

**HOW CAN PROMOTING WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION  
(AND AGENCY) AND RESPONDING TO THEIR  
NEEDS IMPROVE DISASTER RISK REDUCTION?  
CASE FROM POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION  
(OPERATIONS AND MEASURES)  
IN THE PHILIPPINES AND SRI LANKA**

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**HOW CAN PROMOTING WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION AND RESPONDING TO  
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CASE FROM POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS  
IN THE PHILIPPINES AND SRI LANKA**

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**Abstract**

For gender-responsive disaster risk reduction (DRR), the most essential step to be taken might be the translation of DRR into an opportunity to transform unequal gender relations which are root causes of women's vulnerability and exclude them from decision-making processes for DRR. Women and other marginalized groups of people are often regarded as more vulnerable to a risk of disasters because of their limited access to resources and decision-making power, necessary for coping with disasters. However, they are not helpless victims or passive beneficiaries, but active agents for DRR, if they are evaluated from non-gender-bias lens and given proper opportunities. In this light, it is essential for the government and external organizations to promote the agency of women and other marginalized groups of people, while reducing their risk, within relevant interventions. In reality, however, most of relevant projects have not necessarily addressed the transformation of gender relations, and concentrated on daily-based needs of women survivors. Based on this recognition, we conducted field research in the Philippines and Sri Lanka in 2015. Drawing on the cases of JICA's and other organizations' past and on-going relevant projects, we analyze how external interventions contributed to changes in gender relations, as well as the vulnerability and coping capacity of women and men.

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Findings from the research show that women's agency was hardly addressed as a main objective of most of the projects, and women tended to be utilized as good mothers and care-takers based on stereotyped gender division of roles. Instead, some outstanding interventions to challenge for the transformation of gendered division of roles have led to women's active involvement not only in community-based DRR, but other community activities.

**Keywords:** gender, vulnerability, coping capacity, DRR, transformation, agency, practical gender needs, strategic gender needs, the Philippines, Sri Lanka

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACF	Action Against Hunger
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BANIG	Basay Association for Native Industry Growth
BHW	Barangay Health Worker
BNW	Barangay Nutrition Worker
BSPO	Barangay Service Point Officer
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CDP	Center for Disaster Preparedness
CEDAW	Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRS	Christian Relief Services
CSO	Community Service Officer
DA	Department of Agriculture
DMC	Disaster Management Center/Committee
DMCU	Disaster Management Coordinating Unit
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DILG	Department of Interior and Local Government
DiMCEP	Disaster Management Capacity Enhancement Project Adaptable to Climate Change
DMCC	Disaster Management Coordinating CommitteeJS
DOLE	Department of Labor and Employment
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways
DRRMC	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council/Committee
DRRMP	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan
DST	Department of Science and Technology
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
EC	Executive Committee
FGD	Focus Groups Discussions
GA	Government Agent
GAD	Gender and Development
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGI	Gender Gap Index
GIWPS	Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security
GN	<i>Grama Niladhari</i> (village and village chief)
HDI	Human Development Index
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IRP	International Recovery Platform
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSFV	Japan Sri Lanka Friendship Village
LGU	Local Government Unit
MSME	Micro, Small, Medium Enterprise
NAP	National Plan of Action
NBRO	National Building Research Organization
NCDM	National Council on Disaster Management
NCW	National Committee on Women
NDMC	National Disaster Management Center

NDMP	National Disaster Management Plan
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council/Committee
NDRRMP	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan
NEDA	National Economic Development Authority
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NHA	National Housing Authority
NPDM	National Policy on Disaster Management
OCD	Office of Civil Defence
<u>OfERR</u>	Organisation for <i>Elangai</i> Refugees Rehabilitation
PAGASA	Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
PAO	Provincial Agricultural Office
PAR	Pressure and Release
PCW	Philippine Commission on Women
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
RDS	Rural Development Society
SWDC	<i>Suriya</i> Women Development Center
SWDO	Social Welfare and Development Office
T-CUP	Tsunami and Conflict-affected Community's Uplifting Project
TESDA	Technical Education and Skill Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDAW	United Nations Division for Advancement of Women
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VAWC	Violence against Women and Children
WDO	Women Development Officer
WFS	Women Friendly Space
WEDGE	Women's Empowerment Development and Gender Equality
WRDS	Women Rural Development Society



## 1. Introduction

For the last few decades, gender and disaster specialists have consistently called for the integration of a gender perspective into relevant research, national policies, and international initiatives. The understanding of how gender relates to disasters, however, changed as the dominant social-science concept of disasters shifted from the vulnerability paradigm, initiated by Blaikie et al. (1994), to the current resilient paradigm, from a target of individuals to that of a community as a whole, and from a reactive approach to a proactive one. The former focuses more on identifying the causes of vulnerability and the most vulnerable group of people (Fordham 2008; Bradshaw 2013). This focus has moved to a more nuanced understanding of how social groups defined by gender, age, class, race, ethnicity, etc. differ between and within themselves and how they are not simply victims, but active agents (Fordham 2008). As a result, women's diversity and their role as main actors and leaders for promoting peace building as well as disaster risk reduction (DRR) are integrated as a key gender perspective in the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security (2000) and succeeding six resolutions,<sup>1</sup> and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015 – 2030).

From a gender perspective, however, the vulnerability paradigm is not necessarily no longer useful. Women and other marginalized groups of people, who are usually excluded from even ordinary development activities, would not be given a chance to take on the roles of main actors or leaders in DRR without transforming their subordinate positions to men and other dominant groups of people. In the vulnerability paradigm, the power dynamics at all levels, structured by gender, age, class, ethnicity, disability, etc., are considered to be the root causes of vulnerability, which require transformation (Blaikie et al. 2004; Hewitt 1997; Phillips and Morrow 2008). Those root causes of vulnerability are embedded deeply in the daily lives of people. In other words, disasters are partly products of unequal power structures rooted in daily life (Blaikie et al. 2004). The vulnerability paradigm implies that social inclusion and women's leadership in DRR might not be fully achieved unless unequal power dynamics at all levels, from the household to community levels and from local to national/international levels, are transformed.

Disasters are regarded as opportunities for women and other marginalized groups of people (Bradshaw 2013). They might, if provided with effective post-disaster interventions by the government or external organizations, collectively move for justice and achieve a more equitable redistribution of resources dominated by more powerful groups of people in the community (IRP 2009, Lipman-Blumen 1984, Morrow and Enarson 1994; 1996, Phillips and

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<sup>1</sup> Other UN Security Council Resolutions on WPS are 1820(2008), 1888(2009), 1889(2009), 1960(2010), 2106(2013) and 2122(2013).

Morrow 2008). The post-disaster context, on the other hand, can reshape or even worsen pre-existing inequalities (Anderson 2011), if the transformation of the power structures embedded in a community is not properly addressed. Bradshaw and Arenas (2004) argue that both governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), tend not to address the transformation of gender roles and relations in their reconstruction plans. Thus, many of the organizations end up negating the primary responsibility to translate disasters into opportunities for transformation.

Drawing from thoughts above, gender and disaster research needs to address how strategic gender concerns can be addressed in the post-disaster recovery and DRR context, and how such a challenge can promote women's agency and leadership while addressing their basic and practical gender needs. Research to address those questions is worth conducting because most external organizations fail to recognize women as main actors, but rather consider them as either victims or passive beneficiaries (Bradshaw 2013; Hewit 1997). Findings from such research may lead us to a better understanding of not only the causes of women's vulnerability, but also what prevents women and other marginalized groups of people from actively participating and taking leadership roles in post-disaster recovery and DRR activities. In light of those thoughts, we conducted field research in July and October 2015 in the Philippines and in July–August and October 2015 in Sri Lanka. Drawing mainly on a case of the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Sri Lanka, we reviewed how the government and external organizations, including the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), supported affected women and vulnerable groups through a gender lens.

In the following section, we review relevant theoretical frameworks, including the Pressure and Release (PAR) model and Access model by Blaikie et al. (1994), Conceptualization of Empowerment by Kabeer (1999), and Feminist Political Ecology by Rocheleau et al. (1996) to analyze the causes of vulnerability among women and other marginalized groups of people. In the third section, we review the literature, including empirical data, on gendered vulnerability and coping capacity. The fourth section briefly touches on the methodology of the research, including research questions, research methods, and descriptions of the research sites. The fifth section comprises findings from the field research in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The findings include the experiences of female and male survivors in their preparedness for, response to, and recovery from a disaster, as well as the legislative and institutional preparedness of the governments for a risk. We also explore how the interventions made by JICA and other organizations have affected gendered vulnerability and coping capacity as well as pre-existing gender roles and relations. In conclusion, we make some key


recommendations for how a gender perspective should be integrated in future post-disaster recovery and DRR projects in order to promote women's agency and leadership in DRR.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1 Natural Disasters Risk Theory**

Natural hazards are not always produced as disasters since disasters are products of the intersection of hazards and vulnerability (Bradshaw 2013; Flint and Luloff 2005; Oliver-Smith 1998). Vulnerability, defined as “being prone to or susceptible to damage or injury” (Blaikie et al. 1994, 9), is characterized by a person's or group's capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. Vulnerability includes social, economic, and political factors—including gender, class, ethnicity, and age—that determine the degree to which one's life and livelihood are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society (Adger et al. 2007; Blaikie et al. 1994; Enarson and Morrow 1998). Vulnerability is rooted in the unequal distribution and allocation of resources and power among different groups of people, shaped by those factors (Blaikie et al. 1994), which are necessary to well prepare for and cope with hazards.


The PAR model shows how social, political, and economic factors and processes at both lower and higher levels shape the vulnerability of individuals or households and constrain their capacity. The model comprises two opposing forces to shape a risk, a natural hazard event and the processes generating vulnerability, as shown in Figure 2.1.1. Based on the model, individuals or households are at risk only when they are vulnerable and a natural hazard unfolds. Blaikie et al. (1994) emphasize the social, economic, and political factors and processes as the root causes of vulnerability, rather than geophysical factors that cause natural hazards.



Source: Blaikie et al. (1994) and Wisner et al. (2004, 51)

**Figure 2.1.1 Pressure and Release (PAR) Model**

To supplement the PAR model, Wisner et al. (2004) further modified the Access model to show how changes in or reduction of vulnerability over time can relieve risks experienced by individuals or households (see Figure 2.1.2). The Access model focuses on the ways vulnerability is generated or alleviated in social, economic, and political processes that distribute household livelihoods and social protection unevenly (Blaikie et al. 1994; Wisner et al. 2004). This concept largely derives from Sen’s entitlement and capability approaches. In his case study focused on the root causes of famine, Sen (1981) states that famine is created not by droughts or insufficient food stocks, but by the inability of social groups to command food access through market and customary means (Blaikie et al. 1994; Turner et al. 2003). In other words, entitlement to food, rather than availability of food, is what matters. The marginalized groups’ “entitlement” to food tends to be denied or lessened by the un-enabling environment and operation of social, economic, and political processes (Blaikie et al. 1994).



Source: Blaikie et al. (1994) and Wisner et al. (2004, 89)

**Figure 2.1.2 Access Model**


From a gender perspective, the PAR model and the Access model are partly problematic, though they are helpful to explain the mechanism in which certain groups of people are put at risk while others are not. First, the analyses of vulnerability caused by a lack of entitlement or access tends to emphasize people's weaknesses and limitations (Turner et al. 2003; Wisner et al. 2004). This masks the recognition that people are not passive (Hewitt 1997; Turner et al. 2003), but capable of bringing about change (Wisner et al. 2004). In general, poor and marginalized groups of people possess less access to resources (Blaikie et al. 1994), which is easily translated to these groups being more vulnerable to hazards. Despite this prevalent discourse, even poor, underprivileged women in developing countries use a range of strategies to protect their lives and livelihoods from hazards (for example, see Chowdhury 2001; Mitchell et al. 2007). Almost everyone has some capacity for self-protection and group action (Wisner et al. 2004).

Secondly, the Access model focuses on accessibility to livelihoods and accumulative resources at the household rather than individual level. This is based on the egalitarian assumption that accumulative resources are evenly distributed among household members of the same household. Sen (1990) argues that it is not appropriate to treat the family or household as a single, equal unit because intra-household power dynamics determine who does what, who gets to consume what, and who makes what decisions. According to Sen's cooperative conflict model (1990), the perception - from themselves and others - that girls and women contribute less to the household's prosperity or wellbeing tends to put them in powerless positions within a household. Due to their poorer bargaining power within a household, girls and women tend to end up being forced to accept the discriminatory allocation of food and resources, in particular in times of crisis, and sacrifice themselves for other family members (Sen 1980, 1990).

Finally, the Access model looks only at access to livelihoods and accumulative resources, not control over them. Based on his capability approach, Sen (1991) argues that human capability can be determined by the extent of individuals' freedom, or opportunities to choose any of the available means to achieve their well-being or "functionings" (beings and doings). Thus, Sen emphasizes the importance of individuals' control over rather than access to resources because having only access to resources does not necessarily give a person freedom or opportunities to make a decision on how and when to use them. Furthermore, agency is a key to setting up "functionings" based on a person's subjective value and making his/her own choices in order to achieve the "functionings" set up.

Based on the ideas similar to Sen's, Kabeer conceptualizes empowerment well with three inter-related dimensions of resources, agency, and achievements, as shown in Figure 2.1.3, which partly makes up the weakness of the PAR and Access models. Kabeer (1999, 437)

defines power as “the ability to make choices” and empowerment as “a process of change” and “the expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them.” Among the three inter-related dimensions, Kabeer regards agency as a key factor for a person to choose what strategy and what resource to use for addressing his/her life objective of improving the quality of his/her life. According to Kabeer (1999, 438), agency can be defined as “the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them”. She further states that while agency can be taken as the power of decision-making, it can also be “the forms of bargaining and negotiation, deception and manipulation, subversion and resistance” (Kabeer 1999, 438). Based on Kabeer’s conceptualization of empowerment, an individual’s vulnerability to a risk and coping capacity can be assessed by their degree of agency rather than only their accessibility to resources.



Source: Kabeer, N. (1999, 437)

**Figure 2.1.3 Conceptualization of Empowerment**

## **2.2 Feminist Political Ecology**

Feminist political ecology developed by Rocheleau et al. (1996) is another important theory to understand differences among women, as well as women’s coping capacity and collective power in the context of environmental degradation and natural disasters. First, Rocheleau et al. (1996) argues that environmental degradation and natural disasters affect men and women, and even different groups of women, differently. According to Rocheleau et al. (1996), such different impacts can be attributed not only to unequal social, economic, and political structures, but their relation to nature and the environment. Unlike essentialists and ecofeminists, Rocheleau et al. (1996) do not take women as one united group of the oppressed, but differentiate them by their experiences with, responsibilities for, and interests in nature and the environment. This is based on Agarwal’s (1992) idea that gender- and class (caste/ethnicity)-based divisions of labor, and distributions of property and power structure people’s interaction with nature.

In feminist political ecology, Rocheleau et al. (1996) develop the analytical framework consisting of three elements: 1) gendered knowledge; 2) gendered rights and responsibilities; and 3) politics and grassroots activism. Each element emphasizes the gendered power structures

by which women's situated knowledge is overlooked, women's access to and control over resources is limited, and the more vulnerable conditions women are placed in. On the other hand, this analytical framework well explains that although poor rural women are vulnerable due to unequal gender relations, they are not merely powerless, and can collectively take an action for their rights and benefits based on their agency.

First, feminist political ecology focuses on how knowledge and science are structured and legitimized in favor of some social groups over others (Reed and Mitchell 2003). Gender relations influence what counts as knowledge (Cope 2002). In fact, a science of survival is largely in the hands of rural women in developing countries (Rocheleau et al. 1996). There are multiple environmental sciences practiced by diverse groups of rural farmers (Rocheleau et al. 1996), as many rural women employ their indigenous knowledge (Agarwal 1992) to adapt to the risk of future environmental degradation and natural disasters. However, the dominant and most visible structures of environmental science tend to be dominated by men, specifically from the industrialized world (Braidotti et al. 1994), who overlook the women's knowledge of everyday life (Agarwal 1992, Harding 1987, Rocheleau et al. 1996, Shiva 1988).

Shiva (1988) argues that Third World women's special knowledge of nature has been systematically marginalized through the impact of modern science (Agarwal 1992). "Modern reductionist science, like development (including the green revolution), ... has excluded women as experts, and has simultaneously excluded ecology and holistic ways of knowing which understand and respect nature's processes and interconnectedness as science" (Shiva 1988, 14). This illustrates the separation between knowing and doing (Rocheleau et al. 1996) and between ideological and realistic science (Braidotti et al. 1994). From a feminist perspective, science is not value-free or universal (Harding 1987). It is instead highly contextualized or situated (Braidotti et al. 1994). Harding (1987) argues that alternative ways of knowing and ways of learning should be based on everyday life and women's experience, and explicitly stated values should be developed (Rocheleau et al. 1996).

Secondly, gender, intersecting with class, race, and culture, also shapes access to and control of resources, as well as responsibilities to provide and manage resources for households and communities (Agarwal 1992; Rocheleau et al. 1996). Gendered environmental responsibilities and rights are applied to productive resources, such as land, water, trees, and animals, or the quality of the environment (Rocheleau et al. 1996). Socially structured division of labor along gender lines tends to shape the division of resources (Agarwal 1992, Reed and Mitchell 2003) and of space/domains also by gender (Rocheleau et al. 1996). The gendered division of resources does not simply suggest gender differences in terms of access to and control over the types and quantity of resources, but also in terms of the quality and value of



resources, inputs, products, and assets (Rocheleau et al. 1996). Thus, the mechanisms by which gender relations shapes the gendered division of labor and of resources appears to reinforce each other.

Finally, feminist political ecology emphasizes that poor rural women are not just victims who wait only for external assistance, but main actors who think by themselves and take action for solutions and change. This is largely based on Agarwal's (1992, 119) argument:

[W]omen, especially those in poor rural households in India, on the one hand, are victims of environmental degradation in quite gender-specific ways. On the other hand, they have been active agents in movements of environmental protection and regeneration, often bringing to them a gender-specific perspective and one which needs to inform our view of alternatives.

In fact, the involvement of women from developing countries in environmental activism reflects the fact that many poor women have faced further constraints on their livelihoods, specifically in times of environmental and economic crisis (Rocheleau et al. 1996). This is largely because governments and international organizations rarely prioritized the needs of these marginalized people to sustain their livelihoods and surrounding ecosystem. If poor rural women in developing countries do not raise their voices, nobody will represent them and they will fall into further crisis every time they experience an economic or environmental event. Those women's involvement in environmental or even other activism can lead to a sense of women's agency and empowerment (Reed and Mitchell 2003), which can bring about a new recognition of women's roles as key actors (Rocheleau et al. 1996).

