challenge is to come up with a strategy for survival. There is growing concern about the ability of survivors to successfully provide a better life for their children in the future. Despite the goodwill and best intentions of aid agencies, their presence has caused some people to become spoiled and demand that all support services – such as shelter, clean water, waste management systems and health services – be offered for free. Such survivors believe that they are entitled to all these amenities indefinitely. This has made them neglect the urgency to creatively plan for their futures and to start making immediate efforts to fulfil their basic living needs on their own. Another perception of some of the tsunami survivors is that the houses that were built for them were meant to “compensate” for those that had been swept away by the tsunami instead of realizing that these houses came from the generosity of others in sympathy towards their plight. In other words, the assistance provided by aid agencies and NGOs has caused many people to become dependent. This is perhaps partly caused by the housing construction strategy for tsunami survivors that commissioned the construction work to building contractors without inviting the participation of the affected communities.

Despite efforts made by the organizations working on child protection, many challenges still lie ahead to help get the lives of the tsunami survivors back to normal. These include the economic factors already discussed as well as a number of social issues. As time passes and with the help of social workers, certain aspects of psychological trauma caused by the tragic experience of the tsunami may be lessened, but the socio-cultural

trauma indicated by the presence of strong feelings of uncertainty caused by the sudden loss of previous social life space, will take a long time to resolve. The impact of the disaster has also brought about erosion in social capital that once manifested itself in the form of good and strong relations, mutual trust and a high desire by members of communities to help each other. Future planning for child protection should take into account social and economic challenges faced by communities such as those mentioned above.

The quality of life for many OSCYs will depend largely on the well-being of their foster parents in particular and the community around them in general. Efforts to strengthen the communities as future potential caregivers of OSCY should become a priority when formulating Government policy on child protection. The Head of DINSOS Aceh said: “We need to look at this as a great opportunity open in front of us; a chance to change the form of child protection from an emergency intervention to long-term child protection at the community level that will provide a protected environment for the children of Aceh”.¹⁷ In short, strong community resilience and commitment should become a precondition for such an environment to exist.

An important initiative has been made by DINSOS in this direction. A series of interagency meetings coordinated by the Secretariat of Child Protection, DINSOS Aceh, in September 2006 finalized a draft for a strategy regarding the future of child centres. The document, formulated by a Child Centre Working Group consisting of DINSOS, UNICEF, Children of the Edge, Enfants Refugies du Monde, Muhammadiyah and Pusaka Indonesia, provides guidelines for international and national organizations for the process of transferring child centres and child protection activities to the communities by involving the Government in the management structure. The document outlines five steps to be completed in order to successfully transfer the management of child centres to communities.

Step 1: Establish community representation: Child Protection Committees

Every child centre should formally establish community representation by forming ‘Child Protection Committees’ to ensure the continuity of a formal linkage between communities and the child centres. Child Protection Committees may vary in form and membership. Accordingly, the Provincial Social Office strongly recommends that key community leaders be included in the Committee as advisers in finding solutions to cases regarding child protection in their respective communities. Ideally membership of a Child Protection Committee includes heads of sub-districts, village heads and representatives from the child centre, such as playgroup manager, head of extracurricular activities, children representatives and leaders who are widely known in the community.

Step 2: Establish a formal local civil service organization

A local civil service organization should be established whose function is to coordinate the functioning of the child centres with financial and technical support from international and national organizations. The Provincial Social Office recommends that this

¹⁷ Technical Advisor to DINSOS (2006). *Serah Terima Children Centers ke Masyarakat dan Hubungan Potensial ke Dinas Sosial* (Children Centers Exit Strategy: Handover of Children Centres to Communities and Potential Relations with Social Service Office). Banda Aceh: DINSOS Provinsi NAD.

local civil service organization be managed by staff and volunteers who have some experience in managing child centres as well as local community members to ensure that the objective of having the active involvement of this latter group can be met.

Step 3: Build the capacity of local social service organizations and Child Protection Committees

International and national organizations should provide technical support in defining values, goals, roles, and managerial skills in problem solving processes to the local civil service organization and Child Protection Committees. These international and national organizations should also provide technical and financial support to the new local civil service organizations within their operating areas, along with knowledge of disbursement and accountability of funds.

Step 4: Practise joint management before handover

The local civil service organization should control the management of child centres with a clear role played by Child Protection Committees. International and national organizations should still be involved in both capacity building for organizations and in monitoring and evaluation.

Step 5: Management handover

When the local civil service organizations have been able to operate effectively with a certain degree of independence, international and national organizations should gradually step aside to allow the local civil service organizations to perform their own management. However, monitoring and technical support may still need to be provided from time to time by international and national organizations.

The length of time needed to accomplish steps 1 through 5 may vary from one case to another. The Provincial Social Office recommends that the timeframe for the transfer of ownership be planned together by the international or national organizations and the local civil service organizations.

While the above exit strategy steps can be used as a guideline, there are many social factors that should also be taken into account, all of which may contribute to the success or failure of transferring the management of child related programmes to communities. These factors include:

- Capacity for social mobilization;
- Access to public information;
- Educational levels or knowledge base of the community;
- Extent of social cohesion;
- Strength of social capital formation;
- Trust of authority; and
- Credibility of national/community leaders.

VII. UNESCAP Training Workshops and Meetings

UNESCAP, in cooperation with the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs, as part of its project on building community resilience to natural disasters, held two workshops in Banda Aceh and two policy advocacy meetings in Jakarta over a period of 18 months. The purpose of the workshops was to enable the voices of the youth in Aceh to be heard, including on issues they feel are important in their lives, how they perceive the national and international support systems available to them and how they would like to move forward to bring positive change to their lives.

The following summarizes some of the most important issues that were brought forward by the participants during the workshops and the meetings.

A. First Banda Aceh Workshop

Held over 14-16 November 2006, this workshop was attended by two groups of participants representing two communities among those worst hit by the tsunami. The two objectives of this workshop were, first to provide participants with knowledge on child protection policy, through materials prepared by the Ministry of Social Affairs, DINSOS and UNICEF, and secondly to gain an understanding of the perceived needs of the participants so that future policy-making could be formulated according to these needs.