### **3. Literature Review**

#### **3.1 Emerging Concepts of Vulnerability to Disaster from a Gender Perspective**

As briefly mentioned above, the focus of gender and disaster discourses has shifted from women's vulnerability to women's coping capacity and differences among women (Philipps and Morrow 2008). On the one hand, the vulnerability paradigm has led to a better understanding about how men and women differently experience disasters due to gendered vulnerability (Philipps and Morrow 2008; Hewitt 1997). However, it also includes the negative idea that the emphasis of women as a vulnerable group often leads to the victimization of women who are passively waiting for external relief aids (Hewitt 1997), as well as the universalization of women as a united group (Bradshaw 2013). Since women are not oppressed only by gender, but class, caste, race, ethnicity, age, and physical ability, they are not necessarily vulnerable in the same ways (Bradshaw 2013; Philipps and Morrow 2008). Thus, it is important to understand how gender, intersecting with other factors, shapes vulnerability and coping capacity in terms of the distribution of power and resources (Philipps and Morrow 2008).

The disaster literature has come to attend to "resilience" and "disaster-resilient community" rather than "what people lack or cannot do" (Bradshaw 2013, 12). As Bradshaw (2013) argues, communities are not collective or equitable spaces, but highly unequal spaces due to the hierarchies of power structures. Apart from the network of social groups consisting of members with similar backgrounds, other communities, consisting of different groups of people, tend to shape exclusion rather than inclusion (Massey 1994; Philipp and Morrow 2008; Young 1986). Thus, it is problematic to assume that community is so flat for everyone that it can be made resilient easily, without deeply considering the power structures within a community. As Enarson and Morrow (1998) suggest, inequalities of power at all levels, as well as power inequalities within intimate relationships, including gender relations, are key to understanding vulnerability, coping capacity, and disaster.

Another new concept of "building back better" can be regarded as a chance for transformation from a gender perspective (Bradshaw 2013, 101). Byrne and Baden (1995) suggest that after a disaster, there exists an opportunity for transformation because a natural event may cause profound changes in the lives of the people affected. On the other hand, disasters also reveal pre-existing power structures at all levels and inequalities (Enarson and Morrow 1998) and reshape or even worsen them (Blaikie et al. 1994). According to Bradshaw (2013, 101), however, the reconstruction phase provides a "window of opportunity: not just to transform the physical landscape, but also the political and socio-economic landscape; and not

only transform the material conditions under which the majority of the population live, but the context in which these conditions were being produced and reproduced.”

Based on Bradshaw’s idea above, the concept of “building back better” can provide an opportunity for the transformation of traditional gendered division of labor and roles and unequal gender relations (IRP 2009). However, those can be reproduced and even worsen (Anderson 2011) through the process of not appropriate post-disaster-reconstruction interventions by the government, external organizations, or media (Bradshaw 2013; Phillips and Morrow 2008). Bradshaw (2013) argues that women actively contributing in the aftermath of a disaster are regarded as helpers rather than rescuers, whereas in the relief and recovery interventions, they are regarded as beneficiaries and care-givers due to their gendered identities as mothers. More importantly, Bradshaw (2013, 182) argues:

[Many post-disaster-reconstruction] projects create new role of women, but pay little attention to gender relations, focusing instead on ensuring women are able to fulfil “their” practical needs. This focus ensures that the family needs are met, rather than questioning why women have the responsibility to fulfil those needs.

Women’s participation in post-disaster poverty alleviation projects may not improve the socio-economic status of women because gender identities absorb those new roles, leaving the gendered division of roles and gender relations largely unchanged (Bradshaw 2013). Without the deconstruction of unequal power relations, there is no opportunity for women to take on new roles or have new relationships.

Another emerging paradigm of post-disaster interventions is the livelihood approach. This is partly because vulnerability is often viewed as being equal to poverty, and livelihood improvement is a key development concept (Bradshaw 2013). If a person or group of people are financially poor, this may make them more vulnerable to the shocks of social, economic, or political events (Bradshaw 2013). Micro-credit loans are often allocated as the presumed solution to “building back better” their livelihoods, but Lovekamp (2008, 103) argues:

Theoretically, these loans empower women by increasing their autonomy and decision-making within the household, promoting more social interaction, and enhancing their economic status by generating extra income. However, ... these loans reinforce the cycle of poverty and debt and potentially increase women’s vulnerability to future disasters.

Similarly, Rashid reports that despite their efforts, many women in Bangladesh after the 1998 floods were still having difficulties repaying loans and had resorted to borrowing from different

people (Bradshaw 2013). This reveals that access to financial resources is not the ultimate condition for vulnerable women to get out of vicious circle of poverty and disasters.

As a means for social protection, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) has been introduced mainly in middle-income countries in Central and South America. In the CCT programs, cash is transferred through women because, according to the World Bank, channelling resources through women is more efficient. For the transfer, women are conditioned to attend training sessions and take such roles as mothers and care-givers in meeting the conditions in health, education, and nutrition of children (Bradshaw 2013). Thus, CCT tends to burden women with new responsibilities for poverty alleviation or social protection in addition to their traditional roles without deconstructing unequal power structures within the household and addressing women's empowerment (Bradshaw 2013).

### **3.2 Categorizations of Vulnerability and Disasters**

While the vulnerability paradigm led by the PAR model by Blaikie et al. (1994) focuses on individual vulnerability, Bradshaw (2013) looks at institutional problems and different dimensions to vulnerability. Those include: 1) geographical location; 2) the lack of institutions charged with responding to such hazards, by evacuating the population for example; 3) the lack of laws to enforce evacuation; 4) the lack of money to provide transport to move people; 5) the lack of policing to ensure people feel it is safe to leave their property; 6) a mistrust of the government; or a cultural belief that each individual should look after him/herself (Bradshaw 2013).

Disasters are often classified by their onset and typology of stages as shown in Table 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. First, rapid-onset disasters, such as earthquakes and landslides, tend to give little early warning when they occur. The rapid-onset disasters of hurricane and floods also give people only a short moment to prepare or evacuate. On the other hand, slow onset disasters, such as droughts, have time to unfold. Next, disasters are usually categorized by the typology of four stages, as shown in Table 3.2.1, based on which research findings on gendered vulnerability and coping capacity will be examined later. Fothergill (1998) expands to nine categories, narrowing down the phase of preparedness into: 1) exposure to risk; 2) risk perception; 3) preparedness behaviour; and 4) warning communication and response as shown in Table 3.2.1. Based on the concept that vulnerability and coping capacity are not stable, but change over time, it is important to analyze vulnerability and coping capacity by stages.

**Table 3.2.1 Disasters by On-set**

Rapid On-set		Slow On-set
More predictable	Less predictable	
Typhoons	Earthquakes	Droughts
Cyclones	Landslides	Famines
Hurricanes	Floods	

Source: Developed by the Authors

**Table 3.2.2 Typology of Disasters**

Researcher	Drabek (1986)	Fothergill (1996)
Typology of Disasters	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Preparedness</li> <li>2. Response</li> <li>3. Recovery/Reconstruction</li> <li>4. Prevention</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Exposure to risk</li> <li>2. Risk perception</li> <li>3. Preparedness behaviour</li> <li>4. Warning communication &amp; response</li> <li>5. Physical impacts</li> <li>6. Psychological impacts</li> <li>7. Emergency response</li> <li>8. Recovery</li> <li>9. Reconstruction</li> </ol>

Source: Drabek (1986) and Fothergill (1996, 12)

### 3.3 Gendered Implications of Disasters

#### 3.3.1 Gendered Vulnerability and Coping Capacity at the Phases of Preparedness and Response

An examination of the first phase of preparedness reveals that, the poor often involuntarily reside in disaster-prone areas (Blaikie et al. 1994). Due to the gendered division of labor and domains, poor women are more likely than poor men to be exposed to risk from environmental hazards. In her case study on the flood-prone areas in Bangladesh known as *chars*, which are river islands formed from sedimentation, Chowdhury (2001) explains that while male dwellers are usually engaged in wage-labor outside the chars during the day, female dwellers always stay at home and are thus more at risk. Drawing on the 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh, both Ikeda (1995) and Cannon (2002) stress that due to gender roles, their lack of literacy, their lack of mobility, and their seclusion from public places, women had less access to information on the cyclone, specifically for evacuation. Similarly, strict cultural norms constrained women and waited for their male members to make a decision on evacuation and escort them to shelters.

When natural disasters occur, women tend to be disproportionately impacted in terms of mortality, morbidity, and injury (Demetriades and Esplen 2008; Fothergill 1998; MacGregor,

2010). This is largely determined by gender relations, specifically in terms of lower physical capacity, division of labor and domains, and cultural norms/institutions. It is estimated that 90 percent of the victims of the 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh were women and children (Cannon 2002; Ikeda 1995; Khondker 1996). Early warning information about cyclones and floods in Bangladesh was transmitted by men to men in public spaces, rarely reaching women directly, in part explaining why five times more women than men died (Skutsch 2004). Similarly, more women died in the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia, India, and Sri Lanka (Oxfam 2005). Cannon (2002) connects the causality of Bangladeshi women's higher mortality with their weakness, resulting from their relatively poor health conditions and malnutrition status. The 2004 Tsunami in Sri Lanka shows that many women were preparing for breakfast at home and were washed away while their husbands had already been off to sea for fishing and were safe (Oxfam 2005). Muslim women in Sri Lanka delayed evacuating due to fear of the shame attached to leaving the house and moving in public without putting on a scarf (Rosa 2005). Women's clothing, *sari*, and relative inability to swim restricted their mobility and survival in the Tsunami in Sri Lanka (Rosa 2005) as well as in floods in Bangladesh (Cannon 2002; Demetriades and Esplen 2008).

### **3.3.2 Gendered Vulnerability and Coping Capacity at the Phase of Recovery**

In the second and third phases of response and recovery, women tend to play a significant role as food providers and care-takers while their contribution is often invisible (Fothergill 1998). Bolin et al. (1994) argue that media repeatedly shows desperate and crying women with their babies and reinforces the image of women as victims. The relief worker, Bari (1992, 58) explains how poor women in Bangladesh coped with the cyclone:

Because coping with poverty is tougher for women in general, the aftermath of the cyclone and tidal wave hit them the hardest. Their men may have lost the fishing equipment necessary to earn a living, their children may have died and their homes and belongings were washed away but at the end of each day it was the wife/mother who had to cook for whoever survived in her family. In all the relief lines I saw, women stood first. They were the ones collecting bits of wood and bamboo to rebuild the houses. As is customary, they dealt with the children and lack of food.

This reveals that women are not only victims, but active agents who cope with the disaster.

As Bari (1992) illustrates, women tend to bear a disproportionate share of invisible unpaid work as food and resource providers and care-givers (Demetriades and Esplen 2008; Fothergill 1998). After floods, fetching water becomes much more difficult, and burdens women who mainly take responsibility for the task (Cannon 2002, Faisal and Kabir 2005). Women's increased workload often results in more stress than men experience (Kumar-Range

2001), and constrains them from doing income-generating activities (Demetriades and Esplen 2008). Women's self-sacrificing efforts, however, tend to be taken for granted or are invisible because their roles as food providers and care-givers post-disaster is an extension of the pre-disaster roles and often takes place in private places (Bradshaw 2001, 2013; Fothergill 1998).

Women survivors' increased unpaid duties and limited income opportunities tend to exacerbate their economic insecurity and dependence on their husbands (Bradshaw 2001, 2013; Demetriades and Esplen 2008). Losses of harvest and livestock from floods in Bangladesh have a disproportionate impact on women, many of whom rely on food processing, cattle, and chickens for their cash income (Baden et al. 1994). In losing their homes, the poor women who used to conduct home-based small business lose income, their workplace, and production tools (Enarson 2008; UNDAW 2004). Unlike men, these women cannot as easily seek outside work (Kumar-Range 2001) due to their domestic duties and limited mobility. In a study in post-Mitch Nicaragua, many women survivors prioritized their role as care-givers, and could not go back to pre-disaster productive work as quickly as their husbands (Bradshaw 2001). As a result, the proportion of women in productive activities declined in absolute numbers and relative to men's employment in income generating activities (Bradshaw 2001).

One of the most severe problems faced by women in the post-disaster context is all forms of violence. While women tend to experience more emotional trauma and anxiety, men may be more likely to suffer from alcohol abuse in times of disaster (Fothergill 1996; Philipps and Morrow 2008). This alcohol abuse, combined with power inequalities between men and women, can drive men to abuse their wives more than they would in normal circumstances. Gelles (1995) notes, domestic violence against wives increased in the wake of Hurricane Andrew (Fothergil 1996). Bradshaw (2001) also shows that these women survivors could not resist violence by their husbands due to social stigma, their economic dependence on their husbands, and their fear of abandonment by their husbands (Bradshaw, 2001). More problematically, Philipps and Morrow (2008) point out that women with disabilities are more likely to be sexually harassed or violated in evacuation centers where private and safe spaces are not ensured for them.

In addition, disasters reveal differences among women of different marital statuses in terms of economic recovery and poverty (Bradshaw 2013). Women survivors, specifically those who became widows, tend to suffer from their lack of property rights. In patriarchal Sri Lankan societies post-tsunami, many widows were not allowed to claim back the property which had previously been legally owned by their husbands (Oxfam 2005; Rosa 2005). Instead, their male family members or relatives had the rights to claim the land, which marginalized the widows (Oxfam 2005; Rosa 2005). Widows post-tsunami also had difficulty accessing cash payments

and rations because families registered for government and insurance purposes in their husbands' names (Oxfam 2005). Similarly, in many of the post-famine emergency relief programs in Africa, a male-headed household is considered as a model for food provision (Bolin et al. 1998). They often fail to pay special attention to female-heads and the women who are abandoned by their husbands (Bolin et al. 1998).

### **3.3.3 Gendered Vulnerability and Coping Capacity at the Phases of Prevention and Preparedness<sup>2</sup>**

During the phases of prevention and preparedness for a risk of future disasters, women tend to be excluded from the planning processes of DRR programs, which often take place in public spaces (Khondker 1996). Through their everyday practices and group actions, however, women can exercise their coping strategies according to their responsibilities. In her case study in Bangladesh, Chowdhury (2001) illustrates that women's indigenous knowledge and innovative technology play a crucial role in environmental management and the protection of their lives and livelihoods. For example, these women increased food security by composting kitchen waste to produce soil-enriching fertilizer and prepared for floods by securing fodder for their livestock, planting trees around low houses to protect against strong winds, and selecting fast-growing seedlings to make soils more stable (Chowdhury 2001).

To climate variability, women farmers, in particular, had difficult well adapting, due to financial and gender-based reasons. Mitchell et al. (2007, 12) also quote a story of a woman farmer in Bardiya district, Nepal where farmers have suffered unpredictable rain fall patterns and decreasing rainfall:

I am one of the women farmers who are growing off-season vegetables and bananas. These crops suffer less than paddy when there is a flood or a drought. I started to grow vegetables in a kitchen garden to sell. There is no alternative other than changing our cropping patterns to reduce the risk of crop failure.

Mitchell et al. (2007) also show the difficulty faced by women farmers in the context of Nepal where extreme climate events, including heavy rainfall and droughts, have already unfolded. Some women farmers who participated in their study said that changing the way seedbeds are prepared and selecting crop varieties (mixing local and hybrid types) according to the local context could be helpful adaptations. However, Mitchell et al. (2007) observe that hybrid seeds are often more expensive and some crops tend to be labor-intensive, which might thus put more burden on women. They also add that these seeds require knowledge and skills, which can be

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<sup>2</sup> "Preparedness" here is in the context of post-disaster, referring to how people prepare themselves for a risk of future disasters after experiencing one serious disaster.



constraints for those women who are more likely to be illiterate or less educated and have limited access to information and opportunities to acquire new skills.

Some farmers in Nepal responded that finance has remained the barrier for them to use “labor-intensive technologies (through machine/equipment); initiating multiple cropping and intercropping practices; changing cultivation to more easily marketable crop varieties or flood- and drought- resistant crops; and investing in alternative irrigation facilities” (Mitchell et al. 2007, 13). Other women farmers in Nepal insisted on their need for extension worker and veterinary visits, and skill training to allow them to increase their incomes through alternative livelihoods (Mitchell et al. 2007). On the contrary, in her studies on community forestry programs in northern India, Agarwal (2001) shows that cultural norms about female seclusion and limited mobility prevent women farmers from contacting extension workers who are exclusively men and attend the training programs which are overnight and held outside the community.

Similar to their coping and adaptive capacities, women’s potential roles and leadership in DRR tends to be invisible despite their actual contributions. Buvinic (1999) suggests that part of the reason why no deaths were reported in La Masica in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch was that women had been educated in and were in charge of the early warning system. Furthermore, Serrat Vinas (1998) points out that women were highly active in organizing community resistance to enforced relocation, echoing the activism of women around housing issues in the wake of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake (Momsen 1991; Enarson 2008). Thus, it is important to deconstruct the stereotypical image of women as passive beneficiaries, and change their roles through post-disaster reconstruction interventions.

## 4. Methodology

### 4.1 Research Objectives and Research Site Selection

Since March 2015, based on the UNSCR 1325 (2000)<sup>3</sup> and 1820 (2008)<sup>4</sup> and other succeeding related resolutions, JICA has initiated the collaborative research project on gender and DRR, as well as peace building, with the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) in Washington D.C. in the United States. Accordingly, JICA research team focused on gender and DRR conducted field research in the Philippines in July and October 2015 and Sri Lanka from July to August and in October 2015.<sup>5</sup> The overall goal of the research was to explore the gendered implications of disasters in terms of vulnerability and coping capacity, based on findings from the research. More specifically, the team aimed to identify key constraints against and driving factors for the promotion of women's active participation in and leadership of community-based DRR, drawing from the case of post-disaster and DRR projects by JICA and other organizations. Attending to the gendered vulnerability and coping capacity specific to the contexts of the research sites, the team aimed to reflect on the lessons learned from the interventions into the formulation of JICA's future international cooperation projects on DRR.

Despite the research objectives above, JICA's DRR cooperation projects are limited to the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure and the construction of new infrastructure for a mitigation purpose. There are only few projects focused on community-based DRR, including the ones implemented in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. First, since 2014 in parts of Leyte and Samar Islands in the Philippines, JICA has implemented "the Project on Rehabilitation and Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda." In this project, JICA mainly aimed to rehabilitate the roads and schools damaged by the Typhoon and develop technical hazard maps at the city/municipality level. The supported local governments were supposed to make land-use plans and community-based hazard maps later based on the city/municipality-level hazard maps developed. In addition, JICA undertook Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), aiming to improve the livelihoods of affected people, particularly women. JICA supported 15 QIPs, through which around 100 women members of 15 associations attempted to build back their previous

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<sup>3</sup> [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325\(2000\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325(2000)) (the last access: Dec. 22, 2015)

<sup>4</sup> [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1820\(2008\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1820(2008)) (the last access: Dec. 22, 2015)

<sup>5</sup> The JICA team of field research in the Philippines and Sri Lanka consisted of Dr. Yumiko Tanaka, Senior Advisor on Gender and Development, JICA and Dr. Atsuko Nonoguchi, Japan Development Service Co., Ltd. Mr. Hideya Kobayashi, Planning Department, JICA joined a part of the 1<sup>st</sup> field study in Sri Lanka. Ms. Kasheana Alexa Yillarama joined the team as an interpreter in all the field research in the Philippines. Mr. Mohideen Nowzath joined the team as an interpreter in both the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> field studies in Sri Lanka. Mr. Christie Croos and Mr. Sasanka Mendis participated as interpreters in a part of the 1<sup>st</sup> study in Sri Lanka.

businesses and scale them up. Through the QIPs, JICA provided each association with necessary equipment/tools and a building for production.

Secondly, JICA supported tsunami-affected areas of Sri Lanka in various ways right after the Tsunami occurred in 2004. In addition to the rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure, the government of Japan and JICA also supported the people on the east coast who lost their houses. Under the grant aid project, the government of Japan, in cooperation with the local government, provided those homeless people with the permanent houses which were newly constructed in the Japan Sri Lanka Friendship Village (JSFV) in Iqbal Nagar, Kucchaveli Division, Trincomalee District. Through “the Tsunami and Conflict-affected Community’s Uplifting Project (T-CUP)”, implemented from 2006 to 2009, JICA introduced the Women’s Coop’s approach to the women dwellers of JSFV in order to improve their livelihoods. The main activities of the Women Development Cooperative were saving and micro-financing activities, through which women’s families were expected to meet their daily needs and enhance their welfare. Since JICA’s community-based post-disaster recovery and DRR projects were limited to these two projects implemented in the Philippines and Sri Lanka, those two countries were almost automatically selected for the research.

## **4.2 Research Questions**

The field research in both the Philippines and Sri Lanka sought to establish the gendered implications of disasters in terms of vulnerability and coping capacity. To achieve this objective, we developed the primary research question: What kinds of gendered vulnerability and coping capacity should JICA take into account in formulating future community-based DRR projects, through which JICA can prevent women from disproportionately being affected by future disasters and promote women’s leading role in community-based DRR? To address this question, we developed some specific research questions as follows:

- 1) What were the characteristics of gendered vulnerability at the phase of preparedness, response, recovery/reconstruction, and prevention in the project sites?;
- 2) What were the characteristics of gendered coping capacity at the phase of preparedness, response, recovery/reconstruction, and prevention in the project sites?;
- 3) What were differences in vulnerability and coping capacity among women and what kinds of factors tended to shape the differences?;
- 4) How did the JICA projects recognize and address or not recognize or address such women’s vulnerability? What are main reasons for that?;

- 5) How did the JICA projects recognize and utilize (promote) or not recognize or utilize (promote) women's coping capacity for community-based DRR? What are main reasons for that?;
- 6) What kinds of interventions were effective or ineffective to promote women's agency, leadership, and empowerment while reducing their vulnerability? What are main reasons for that?; and
- 7) How did the JICA projects contribute or not contribute to women's recovery from the past disaster, their active participation in community-based DRR, and their agency/leadership/empowerment? What are main reasons for that?

### **4.3 Research Strategy**

As stated above, the main objective of the field research was to understand how gender, intersecting with other factors, shapes human vulnerability to and coping capacity for a risk of disasters. The study is specific to the context of the research sites, but applicable to other regions and countries. We employed a case study for our research project based upon its ability to address complexity and context-specificity (Creswell 1997; Yin 2002). There were mainly two cases we explored: 1) partial areas of Leyte and Samar Islands in the Philippines which were severely affected by the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan; and 2) the JSFV in which the government of Japan funded to construct permanent houses for the relocation of those who lost their houses due to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, and JICA supported women, with the initiative of the Women Development Cooperative, through the saving and micro-finance activities. Focusing on the gendered vulnerability and coping capacity specific to the contexts of those research sites, we examined how JICA and other organizations' interventions could affect women's active participation and leadership in recovery from the past disaster and community-based DRR.


#### 4.4 Research Sites and Participants in the Research

##### 4.4.1 The Philippines



Source: <http://www.maps-of-the-world.net>. (Accessed September 23, 2016)

Figure 4.4.1 Map of the Philippines



Source: the “Wikipedia” entry for each City/Municipality (Accessed November 20, 2015)

**Figure 4.4.2 Map of Research Sites in the Philippines**

**(1) Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)**


Typhoon Haiyan, known as Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines, hit Southeast Asia, and particularly the Philippines, in early November 2013. It was one of the strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded, killing at least 6,300 people in the Philippines alone. Haiyan is also the strongest storm recorded at landfall, and the second-strongest tropical cyclone ever recorded in terms of one minute sustained wind speed.<sup>6</sup> It caused catastrophic destruction in the Visayas, particularly in Samar and Leyte, Cebu, Capiz, Negros, and Northern Iloilo. According to the U.N. reports, about 11 million people have been affected, many of them made homeless. The general profile of Typhoon Haiyan is shown in Table 4.4.1, and the map of the affected areas in Figure 4.4.3.

<sup>6</sup> <http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/was-typhoon-haiyan-a-record-storm/> (Accessed November 20, 2015)

**Table 4.4.1 General Profile of the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan**

Description	Details
Name	Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)
Date	Nov. 8, 2013
Highest Wind (measured by PAGASA)	230 km/h (145mhp)
Primary Affected Places	Eastern Samar, Samar, and Leyte provinces
Casualty	
1. Affected	16 million persons
2. Death	6,300 persons
3. Injured (as of Apr.17, 2014)	28,689 persons
4. Missing (as of Apr. 17, 2014)	1,061 persons
5. Displaced	4.1 million people
House Damaged/ Destroyed	1.1 million houses
Total Damage as of April 2014 by NDRRMC	USD 2 billion
Economic Impacts	USD 14 billion

Source: USAID<sup>7</sup>



Source: UNOCHA<sup>8</sup>

**Figure 4.4.3 Map of the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)-affected Areas of the Philippines**

<sup>7</sup> [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/philippines\\_ty\\_fs22\\_04-21-2014.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/philippines_ty_fs22_04-21-2014.pdf) (Accessed November 20, 2015)

<sup>8</sup> [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MA007\\_AffectedPopulationRegion\\_v01-300dpi.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MA007_AffectedPopulationRegion_v01-300dpi.pdf) (Accessed December 18, 2015)

## (2) Profile of JICA’s Project on Rehabilitation and Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda

As briefly mentioned above, JICA implemented the Project on Rehabilitation and Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda starting in 2014. The purpose and main activities of the Project are as shown in Table 4.4.2.

**Table 4.4.2 Profile of JICA’s Project on Rehabilitation and Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda**

Profile of the Project	
Project Title	Project on Rehabilitation and Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda
Period	Feb.1, 2014 to Oct. 31, 2016
Counterpart	NEDA and DPWH
Goal	To realize the society resilient against disasters
Objectives	1) To support affected people and local governments 2) To recover from Typhoon Yolanda and build resilient society and community 3) To conduct development survey in order To realize that objective
Main Activities	1) To develop a master plan on rehabilitation and recovery 2) To develop technical hazard maps at city/municipality level 3) To conduct rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure 4) To conduct livelihood-improvement projects (QIPs)

Source: developed by the authors

## (3) Research Sites and Participants in Focus Groups Discussions in the Philippines

The field research targeted Tacloban City, Tolosa Municipality, Tanauan Municipality, Palo Municipality in Leyte, and Basey Municipality in Samar, which were all severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan. General information on those cities/municipalities is shown in Table 4.4.3.

**Table 4.4.3 Profile of the Research Sites in the Philippines**

Municipality	Population (2010)	Number of Barangay	Number of death	Exposure of Risk to Disasters
Tacloban	221,174	138	2,496	typhoons, storm surges, etc.
Tolosa	17,921	15	n.a.	typhoons, storm surges, floods, soil erosion, etc.
Tanauan	50,119	54	1,252	typhoons, storm surges, volcanic explosion, etc.
Palo	62,727	33	1,089	n.a.
Basey	50,423	51	n.a.	typhoons, floods, landslides, etc.

Source: NSO<sup>9</sup> and partly developed by the authors based on the key-informant interviews.

<sup>9</sup> <https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/hsd/pressrelease/Eastern%20Visayas.pdf> (Accessed November 20, 2015)



Through the main (1<sup>st</sup>) and supplementary (2<sup>nd</sup>) field studies in the Philippines, we conducted 12 focus groups discussions with more than 75 local women and 5 local men in Tolosa, Palo, Tanauan, and Basey. Nine focus group discussions were conducted from July 8 to July 25, 2015 in the 1<sup>st</sup> study and 3 from Sep. 25 to Sep. 27, 2015 in the 2<sup>nd</sup> study. Those women participants were mainly members who were involved in JICA's QIPs and attempted to increase their profits and scale up their businesses. Due to time constraints and other reasons, the participants in all focus group discussions were not counted, but 79 women and 7 men were recorded. It was not possible to collect the personal socio-economic profile from all those 79 women and 7 men, though it was collected from some of them. Within the limited data, the age of women participants varied from 24 to 65 years old, and their educational level also varied from elementary school level to college level. Most of the women participants regarded themselves as home makers while some as laundry labor workers, fish vendors, fish care takers, shop owners, etc. The details of the participants whose data are available are shown in Table 4.4.4 and 4.4.5.

**Table 4.4.4 Profile of Focus Groups Discussions conducted in the Philippines**

Barangay	Date of FGD	Number of Participants	Activity	Support by JICA
Tanghas	July 8, 2015	6 women	boneless <i>Bangus</i> (local fish)	Yes
Burak	July 8, 2015	6 women	vege-fish noodle	Yes
Telegrafo	July 8, 2015	5 women	pork meat loaf	Yes
Olot	July 9, 2015	9 women	local sausage (longanisa)	Yes
-	July 10, 2015	4 women	women facilitators for WFS	No (initially by UNFPA, now by DSWD)
-	July 10, 2015	7 women	women facilitators for WFS	No (initially by UNFPA, now by DSWD)
-	July 11, 2015	3 women	members of Camp Management Committee for Bunk House in Sagkahan, Tacloban	No
St. Cruz	July 13, 2015	9 women	soft-boned <i>Bangus</i> (local fish)	Yes
Cambayan	July 14, 2015	6 women	boneless <i>Bangus</i> (local fish)	Yes
Burak	Sept. 25, 2015	5 men	-	husbands of the women supported by JICA
San Roque	Sept. 25, 2015	16 women	beneficiaries of 4Ps want to do business, but no support representatives of the associations belonging to	No
-	Sept. 26, 2015	8 women	BANIG	No

Note: Total 79 women and 7 men

Source: developed by the authors based on the records of the focus groups discussions.

**Table 4.4.5 Profile of the Participants in the Focus Groups Discussions in the Philippines**

City/ Municipality	Group (Number of participants)	Age Range	Educational Level	Occupation	Number of Children
Tolosa	Tanghas (6 women)	35 - 49	Elementary to College level	Home makers Husbands: pedi-cab drivers and laborers	2 - 6
	Burak (8 women)	24 -74	n.a.	Mostly home makers Husbands: pedi-cab drivers and farmer	1- 4
	Telegrafo (5 women)	51 - 57	n.a.	n.a.	3 - 6
	Olot (9 women)	35 - 65	n.a.	Some home makers Others: laborers, laundry, and shop- owner	0 - 8
	Women Facilitators for WFS (4 women)	na	na	na	na
Palo	Women Facilitators for WFS (7 women)	na	na	na	na
Tacloban	Members of Camp Management for Bunk House (3 women & 2 men)	na	na	na	na
Tanauan	St. Cruz (9 women)	39 - 59	Elementary to College level	Fish vender, fish take-carer, manucure/ pedicure, etc. Home makers' husbands: fishermen, fish vender, etc.	2 - 5
Basey	Cambayan (6 women)	26 - 57	Elementary to College level	Farmers home makers' husbands: pedi-cab drivers and laborer	0 - 5
Tolosa	Burak (5 men)	27 - 62	No education to Elementary's Grade 4 level	former coconuts farmer (present: laborers) former coconuts farm land owner, electronic technician, pedi-cab driver	0 - 7
	San Roque (18 women)	na	na	na	na
Basey	(8 women)	na	na	na	

Source: Developed by the authors based on the records from the focus group discussions.

Note: Out of 79 women and 7 men participants, the data from only some of women and men shown in Table 4.4.5 are available.

#### 4.4.2 Sri Lanka



Source: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/srilanka.pdf>

**Figure 4.4.4 Map of Sri Lanka**



Source: <http://www.maps-of-the-world.net>

**Figure 4.4.5 Map of Research Sites in Sri Lanka**

## (1) Indian Ocean Tsunami

The Indian Ocean Tsunami, resulting from the Indian Ocean Earthquake on December 26, 2004, devastated Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, and Maldives. It was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded history. In Sri Lanka, 35,322 people were killed and 21,411 people were injured by the Tsunami.<sup>10</sup> According to Oxfam (2005), many of the dead were women and the elderly. Over a half million people were internally displaced from their homes.<sup>11</sup> The Tsunami hit the entire coastline of Sri Lanka, particularly the south and east coasts, around two and a half hours after the earthquake which was estimated to be 9:25am at the Galle port in the south. On the east coast, the Ampara, Batticaloa, Mullaitive, and Trincomalee Districts were severely affected. The general profile of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami is shown in Table 4.4.6, and the map of Tsunami disaster and number of deaths by district in Figure 4.4.6.

**Table 4.4.6 General Profile of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (Sri Lanka)**


Description	Status
Name	Indian Ocean Tsunami
Date	Dec. 26, 2004
Magnitude of the Earthquake	9.0
Primary Affected Places	Mulaitive, Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Hambanthota, Trincomalee, Kilinochchi Districts
Casualty	
1. Affected	1,019,306 persons
2. Dead	35,399 persons
3. Injured	23,176 persons
4. Missing	not specified
5. Displaced	480,000 persons
House Damaged/ Destroyed	114, 069 units
Total Damage as of	USD 1,316.5 million

Source: International Recovery Platform<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2005/12/sri2-d29.html> (Accessed November 20, 2015)

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> [http://www.recoveryplatform.org/countries\\_and\\_disasters/disaster/15/indian\\_ocean\\_tsunami\\_2004](http://www.recoveryplatform.org/countries_and_disasters/disaster/15/indian_ocean_tsunami_2004) (Accessed December 20, 2015)



Source: NDMC<sup>13</sup>

**Figure 4.4.6 Map of Tsunami 2004 Disaster – Number of Deaths by District in Sri Lanka**

**(2) JICA’s T-CUP and GiMCEP**

In Sri Lanka, we conducted the field research in three areas: 1) the tsunami-affected area of the Trincomalee District on the east coast; 2) the landslide-prone area of the Rathnapura District, located in the central area of the country; 3) the flood-prone area of the Batticaloa District on the east coast. In the first area, after the grant aid project by the government of Japan, JICA implemented the T-CUP from 2006 to 2009. As briefly mentioned above, this project mainly aimed to provide some of those who lost their houses due to the Tsunami with newly-constructed permanent houses in the Trincomalee and Ampara Districts. In the second area, JICA implemented the Disaster Management Capacity Enhancement Project Adaptable to Climate Change (DiMCEP) from March 2010 to March 2013. Under this Project, JICA undertook some pilot projects focused on community-based DRR in landslide-prone areas. The brief profiles of the Projects are as shown in the Table 4.4.7 and 4.4.8.

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.google.co.jp/search?q=map+of+tsunami+number+of+death+by+district+in+sri+lanka&biw=1242&bih=585&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjN0fC8nuLJAhWBLqYKHfajDX0QsAQIGg#imgrc=bUeYuaPDRVZsM%3A> (Accessed December 20, 2015)

**Table 4.4.7 Profile of JICA’s T-CUP**

<b>Profile of the Project</b>	
Project Title	The Tsunami and Conflict-affected Community’s Uplifting Project
Period	Sep. 2006 to Sep. 2009
Counterpart	Ministry of Nation Building & Estate Infrastructure Development Trincomalee & Ampara District Secretariat
Goal	To build reconciliation and peace among people
Objectives	To develop a community development model in a newly-built village through the relocation of people who lost their houses by the Tsunami
Main Activities	1) To undertake income-generating activities through Women’s Coop’s interventions as well as JICA’s training programs. 2) To strengthen a social tie among people. 3) To train local government’s officials to promote participatory community development.

Source: Developed by the authors.

**Table 4.4.8 Profile of JICA’s DiMCEP**

<b>Profile of the Project</b>	
Project Title	The Disaster Management Capacity Enhancement Project Adaptable to Climate
Period	March 2010 to March 2013
Counterpart	Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resource Management
Goal	The model structure system for disaster management will be applied in other areas than pilot project areas
Objectives	To develop the model structure system for disaster management in terms of community based DRR activities in pilot project areas
Main Activities	1) To train the officials of DMC for better leadership and coordination 2) To improve the capacity of the relevant governmental organizations for better landslide control 3) To implement activities related to preparedness and early warning in pilot project areas

Source: Developed by the authors

### **(3) Research Sites and Participants in Focus Groups Discussions in Sri Lanka**

The field research in Sri Lanka was conducted mainly in the sites where JICA implemented T-CUP and DiMCEP. For supplementary purposes, we conducted a few discussions with local women and men in flood-prone areas of Batticaloa District where *Suriya* Women Development Center (SWDC) and Oxfam separately implemented their community-based DRR projects. The general information on the research sites is shown in Table 4.4.9.

**Table 4.4.9 Profile of Research Sites in Sri Lanka**

District	Division	GN	Ethnicity	Population (Female)	Number of Household	Main Occupation	The most severe flood ever had	Flood Season	Drought Season	Land-slide
Trincomalee	Kuchchaveli	Iqbal Nagar	Muslim Tamil	na	246 (Tamil 136; Muslim 110)	Fishing, farming, and labor work	2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami	Oct. to Dec.	Aug. to Oct.	-
Rathnapura	Kolonna	Ranhotikanda	Sinhalese	2,560 (1,294)	645	Farming and labor work	-	-	Aug. & Sep.	Oct. to Dec.
Batticaloa District	Mamunai West Division	Villavatu	Tamil	1,701 (839)	498	Selling firewood, and labor work	2010/11 Flood	Oct. to Mar.	Apr. to Oct.	-
		Karavetti	Tamil	2,010 (1,025)	630	Labor work, and lagoon fishing	2010/11 Flood	Nov. to Jan.	up to Aug./Sep.	-

Source: developed by the authors.