The first group of participants consisted of 25 women and men who were caregivers of OSCY who had returned to their previous dwelling place at Cut Lamkuweuh village, an area in Banda Aceh located around one kilometre from the seashore (see Figure 3). The majority of the residents of this village were previously well-off, with decent homes and many amenities. Although their houses and property were ruined by the tsunami, most survivors of the village were able to cope with their losses as they were still employed by the Government or private companies or they were shop owners, worked in business or worked as craftsmen. A number of household heads earned a lot of money from their occupations as house builders and furniture makers, their products being in high demand during the reconstruction phase. Many survivors in this urban village still had money in the bank or had family members outside the area to help them fulfil non-urgent needs, such as buying electrical appliances and expanding houses provided by donor agencies.

The second group of participants also consisted of 25 women and men. These people, until recently, lived in a refugee camp in Jantho, the capital of Aceh Besar District. They were caregivers of OSCY who mostly came from Pulo Aceh, a sub-district of Aceh Besar District composed of a group of small islands located about 30 kilometres off mainland



Figure 3: A stilt house in Cot Lamkuweuh village, Banda Aceh (in the background) built by a Canadian NGO and a similar one on the foreground with the bottom part walled in by the owner to make more room on the ground floor. A total of 25 participants of the first UNESCAP training workshop came from this area.

Aceh (see Figure 4). Most of them came from low income families who previously made a living from fishing and agriculture. When the tsunami hit, generally they saved themselves by running to higher parts of the islands. Many of their family members and relatives instantly perished in the tsunami. According to the head of Pulo Aceh, only a half of the initial population of 4,000 people survived the tsunami.

Most of the people from this group did not want to return to where their homes had been, partly because of the lasting trauma that was still haunting them and partly because they had lost hope in being able to make a living in Pulo Aceh since their agricultural land and fishing equipment were destroyed by the tsunami. They had become a part of a permanent group of IDPs whose total number may have reached hundreds of thousands from all over the coastal areas of Aceh. Strikingly different from the first group of participants who were moving into decent houses, the majority of them were impoverished and struggling to meet their basic needs of food and other daily necessities. They were still living in temporary shelters isolated and far away from centres of economic activity and were waiting until the simple living quarters that were being built nearby were ready for them.

The participants felt that they had gained much important knowledge during the three days of the workshop, although some of the materials presented by the trainers were too technical and beyond their simple educational backgrounds to absorb. They understood their important role in child protection and the materials provided during the workshop added to their previous instinctive knowledge of child rearing. For example, the training made them more aware of the many unfortunate events that may occur to OSCY, such as child trafficking and exploitation.

The participants saw the training workshop as an opportunity to increase their chances of getting financial assistance to run livelihood activities, such as small shops and businesses, farming, handicrafts and home economics. They were also hoping to obtain



Figure 4: Simple houses built for tsunami survivors at Terbih village in the vicinity of Jantho, the capital of Aceh Besar District. Another 25 participants of the first UNESCAP training workshop came from this refugee camp.

educational scholarships for OSCYs, from elementary up to tertiary education, and help with the cost for running youth centres and special boarding houses for OSCY so that their children could receive a good moral upbringing based on religious faith.¹⁸

B. First Jakarta Policy Advocacy Meeting

The first meeting on policy advocacy for enhancing community resilience to natural disasters focusing on children and youth was held in Jakarta over 21-23 March 2007 as part of the UNESCAP and Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) effort to develop policies to take care of the problems of OSCY in Aceh. It was aimed at obtaining inputs from participants that were deemed important in developing policies related to child protection in the aftermath of the tsunami in Aceh and other natural disasters elsewhere in Indonesia. The meeting was also intended to act as a forum to gain information in preparation for the second training workshop held by UNESCAP in cooperation with MOSA and DINSOS in Banda Aceh in May 2007.

The three-day meeting emphasized policy advocacy as an important way to overcome the problems of OSCY in the years to come as the technical and financial assistance from international agencies is gradually reduced. Community empowerment through training for the management of children and youth centres as well as the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and micro-financing to start such enterprises was considered as important in enhancing the resilience of communities with OSCY.

¹⁸ A DEPSOS officer who contributed to organizing the workshop took notes on the expectations of participants and compiled a list of economic and social activities that could be supported by concerned stakeholders.

The presentations from MOSA, UNESCAP, NGOs and representatives from among the tsunami survivors all contributed ideas and suggestions on how the problems caused by the tsunami and affecting the lives of OSCY and their communities should be tackled in the reconstruction phase. All the participants agreed that, although the phase of physical reconstruction had almost been completed, social reconstruction had just began and it would take a much longer time before the social and cultural life of the Aceh people could return to normal.

The following recommendations were formulated by the participants at the end of the meeting:¹⁹

1. Increase community preparedness and capacity to respond rapidly to emergency situations.
2. Foster and promote good governance among all stakeholders.
3. Enhance awareness of and advocacy for affected people and communities, and give women, children, youth and other disadvantaged groups an opportunity to express their concerns and needs.
4. Encourage the development of partnerships and enhance synergy, collaboration and coordination among government agencies, NGOs and international organizations/donors, as well as other stakeholders.
5. Promote participation in decision making and implementation by all stakeholders, including children, youth and communities.
6. Consider and incorporate local values and cultures in all phases of disaster preparedness and management.
7. Enhance formulation of priority strategies to address gender issues and to protect children and youth, especially from violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation.
8. Promote reliable data collection to develop a standardized evidence base for understanding community needs, and developing and implementing effective response strategies.
9. Ensure effective monitoring and evaluation of all response strategies that are implemented.
10. Support research activities related to community participation and social resilience.
11. Ensure that the media play an effective role in dissemination and advocacy with the interests of children, youth and their communities in mind.
12. Provide communities with the skills to ensure effective management and coordination and facilitation of reconstruction and empowerment programmes, as well as the sustainability of such community initiatives.

¹⁹ Report of the national meeting on Policy Advocacy for Enhancing Community Resilience to Natural Disasters Focusing on Children and Youth, UNESCAP, Jakarta, Indonesia, 21-23 March 2007.