During the main (1<sup>st</sup>) and supplementary (2<sup>nd</sup>) field studies in Sri Lanka, we conducted 13 focus group discussions with more than 88 women and 7 men who were involved in JICA's T-CUP and DiMCEP, as well as in the community-based DRR projects implemented separately by SWDC and Oxfam. The participants in the discussions in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa Districts were either Muslim or Tamil, and those in the Rathnapura District were all Sinhalese. Out of 13 discussions, we conducted 10 from July 31 to August 5, 2015 in the 1<sup>st</sup> study, and 3 on Oct. 14 and 15, 2015 in the 2<sup>nd</sup> study. Due to time constraints and other reasons, the number of participants in all focus group discussions was not counted, and personal socio-economic profiles were not collected from all the participants. The profile of the focus group discussions conducted in Sri Lanka, despite no socio-economic background information of the participants, is shown in Table 4.4.10.

**Table 4.4.10 Profile of Focus Groups Discussions in Sri Lanka**

District	Division	GN	Name of Group	Number of Participants	Ethnicity/ Religion	Date of FGD	Supported by JICA or Other Org.
Trincomalee	Kuchchaveli	Iqbal Nagar	① Alsafa Group 5	10 women	Muslim	July 31, 2015	T-CUP by JICA
			② Zahira Group 2	5 women	Muslim	July 31, 2015	
			③ Malarom Moddukul	8 women	Tamil	July 31, 2015	
			④ Sevanthi Women's Group	7 women	Tamil	July 31, 2015	
			⑤ RDS (Tamil)	3 men	Tamil	Aug. 1, 2015	
			⑥ Arna Group 4	5 women	Muslim	Aug. 1, 2015	
			⑦ Minha Women's Group	4 women	Muslim	Aug. 1, 2015	
Rathnapura	Kolonna	Ranhotikanda	⑧ GN DMC (EC)	na	Sinhalese	Aug. 4, 2015	DiMCEP by JICA
			⑨ members of various women's group	20 women	Sinhalese	Aug. 4, 2015	
			⑩ Women's Society	6 women	Sinhalese	Aug. 5, 2015	
Batticaloa	Manmunai West	Puthuman- dapathady	⑪ members of various women's group	na	Tamil	Oct. 14, 2015	by SWDC 15, by Oxfam
			⑫ GN DMC	13 women 4 men	Tamil	Oct. 15, 2015	
		Karavetti	⑬ members of various women's group, including	12 women	Tamil	Oct. 15, 2015	

Source: developed by the authors based on the Records from Focus Group Discussions in Sri Lanka

## 4.5 Research Methods

To address the core and specific research questions, we used three methodological approaches: 1) review of secondary data; 2) key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGD); and 3) analysis. For the first step, we collected and reviewed relevant documents created by JICA and other international organizations to understand the outline of the disasters we explored and the socio-economic conditions within the research sites. The second step of key informant interviews and focus group discussions were both semi-structured. The key informant interviews took place in the capital city and research sites of both countries. The key informant interview in the capital city targeted central government officials and representatives of international/local organizations based in the capital city who engaged in gender and DRR. The key informant interview in the research sites targeted local governmental officials and field workers of international/local organizations based in the research sites. All focus group discussions also targeted local women and men living in the research sites who were severely affected by the past disaster or exposed to a risk of future disasters.

For the third step of data analysis, we followed steps based on the analytical strategies recommended by Creswell (1997). First, we wrote findings in the form of field memos and transcripts, which was an initial step to writing all details of field research. Then, we read through all information and data collected in order to obtain a sense of the overall data. The second step was to reduce the data. For this, we looked at the field notes and transcriptions to see if there were key words used frequently by the participants in the key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Once the data was sorted and reduced, we interpreted it based on hunches, insights, and intuition, and generalized to some extent. The final step was to present the data in the text of a final report.

## 4.6 Limitations

There were critical time constraints for the field research, which consisted of only 3 weeks in total for each of the field studies in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Thus, there were serious limitations on the number of participants in focus group discussions and the quality of the data collected. Due to time constraints, the research did not contain in-depth interviews, but only key informant interviews and focus group discussions. This was one of critical shortcomings for developing a deeper and more comprehensive understanding. Another concern created by time constraints was the level of relationship (*rapport*) which we were able to build with the participants whom we were meeting for the first time at the discussions. In addition, there was the possibility of misunderstanding due to our communication with the participants through an interpreter. These translations may not have been perfect, though we confirmed with



the participants every time we encountered an answer that did not make sense or differed from our understanding.

#### **4.7 Validity and Reliability**

In order to verify the accuracy of findings from the field research, we used a couple of methods. For improving credibility, we applied triangulation, peer debriefing, and peer examination. As described above, we used multiple research methods, such as the review of secondary data, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions, which worked for triangulation. To address unclear or doubtful findings from focus group discussions, we double-checked with key informants. Due to time constraints, we could not go back to the research sites for peer-examination; however, we did confirm with those staff members of JICA projects and international/local organizations who attended in the interviews. For peer debriefing, we asked a few specialists who are familiar with gender and disaster issues in the local contexts.

## **5. Findings**

In this section, we show key findings from the field research in the Philippines and Sri Lanka, drawing from the theoretical frameworks and literature reviewed above. First, we look at national and local institutions, in both the Philippines and Sri Lanka, which Blaikie et al. (1994) treat as a part of “Dynamic Pressures” to progress vulnerability in their PAR model, and Bradshaw (2013) considers to be critical to determine vulnerability. Secondly, we examine human vulnerability and coping capacity, mainly by gender, place, and race/religion, which are considered to be “Root Causes” in the PAR model.

National and local institutions are analyzed in terms of: 1) national laws, policies, and structures from the national level to the village level; and 2) how a gender perspective is mainstreamed into the laws, policies, and structures. On the other hand, human vulnerability and coping capacity, specific to the research sites, are analyzed in terms of how they are shared or differentiated among different groups of people identified by gender, places, races, religion, etc. The analysis of vulnerability and coping capacity is done by phases of a disaster, categorized by Drabeck (1986): (pre-disaster) preparedness; response; recovery and reconstruction; and preventions and (post-disaster) preparedness. By doing this, we look into changes in vulnerability and coping capacity over time and specifically with external interventions. In this light, we examine how JICA and other organizations contributed to gender mainstreaming in post-disaster recovery and DRR interventions in terms of the transformation of the gendered division of roles and decision-making power dynamics, drawing on feminist political ecology by Rocheleau et al. (1996) and the concept of empowerment by Kabeer (1999).

### **5.1 The Philippines**

#### **5.1.1 Institutional Arrangements**

##### **(1) National Laws, Policies, and Structures for DRR**

The national law of the Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (Republic Act 10121) was adopted in 2010. Based on this law, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) (2011-28) was developed. Accordingly, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), consisting of key stakeholders from both governmental and non-governmental organizations, was set up to implement the plan. The Council is led by the chair of Secretary of National Defence (ND) as well as vice chairs of the Secretaries of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and the Department of Science and Technology (DST). Among the vice chairs, DILG is in


charge of the stage of preparedness, DSWD of response, NEDA of recovery and reconstruction, and DST of prevention or mitigation. As one of the members of NDRRMC, the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW), the national machinery for promoting gender equality joins the Council as well as the Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP), World Vision, and Plan International as the representatives of the civil societies. The Office of Civil Defense (OCD) under the ND functions as secretariat for the Council. The legislative and institutional arrangement for DRR in the Philippines is shown in Table 5.1.1.

**Table 5.1.1 Legislative and Institutional Arrangement for DRR in the Philippines**

<b>Policy/ Plan/ Structure</b>	<b>Description</b>
Law	The Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (Republic Act 10121)
Policy/ Plan	National Disaster Reduction and Management Plan (NDRMP) (2011-2028)
Structure: National	NDRRMC chaired by Secretary of ND
Local	City/Municipality DRRMC chaired by Mayor
Barangay	Barangay DRRMC chaired by Barangay Captain
Department in Charge	
Preparedness	DILG
Response	DSWD
Recovery	NEDA
Prevention	DST
Budget National/ Local	Calamity Fund (5 % of the total budget at each level)

Source: developed by the authors based on the key-informant interviews.

Based on the law, the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils/ Committees (DRRMC) are to be set up at the city/municipality and *barangay* or village levels and the Councils/Committees are supposed to develop their own Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plans (DRRMP) as well. Some barangays, including San Jose Barangay in Tacloban City, have proactively set up the Committees, consisting of the Barangay Captain as the chair of the Committee, 7 counsellors, 1 secretary, 1 accountant, and 1 security officer as well as community volunteers, including barangay health workers (BHWs), barangay nutrition scholars (BNSs), and barangay service point officers (BSPOs), most of whom are women. The structure for DRR at the local level is shown in Figure 5.1.1.



Source: developed by the authors based on the key-informant interviews

**Figure 5.1.1 Structure for DRR at the Local Level in the Philippines**

**(2) Mainstreaming Gender into the Laws, Policies and Structures**

A gender perspective is integrated into the national law of the Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (Republic Act 10121). Section 2 of the Act states that disaster risk reduction and management measures should be gender-responsive, sensitive to indigenous knowledge, and respectful of human rights, focusing on the importance of the protection of women. Section 11 states that the Head of Gender and Development (Gender Focal Point), who is appointed by Local Government Unit (LGU), should be invited to the City/Municipality DRRMC as a member. Similarly, the law states that 5 percent of the total budget for each city/municipality at the local level and departments at the central level should be allocated as a calamity fund for disaster preparedness and emergency relief activities. More importantly, 5 percent of the calamity fund should be allocated and utilized for women or GAD relevant activities while another 5 percent for children, 5 percent for elderly people, and 5 percent for people with disabilities. The integration of gender in DRR policy and integration of DRR in gender policies is shown in Table 5.1.2.

**Table 5.1.2 Integration of Gender in DRR Policy and Integration of DRR  
in Gender Policy in the Philippines**

<b>Item</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Integration of Gender/ DRR</b>
DRR relevant Law	the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (Republic Act 10121)	Section 2 (utilization of women’s indigenous knowledge, protection of women’s human rights, women’s security, etc.) Section 11 (appointment of Gender Focal Point as a member of C/M DRRMC)
Gender Policy	Magna Carta of Women (RA9710) WEDGE 2013-2016	Statements of Gender and Disaster Section of Environmental Management and CCA
Gender Budget	Calamity Fund at national & local levels	Allocation of 5 % of the total calamity fund for women or GAD relevant activities

Source: developed by the author based on the key-informant interviews.

For casualties of each disaster, systematic data-collection and data-base system have not yet been developed by the Government of the Philippines. The data collected at the barangay level or any local offices are not necessarily disaggregated by gender, age, and physical ability (types of disability).

In order to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment, the Government of the Philippines developed the Magna Carta of Women (RA9710) in 2009 and the Women’s Empowerment Development and Gender Equality Plan (WEDGE) (2013-2016) in 2013. Both have statements or sections on gender and disaster, especially about the importance of the protection of women from gender-based violence (GBV) as well as the importance of recognizing women’s coping capacity/strategy and their roles as main actors/leaders in DRRM. The Government also developed the National Plan of Action on UNSCR 1325 and 1820: 2010–2016. However, it does not include a section on disaster, but on peace building only.

As mentioned above, the PCW is the national machinery/mechanism for promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment in the Philippines. Based upon the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the PCW developed the Magna Carta of Women in 2009 and the WEDGE in 2013 as mentioned above. Consistent with such gender policies and plans, the PCW is expected to fulfil the mandate of advocacy to suggest that relevant government departments integrate a gender perspective into all the stages of their planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation, as well as to supervise and monitor the processes and progress of gender-mainstreaming. Due to its limited number of personnel and lack of implementation bodies at the local level, the PCW has not necessarily fulfilled the mandate. Similarly, even

though PCW participates in NDRRMC meetings as a member, it does not play a leading role in advocacy or mainstreaming gender into the NDRRMC and sub-committees of Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Prevention (Mitigation), in terms of each committee's planning, implementation, and monitoring, and evaluations.

The PCW has another critical mandate to monitor/check on how each of the central and local governments allocates the budget of the calamity fund for women and gender-responsive activities. However, the PCW faces difficulty in monitoring/checking all of budget plans due to the limited number of personnel at the central level and a lack of supporting structures at the local level as briefly described above. It seems that the PCW has neither refused the budget plans submitted by the central and local government organizations, even if a plan lacks relevance to gender-responsiveness, nor suggested the plans be revised to better promote women's empowerment.

As implementing bodies, the DSWD, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) play crucial roles in DRR, taking into account a gender perspective. As the department-in-charge of "Response" in the NDRRMC, the DSWD is responsible for evacuation to a shelter and emergency relief, including food distribution in the aftermath of a disaster to the time when people resume normal life. From a gender lens, the DSWD appoints Gender and Development Officers (Gender Focal Points) at City/Municipality level, who are supposed to join the C/M DRRMC and take responsibility for GBV issues. The DSWD set up its offices even in the temporary shelters and bunk houses, and closely work with a person-in-charge of GBV issues in camp management committees. To ensure the security of women living in the shelters and bunk houses, policewomen also patrol around the shelter and bunk house areas, particularly at night.

On the other hand, DOLE and DTI, as well as Department of Agriculture (DA), support the women affected by a disaster to rebuild their livelihoods. Those organizations also support women in livelihood enhancement or entrepreneurship during normal time. The DOLE and DA provide members of women's associations with necessary training and equipment/tools. The DTI, mainly targeting the women running micro and small enterprises, provides special loans to women entrepreneurs whose businesses were seriously damaged by a disaster.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> The DTI developed the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Development Plan 2011-2016, and is implementing Great Women Project to promote upgrading women's business based upon the Gender Responsive Value Chain Analysis, with PCW and other agencies.

## 5.1.2 Gendered Vulnerability and Coping Capacity

### (1) Preparedness and Response

The research sites of Tacloban City, Tolosa Municipality, Tanauan Municipality, and Palo Municipality on Leyte Island, as well as Basey Municipality on Samar Island, are prone to and vulnerable to typhoons and tidal waves. This is partly due to their coastal location and flat geographic conditions. Apart from usual typhoons, the tidal waves of Typhoon Haiyan reached not only the coastal areas, but inland areas which are relatively low and flat. According to the official in charge of DRR in Tolosa, out of 15 barangays in Tolosa, 8 are located in the coastal areas. Similarly, the official in charge of planning in Tanauan explained that Tanauan is only 30 meters above the sea and relatively flat, which is why it is at high risk. A couple of women in Telegrafo Barangay, Tolosa who participated in a focus groups discussion (FGD) stated, “We evacuated to a neighboring barangay because that barangay is not in the coastal area, but inland. So, we thought that place should be much safer than ours. In reality, water reached even there.” All the women who participated in a FGD in Tanghas Barangay, Tolosa explained, “There is no hill in our neighborhood. Our area is all flat. The nearest hill is 12 kilometers away.”

In the research sites, there was little gender difference in terms of access to information on the typhoon. Unlike the case of Bangladesh where women tend to have less access to information for evacuation due to *purdah* or seclusion, all women participants in all FGDs were aware of Typhoon Haiyan a week in advance, due to the weather forecast on TV news. In addition to the TV news, some participants in a FGD in Olot Baranagay, Tolosa described that their Barangay Captain visited one house after another and advised residents to evacuate a couple of days before. Although they knew that a “super typhoon” was coming soon, they had little idea of the meaning of “storm surge,” which was frequently repeated on TV news. Some women who participated in a FGD in Burak Barangay, Tolosa explained, “The word of ‘storm surge’ was repeated in the TV news. But, we didn’t understand what it really meant because we had never experienced it before.” There was not a gender-based disadvantage in either access to information on the typhoon or the knowledge level of disaster terminology.

However, both men and women in the research sites were put in a vulnerable position in regards to the typhoon, in the sense that they were not necessarily able to well prepare for it due to a lack of accurate information on the typhoon. The official in charge of DRR in Tacloban City pointed out that the weather forecast in the Philippines lacks accuracy compared to that in Japan, and Typhoon Haiyan arrived seven hours earlier than forecast. According to him, although the typhoon was predicted to reach around the noon,

it actually reached around five in the morning. A lack of accurate information and early warning system partly contributed to the vulnerability of both men and women in the research sites, which can be taken as a lack of institutions, contributing to vulnerability, shown in the PAR model.

All residents in the coastal areas were vulnerable to the typhoon because of their location, but some were more vulnerable due to their shabbily constructed houses while others were not. Most of participants in the FGDs resided in simple one-story houses mainly because they were poor. In such rural areas where main industries are limited to fisheries and agricultures, most people struggled to earn a living. They were beneficiaries of the *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino* (Bringing up Filipino Family) Program, called 4Ps in short, which is the National Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program targeting relatively poor families with a child/children up to the age of 18 years. One woman participant in a FGD in Burak Barangay explained, “Since my house was built so weak and simple, I thought our family were not able to be survived if we stayed in this house.” On the other hand, another woman participant in the Burak FGD witnessed that her concrete house suffered only minimum damage. Thus, vulnerability resulted from home construction and was thus associated with location and poverty, identified by class. Based on the PAR model, their vulnerability can be considered to be shaped by the “Root Causes” of unfair local “Economic systems” and progressed because of “Unsafe Conditions” of “Dangerous locations” and “Low income level.”

Interestingly, there were some differences in risk perception and roles of preparedness and evacuation between men and women, which varied by areas of the research sites. One female participant in the FGD in Burak Barangay described:

One day before, I asked my neighbor to let me and my children stay in their house since their house was much stronger than ours. My husband insisted that there should be no need for evacuation. But, I was so scared that I made the decision of evacuation by myself. My husband remained in our house until the typhoon started destroying our house and finally evacuated to the place we stayed in.

Other women shared similar experiences of evacuating to another safer place with their children while men stayed in their houses until the last moment. According to those women participants, this was partly because many men overlooked the severity of the typhoon and were overconfident, based on their experiences of hundreds of typhoons and masculinity. A more common reason, however, was that men tended to stay at their houses



longer than their wives and children because they were responsible for tying their houses with ropes/strings so that building materials were not washed away. These stories from women participants highlight two critical gendered implications of a disaster. One was that women in the research sites had autonomy to make the decision to evacuate by themselves, which was different from the case of Bangladesh where women must wait for their men's decision about evacuation.

The other one was women's coping capacity. Based on ordinary gender roles, men tried to fulfil their responsibility as breadwinners even before the typhoon. However, women did not necessarily rely on men only, but also tried to reduce the risk of economic loss by the typhoon. One woman participant in the FGD in Burak Barangay explained her coping strategy, saying, "I sold the pigs I owned one day before. After I knew about the typhoon on the news, I was afraid if they might be killed by the typhoon. So, I sold the pigs in advance." On the other hand, men participants in a FGD in Burak Barangay said, "Men tried to earn as much cash as possible to buy food in advance. Also we tried to sell the pigs we owned, but we couldn't. Since everyone tried to sell his, it was too competitive to find out anyone who would buy ours. We ended up losing all the pigs due to the typhoon." Thus, both men and women tried hard to well prepare for the typhoon by exercising their coping capacity, which did not necessarily differ between men and women.