13. Facilitate the involvement of the private sector in the provision of food, medical treatment and other necessities.
14. Recognize that the provision of effective, community driven and relevant educational, training, recreational and development initiatives should be a focal point of the social reconstruction programme.
15. Enhance the training of social workers and the provision of services, including psychosocial support, both during disaster and non-disaster periods.
16. Enhance the capacity of family and community care and the protection for children in crisis/distress. Clear assessment is required to determine the needs for additional children's home.
17. Sensitize teachers and health-care workers to the need to increase children's access to child-friendly services.
18. Increase awareness of risk factors and behaviour, including drug use.
19. Enhance mechanisms to prevent violence and, for where/when it happens, to improve reporting.
20. Train social workers and other community groups to promote and protect child rights.
21. Ensure reconstruction and social empowerment programmes focus on developing basic infrastructure in communities badly damaged by natural disasters and, in doing so, provide employment opportunities to local communities.
22. Address poverty, food shortages and unemployment in the social reconstruction programme by supporting the development of agriculture and industry for affected communities.
23. Facilitate and prioritize the development of small, medium and micro-enterprises which are owned and managed by disadvantaged groups and self help groups, as these form part of the growing economy and contribute towards improving the quality of life.
24. Create employment opportunities which focus on previously disadvantaged groups, such as the women, youth and persons with disabilities.
25. Use training to improve the livelihood and income earning capacity of those who lack skills.
26. Establish and train self-help groups to provide support to families and help to manage funds.
27. Ensure conservation and protection of the environment and natural resources are focal areas in social reconstruction and social empowerment programmes.
28. Develop effective strategies to ensure continuity and sustainability when INGOs transition out.

C. Second Banda Aceh Workshop

The purpose of this workshop, which was conducted by UNESCAP in cooperation with international and local partners in Banda Aceh during 22-24 May 2007, was to explore ideas regarding psychosocial care, livelihoods and community participation and how to better support and protect OSCY. Primarily, the workshop gave youth a chance to voice their issues and concerns in the presence of community leaders, local organizations, international organizations and members from the Government. The workshop focused on youth and community participation as the primary source of information in determining effective referral systems, and secondly, served to inform youth on existing support systems available in psychosocial care, livelihoods and community mobilization. With this exchange of ideas and information, the awareness and capacity of participants to deal with issues relevant to youth in a context of natural or human disasters was enhanced.

Some of the 40 youth participants were members of local NGOs which were affiliates of ChildFund Indonesia and UNICEF. Other participants included adults representing the community of Banda Aceh and the community in the District of Aceh Besar, which had participated in the earlier workshop held in Banda Aceh. The first two days of the workshop were dedicated to presenting and discussing four topics, namely youth vulnerability, education, employment and health. These topics were examined in terms of positive and negative attributes in order to formulate recommendations for the future.

Day 1: The participants, comprising youth, community leaders and representatives, religious leaders, local NGOs, INGOs and government representatives from DINSOS and the Educational Office (Diknas), were organized into three groups and discussed issues of vulnerability faced by youth in Aceh Besar and Banda Aceh during the conflict period, the initial post-tsunami period and the current period. The groups were then given the opportunity to present ideas that arose from the discussions.

Day 2: The groups held discussions to identify possible solutions to existing gaps; to find means of reinforcing existing effective systems on education, employment and health; and to identify alternative ways of addressing these issues.

Day 3: The groups developed plans of action to rectify or strengthen referral systems to respond to the needs of youth and other victims of the conflict and the tsunami in Aceh Besar and Banda Aceh. They also discussed how the workshop results could be shared with all stakeholders, especially local government agencies, and the ways in which the resultant action plans could be implemented within the affected communities.

The youth participants of the workshop had many ideas about how to solve their own problems. Their aim was to point children and youth toward opportunities that are positive and constructive for their futures, with help from the local community and the Government. The action plans put forth by the young people included efforts to gather valid data, from government and non-government sources, and to use the information to improve every aspect of their society, from shelters to trainings, so that they could work together towards creating a better future. Campaigns using the media and other information dissemination methods would educate people so they could clearly understand matters concerning their rights and opportunities.

Bellow are some of the things that the young people had to say:

Problems and Action Plans

1. *Problem:* A large number of OSCY have unmet needs.

Action Plan: Compile a database regarding the number of OSCY and their needs. Conduct training in life skills and religious values to encourage independence and to develop strong values, using peer educators whenever possible. Advocate for the provision of more care for OSCY and more funds for youth-related activities by the Government.

2. *Problem:* A large number of street youth have unmet needs.

Action Plan: Instil cultural and religious values in youth in public schools, religious schools, mosques, community halls and dormitories, using brochures, media and the Ceuramah (Alternative Newspaper). Conduct training in life skills and provide street shelters. Undertake advocacy to sensitize many agencies about the problems of street youth and campaign at the community level on ways to deal with street youth and to change negative community perceptions about them.

3. *Problem:* Youth and drugs.

Action Plan: Raise awareness of the affects of using drugs at public schools, religious schools, in communities, barracks and at street shelters using mass media, brochures, posters and stickers. Provide treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependent youth at the community level.

4. *Problem:* Long-term psychosocial trauma caused by the conflict and the tsunami.

Action Plan: Provide health-care facilities to treat trauma in tsunami and conflict affected areas using counselling and recreational activities.

5. *Problem:* Child abuse caused by the breakdown in social structures and societal norms.

Action Plan: Optimize and socialize child protection at the family and community levels in schools and community centres using mass media, trainings, brochures, posters and stickers. Provide shelter and health care for victims of child abuse.

6. *Problem:* Physical and mental disabilities caused by the conflict and tsunami.

Action Plan: Give those with disabilities the same opportunities as everyone else, build up their self esteem and reduce discrimination at the community level and in schools using mass media, trainings, brochures, posters and stickers. Provide easily accessible health care for people with disabilities at the community level.

7. *Problem:* Human trafficking.

Action Plan: Reduce human trafficking by raising awareness of human rights and encouraging community leaders to be 'watch dogs' to prevent further exploitation, using the mass media to disseminate information and also through trainings, brochures, posters and stickers. Provide rehabilitation and care for victims of human trafficking.

8. *Problem:* Unwanted pregnancies and reproductive health problems due to the breakdown in the social order.

Action Plan: Undertake advocacy work and disseminate information on the importance of good moral behaviour and reproductive health in communities, public schools and religious schools, using mass media, trainings, brochures, posters and stickers. Provide health care for people with reproductive health problems at the community level.