In the gender division of roles during evacuation, there was a difference between the coastal and inland areas. As described above, many participants in the FGDs held in inland areas witnessed that men usually stayed at their houses longer than women and children, and tied their houses with ropes. As an exception, a couple of women participants in a FGDs held in Olot Barangay, Tolosa described how they tied their houses and coconut trees by themselves, following their traditional way of preparation. On the other hand, women participants in a FGD in San Roque Barangay, Tolosa, which is located in the coastal area, explained that both men and women usually evacuate together. According to them, their place is coastal and there is little time available before evacuation. Therefore, both men and women used to engage in tying the houses with the help of older children even before Typhoon Haiyan.

An examination of institutional arrangements reveals that preparedness with pre-disaster practice of drills and identification of evacuation centers was not sufficient in many of the research sites. All the participants in the FGDs stated that they had never practiced any drills before Typhoon Haiyan. In most of the research sites schools and barangay halls, which were built of concrete, were identified as evacuation centers, and

many of participants in the FGDs were aware of the location of the nearest evacuation center. However, according to women participants in the FGD in Tanghas Barangay, the high school identified as an evacuation center in their area was located in a flat place rather than on a hill. Women participants in the FGD in San Roque Barangay shared their experience by saying, “Although we once evacuated to the school identified as an evacuation center, the surge reached the school soon. So, we had to evacuate to a hill which is 500 more meters away.” Another problem with evacuation centers in the research sites was their limited capacity. Women participants in the FGD in Olot Barangay stated that while they evacuated to the school identified as an evacuation center, there was limited space and not all people could stay there. Thus, vulnerability of local men and women in the preparedness and response phases was closely associated with insufficient institutional arrangements by the local government, as well as class- and gender-based factors. The combination of “Root Causes” of gender and class and the “Dynamic Pressures” of insufficient local institutions, illustrated in the PAR model, contributed to their vulnerability.

## **(2) Recovery and Reconstruction**

As main food providers for their family members, women in the research sites exercised their survival and coping capacity in the aftermath of the typhoon. Although most of the participants in the FGDs suffered from hunger and lack of clothes in the aftermath of the typhoon, they got survived with their coping capacity and mutual cooperation until they received emergency aid in three to five days after the typhoon. Women participants in the FGD in St. Cruz Barangay, Tanauan witnessed, “Our hunger lasted for five days until DSWD people delivered some rice for us. We also had a problem of a lack of clothes. Therefore, we looked for any clothes left on the road, picked up any available ones, washed them, and put them on our children first.” Similarly, women participants in a FGD held in Combayan Barangay, Basey described, “We suffered from hunger, so we ate whatever was available. We ate even the rice soaked in the sea water of which color changed to yellow and of which smell was terribly bad.” Women participants in the FGD in San Roque Barangay, Tolosa appreciated that people living at the base of a hill who were not affected shared their food and clothes with them. As a result, there were no desperate or helpless women in the research sites, which was completely opposite of the image of women as created by the media, as Bari (1992) reported, drawing from a case of Bangladesh.

Similarly, many women survivors in the research sites played a big role in the reconstruction of their lost houses. Most of women participants in the FGDs responded

well to the loss of their houses with their coping capacity as survivors. In the discussions, they described that they went back to the places where their houses used to be right after the typhoon passed by. They, in cooperation with their husbands, collected whatever materials were left nearby and built simple huts with those available materials just for their survival. One woman who participated in the FGD in Burak Barangay described that her family was living in a pig shed for a month. Similarly, another woman participant in the same FGD was living in a house without a roof for a while.

Despite a delay in the delivery of emergency aid, there seemed no discrimination by gender, location, or other reasons in the research sites. In this sense, men and women or different groups of people in the research sites did not necessarily face “Limited access to resources” which is considered to be a “Root Cause” in the PAR model. Almost all participants in the FGDs were able to access similar services provided by the local governments and external aid organizations, along almost the same timeframe. First, many of participants in the FGDs witnessed that they were able to receive emergency food aid mainly through their local governments, though it was not delivered until a couple of days to several days after the typhoon as described above. According to key informants in local governments, the main cause of the delay was that the local governments were not allowed to allocate the budget for the stock of emergency food prior to the occurrence of a disaster. Thus, it took a while for them to prepare food and distribute it among affected people. Another cause for the delay was that the main road used for delivery was cut off by the typhoon. Thus, institutional arrangements, including the allocation of money for emergency food supplies, are critical challenges faced by the local governments in order to reduce the risk for local people.

Even after the emergency period, the local governments continuously provided affected people with free food aid for six months or a year at longest after the typhoon. This helped the affected people building back their livelihoods. Many women participants in the FGDs described that they tried to save as much money as possible while food was being provided by free so that they could rebuild their houses. One woman who participated in the FGD in Olot Barangay explained, “We were able to be survived somehow. Largely because of the free food aid, we could go through.” Thus, in terms of post-disaster food aid and relevant services, local governments made relatively proper institutional arrangements, which did not progress the vulnerability of affected people.

The households that lost their houses due to the typhoon were forced to live in a temporary shelter. Those homeless households in Tanauan Municipality were living in the Tanauan Proper for a few weeks. According to women participants in the FGD in St. Cruz

Barangay, Tanauan, around 800 survivors were living together in the Tanauan Proper, with five to eight families living in each classroom. There was no partition to keep privacy between families, though there was a space for women to change clothes. Similarly, those homeless households in the coastal areas of Tacloban City were living in Astro Dorm for four months until they moved to Bunk House (temporally shelter/house) in Sagkahan Barangay, Tacloban.



Astro Dorm in Tacloban  
(Photo: July 2015)



Bunk House in Tacloban  
(Photo: July 2015)

Following Typhoon Haiyan, women in the research sites were exposed to a risk of GBV; however, they were also protected by the local government and external organizations' interventions. After the typhoon, necessary measures against GBV were taken by UNFPA and DSWD. The UNFPA built "Women Friendly Space" in target cities/municipalities, including Tolosa and Palo, where victims of GBV or violence against women and children (VAWC), particularly domestic violence by their husbands, could access counselling and necessarily legal information. The UNFPA, in cooperation with DSWD, provided selected 7 local women each in Tolosa and Palo with training to work as facilitators in the spaces. The training was consisted of 10 modules, such as gender sensitivity, VAWC, etc. The facilitators in Tolosa explained that the number of VAWC cases increased because many men lost the source of their livelihoods and got financially stressed after the typhoon. According to the facilitators in Palo, due to their presence in the spaces and the dissemination of relevant information to the public, victimized women tended to speak up. Intervention through "Women Friendly Space" protected women who were in "Unsafe Conditions" and at risk, illustrated in the PAR model.

On the other hand, men tended to be mentally more vulnerable to an economic crisis after the typhoon. According to the executive director of the Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP) in Manila in the Philippines, men tend to suffer from not being able to

fulfil their role as breadwinners based on strict gender roles in the Philippines. However, they tend not to be able to express their feelings, especially in front of other people, because of beliefs about masculinity. In light of this, in order to protect women from a risk of GBV and VAWC in the context of post-disaster, therapy services are also necessary for the men who vent their feelings by violating and abusing their wives and partners.



Women Friendly Space in Tolosa  
(Photo: July 2015)

In the WFSs, some training programs for women's skill development were conducted, which aimed to raise awareness of women's rights, as part of strategic gender needs. According to the women facilitators in Palo, women participants in the training programs were supposed to first take a three- to four-month gender sensitization program, consisting of 10 modules, before taking skill development training. Due to time constraints or interruption by their husbands, most of the participants ended up quitting the program in the middle. Those who finished both the sensitization program and skill training received the certificate from Technical Education and Skill Development (TESDA). One critical problem with this training program, specifically gender sensitization session, was that it targeted only women, not men. In their approach to GBV and VAWC, the facilitators did not interact with men, but only women. Another problem seemed to be that the facilitators were not necessarily free from stereotyped and traditional ideology on women as good wives and mothers. One of the facilitators expressed, "I always suggest women to become good wives and mothers. By doing so, they would not be abandoned by their husbands." This really illustrated women's vulnerable position within a household, which is shaped by intra-household gender roles and bargaining power dynamics as described by Sen (1990) in his cooperative conflict model.

With strong leadership and support by DSWD and other relevant local governmental organizations, temporary shelters and bunk houses in the research sites were

managed by not only men, but also women. The case of National Housing Authority (NHA) Bunk House Sagkahan in Tacloban City included gender-responsive elements as shown in Box 5.1.1.

**Box 5.1.1 Camp Management in NHA Bunk House Sagkahan, Tacloban**

In the NHA Bunk House Sagkahan in Tacloban City, 1,447 people (681 women) lived after March 2014. They used to live in the coastal area and lost their houses in Typhoon Haiyan. They temporarily lived in the Astro Dorm until they moved to the Bunk House. Their camp management committee was consisted of the leader, vice leader, secretary, assistant secretary, a member in-charge of VAWC, a member in-charge of security, etc. Out of all members, the vice leader, assistant secretary, and a member in-charge of VAWC were women. All of them worked on a voluntary basis for the benefits of residents there. In the Bunk House, one room was allocated for GBV/VAWC issues. In that room, an officer of DSWD and the member in-charge of VAWC in the committee provided consultation and legal information to any victims/survivors. The member in-charge of security, as well as the policemen/women, took responsibility for patrolling around the Bunk House and protecting women and girls residents, in particular, from GBV/VAWC.

Almost all the participants in the FGDs who lost their houses were provided “emergency shelter assistance” by DSWD while a few participants received similar assistance from the Red Cross. Even though this assistance helped the homeless people to some extent, it did not contribute to their building back their houses better or sooner. Some participants in the FGDs received a combination 10,000 pesos in cash for the cost of labor for building houses and a coupon for 20,000 pesos for the cost of building materials. Due to difference in local governments’ arrangements, others received all 30,000 pesos in cash instead. Most of beneficiaries spent it to rebuild their houses. According to the participants in the FGD in Combayan Barangay, Basey, however, some people, and particularly those who received the assistance only in cash, bought livestock to improve their livelihoods because the money was not enough to rebuild their houses.

Many participants in the FGDs complained that the assistance was insufficient for them to buy materials and pay labor costs for rebuilding houses, partly because the market price for both rose after the typhoon. One woman who participated in the FGD in Tanghas Brangay explained, “The assistance was not enough at all. So, we sold six pigs and added the money earned from the pigs to the cost for rebuilding our house.” Another woman participant in the same discussion described, “I wanted to build a stronger house. But, with the limited assistance by the government, we were able to buy few materials and could not

afford to build a strong house at all.” One woman participant in the FGD in Telegrafo Barangay demonstrated her coping strategy, saying, “We tried to rebuild a house by ourselves, saving the cost for hiring a laborer since the wage for a laborer rose up to 500 pesos per day after the typhoon.”

“Cash for work” was also provided in most of the research sites by DSWD, DOLE, Oxfam, UNDP, Christian Relief Services (CRS), or Tsuchi Foundation as one method for both affected men and women to maintain their livelihoods. Women participants in the FGD in Tanghas Barangay explained that they were engaged in cleaning work for 15 days through “cash for work” at the same rate of 260 pesos per day as men. However, the payment was not provided until three months after their work was completed. Women participants in the FGD in Olot Barangay also received the same rate for “cash for work” and late payments, but the work was available to them for only six days. According to all of those participants, however, the delay in payments did not matter very much because the free food aid was available for them.

Unlike other organizations, Oxfam tried to transform the stereotyped gender division of work through “cash for work.” In cooperation with TESDA, Oxfam provided affected women with three-months training in basic carpentry work, and the women then worked as carpenters through “cash for work” for some time. Unfortunately, this trial did not lead to their sustainable occupation, and those women quit the work and went back to the original roles of child care and household chores at home. According to key information provided by gender specialists belonging to international organizations in Manila in the Philippines, this was mainly because neither men nor women were free from social norms and stereotyped gender division of roles. Since the skill acquired by the women was too basic, representatives of construction companies tended to undervalue their skills and work, and were reluctant to hire them, partly due to gender bias. As a result, those women could not take advantage of the opportunity provided by the local government’s plan to construct another 500 permanent houses in near future.

Whether the participants in the FGDs were able to recover their livelihoods early or late depended mainly on the types of work they did, available tools and resources, and their coping strategies, regardless of gender. Some of the women participants who used to do laundry work for other people for a living were able to come back to the work right after the typhoon, because the laundry work was manual labor that did not require any productive resources, such as land, or any machines and equipment. They did have difficulty getting soap, which was hard to obtain only in the aftermath of the typhoon. Similarly, some women participants in the FGD in St. Cruz Barangay, Tanauan explained

that their husbands, whose fishing boats were not damaged, were also able to restart fishing right after the typhoon and earned more profit due to the increased price of fish in the aftermath.

On the other hand, a son and his father, who participated in the FGD in Burak Barangay and used to depend exclusively on coconut farming for a living, lost their livelihoods when they lost all coconut trees in the typhoon. They did not have an alternative livelihood other than wage labor work while they tried to replant seedlings of coconuts and farm vegetables, which ended in failure. One woman participant from Olot Barangay also lost her own small shop (sari-sari store) due to the typhoon. Using a coping strategy built through her experiences, however, she borrowed 10,000 pesos from a private money lender, and re-started her business right after the typhoon. She explained that she was able to make much profit and returned the loan with the interest of 20 percent within 58 days because there was no other shop available nearby at that time. Thus, people's abilities to return to their pre-disaster livelihoods depended on the types of work they had done, availability of tools and resources necessary to recover the livelihoods, and coping capacity.

In the research sites, most of the households that lost their livelihoods had access to the assistance provided mainly by NGOs. Though such NGOs exclusively approached affected women, they did not necessarily target the women or aim to promote their agency and empowerment. Through the women, the assistance was supposed to reach their husbands/partners and family members. One woman participant in the FGD in Olot Barangay explained, "I applied for Red Cross's CCT to repair her husband's pedi-cab which was damaged by the typhoon." Similarly, ACF provided the husband of one woman participant in the FGD in Olot Barangay, who lost his fishing boat, with the materials necessary for reconstruction, valued at 15,000 pesos. Therefore, livelihood assistance in the post-disaster context, tended to utilize women as superficial beneficiaries to fill the demand of funding organizations that require implementing agencies to exclusively support women survivors. In the sense of bringing benefits to the household, women's contribution could be appreciated and recognized by family members, as Sen's cooperative conflict model states. However, this did not contribute to women's gaining agency at all.

Support by external organizations for the enhancement of livelihoods included another problematic aspect. One woman who participant in the FGD in Cambayan Barangay, Basey complained that NGOs widely distributed the same species of vegetable seeds to affected farmers almost all over in the barangay. According to her, every farmer started farming the same vegetable, and so the price of that vegetable went down and her



livelihood based on vegetable cultivation was seriously affected. Similarly, others complained that NGOs supported many women survivors to start their *Sari Sari* shops or small shops, which made the business more competitive, and many of them ended up closing the shops. Such a support without any marketing strategy did not lead to building back to the pre-disaster economic status of survivors, and in fact worsened their status. Based on the PAR model, such inappropriate support contributed to increased vulnerability among those affected people, just as a lack of support does.

Based on the gendered division of labor and roles embedded in the society of the research sites, men and women suffered from different difficulties. Many women participants in the FGDs discussed the difficulty of a lack of food, clothes, and medicine, particularly for their children in the aftermath of the typhoon. Women participants in the FGD in San Roque Barangay identified the damage of their wells for drinking water as their hardship. According to them, until May 2015 when one INGO repaired the wells, women whose main responsibility was to fetch water had to go to a water source 500 meters away three times a day. On the other hand, three men who participated in the FGD in Burak Barangay lost all the coconut trees that were the means of their livelihoods in the typhoon, as described above. In the discussion, they repeated their post-disaster economic and psychological difficulty over and over. Their attempts to replant seedlings of coconuts and to farm vegetables were both unsuccessful and they ended up engaged in day-to-day laboring work. They indicated that the low income left them unable to fulfil their roles as breadwinners as they had before the typhoon.

In the QIPs, JICA has supported 15 women's associations in Tolosa, Tanauan, and Basey Municipalities since 2014 for the recovery and expansion of their businesses. The JICA-supported associations in Tolosa and Tanauan were initially encouraged by DOLE to form a group, officially register as an association, and engage in business. The associations in Basey, on the other hand, registered as associations and started their business only after JICA implemented its project in 2014. As DOLE previously supported the formation of women's associations, JICA supported each of the associations based on its proposal, by providing tailor-made training, equipment, and building space necessary for the production of their food-processing products. JICA therefore contributed to reducing those women's vulnerability and a risk of a future disaster or economic crisis through the provisions of "Training" and "Local material" which can relieve "Dynamic Pressures" in the PAR model.



Building provided to the women associations supported by JICA (Photo: July 2015)



Equipment provided by JICA to women associations in Tolosa (Photo: July 2015)



Equipment provided by JICA to the women associations in Tolosa (Photo: July 2015)



Soft-bone milkfish (*bangus*) made by Tanauan women's group (Photo: Feb. 2015)



Veg-fish noodle making by Tolosa women's group (Photo: Feb. 2015)

Despite the best efforts made by JICA and participants in the QIPs, almost all the associations faced some problems, particularly with marketing. None of the associations, except for one working on deboned milkfish (*bangus*) in Tanghas Barangay, Tolosa, made enough of a profit to monthly or even periodically redistribute sufficient money among the members. They distributed only 1,000 pesos per person, once or twice a year. As one effective marketing strategy, the local government of Tolosa Municipality suggested all associations in Tolosa work on a different product in order to avoid competition in the market. Even though three associations in Tolosa supported under the QIPs by JICA were working on different products of vege-fish noodles, sausages, and deboned milkfish, there remained critical marketing issues with which members of those associations had to struggle. As a sales manager of Robinson Department in Tacloban City pointed out, the association in St. Cruz Barangay, Tanauan needed to determine the most marketable price and number of cuts in one package based on the target customers of each of their buyers/whole sellers. As a matter of a fact, JICA added the component of the QIPs on an ad hoc basis, based on the request of the local government and the needs of the women's

association. Thus, JICA did not necessarily allocate sufficient human resources or budget for the QIPs from the planning process. How to make up a shortage of “Training” on marketing and relieve “Dynamic Pressure”, illustrated in the PAR model, is a critical challenge for JICA’s project.