9. *Problem:* Lack of access to quality education.

Action Plan: Reduce discrimination regarding access to education and reduce the cost of attending local schools. Increase access to education for remote communities by building more schools and providing scholarships for vulnerable youth. Discourage teachers from taking side jobs by giving them adequate salaries. Increase the participation of youth in developing district/regional curricula.

10. *Problem:* Broken homes caused by the tsunami and/or conflict.

Action Plan: Identify the families that are at risk or are currently affected and pass this information to the proper authorities for immediate action. Community participation and consultation are critical to ensure that appropriate interventions are carried out.

11. *Problem:* High rates of school drop-out caused by poverty.

Action Plan: Offer training in entrepreneurship and business management as well as livelihood development, particularly for those that have dropped out of school or are at risk of dropping out, and offer these trainings at appropriate times so that the most vulnerable will be able to attend. Conduct market research to determine the most appropriate trainings to offer.

12. *Problem:* Child labour.

Action Plan: Increase community awareness of child rights in conjunction with livelihood support and trainings in entrepreneurship, business management and livelihood development, to allow families to have sustainable finances without being dependant on child labour.

13. *Problem:* Youth at risk with the law.

Action Plan: Identify youth and community leaders who can represent youth at risk and help to educate youth about the consequences of actions outside of the law.

14. *Problem:* Victims in conflict areas are not receiving the same support as victims of the tsunami.

Action Plan: Increase support services for conflict victims and educate community members about who to contact for appropriate psychosocial support and counselling services. Develop a plan to help conflict victims integrate back into their communities as productive members.

15. *Problem:* Affects of globalization harming small businesses and the local economy.

Action Plan: Negate the harmful effects of corporations which install large-scale businesses and implement change without hearing the voices of local people. Encourage participatory development in all aspects of restoring and rehabilitating Aceh.

One of the most important issues brought forward in the workshop discussions concerned the large numbers of street youth and associated problems. During the time of the conflict many children – now youth – lost their parents, either through intentional killings or from being caught in the crossfire between the conflicting parties. Some of the youth were also recruited by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) as combatants. When the armed conflict ceased, hundreds of youth who had lost parents and relatives had nowhere to go and eventually ended up in Banda Aceh as street youth, begging to get money for food to stay alive from shoppers and passers-by. A former Head of Dinsos Aceh pointed out that the failure to address this issue may negatively affect the security situation in the future.

Another issue highlighted in the workshop discussions was the poor economic condition of parents and relatives with OSCY. Economic hardship as a result of loss of jobs and employment in the aftermath of the tsunami significantly diminished the ability of many families to raise and support their children. Some children benefitted because their parents or relatives could manage to send them to children's homes or orphanages, where they could be provided with lodging, meals and education for free. Others, however, were exploited by their parents to earn money as child labourers, or sent to the streets to beg.

On the last day of the workshop plans for activities and actions to be conducted by the youth concerning the four topics (youth vulnerability, education, employment and health) were formulated. The youth participants realized that these plans could only be implemented with the involvement of related government offices and other stakeholders, both as sources of expertise and as financial supporters.

The workshop concluded with the message that although the youth were enthusiastic and eager to implement their action plans, they would need to advocate for the financial resources that they required from government agencies and other financial aid institutions. In other words, synergistic partnerships and concerted efforts among all concerned stakeholders were absolutely necessary to make these plans a reality.



Figure 5: When young people are given opportunities they can contribute significantly to positive development in society.

D. Second Jakarta Policy Advocacy Meeting

This three-day meeting was the last in the series of four events held jointly by UNESCAP and MOSA. It was convened in Jakarta over 24-26 July 2007 and the objectives of the meeting were to summarize the ideas coming out of the previous workshops and meeting and to refine the recommendations that were put forward by the

participants regarding ways in which community resilience to natural disasters could be enhanced at the community level and how advocacy for child protection policies would be in the best interest of the OSCY of Aceh.

Participants of this meeting were representatives from line ministries and other institutions, including MOSA, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Communication and Informatics, Ministry of Women's Empowerment, University of Indonesia, national and local NGOs, as well as representatives from the two Aceh communities which were affected by the tsunami and were involved in the two Aceh workshops. Most of the 80 participants of this meeting had also participated in the first policy advocacy meeting held in Jakarta during 22-24 March, 2007. Despite the absence of youth participants in this meeting, their voices were heard through the recommendations that they submitted during the second workshop held in Banda Aceh during May 22-24, 2007. The ideas presented by the youth represented the base on which the participants of the Jakarta meeting built their final recommendations.

The main area of concern among the meeting participants was how to handle the enormous problems that would face disaster victims in Aceh when the technical and financial assistance from international aid agencies and NGOs was no longer available. A strategy for survival to enhance community resilience in anticipating future natural disasters and other catastrophes was discussed in detail on the third day of the meeting. Improvement in coordination amongst government agencies, civil society organizations and NGOs was considered a prerequisite in order to ensure the effectiveness of policies which enhance community preparedness and mitigate the impact of natural disasters.

The issue of the importance of local wisdom in enhancing community preparedness also drew much attention in the meeting discussions. Local wisdom and customs contributing to traditional early warning systems were considered very useful for predicting the coming of natural disasters, such as a tsunami. These natural early warning signs may take the form of receding shorelines, dark clouds and fleeing birds. The residents of Simeulue Island heeded such natural early warning signs because of traditional knowledge passed down through the generations and most of them were able to get to higher ground just before the 2004 tsunami hit their island.

During the meeting, representatives from line ministries were concerned with problems of regulations, policies and coordination, while the other participants, mostly people working in the field and representatives from local communities, were more interested in issues directly related to day-to-day problems caused by the armed conflict and the tsunami that needed immediate attention and solutions. In other words, the former were inclined to talk about "*das Sollen*" or ideals, while the latter about "*das Sein*" or facts of life and practicalities. A better understanding and cooperation between such groups is needed to reduce the potential for mutual distrust that frequently arises in their working relations.

The third day of the workshop was dedicated to the formulation of recommendations by the participants. The recommendations are as follows:²⁰

²⁰ Report of the follow-up meeting on Policy Advocacy for Enhancing Community Resilience to Natural Disasters Focusing on Children and Youth, UNESCAP, Jakarta, Indonesia, 24-26 July 2007.