The banner to promote the softbone milkfish of JICA-supported women’s association in Tanauan (Photo: Sep. 2015)



Packaged soft-bone milkfish processed by JICA-supported women’s association in Tanauan (Photo: Sep. 2015)

On the other hand, the associations in Combayan Barangay, Basey faced more serious problems with the price of raw fish and competition with other associations in neighboring barangays. Women participants in the FGD in Combayan Barangay explained that the price of raw milkfish increased due to limited cultivation, so they had only once bought raw milkfish and processed them after JICA provided the necessary equipment and tools. According to the participants, because of the higher price of the raw fish available to them, the price of their processed milkfish was not competitive with others’ at all. Although they suggested alternative processing products, a national consultant and an official in Provincial Agriculture Office (PAO) insisted on their continuous production of processing milkfish, believing optimistically that the price of raw fish would go down as the amount of cultivated fish increased. However, there was little possibility for such an increase because the government tended to control against the over-catch of fish. This illustrates how the combination of the “Root Cause” of vulnerability in the PAR model, such as improper economic systems in the site and improper technical support led to the vulnerability of those women.

A relatively successful association among those supported under the QIPs by JICA was based in Tanghas Barangay, Tolosa, working on deboned milkfish. Key factors leading to their more successful outcomes and differences from other associations were analyzed by a key informant in the local government of Tolosa Municipality, as shown in Box. 5.1.2.

**Box. 5.1.2 Key Factors for Better Outcomes by Tanghas Women’s Association**

According to a key informant in the local government of Tolosa Municipality, the Tanghas Women’s Association has some advantages to make their business successful. First, with only six members in the association, it is easy for them to discuss and handle any matters. Importantly, all members are aggressive and eager for their business to succeed. Second, they work with deboned milkfish, which is neither very expensive nor common, so the market is less competitive and they have some restaurants that are regular customers. Finally, the leader of this association has leadership skills, and enough time to work on the activities of the association since her children are all grown up.

The key informant also pointed out some disadvantages of other groups. Both leaders and members of other associations have a lot to do and were unable to concentrate only on their business. She suggested, “Not only leaders, but other members should develop the knowledge necessary for production and marketing. Other members should not depend only on their leaders.” She also emphasized the importance of the attitude of members toward their business, as well as leadership, as key factors for success. To her, it is important to motivate women not to depend on other women, but instead to be empowered and eager to succeed.

Drawing from Kabeer’s conceptualization of empowerment, the QIPs well contributed to women’s access to necessary resources as pre-conditions. However, those women who participated in the QIPs have not necessarily gained sufficient agency to achieve their desired outcomes. The women were not able to negotiate with their husbands on the sharing of household chores and child care, which was necessary for them to concentrate more on their business and achieve their goal of improving their livelihoods. Their limited bargaining power toward their husbands might therefore contribute to their limited profits from their QIP activities, which in turn affected their and their husbands’ perceptions of their low contribution to their household income, as Sen’s cooperative conflict model states.

As the QIPs was an added component to the JICA project after the project started, it was not designed to be gender-responsive from the beginning and did not aim to promote the agency and empowerment of women. The QIPs rather focused merely on the provision of necessary training and materials, which are considered as “pre-conditions” of “resources” in Kabeer’s concept. As a result of this focus and not considering gender relations in the sites, there were no gender sensitization workshops or sessions held during QIPs that included the participation of both men and women in each site. Both JICA experts and the members of the associations participated in the QIPs aimed at improving the livelihoods of the members without considering gendered division of roles and gender

relations. As a result of difficulties experienced by the women with balancing time between their original and new roles, they seemed unable to concentrate on their association's activities, and most work was left in the hands of those who had no small children to take care of. Many of the members did not negotiate with their husbands for household work-sharing. Negotiations with their customers was left to the leaders or those members who had sufficient time and capacity to do so.

A similar issue was also observed among the women beneficiaries of 4Ps, the National CCT Program. As a condition to receive the cash, a member of the targeted households, particularly women, were supposed to participate in the family development sessions organized by 4Ps, which tended to reinforce the role of women as mothers. The 4Ps gave those women access to cash; however, the program did not give them the freedom to make a choice on how to use it, in other words "agency" stated in Kabeer's conceptualization of empowerment. Rather, the 4Ps gave the women a sort of the conditionality to use the cash for their children's education and welfare.

The QIPs contributed to the promotion of women's collective work to some extent. Forming a group and working together with other women under the QIPs was very useful for most of the women participants in the FGDs because they were able to supplement some members' weakness with others' strengths, and share information and skills. However, the management of the associations was left exclusively to the leaders, or any other members who had more knowledge and skills, and more importantly more free time. Remaining members tended to depend on them. Their group work did not necessarily result in the capacity development of leadership skills for all the members. Since the associations were not formed for the transformation of the gendered division of roles and gender relations, leaders of the associations did not function in that way. For most of women participants in the FGDs, leadership meant taking on all burdens and tasks that other members did not have time to do. According to them, the most critical conditions to be a leader for the women's associations were to have a lot of free time as well as to be responsible, patient, and honest.

### **(3) Prevention/Post-disaster Preparedness**

The local governments of the research sites, including Tacloban City, Tolosa Municipality, Tanauan Municipality, and Basey Municipality, developed City/Municipality DRRM Committees based on the national law. They also developed their DRRMP even before Typhoon Haiyan. According to an official of Tacloban, the plan covered from 2013 to 2016. Based on the lessons learned from Typhoon Haiyan, a revised

plan was adopted in the middle of July 2015 that covered 2015 to 2020. In Tolosa, the LGU formed their MDRRMC with not only public officials, but representatives of civil society, including community service officers (CSOs). Good collaboration resulted in the committee meeting on a monthly basis.

Due to effective interventions by external organizations, including JICA, the extent of post-disaster preparedness for future disasters was improved at the city/municipality level, compared to the pre-disaster context. Through its project, JICA provided technical hazard maps at the city/municipality level targeting LGUs, including Tacloban City, Tolosa Municipality, and Tanauan Municipality. Based on the maps, those LGUs were under the process of developing their new land-use plans and supposed to develop barangay- or community-based hazard maps. The mayor of Tanauan Municipality explained, “Since JICA developed a hazard map for Tanauan, we have to conduct training, at the barangay level, on preparedness, response, and recovery, based on the map from now on.” One official of Tanauan called for the identification of who is needed for assistance for his/her evacuation in each household, drawing from the map. An official in Tolosa explained that after relevant officers participated in JICA’s training on how to read the map, they were supposed to teach it to local people. Thus, how to follow up, particularly with DRR at the barangay or community level, would be a critical challenge for prevention and post-disaster preparedness in the research sites.

There were problems that remained unsolved in some research sites. For example, the Mayor of Tanauan mentioned that since there is no hill in Tanauan, it is critical to determine where to evacuate. According to him, the entire population of Tanauan, around 53,000 people, will have to evacuate in the event of a typhoon. The mayor explained that while four evacuation centers out of the planned eight were newly constructed with the financial support of NGOs, the other four remained unconstructed due to a lack of financial support. Similarly, Tolosa still faced the problem of a lack of appropriate evacuation centers since there were few sufficiently large concrete-made two-story buildings. The success of preparation for future disasters also depends on how well institutional or administrative arrangements, including budget allocation, are done, as the PAR model illustrated.

Despite such difficulties and deficiencies, LGUs in the research sites made efforts to prepare. In Tacloban City, they tried to develop a system of evacuation ID cards which contain necessary information about all members of a household, in particular identifying those who would need assistance during an evacuation. This system would not be gender-responsive, however, since the ID cards were made not at the individual level, but

for each household, and were given only for the head of a household, usually a man. This would be also inconvenient for those who were not necessarily evacuating together. On the contrary, an official of Tanauan explained that they would make ID cards on an individual basis, including a photo of each person and personal information.

The extent of preparedness for future disasters tended to vary by barangays, as well as by the availability of support from external organizations. In the FGDs, all women participants from Tanghas, Burak, and Olot Barangays, Tolosa stated that they were not aware of any barangay-level DRR activities even after Typhoon Haiyan. On the other hand, one woman participant who was Brangay Captain in Combayan Barangay, Basey explained that her barangay was supported by an NGO for drills and training on community-based DRR after the typhoon. She also organized a Barangay DRRMC and developed their Contingency Plan based on the Republic Act 10121 in participation with 30 local people. Similarly, the women facilitators trained by UNFPA in Palo explained that they developed community-based hazard maps in a participatory way, with financial and technical support from an NGO. According to the facilitators, women were very active in making the maps because they well knew about who lives where and with what conditions. Thus, making a hazard map as a part of community-based DRR might be the process to develop women’s agency and leadership in community-based DRR. However, it will depend on how supporting external organizations address women’s agency, considering such an intervention as an opportunity for the transformation of gendered division of roles and gender relations.



Storm surge inundation map of Tanauan made by JICA’s technical assistance (Photo: July 2015)



Community hazard map of Palo made with NGO assistance (Photo: July 2015)

## 5.2 Sri Lanka

### 5.2.1 Institutional Arrangements

#### (1) National Laws, Policies, and Structures for DRR

After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Sri Lanka Disaster Management Act, No. 13 of 2005 was adopted in May 2005. The law regulates the creation of the National Council on Disaster Management (NCDM) headed by the President. The Council's main role was to develop National Policy on Disaster Management (NPDM), which was developed and finally adopted in 2014. The National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) (2013-2017) was also approved by the Parliament in 2013. The legislative and institutional arrangement for DRR is shown in Table 5.2.1.

**Table 5.2.1 Legislative and Institutional Arrangement for DRR in Sri Lanka**


Policy/ Plan/ Structure	Description
Law	Sri Lanka Disaster Management Act, No. 13 of 2005
Policy/ Plan	National Policy on Disaster Management (adopted in 2014) National Disaster Management Plan (2013-2017)
Structure	
1) National	National Council on Disaster Management chaired by the President Disaster Management Coordinating Committee chaired by Secretary of MDM
2) Local (District & Division)	District Disaster Management Committee chaired by Government Agent Division Disaster Management Committee chaired by Divisional Secretary
3) Village (GN)	GN Disaster Management Committee chaired by GN
In-charge of DRR	
1) Policy	Ministry of Disaster Management
2) Implementation	Disaster Management Center & Disaster Emergency Relief Center
3) Research/ Technology	National Building Research Organization
Budget National/Local	No specific percentage for budget allocation as calamity fund

Source: developed by the author based on key-informant interviews.

Based on the Law (Act, No. 13 of 2005), National Disaster Management Center (NDMC) was established under the Ministry of Disaster Management, which is mandated to coordinate for the NCDM and to implement and monitor the NPDM and NDMP. As a branch of the DMC, the Disaster Management Coordinating Unit (DMCU) was established at each of the 25 districts in Sri Lanka. The DMCU promoted the formulation of Disaster Management Committees (DMCs) at the district, division, and *Grama Niladhari* (GN) or village levels as well as the development of a disaster management plan, especially an annual emergency operation plan, at the district level. The NDMC allocates and provides a disaster management budget to each DMCU at the district level, according to its annual master plan on disaster management. The budget is mainly distributed for the purpose of raising awareness of the need to prepare for future disaster and of constructing small-scale



infrastructures for disaster mitigation. The disaster management structure at the local level of in Sri Lanka is shown in Figure 5.2.1.



Source: Developed by the authors based on the key-informant interviews

**Figure 5.2.1 Disaster Management Structure in Sri Lanka**

Field research undertaken in the Trincomalee and Rathnapura Districts determined that the committees were established at both levels of the Trincomalee District and Kuchchaveli Division under the Trincomalee District as well as of the Rathnapura District and Kolonna Division under the Rathnapura District. According to the key informants of those local authorities, the members of those committees held meetings at least once a year in order to update their disaster management plans and develop annual emergency operation plans. In the Ranhotikanda GN under the Kolonna Division, Rathnapura District, local people established a DMC at the GN level based on the suggestions made by JICA experts of DiMCEP. Under the Committee, an Executive Committee (EC) and Sub-committee were set up, consisting of: 1) early warning; 2) search and relief; 3) first aid; 4) camp management; and 5) monitoring.

## **(2) Mainstreaming Gender into the Law, Policy, and Structure**

A gender perspective is not integrated into the Sri Lanka Disaster Management Act, No. 13 of 2005. As members of the NCDM, the Act assigns 20 Ministries, including the Ministry of Social Welfare Services; Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Urban Planning; Ministry of Housing; Ministry of

Education; and the Police. However, the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs is excluded from membership on the Council. This prevented the Ministry from functioning and playing a role as a national machinery for mainstreaming gender in DRR policies, plans, and programs. As of October 2015, the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs participates in the regular meetings of the Disaster Management Coordinating Committee (DMCC), newly established at the national level. However, it is unclear what kind of roles it plays in the Committee. The integration of gender in DRR policy and integration of DRR in gender policy in Sri Lanka is shown in Table 5.2.2.

**Table 5.2.2 Integration of Gender in DRR Policy and Integration of DRR in Gender Policy in Sri Lanka**

<b>Item</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Integration of Gender/ DRR</b>
DRR relevant Law	Sri Lanka Management Act No. 13 of 2005	No statement for the membership of Ministry of Women and Child Development for NDRRC
DRR Policy	National Policy on Disaster Management	Section 13: Equality, diversity and inclusion
DRR Plan/Program	National Comprehensive Disaster Management Plan/Program	Separate Chapter on Gender Integration of a gender perspective into an development plan of each of around 20 targeted sectors
Gender Policy	Women’s Charter	No statement for DRR
Gender Budget	No calamity fund	-

Source: Developed by the Author based on the Key-informant Interviews

The NPDM approved in 2014 includes “Section 13. Equality, diversity and inclusion,” which states, “All people affected by disaster have equal rights to receive assistance and information regardless of ethnicity, gender, religious beliefs, ability or other personal attributes.” In the section, target groups are identified as those who are vulnerable to possible hazards and disasters, including people with disabilities, sick people, elderly people, pregnant women, small children, and displaced people, and are supposed to be given special consideration. Section 13 also includes the following critical statement: “Disaster management should ensure gender equality and in particular the empowerment of women and girls.” However, there is no detailed description on how to develop the empowerment of women and girls in disaster management, as well as gendered vulnerabilities, coping capacity/strategies, or gender needs, all of which should be taken into account.

In cooperation with the UNDP, the Ministry of Disaster Management has developed a National Comprehensive Disaster Management Plan (2014–2018). Based on

the Plan, the Ministry has already begun to implement the National Comprehensive Disaster Management Program (2014-2018). Under this Plan and Program, all governmental agencies participating in the Program (around 20 in total) are supposed to integrate not only a disaster management perspective, but also a gender perspective in their own annual development plans. With the initiative of the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs, the form for budget proposals to be submitted from each of those participating governmental agencies to the National Planning Department under the Ministry of Finance will be developed with a gender perspective. The format is supposed to include sections that require agencies to provide gender-disaggregated data and gender-related descriptions. For this purpose, the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs will develop relevant guidelines and manuals, implement advocacy activities, and train their officials under the Plan and Program.

In Sri Lanka, the National Committee on Women (NCW) under the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs developed a Women's Charter in 1993. The policy, however, did not contain a section on gender and disaster, while it touched upon women's participation in politics, education/training, and economic activities, their accessibility to health care, and their rights to be protected from violence and discrimination. Addressing GBV, the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs amended the Penal Code with Act No. 22 in 1995, and developed the 2005 Plan of Action Supporting the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act in 2005 and the National Gender-based Violence Plan of Action (2010-2013) in 2010, which were appreciated by the Committee of CEDAW to some extent. However, the Ministry does not intend to make the National Action Plan for the UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security separately. Instead, the Ministry will integrate the chapter of the Plan into the forthcoming second National Gender-based Violence Plan of Action.

The Bureau of Women under the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs is an implementing agency, by which Women Development Officers (WDOs) and Counselling Officers are hired to promote women's empowerment and protect women from GBV/VAW at the district and divisional levels. Those officers are involved as members in the DMC at the divisional level in particular. However, the NPDM does not propose any concrete measures to protect women from GBV/VAW in the context of the aftermath of a disaster, though the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs usually provides counselling and legal information to women survivors at Women's Counselling Centers located in 12 places over the country. The Ministry also provides tentative shelters in Colombo (near future in Jaffna, Mullitivu, Batticaloa, Rathnapura, and Kandy) to the victims of human trafficking and GBV/VAW.

## **5.2.2 Gendered Vulnerability and Coping Capacity**

In this section, we describe how the women who participated in FGDs in the research sites of Sri Lanka, in particular, experienced past disastrous events. Drawing from the theoretical frameworks and literature reviewed above, vulnerability and coping capacity—differentiated by gender, location, race, and religion and specific to the contexts of the sites and partly common to other regions/countries—are shown by the phases of preparedness, response, recovery, and prevention for future disasters. Furthermore, the analysis of vulnerability and coping capacity is also divided into each of the research sites of Iqbal Nagar GN (tsunami-affected area), Ranhotikanda GN (landslide-prone area), and Manmunai West Division (flood-prone area). In Iqbal Nagar GN, JICA’s T-CUP was implemented, while in Ranhotikanda GN, JICA’s DiMCEP was implemented. Manmunai West Division is the project sites of Oxfam, as well as SWDC.

### **(1) Preparedness**

#### **a. Tsunami-affected Area in Trincomalee District: JICA Project Sites**

One of the critical factors attributing to serious casualties of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Sri Lanka was a lack of both technical information on tsunamis and an early warning system to alert people to evacuate in advance. The national and local governments took few institutional and technical measures to reduce the risk of disasters, especially tsunamis. Based on the PAR mode, such a lack of proper institutions and technology contributed to the adverse effects of the tsunami as “Dynamic Pressures.” Without proper information and institutional arrangements, local men and women never imagined or prepared themselves for a tsunami. Regardless of differences in ethnicity and religious beliefs, those women who participated in the FGDs conducted in the JSFV in Iqbal Nagar, Kuchchaveli Division, Trincomalee District stated that neither men nor women had ever heard the word of tsunami before the disaster. One Muslim woman, as well as one Tamil woman, who participated in the FGDs, mentioned the same experience, by saying “I didn’t know anything about tsunami before, but I have realized what it means since I experienced it by myself.” Unlike a case of Bangladesh reviewed above, the extent of access to information was not differentiated between men and women and within women there.

Secondly, those people who were severely affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami were vulnerable because of the location of their residences. Both women and men, including women participants in the FGDs, also did not live in strong or resilient houses for disasters. According to the participants, the residents of the JSFV in Iqbal Nagar used to live in Nilaveli village which was located only 50 meters away from the coast hit by the tsunami. Since most of their husbands/partners were engaged in fishing for

a living, the participants in the FGDs lived close to the coast. In addition to their lack of awareness, those women lived in non-resilient houses as they did not afford to construct strong houses. One Tamil woman participant explained, “We used to live in a very shabby house with the roof made of banana leaves.” Under such “Unsafe Conditions,” combined with “Dangerous locations” and “Limited income level” stated in the PAR model, both men and women in Nilaveli were vulnerable to the risk of tsunamis.