1. There should be clear mechanisms regarding the coordination among line ministries and decision making processes so that joint commissions such as BAKORLAK PB (Coordinating Body for Disaster Management) can perform their functions in disaster management effectively.
2. In the case that BAKORLAK PB members fail to make decisions, the matters should be discussed and decided at the ministerial level so as to avoid delays in decisions regarding handling the impacts of disasters.
3. Despite the existence of laws as guiding principles on disaster management and child protection in disaster situations, they should also be devised with some sets of technical and operational procedures so that the implementation of programmes and activities in overcoming the impacts of disasters on both adults and children has a clear reference.
4. At the local level, better coordinative functions should also be performed by SATKORLAK PBP (Coordinating Unit for Disaster and IDP Management) with local government offices and civil service organizations or NGOs so that the tasks and operations to help disaster victims can be managed appropriately.
5. The departing INGOs, with their local affiliates in handling the problems of children and youth, local line government offices and communities with OSCY should sit together to plan the best preparation before handing over the management of children centres to communities.
6. Cooperation with INGOs should not be limited to psychosocial and livelihood support provision but it should also include the transfer of knowledge and technology so that local NGOs could be better equipped in handling future disasters.
7. An official information service centre from which people could obtain trusted information on matters regarding disasters should be established in disaster-prone areas so as to avoid panic created by false information from unknown sources as has frequently happened.
8. The media should be proactive in seeking accurate information from trusted sources in order to be able to disseminate correct information on disasters to the public.
9. There should be a mechanism of control on the use of the internet by young people so that adverse impacts from the use of information technology on their attitudes and behaviour can be avoided.
10. Information on the extent and duration of assistance provided by each assistance agency should be made clear so that efforts can be made in advance to arrange for the continuity of the assistance when needed.
11. Children and youth should be involved in decision-making processes at the community level so that the decisions made would reflect their best interests.
12. Women, especially those who are taking care of OSCY, should be given greater opportunity in decision-making processes in their communities so that the best interests of the children and youth can be fully considered.
13. Standardized forms of service in emergency situations should be established to avoid gaps in quality of service between those provided by government agencies and NGOs, and from one place to another.

14. To avoid delays in starting time to provide services by INGOs the Government should issue a standard procedure that would guarantee the minimum time needed to obtain work permits.
15. A comprehensive database on children and youth according to their respective conditions and needs should be established so that dedicated programmes can be designed and responsibilities to run each programme can be evenly shared among government agencies and civil society organizations.
16. More attention should be paid to children and youth with disabilities resulting from the conflict and the tsunami by providing them with equal opportunity to obtain education and health services relative to other persons.
17. A comprehensive referral system from village up to provincial levels should be established so that tens of thousands children and youth affected by the conflict and the tsunami who still remained undetected could be reached.
18. School curricula should include a subject on disaster response to provide students with sound knowledge in all matters regarding the best measures to take in the event of disasters.
19. A trauma centre with an adequate number of professional staff should be established in Aceh to provide continuous services for children and adults who have not fully recovered from symptoms of PTSD.
20. Religious and customary leaders should be more active in providing children and youth with religious and moral doctrines so that their behaviour would not be diverted from socially accepted norms and values.
21. Community resilience to natural disasters should be enhanced by providing members of communities with adequate knowledge in all matters regarding the best measures to take in the event of disasters.
22. Research institutions should conduct studies on the extent of community resilience to natural disasters. An appropriate course of action could be designed to enhance community resilience based on the findings of the studies.
23. Courses in community based disaster risk management (CBDRM) should be widely held in disaster prone areas so that communities can be well equipped with knowledge on how to minimize potential losses brought about by natural disasters.

VIII. Lessons Learned

Many lessons have been accrued from the UNESCAP project in Aceh. These lessons should contribute to a better understanding about the ways to mitigate the impact of large scale disasters, how communities can be better prepared to anticipate the coming of future disasters and how better coordination among agencies – both governmental and non-governmental – may substantially reduce the harmful affects of disasters. The following is a summary of the important lessons learned:

1. Coordination in mitigating the impact of disasters is a catch phrase that is incorporated into every programme. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that good coordination cannot easily take place during the time of disasters and preparedness is a key aspect of any response. Help must immediately reach the victims wherever they are to avoid increasing the suffering of victims during the initial period of crisis.
2. Some aid agencies and NGOs, both local and international, perceive existing coordination activities as a hindrance to delivering immediate aid to victims of disasters. This may explain why out of more than 500 NGOs working in tsunami hit areas in Aceh, less than one third were under the coordination of the *Badan Pelaksana Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) NAD-Nias* (Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Implementing Agency).
3. The psychological trauma brought about by the tragic experiences of the tsunami may be reduced with the passage of time. However, it will take a long time to resolve the socio-cultural trauma shown by the presence of a strong feeling of uncertainty on the part of tsunami survivors. Unless more extensive and ongoing treatment in psychosocial healing is provided for disaster victims, the symptoms of PTSD could remain and the trans-generation transmission of trauma may even take place as a result.
4. Prolonged support in the form of charity may cause continuing dependence of people affected by disasters on outside assistance. In the long run this may discourage those affected by disasters from being self-supporting and make them neglect the urgency of having to think creatively about how to become self-sufficient and self-sustaining. Unfortunately, some victims of disasters have the perception that they are entitled to receive charitable assistance indefinitely, when in fact it is often provided on the basis of little more than a token of sympathy from others.
5. Related to the above, disaster victims need to understand that there are limitations to the amount of assistance which will be provided by external sources. The substantial amount of aid provided may have eased many life-threatening problems during the emergency and rehabilitation periods. However, the main responsibility of

returning communities to normalcy should rest principally in the hands of local stakeholders, including the local government, local NGOs, other civil society organizations and community leaders. Furthermore, mechanisms should be put in place to increase the effectiveness of these stakeholders.

6. Communities in situations of distress cannot be expected to fully take care of OSCY without external assistance. Multiple deprivation caused by disasters in the form of community impoverishment, loss of life-support systems, and disruption of social fabric has significantly weakened the capacity of communities to function normally. The loss of religious, customary and other informal leaders as providers of moral guidance in many communities has also significantly reduced the strength and social cohesion of communities. It will take years for communities to nurture potential leaders who will be able to replace ones that were taken by the tsunami. Nevertheless, there is a need for action to this effect from within communities as well as with support from the Government and a variety of other sources, such as NGOs.
7. International aid agencies should incorporate, as part of their exit strategy, a way to help disaster victims cope with problems that come about as a result of their departure. Despite efforts that have been made by INGOs in helping OSCY, their families and communities to overcome physical and psychosocial problems, the prolonged presence and assistance offered by INGOs has created a dependency which must be addressed during the exit phase of programme implementation.
8. Young people have shown great potential in contributing towards the process of social reconstruction. Many of them put forward very insightful ideas during discussions at the Second Banda Aceh Workshop on how they could contribute to the betterment of life for OSCY in Aceh. Their enthusiastic participation in a number of youth-related activities, such as a drug awareness campaign conducted by ChildFund Indonesia in October, 2006 (see Figure 6), could play a significant role in the process of enhancing community resilience to natural disasters. Unless they are enabled to transform their energy into actions, this valuable potential will remain idle. Local government offices, civil service organizations and international aid agencies that have technical expertise and material resources at their disposal could help engage young people to a greater extent, though supporting youth organizations and other means, in order to make their aspirations become a reality.
9. One of the impacts of natural disasters is the breakdown of family structures. The poor economic conditions of families with OSCY after the tsunami caused them to send their children to orphanages or children's homes. These institutions not only provide children with food and boarding but also support their education up to high school, causing many parents or relatives to leave their children in the institutions until they finished their schooling. Some policies have proven to be impractical during emergency situations. For example, although the policy of the Ministry of Social Affairs stated that sending OSCY to institutions was a relatively poor option for their care (living with their own families and communities being the best option), in reality this policy did not take into account the tens of thousands of OSCY who were left without good caregivers. In addition, certain children and youth are being sent to the institutions by their impoverished families. Recognizing this need, the Ministry has built more children's homes to accommodate the large number of disadvantaged children and youth. Nevertheless, issues still remain as to what the best approach is and how this can be put into effect; hence, working with all relevant stakeholders to resolve such matters should not be neglected.



Figure 6: Aceh youth enthusiastically participate in a drug awareness campaign conducted by ChildFund Indonesia in October, 2006.

In addition to the lessons learned above, an examination of how the early warning and information dissemination systems are working on the ground would highlight areas in need of improvement. A network of tsunami warning systems has been created in Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami, but it only covers part of the coastline. Many vulnerable areas are excluded and many of the existing systems have experienced technical failures. For example, on Monday, 4 June 2007 the tsunami warning siren in Banda Aceh malfunctioned and sent a false alarm which spread panic amongst the residents who were still traumatized by the 2004 tsunami. The siren rang for 30 minutes sending people rushing out of their homes and clogging the streets in chaos and panic. Traffic drew to a virtual standstill as people attempted to flee. There were numerous traffic accidents and many people were reported injured as a result of the confusion and the lack of a systematic disaster evacuation plan. Fortunately, a real tsunami did not occur because if it had, the setting was ripe for another major catastrophe. Following this incident, angry residents disabled the system by smashing an electricity box which powered it, though they did not damage the actual warning siren and tower.

The false alarm in Banda Aceh served as a valuable lesson in regard to the lack of effectiveness of the existing disaster early warning system and the lack of preparedness of the people to respond in an appropriate way to a real disaster. Despite efforts made toward establishing a disaster preparedness and response plan, there still remains a lot of work to be done. One problem which was clearly evident during the panic was the lack of a clear coordinating body that is responsible for information dissemination. Various media sources presented contradictory information during the false alarm which further exasperated the situation.

IX. Recommendations

A. Early Warning System and Information Dissemination

There is a clear need for a reliable, centralized command post to quickly disseminate accurate information to the various geographical areas of Aceh. Each area, in turn, should follow a systematic and well rehearsed emergency response procedure, which is coordinated by a predetermined communication network. Frameworks that enable effective action when natural disasters strike need to be developed based on matters such as participatory risk assessment and involving entities such as those that are concerned with risk management.

An emergency plan, which is put together by key scientists, government officials, NGO staff and emergency managers, should be regularly rehearsed by both local authorities and community members. This would make it easier for the local police to effectively undertake crowd control and facilitate the rapid movement of people to safe locations. It would also enable the rapid mobilization of emergency resource personnel and equipment. The coordinating body for the disaster preparedness and response plan should be under the jurisdiction of the special agency SATKORLAK PBP (Coordinating Unit for Disaster and IDP Management) or a special task force set up by the provincial government, which is fully supported at the national level. The local media should comply with the set protocol to ensure that all the radio and TV channels are tuned to a single emergency channel operated by the central command agency.

At the community level, each sub-district of the 22 districts in Aceh should have an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) in place. The undertaking of this endeavour would have a significant impact on enhancing community capacity to respond to natural disasters. Fairly reliable community and population data can be obtained for the development of EAPs from the registration that occurred of all the people in Aceh prior to the successful elections that took place in December 2006. This was an impressive accomplishment when one considers how little reliable data was available following thirty years of armed conflict. A valuable source of support for the development and implementation of the EAPs might be the Multi Donor Trust Fund that was generated in response to the tsunami. A Specialized Task Force for each district, made up of structural engineers specifically trained in earthquake building design as well as civil engineers to design exit routes and point out danger points/hot spots, should work in coordination with the various sub-district government officials, and in particular the Departments of Health, Education and Social Welfare, as well as other stakeholders, to develop an EAP for each community within the 22 districts of Aceh. Although it is vital for the communities to participate in the development of the EAP, the main responsibility for its coordination needs to remain in the hands of the Specialized Task Force.

The main responsibilities of the Specialized Task Force are to:

- Determine which buildings in the community are structurally sound/earthquake resistant to act as emergency meeting centres;
- Draw up exit routes to those emergency meeting centres or to buildings and areas identified as safe;
- Identify potentially dangerous buildings and areas;
- Determine point persons for each emergency meeting centre who will be responsible for the identification of community members;
- Establish the key contact persons for the community who have a complete list of community members and the contact information of the point persons for each of the emergency meeting centres; and
- Present this information at the sub-district and district Dinsos level and to the Department of Health and Education.