Tsunami-affected beach in Nilaveli  
(Photo: August 2015)



Tsunami-affected beach in Nilaveli  
(Photo: August 2015)

#### **b. Landslide-prone Area in Rathnapura District: JICA Project Sites**

Women’s and men’s lack of information and knowledge, resulting in their vulnerability, was found not only in the tsunami-affected areas, but also in the landslide-prone and flood-affected areas in Sri Lanka. In the FGDs held in Ranhotikanda GN, Kolonna Division, Rathnapura District, Sinhalese male and female participants revealed that they had never known or perceived that they were exposed to a risk until they were technically advised by JICA experts in 2010. They, both women and men, realized through JICA’s training and workshops how a landslide was caused and what kinds of adverse effects it would cause. A couple of the female participants in the FGDs described the benefits of knowledge gained from JICA: “It was much better to know about ‘the existence of a devil’ rather than not to know about it at all.”



Landslide-prone area in Ranhotikanda  
(Photo: Aug. 2015)

The increased knowledge and risk perception of both women and men participants in the FGDs in Ranhotikanda GN reduced their vulnerability to some extent. However, it did not completely remove their risk as long as they continue to live in a place identified as highly risky by the National Building Research Organization (NBRO) under Ministry of Disaster Management. According to some participants in the FGDs, since the place identified as highly risky is geo-physically problematic, they are unable to reduce the risk simply by planting tree seedlings or building check-dams. Instead the local and national governments recommended that residents living there relocate to a safer place. However, this largely depends on the conditions of possible relocation areas offered by the local government. Despite the risk, the residents, both women and men, seemed to decide to continue living in the same place because they had little choice. Women participants living in that risky place explained that the places offered by the local government were far away from their residences and on much smaller plots of land than what they already owned. Thus, the vulnerability to risk shared by those women and men attributed largely to their economic reason and local government's not appropriate administrative arrangements, which are considered as a critical part of "Root Causes" and "Unsafe Conditions" to progress vulnerability, illustrated in the PAR model.

**c. Flood and Drought-prone Areas in Batticaloa District: NGO Projects Sites**

The Batticaloa District in the east coast was once severely affected by the tsunami in 2004 as the Trincomalee District. The district is also geographically vulnerable to floods as its elevation is lower than neighboring districts and partially lower than the adjoining sea and lagoon levels. According to the Government Agent (GA) and an official in charge of DRR in the Batticaloa District, when water tanks in the upstream areas of other districts are full following heavy rainfall creating an uncontrollable situation, water in the tanks is discharged for flood control. As a result, the water bursts into the downstream areas of Batticaloa several hours after the discharge, causing severe flood. They explained that the capacity of water tanks in Batticaloa was only sufficient for containing rainfall in Batticaloa, but not extra rainfall pouring in from the upstream areas.

More problematically, few institutional arrangements were made for mutual flood control/management between the local governments of upstream and downstream areas. According to the GA of Batticaloa, the local governments of the upstream areas would discharge water from their tanks without informing to the GA of Batticaloa. The water tanks and channels in Batticaloa remained closed and would overflow with the water from the upstream areas, which would create a flood. Despite these urgent and critical problems, the GA had never had coordinating meetings with the representatives of relevant districts

adjoining Batticaloa. She explained the reason for this was that she had little power over their cooperation since there was no law which would force them to inform her when they discharged their tanks. She argued for the establishment of a new law or policy on this matter, based on which she could take necessary measures for mutual flood control in cooperation with relevant upstream districts and government organizations. A lack of institutional or administrative initiatives by the Batticaloa District shows the historical and complex power dynamics between powerful (Sinhalese-led) and powerless (Tamil-led) districts in Sri Lanka which were associated with ethnicity issues. This well illustrated that a lack of access to power by Batticaloa District Government was one of critical “Root Causes” in the PAR model for their vulnerability.

Reflecting the lack of legal arrangements and institutional capacity of the Batticaloa District, local people of Batticaloa were vulnerable to the 2010/2011 flood which started December 2010 and lasted intermittently up to January 2011, mainly due to a lack of information and early warning system. In the FGDs, organized by Oxfam in Vilaveduwani GN, as well as in Karavetti GN, Manmunai West Division, in the Batticaloa District, Tamil male and female participants mentioned that they did not have a weather forecast or other early warning that would alert them in advance of the possibility of a great flood. All they could do was carefully watch the water level of a nearby river, providing information on a rise in the water level to the Hindu temple where a siren was available. Without information and early warning in advance, one female participant explained, “Only when water came into my house, I noticed the occurrence of a flood and jumped up on a table by any means.” All women participants in the FGDs agreed that they had insufficient time to move their livestock to a safer place or bring out any important documents, cash, or food with them, but barely saved their own lives.

## **(2) Response**

### **a. Tsunami-affected Area in Trincomalee District: JICA Project Site**

Different groups of people living in Trincomalee District responded to the unpredicted disaster of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in similar and different ways. According to the FGD participants of the JSFV in Iqbal Nagar GN, the tsunami occurred in the morning when women were preparing for their breakfast. Some men had already gone out for fishing or had stayed on the coast, preparing for fishing for the next day. As some children were still in bed at the moment of the tsunami, their mothers had to wake them up and urged them to escape from the coast. Almost all the participants of the FGDs stated that they tried to run away from the coastal area to a hill when they saw the first great wave coming towards them.

Due to the social norms embedded in their society, Muslim women participants in the FGDs reported that they had difficulty evacuating by themselves and quickly. One Muslim woman participant explained, “Women don’t know how to swim. It’s a shame of us to swim, exposing our skin to other people.” Others described their experience protecting themselves from a big wave by holding a boat or something floating, despite not knowing how to swim. Another woman participant described her husband, who knew how to swim, helping her and their children to evacuate. According to one Muslim woman participant, some Muslim women were so shy and lacking in confidence in themselves that they were unable to decide to evacuate on their own. She explained that the tsunami occurred in the morning when many of those women had neither combed their hair nor changed their clothes, which made them embarrassed and hesitant to leave their houses. Their experiences were similar to the literature, focusing on Muslim women in Bangladesh, reviewed above.

On the other hand, Tamil women participants of the FGDs responded to the tsunami differently. Two out of eight Tamil female participants from Malarom Moddukal Women’s Group knew how to swim, having learned during childhood. One of the two stated that she survived by swimming and holding a stick. Another Tamil woman participant described the details of her experience:

While my husband and I were planting onions in the field, there was booming noise. Then, a wave of 30-feet-high or so was coming towards us. We desperately ran towards a hill. Fortunately, our children were in Colombo at that time. Without the children, we were just able to concentrate on ourselves and protect ourselves.

Many of both Muslim and Tamil female participants in the FGDs expressed their difficulty and sorrow over their own and family members’ injury, deaths, and loss of their valuable assets. Some Muslim and Tamil female participants described that they struggled to escape from the coastal area and got their limbs injured in the wires of fences. The husband of one Muslim woman got his leg injured and ended up having it amputated. One Tamil woman explained that she lost all her family members, including her baby. Another woman lost her sibling and was unable to find his body, entwined in wires, for two weeks. According to another Muslim woman, “All people struggled to protect themselves. Some carried and saved their children. But, others were unable to do anything for their children who were washed away.”

As a result of the tsunami, all participants in the FGDs lost their valuable property and assets. First, the houses in Nilaveri beach where they used to live were all washed



away, which forced them to move to temporary shelters and the JSFV in Iqbal Nagar eventually. In addition to property, they lost valuable assets, including the cash kept at home. They were also under stress and tension caused by conflicts which were still ongoing at that time. One Muslim female participant explained:

I was unable to bring anything with myself. All cash was at home. We lost it all due to the tsunami. We were not accustomed to save money in the bank before. At that time, we were still in the middle of the conflicts, and nobody trusted banks. We were unable to foresee what would happen on the following day. We always needed cash to buy fuel for our fishing boat and agricultural inputs. Thus, we kept all our cash at home.

The tsunami, combined with the adverse effects of the pre-existing conflicts, seriously impacted the people's assets and livelihoods. This really proves the progression of vulnerability in the PAR model, in other words, how human vulnerability is exacerbated with the "Dynamic Pressures" of conflicts and a lack of local institutions.

**b. Landslide-prone Areas in Rathnapura District : JICA Project Site**

The women and men who participated in the FGDs in this area did not experience any disastrous landslides.

**c. Flood and Drought-prone Areas in Batticaloa: NGO Project Site**

Women participants of FGDs from Vilaveduwani GN and Karaveti GN in the Batticaloa District, where Oxfam implemented their community-based DRR project, were all Tamil. They rated the 2010/2011 flood as the most severe disaster they had ever experienced. Women participants from Karaveti explained that compared to their neighboring village of Vatyal, Karaveti used to be safer from floods, but it was also severely affected by the 2010/2011 flood. According to the participants of the FGD in Vilaveduwani, water reached as high as adult chest-level in some places. One female participant in the same discussion observed that the water level of a nearby river gradually increased from nine to eleven o'clock at night while she was carefully watching instead of sleeping.

The 2010/2011 flood resulted in severe impacts on women's and men's daily lives due to its intensity and continuity. According to the participants in the FGD in Vilaveduwani, water went away only slowly and remained for one to two weeks. They also described a series of floods that occurred one after another from December 2010 to January 2011. Consequently, both women and men had to go back and forth between their houses and the school identified as their evacuation center. During that period, therefore,

they were forced to stay in the evacuation center of the school for a total of around 20 days, being provided with emergency food aid by local government.

### **(3) Recovery**

#### **a. Tsunami-affected Area in Trincomalee: JICA Project Sites**

In the aftermath of the Tsunami, Muslim and Tamil survivors who used to live in Nilaveli beach spent their initial survival and recovery phases separately and differently. According to the women participants in the FGDs, they got together in the sites of temporary housings later. Before then, Muslim female survivors stayed in a tent village for around a half year, which was set up next to the mosque while Muslim male survivors stayed. On the other hand, some Tamil female and male survivors stayed in the emergency shelters (huts), for a couple of months, which were built by Care International, Organization for *Elangai* Refugees Rehabilitation (OfKabERR), and other organizations close to the place where their houses used to be. According to Muslim female participants, they were well supported by not only the mosque and Muslim people in Saudi Arabia, but also various NGOs, Hindu temples, private hotels, and non-affected people, regardless of differences in ethnicity and religion. Tamil female participants explained that they were provided with cooking utensils, food, and clothes by NGOs in the aftermath of the tsunami.

Emergency relief and recovery aid were mainly provided by external organizations, particularly NGOs and multi-lateral and bilateral international aid organizations, although some food aid was provided by the local government. In an FGD, one Muslim female participant complained, “The government’s people never visited us for any emergency aid purpose. They came to see us only when JICA would support us for our resettlement housings.” According to one Tamil woman participant, however, their Divisional Secretariat distributed the food stamps of Rs. 1,200 per person per month for 6 months. She stated, “With the stamps, we bought rice, flour, sugar, milk, canned food, kerosene, etc. at a multi-purpose co-op society’s shop. Those were insufficient, but we could supplement with other food aid provided by NGOs.” Such a difference in their access to resources, including food, among survivors might differentiate their vulnerability, based on Sen’s entitlement approach.

During the recovery phase, Muslim and Tamil female participants of the FGDs observed that women survivors in the tent village and temporary housing were excluded from camp management which was done only by their men and aid organizations. According to Muslim female participants, there was a Management Committee consisting of only men which was originally organized for a religious purpose, and which took a

leading role in the camp management of the tent village. Whenever the women faced problems, such as a shortage of water and bathrooms in the tent village, they first had to talk to their husbands, and their husbands raised the issue in the Management Committee. The Management Committee tried to solve the problems by consulting with any NGOs concerned. As illustrated in the PAR model, such exclusion of women from the decision-making processes was shaped by unequal gender relations, which is a part of “Root Cause” contributing to those women’s vulnerability. Furthermore, in terms of the concept of empowerment by Kabeer (1999), those Muslim women were not given autonomy or agency to make a choice on their own in order to solve their problems and meet their needs.

Similarly, during the whole period they stayed in the temporary housing supported by a local NGO called Sevalanka, only a group of men was in charge of camp management. One Muslim woman participant explained, “We never thought about organizing a committee by ourselves at that time. We never thought that we had such a capacity.” Such perceptions of their own lack of capacity well reflects on Sen’s cooperative conflict model (1990), as well as their lack of agency referenced in the concept of empowerment by Kabeer (1999). Without getting any gender-responsive interventions from the external organization, both Muslim and Tamil women lost an opportunity to bring about a change in their stereotyped gender roles and responsibilities and take on new roles in the camp management.

After living in the temporary housing for a couple of years, the Muslim and Tamil survivors who used to live in Nilaveri moved to the resettlement community of the JSFV in Iqbal Nagar from 2006. Some of the Tamil survivors, however, left for India by that time due to physical danger caused by the conflicts. Through the resettlement project funded by the Government of Japan, JICA, in cooperation with relevant local government agencies, constructed permanent housing for 246 households, including 136 Tamil and 110 Muslim households, in the land owned by the Government of Sri Lanka. JICA took into account the participation of future beneficiaries of the housing during the process of deciding on the design of the housing so that the beneficiaries could have more ownership over the housing and village. JICA did not actively involve, but did not intend to exclude women from the processes, either. One Muslim woman participant observed, “JICA took us to Kandy for a study tour/training in which they showed us three types of model housings. Even after coming back, they brought the model housings here and showed them to other people.” With the interventions by JICA, those women were able to have access to

information on the housing, which partly contributed to their building coping capacity, as well as agency.

JICA also involved both men and women in the session to explain about the ownership of the land allocated for each household in the JSFV in Iqbal Nagar. Both Muslim and Tamil female participants understood well how the process for handing over landownership from the Government of Sri Lanka to the residents would work. One Muslim woman explained, “I know we (our family) can get a landownership after we lived here for 10 years. I remember it very well because JICA explained in that way.” Another participant said, “It has been only eight years since we moved here. Now, we have only a temporary ownership. In two more years, we (our family) can get our own landownership.” Similarly, Tamil female participants explained that the Land Commission in Colombo would issue Permanent Deeds for them after 10 years of their arrival there. Those Tamil women participants even discussed their plan to register the land under their own names or at least claim joint-ownership with their husbands. This was not because JICA encouraged those women to register the land under their names, but the houses which were washed away by the tsunami were originally under their possession, based on traditional Tamil culture.

Survivors from the tsunami were affected not only physically and economically, but mentally as well. In that sense, post-disaster recovery aid projects had the important role of encouraging the survivors to use their agency to move forward and go back to a normal or better life. The T-CUP, undertaken by JICA, contributed, to some extent, to the psychological recovery of the Tsunami survivors in JSFV in Iqbar Nagar and its vicinity. A Tamil female participant in the FGD expressed, “After I lost my beloved people from the tsunami, I didn’t know whether I was alive or dead for a while. I felt very happy when I knew that we are given a house here.” Similarly, a Muslim female participant in the discussion explained, “I felt as if I was living in a paradise when I first moved in here. This resettlement housing is wider than other places.” On the other hand, a Muslim woman participant expressed, “When I was so depressed after the tsunami, a JICA expert motivated me to participate in Women’s Coop’s activities under the T-CUP and move forward also for the sake of my children.” Those women were encouraged and motivated to move forward, but mainly through their role as mothers, rather than main actors in the recovery processes.

Some participants in the FGDs were more traumatized by the conflicts, rather than the tsunami, which began before the tsunami and continued afterward. One of three Tamil male participants in a FGD explained, “Even after we moved in here, the war was still going on. Both men and women living here were violated by the military people. I was

really terrified by that. After the cease-fire in 2009, my emotional wound was naturally healed little by little although I had little opportunity to take any counselling session.” Similarly, a Muslim woman participant expressed, “The tsunami was only one-day event. But, the conflicts lasted for a longer time. We were exposed to a risk of kidnapping and abduction throughout the conflict’s duration.” Another Muslim woman stated that she was anxious about her uncertain future due to the conflicts. Drawing from the PAR model, the conflicts can be “Dynamic Pressures” which exacerbated their vulnerability even after their recovery from the tsunami.

Throughout the T-CUP project, JICA provided training programs to both men and women and introduced exclusively to women the saving and micro-financing activities undertaken in collaboration with the Women’s Coop based in Colombo. On the one hand, the T-CUP contributed to an increase in women’s access to resources, including micro-finance, which is considered as pre-conditions in the concept of empowerment as described by Kabeer (1999). However, the T-CUP, specifically the Women’s Coop, did not aim for the empowerment of women, so it did not take any interventions by which women could achieve agency or empowerment, on the other hand. In saving and micro-finance activities, women were expected to adhere to their main roles proscribed by intra-household power dynamics and efficiently improve the welfare of their children and family members, Through the project, therefore, women’s empowerment or the transformation of gender roles and equal power relations were not achieved.

The Manager of the Women’s Coop who founded the organization insisted that the main purpose of their saving and micro-financing activities was not the women’s, but the entire family’s welfare. He explained the main reason for targeting women rather than men was that women had been previously found to be generally more patient than men and tended to think and act for the sake of children and family members. This is common to the reason why World Bank utilizes women as an entry-point of beneficiaries, due to their patience and efficiency, for its CCT programs, as reviewed above. Women thus ended up being used by the purpose of Women’s Coop. This highlights women’s sacrifices for their family members partly due to their roles as care-takers and the self-perception of their lower contributions to household livelihoods, as Sen (1990) explains in his cooperative conflict model.

JICA and the Women’s Coop conducted few workshops focused on gender sensitization to change both men and women’s attitude toward women’s stereotyped roles and their limited rights. Based on the stereotyped gender division of work embedded in the society, men were provided with training on carpentering, painting, and mechanics and

women with training on food-processing and sewing. As ultimately little attention was paid to promoting those women to carry out business in a professional way, while a capacity development program was undertaken, it did not sufficiently motivate and technically support them to start their business/entrepreneurship. Without changing their stereotypical attitude and ideology, and addressing professional business development, those women who participated in the training program, especially Muslim women, ended up having difficulty using the skills acquired. One Muslim woman participant explained that although she took the 7-day training course on producing fruit jam, she only made fruit jams for family consumption and not for commercial purposes. Similarly, another Muslim woman participant stated, “I took the training on sewing. I was selected as one of the most devoted trainees. JICA gave a sewing machine to each of the selected 12 women, including me. I make clothes, but mostly only for my family members.”