Once the EAPs have been formulated and the necessary population data registered with the proper authorities, regular emergency drills should be scheduled to test the effectiveness of the EAP and to implement any necessary changes. The most important aspect of the plan is to familiarize the residents with its procedures so that there is no confusion during an actual emergency. Once all the EAPs have been mapped for each of the 22 sub-districts, they should be shared with the necessary police and army officers in charge of mobilization during emergency operations. In addition, the list of residents and contact information must be regularly updated and this information also passed to the local authorities. The Department of Health should ensure that a strategy is developed to mobilize emergency personnel and equipment to the emergency centres. Furthermore, an inventory of emergency equipment and supplies should be stocked with special attention given to expiry dates of medicines.

At the regional level, an Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS) has been developed and was put in place in September 2007. This system, which utilizes a dedicated channel for disaster management, is designed to deliver high resolution and real time data to local warning centres and eventually would also be used for storm surges. The Indonesian Government needs to be committed to not only establishing an effective emergency response system at the national level but the planning and preparation for the recovery process following a natural disaster. This includes determining clear lines of authority among government agencies. Confusion over responsibilities can create major delays, so national policies and frameworks need to be in place well ahead of time.²¹

B. Educating Communities and Building Capacity, Knowledge and Skills

Following the tsunami, emergency services provided by government agencies and NGOs focused on the immediate needs of the survivors, such as psychosocial support, the development of basic livelihood activities and free health-care services. These emergency services, which were provided well into the rehabilitation phase, are now being replaced

²¹ Key Propositions for Building Back Better: A Report by the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, William J. Clinton, December, 2006.

by the provision of knowledge, skills and financial assistance needed for community rebuilding and empowerment. This phase is a very critical time for the people of Aceh as the number of agencies and the amount of assistance offered by both local and international organizations is gradually lessened. The expertise and financial resources to address social, economic and psychological impacts of the disaster and the responsibility for continuing to restore normalcy to Aceh is now largely in the hands of the Acehnese people themselves.

Educating communities about disaster preparedness and response will greatly enhance community resiliency to natural disasters. A dramatic example of this was seen on the island of Simeulue where the local people, who knew what to do in the case of a tsunami thanks to their traditional wisdom in oral histories and songs, survived the tsunami when so many others perished.

The local media, under the leadership of DINSOS, can play an important role in socializing and disseminating information about the development of EAPs. Mosques and schools are also suitable venues to effectively pass on information to community members. A major challenge during the formulation of the EAPs is to ensure that community stakeholders – especially village leaders, religious leaders, children/youth representatives and women – are actively involved in the process. The Department of Education should develop educational materials on disaster preparedness in a campaign to educate students about what to do in the event of a disaster.

Education and dissemination of information should occur prior to emergency drills so that:

- People have a good understanding of why the emergency procedures are in place;
- People understand the importance of building earthquake-resistant homes and ensuring escape routes; and
- Children will feel less frightened, while being empowered by the knowledge of how to prepare for and respond to disasters.

Unfortunately, the involvement of the Acehnese people in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh has been inadequate. The people who have survived disasters are frequently the ones who know what recovery strategies best meet their needs, but too often their voices are not heard. Governments, donors and aid agencies must recognize that local communities need to be empowered to determine the direction of their own development. Often demands for accountability come loudest from donors, so implementing agencies are more likely to focus on this kind of upward accountability, instead of being accountable to the communities. However, sacrificing local ownership for speed means that the rights of affected populations to have a say in their own future are neglected. In order to effectively build the capacity of the relevant communities, agencies need to be partners in action with the local people.²²

The novel approach of the Second Banda Aceh Workshop, conducted by UNESCAP the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Social Service Office of Aceh and ChildFund Indonesia, showed how youth can effectively address important community recovery and resiliency issues and communicate what they feel is important to concerned officials. This type of

²² Ibid.

participatory approach would be particularly appropriate when formulating EAPs at the community level. Trainings should be conducted in participatory development and implementation of activities, particularly at the sub-district level. At present, there is far too much of a 'top down' approach in service delivery and not enough involvement of community members in the decision making process.

BRR has issued guidelines on how to carry out community driven reconstruction. These guidelines recognize the diverse nature of communities and how different communities require a broader range of choices for appropriate levels of support. A participatory approach would put resources directly into the hands of the people and would enable them to chart their own path to recovery. Recovery efforts should always ensure that communities are rebuilt safer than they were before the disaster that affects them. Each step of the reconstruction process will either contribute to risk reduction or effectively could become an enabler for the next big disaster. Schools and homes should be rebuilt to higher standards and on safer ground. In addition, integrated coastal management enables the people to conserve and rehabilitate mangroves, sand dunes and coral reefs which provide a natural barrier to tsunamis and storm surges.²³

C. Addressing the Needs of Vulnerable Groups

Vulnerable groups, especially women, children, youth, persons with disabilities and older persons, usually suffer the most severe losses during disasters. If this issue is left unaddressed during recovery efforts existing patterns of vulnerability and discrimination will be perpetuated or even exacerbated within communities. Recovery strategies should promote fairness and equity and create opportunities to shift traditional patterns which work against this. For example, in Aceh for the first time, land titles are being issued in the names of both husbands and wives. However, further steps in this direction need to be taken. Finding opportunities for disadvantaged groups to not only voice their concerns but work together towards resolving them would greatly enhance their self esteem and motivate them to take a more active role in shaping their future.

In post-tsunami Aceh, inequity occurred with asset replacements, and vulnerable groups which did not have the political awareness or power to demand their fair share ended up with less. In addition, inequity in the provision of housing caused conflict between neighbouring communities, and many tsunami affected communities received benefits that were not offered to large populations of people affected by decades of conflict. Ignoring these inequities can result in retaliations and potentially destroy the fragile peace that has been one of the most positive initiatives of the recovery of Aceh. At a UN Interagency meeting, Dr. Ir. Kuntoro Magkusubroto the Director of BRR presented a report about his trip to meet with donor countries and said that the majority of the concerns that were raised about the situation in Aceh were not related to reconstruction activities but to what steps were being taken in the area of reintegration. He pointed out that it was not within BRR's jurisdiction to get involved in post-conflict areas and to deal with these issues. With the recent increase of violence, it is becoming evident that if these issues are not addressed, the political climate could deteriorate and things could spiral into the previous state of conflict. Unfortunately, because most aid agencies are financially restricted to working only with tsunami affected communities, they cannot offer support for post-conflict activities. The World Bank and IOM are primarily the only agencies that are

²³ Ibid.

working in the post-conflict areas, along with the BRA. Additional support, similar to UNICEF's construction of primary schools in post-conflict communities, is urgently needed. Without a dedicated effort to change historic patterns of inequity, traditionally marginalized or disenfranchised groups will continue to be vulnerable.

D. Building Resilience

Resilience to natural disasters needs to be strengthened in communities in order to protect young people from becoming victims of disasters. The following recommendations address the need to enhance policies which affect OSCY and to strengthen the resilience of communities to natural disasters, both in Aceh and elsewhere in the Asian and Pacific region.

1. Community resilience to natural disasters would be strengthened by giving people relevant information about the best life-saving plans of action during (and after) natural disasters and also by providing comprehensive knowledge about the origin of earthquakes and tsunamis. The acquisition of such knowledge is very important, not only for improving the preparedness of those vulnerable for dealing with disasters, but to give them peace of mind so that they can manage their daily lives with a higher degree of confidence and certainty.
2. Policies designed as guiding principles in disaster management and child protection in disaster situations should include a clear set of technical and operational procedures for the implementation of programmes and activities following a natural disaster. This would provide a standardized reference for all agencies in order to most effectively and efficiently target their activities toward mitigating the impacts of natural disasters.
3. Equity in the provision of services in emergency situations must be established to avoid gaps and unmet needs based on communally-accepted perceptions of fairness. A standardized plan of action should apply to all the services provided by government agencies, aid organizations and NGOs in affected areas.
4. Community resilience to natural disasters would be enhanced by building the capacity of people to manage livelihood and microfinance activities which would in turn lead to an improvement in the quality of life and overall living standards.
5. Cooperation among INGOs and government agencies should not be limited to psychosocial and livelihood support but should also include the transfer of relevant knowledge and technology to local NGOs in order to strengthen their capacity for handling future disasters.
6. A comprehensive database on children and youth, according to their respective conditions and needs, should be established so that programmes can be designed and responsibilities for the operation of each programme can be evenly shared among government agencies and civil service organizations. A reliable data collection format would help to develop this standardized evidence base for understanding community needs and developing and implementing effective response strategies.
7. Women, especially those who are caregivers of OSCY, should be given the opportunity to participate in the decision making processes of their communities so that the best interests of OSCY can be fully incorporated.



Figure 7: National Children's Congress press conference held by Aceh youth in Banda Aceh in November, 2006.

8. Participation in decision making should be promoted with all stakeholders including children, youth and community members. Youth should be involved at the community level so that the decisions will reflect their best interests.
9. Departing INGOs should discuss with their local affiliates, partners, local government offices and communities how to handle the problems of children and youth. This preparatory process should occur before handing over the management of child centres to communities.
10. The information on the extent and duration of assistance provided by each aid agency should be made clear so that efforts can be made in advance for the continuity of the assistance when needed.
11. A comprehensive referral system from the community level up to provincial levels should be established so that the needs of tens of thousands of children and youth affected by the conflict and the tsunami and who are still undetected can be met.
12. A trauma centre with an adequate number of professional staff should be established to provide continuous services for children and adults who are not fully recovered from the symptoms of PTSD.
13. Religious and community leaders should be more active in providing children and youth with religious and moral doctrines so that they will consistently follow socially accepted norms and values in their behaviour in the wake of a natural disaster.

14. An official information centre from which people can obtain trusted and reliable information regarding disasters should be established in disaster prone areas so as to avoid panic created by false information from unknown sources, as has frequently happened in the past.
15. Mechanisms to address gender inequalities and to protect children and youth from violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation should be incorporated into support systems so that there is a strategy in place to deal with these issues following a natural disaster.
16. Effective monitoring and evaluation of all response strategies that are implemented will ensure ongoing improvements of such strategies over time.
17. The media can play an important role in dissemination of information and advocate for the rights of children and youth during natural disasters.
18. Education, health and employment are key issues which should be addressed in capacity development programmes aimed at building the resilience of communities to natural disasters.
19. Research institutions should conduct studies on the extent of community resilience to natural disasters. Policies and appropriate courses of action can be designed to enhance community resilience based on the findings of the studies.
20. The development of stronger and more dynamic partnerships, and synergy, collaboration and coordination among government agencies, NGOs and international organizations, as well as other stakeholders, will enhance resilience at all levels.

X. Conclusion

Building resilience in the communities of Aceh would help to protect OSCY, their families and communities from becoming victims of natural disasters. After years of isolation, Aceh has restored the peace necessary for its communities to reach out to the global community. Acehnese youth are struggling to express themselves and find ways to gain access to systems which can help them develop as productive citizens within their communities. Finding venues that allow for children and youth to freely voice their concerns is a challenge that should be taken up by all those involved in the restoration and rehabilitation of Aceh. Networking among youth groups can expose them to the views and perspectives of youth throughout Aceh and the world beyond. While youth find productive ways of making positive changes in their lives, they can be empowered to continue to advocate for change and encourage others to get involved. Positive action can be nurtured in order to replace destructive or violent ways as youth establish themselves in the workforce and begin to play a vital role in the development of their communities.

Partnerships and synergies among stakeholders should be strongly forged because government agencies, both at central and local levels alone, lacked the capability of managing the complexity of problems that emerged as direct and indirect consequences of the conflict and tsunami disasters. The issues regarding greater community resilience are strongly intertwined with a host of other issues in the context of social reconstruction in Aceh. Therefore, a concerted effort involving all stakeholders in mapping the problems of social reconstruction and their linkages leading to comprehensive social planning for a better Aceh would be an important undertaking that should be considered at the earliest.²⁴

²⁴ Report of the follow-up meeting on Policy Advocacy for Enhancing Community Resilience to Natural Disasters Focusing on Children and Youth, UNESCAP, Jakarta, Indonesia, 24-26 July 2007.

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