This tendency for women to work only for their families was also observed in their saving and micro-finance activities. Those women borrowed money through Women’s Coop’s saving and micro-financing activities not for themselves, but rather for their families. Most of the Muslim women who participated in the FGDs borrowed money for their sons and/or husbands whereas some Tamil women borrowed money for themselves. Those Muslim women borrowed money mainly for buying their sons motor-bicycles, helping them and/or husbands commencing new business, paying for the fuel of their husband’s fishing boat, or buying a new engine for their husband’s fishing boat. In such a context, those Muslim women did not develop their agency or get empowered, but merely served as a tool of their men to borrow money. In the concept of empowerment by Kabeer (1999), those women ended up having only access to resources as “pre-condition”, but they were not given an opportunity to develop their “agency” and make a choice on their own to meet their needs or goals as a process toward their empowerment.

The main constraints preventing those Muslim women from doing their own business by taking loans was a lack of agency or decision-making power, their limited mobility, and their husbands’ objections to their doing business. Such limited power, as well as local institutions or social norms dictating women’s limited mobility and the gendered division of roles, contributed to those women’s vulnerability as “Root Causes” and “Dynamic Pressures” shown in the PAR model. One Muslim woman participant revealed that she was unable to decide to borrow money on her own, but instead needed her husband’s or son’s agreement. Since another Muslim woman participant insisted on home-based work which did not require her to move out of the house, she had to engage in low-income-work of cutting onions at home and selling them to middlemen. In that work,

the middleman brought row onions to her house and collected the cut-onions from her so that she could stay at home. Furthermore, one Muslim woman participant explained, “As a breadwinner, men usually disapprove their women to work outside and earn a living. They want to show their dignity/authority as a man to their women.” Based on the power relations between men and women which was shaped by traditional patriarchal culture and institutions, women were deprived of an opportunity to make a choice and decision by themselves for their valued lives. In other words, those women lacked agency, largely shaped by gender, culture, and religion, which was not necessarily addressed within the T-CUP.

If their husbands’ control was minimal or their economic condition was desperate, even Muslim women seemed to be able to engage in business, regardless of their socio-cultural and religious norms. The story of one outstanding Muslim woman who participated in an FGD and was doing business is shown in Box 5.2.1.

**Box 5.2.1 Story of One Outstanding Muslim Business Woman in the JSFV**

Unlike other Muslim women participants in the FGDs, this Muslim woman played the role of leader for “Arna Group 4,” formed under the Women’s Coop’s activities. She was doing business by making snacks at home and not only selling them at home, but distributing them to some shops located outside the JSFV. She used to do this business even before she got married. Although her husband migrated to the Middle East, his income was very low. Based on his trust in her, as well as limited household income, he agreed her to continue doing her business and even moving around by herself. She was so eager for scaling up of her business that she invested in buying a slicer to increase the production with the subsidy given by the local government. Through the micro-finance service by Women’s Coop, she took out a loan to buy a three-wheeler for distributing her products to some shops outside the village. She was looking for further support from a subsidy by the government to increase production and expand her business.

On the other hand, there was a Muslim woman participant whose husband was disabled by the tsunami and who had difficulty profiting from her business. Her story is also shown in Box 5.2.2.

### **Box 5.2.2 Story of One Muslim Woman Struggling with her Difficulty**

A Muslim woman, belonging to Minha Women's Group formed under the Women's Coop's activities, had a husband whose leg was amputated after an injury caused by the tsunami. He tried to make a living as a driver of a three-wheeler. However, due to a bias against his disability, many parents were reluctant to send their children to school in the three-wheeler driven by him. Actually, she bought the three wheeler by borrowing some money from a bank under her brother's name and the remaining Rs. 50,000 from the micro-finance program of Women's Coop. Although she returned the money borrowed from the Cooperative, a part of the loan from the bank still remained. She said that she was really anxious. To support their livelihoods, she started a yogurt business in which she made yogurt and her husband went out to sell it. Since she did not have a cow and needed to buy milk, her profit from making yogurt was much less than she expected. She explained that her difficulty making a profit was due to her limited capital, as she was unable to buy much milk, and the amount of the yogurt she was able to make was therefore limited. She cried as she expressed her hardship during the discussion.

Compared to the Muslim women shown above, Tamil women participants in the FGDs seemed to enjoy more flexible mobility and freedom to engage in business by themselves. Many Tamil women participants still borrowed money for their survival or for the sake of their husbands or sons. However, some of them also conducting their own business, such as farming onions, making handicrafts of *Palmyra*, raising poultry, making clothes, etc. which were relatively successful. One of those Tamil women participants expressed her husband's feeling about her work: "My husband should be very happy about my earning income. Otherwise, he cannot manage to bear all the family expenses only with his income."

This economic empowerment experienced by these Tamil women did not necessarily affect the power dynamics based on gender in the Tamil community of the JSFV. Despite their willingness, Tamil women in the village were prevented by their men from organizing a Women Rural Development Society (WRDS) during the period when the T-CUP was implemented. Tamil male participants in the discussion did not regard the main purpose of WRDS as raising awareness of or protecting women's rights, but merely receiving micro-finance. Although three Tamil women had been involved in the Rural Development Society, which was a committee run only by Tamil men, their voices were not necessarily heard or taken seriously by male members of the committee. One Tamil woman participant in the FGD explained, "Those three women were not the members of the RDS's committee. Whenever we face a problem, we go talk to them. But, nothing has been solved." Another woman expressed, "I once participated in the RDS's regular



meeting and requested cement-made blocks which were supposed to be distributed for making fences. But, the members of the committee have not yet done anything about it, so I quit going to the meeting.” Thus, women’s active involvement in the saving and micro-finance activities did not necessarily change women’s decision-making power or expand their activities to other community development ones.

The micro-finance services provided by the Women’s Coop under T-CUP simply replaced the money-lenders who used to require them to pay back loans with high interest rates. JICA largely contributed to increasing women’s access to financial resources as “pre-conditions” toward their empowerment; however, it did not help them to develop their agency and get empowered by using the loans. As those women did not have the ideas or skills necessary to conduct their business, most of them utilized the money borrowed from the Cooperative to cope with their emergency economic crisis. One Tamil woman participant in the discussion expressed, “When the Cooperative was unavailable here, I borrowed money from a neighbor. Otherwise, I just prayed for the god.” Another woman also expressed:

When any of our family members got sick, we used to use medical herbs. Otherwise, we borrowed money from a middleman to buy medication, but we had to repay with 10 percent interest within a week or so. Now, we don’t need to go borrow money from a middleman.

This showed that micro-finance program did not always lead to women’s empowerment, particularly when there was no intervention for more business-specific training and gender sensitization for both men and women in the community.

**b. Landslide-prone area in Rathnapura District: JICA Project Site**

Participants in the FGD in this area did not experience any disastrous landslides.

**c. Flood and Drought-prone Areas in Batticaloa District: NGO Project Sites**

After the 2010/2011 flood hit the area, affected women and men who participated in the FGD, expressed their difficulty recovering from the adverse effects of the flood and returning to a normal life. There were some differences in the hardship raised by women and men participants in the FGD in Vilaveduwani GN. Women participants explained that the most serious problems they faced in the aftermath of the flood and early recovery phase were a lack of privacy and children’s health issues in the evacuation center. On the other hand, men participants felt their main hardship involved the work of removing mud from their houses and cleaning them up, and they agreed with the opinion of the women that the

lack of privacy in the evacuation center was problematic. According to the participants, around 90 families were staying at the evacuation center, which was consisted of four buildings with 12 classrooms.

In the center, the camp management committee was not newly developed. According to the participants in the FGD, they did not have any support from external organizations, including Oxfam, for DRR during that time. Thus, the pre-existing Rural Development Society run by only men played a main role in managing the center. Men participants in the discussion witnessed that they went to the Divisional Secretariat in spite of a still-flooded road to get food aid, and distributed the food received from the Secretariat among evacuated people. On the other hand, the evacuated women took responsibility for cooking for the evacuated people, following gendered division of roles.

#### **(4) Prevention and Post-disaster Preparedness**

##### **a. Tsunami-affected Area in Trinmalee District: JICA Project Site**

Based on the experience of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the local governments at the division and GN levels made some efforts to prepare for the risk of future disasters. First, a DMC at the GN level was organized. However, the existence of the committee was unrecognized by local people, especially Tamil people, and it was not very functional. Secondly, the early warning system was set up and evacuation centers were identified at the GN level. In Iqbal Nagar, there was a siren tower for the early warning of a tsunami or other disasters. Some Muslim participants in the FGDs observed that a Disaster Management Officer based in Kuchchaveli Division regularly came to check the function of the siren.

At the GN level, as some Muslim women participants revealed, they were provided several training programs on DRR by various NGOs after the tsunami. They also mentioned that they participated in evacuation drills two times after they moved to JSFV. Other Muslim women revealed that they made a community-based hazard map. One Tamil woman participant described that while she never attended a training or drill, her husband attended and prepared for an evacuation bag with important documents. On the other hand, three Tamil male participants in the FGD were not aware of the DM or of the trainings or drills conducted at the GN level. Information on DRR seemed to be limited to Muslim people who live close to the loadhead or those who usually stayed at home during day time.

**b. Landslide-prone Area in Rathnapura District: JICA Project Sites**

Based on the technical advice provided by JICA experts, people in Ranhotikanda, Kolonna Division, Rathnapura District established a DMC at the GN level. Since JICA did not aim to empower women through the DiMCEP, women were not necessarily encouraged to take active and leading roles in the Committee. The Committee comprised 50 households, from each of which more than one member was supposed to attend its regular meeting. Out of the Committee members, seven were to be selected as the members of the EC. Currently, the vice chairperson is the only female member in the EC. She seemed to be selected as the vice chairperson not because of her strong commitment or leadership, but rather her relatively higher level of education. Under the EC there were sub-committees, such as early warning, relief and rescue, first aid, camp management, and monitoring. Some women were involved in each of the sub-committees while no woman in the subcommittee of relief and rescue which required hard work and was supposed to be men's work. However, this was not necessarily reflected by women's reluctance, but rather a gender bias of decision-makers, as a couple of women participants in the FGD showed their willing to work in the committee for their local people.

One critical problem was that the Committee did not conduct any drills after the DiMCEP was terminated in 2013. Since there were some elderly people and people with disabilities who were unable to walk by themselves, carrying them to an evacuation center smoothly would be a big challenge for the members of the relevant sub-committees in an actual situation. Such a lack of local initiative can exacerbate the vulnerability of those people living in highly risky places.

The DiMCEP improved local people's awareness of a risk and their preparedness in terms of early warning. Under the DiMCEP, a community-based hazard map was made and displayed in the center of Ranhotikanda GN. An early warning system was developed among the district, division, and GN levels. In some more risky places of Ranhoticanda, the rain gauges were set for risk assessment. Based on the system, people in Ranhoticanda were supposed to receive a message for evacuation. If the result of the rain gauges suggested a risk, the announcement to evacuate would be delivered from the GN (village chief) and sub-committee members to all residents living in the risky places. The GN revealed that whenever it rained heavily, he tried to go and check the places identified as highly risky and would make announcements to residents living around there if necessary. He also insisted that he would even use the police to force those who would remain at home to protect their assets to move to an evacuation center.



The community-based hazard map made by JICA (Photo: August 2015)



Building, as information center, provided by JICA (Photo: August 2015)

In order to protect their livelihoods, Sinhalese women who participated in an FGD in Ranhotikanda GN took up a couple of livelihood programs, such as “Samurdhi” and “Gamedia,” and women’s organizations, such as Women’s Society. This was mainly because they expected to make more use of micro-finance services from those programs. However, they did not necessarily utilize the money borrowed for doing business, but rather for their daily survival. Those programs and organizations concentrated only on the provision of micro-finance services, which functioned only as “pre-condition” in the conceptualization of empowerment by Kabeer (1999), and lacked interventions to develop women’s agency toward their empowerment.

In Ranhotikanda, economic poverty was both the cause and effect of men’s alcoholism and domestic violence against women. Women participants in the FGD revealed that some men overused their income for alcohol and did not give their wives sufficient money for the cost of living, while others even took money from their wives for alcohol. They expressed that a lack of money caused conflicts between a wife and husband and that the conflicts tended to result in a husband’s violence against his wife. “Despite available support and services by the local government, around 20 percent of victim women did not report to the police or the GN,” some women participants in the FGD explained. Those women also explained that the main reason for this was that the women who did not report to the police or the GN were afraid if their husbands would get angrier and more violent after being reported. This shows the intra-household power dynamics by gender, which tended to exacerbate the vulnerability of those women victims in the post-disaster context.

Most of the livelihood-enhancement programs conducted in Ranhotikanda did not aim to promote the public awareness of women’s rights and women’s roles as main actors in collectively working for a social change. Under the programs, women were organized

only to save money and manage micro-financing activities efficiently. The formation of a group was not utilized as a process for developing women's mutual trust and cooperation and eventually their empowerment, but rather as a tool to realize more efficient management of saving and micro-finance activities. There were few gender sensitization workshops or leadership trainings conducted within the programs. As a result, there seemed little mutual cooperation among the members of the group formed, which was seen in the research sites of the Philippines, and little commitment and sympathy of leaders to women's empowerment and protection of women from a violence. .

**c. Flood- and Drought-prone Area in Batticaloa District: NGO Projects Sites**

Tamil female participants in FGDs conducted in both Puthumandapathady GN and Vellavettuwan GN, Manmunai West Division demonstrated their coping strategies or adaptation capacity. Some of the coping strategies and adaptive capacity were based on their traditional or indigenous knowledge, which was well reflected in the experience- and roles-based gendered knowledge stated in the feminist political ecology theory by Rocheleau et al. (1996). Others were based on information and advice given by external organizations, such as SWDC and Oxfam. Women participants from both GNs described their traditional coping strategy of trying to collect as much firewood as possible during the dry season so that they did not need to go often to the forest during rainy season. Similarly, they tried to produce preservative food before the drought season started. Female participants from Karavetti GN explained that they would store food as well as the seeds and the products harvested in the upper places of their houses during the rainy season, so that they could protect them from flooding.



Suriya Women Development Center (SWDC),  
Batticaloa (Photo: October 2015)



Oxfam, Batticaloa (Photo: October 2015)

In their community-based DRR project, Oxfam succeeded in facilitating local people, specifically women, to take initiatives for their community-based DRR and adaptations to climate variabilities. Women in Vilaveduwani GN proposed Oxfam to

construct a reservoir, based on their own role- and experience-based knowledge. Oxfam did not overlook those women's proposal, but rather appreciated their knowledge and autonomy, which are a key to community-based DRR. Women participants in an FGD in Vilaveduwani GN revealed that although they were severely affected by the 2010/2011 flood without the reservoir, they were able to control the 2014 flood with the reservoir to some extent. According to them, the reservoir could also function well to reduce a risk of droughts. Water saved in the reservoir was usually used for an agricultural purpose.



Reservoir built in Vilaveduwani GN with Oxfam assistance (Photo by Oxfam)



Reservoir built in Vilaveduwani GN with Oxfam assistance (Photo by Oxfam)

Oxfam encouraged people in their project sites of Vellavettuvan GN and Karavetti GN to form the DMC at GN level, involving all community members, particularly women and other marginalized groups of people. The committee as well as sub-committees formed in Karavetti was consisted of many female members who were engaged in early warnings, search and rescue, first aid, etc, which was not necessarily based on stereotyped gendered division of roles. Oxfam also facilitated all local stakeholders to participate in making a community-based hazard map and DRR strategies. The involvement of all stakeholders within a community in decision-making processes is the first step for developing the agency of women and other marginalized groups of people toward their empowerment eventually.



Community-based hazard map for Vilaveduwani GN (Photo: Oct. 2015)



Cue for water in Vilaveduwani GN (Photo: Oct. 2015)

To diversify their sources of income and avoid the exclusive reliance on selling firewood for a living, women participants in the discussion in Puthumandapathady GN used to work as agriculture laborers. Following the introduction of mechanization into agriculture, however, they lost job opportunities in agriculture. Despite gender discrimination against the wage rate, they were still able to earn some cash from their labor work. According to women participants in the discussion, manual labor in agriculture was required only in Polonnaruwa District, and jobs were only available for 15 days or so during the harvest season. Their men shifted from labor work in agriculture to work in manufacturing or the service industry in urban areas. However, women did not have any available work in rural areas, such as Puthumandapathady GN, or take a job in urban areas due to social norms and household chores, and remained unemployed. Such social change drove women to be placed in a more vulnerable state than men, as shown as “Dynamic Pressures” to progress vulnerability in the PAR model by Blaikie et al. (1994).

Based on Oxfam’s gender mainstreaming policy, Oxfam intended to involve women and marginalized groups of people in the decision-making process of DRR activities and encourage them to take on non-stereotyped roles. In the FGDs of Vilaveduwani GN and Karavetti GN, which are Oxfam’s project sites, women participants revealed that women actively worked as members of the main committee of the DMC at the GN level, such as the secretary and treasurer, and members of the sub-committees of the DMC, including early warning, relief and rescue, and site security. In the construction of the reservoir, women from the women-headed households (mainly widows) and people with disabilities were prioritized to be selected for “cash for work” since they were considered as the most vulnerable. Thus, the community-based DRR project implemented by Oxfam was gender-responsive, addressing not only practical gender needs or daily-base needs of women, but also strategic gender needs or the transformation of gendered division of roles and gender relations.

To address the issue of GBV, Oxfam provided both men and women with training programs focused on how to report and deal with GBV, as well as women’s value and leadership, in the same sites. The civil society organization in Karavetti GN, consisting of 20 men and 5 women, watched for any cases of GBV and child abuse, and more generally watched the places where alcohol was sold and violence or assault often took place. One of women participants in the FGD in Karavetti GN was a member of this organization. She showed her strong commitment to her duty as she kept GBV cases occurring in Karavetti confidential. To protect women from a risk of violence, as well as enhance their agency and achieve a social change, Oxfam’s interventions prove the importance of approaching not only women, but also men, taking into account gender.

### 5.3 Summary of the Findings and Recommendations for Future Interventions

The summary of key findings from the field research in the Philippines and Sri Lanka in terms of gendered vulnerability and coping capacity are shown in Table 5.3.1. Some critical points to be taken into account in future DRR projects, as well as possible interventions, are also shown in Table 5.3.2.

**Table 5.3.1 Summary of the Key Findings from the Field Research**

Findings	the Philippines	Sri Lanka		
	Region VIII 2013 Typhoon Yolanda	Trincomalee 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami	Rathnapura (Prone to disasters)	Batticaloa 2010/2011 Flood
(1) Preparedness	Living in coastal areas and shabby houses No hill, but flat places Had information on 'super typhoon' from TV news a week before Not understand the meaning of 'surge' Had early warning a couple of days before Not everyone evacuated due to low level of their risk perception Based on traditional coping strategy, men mainly tied up a house and women took children to an evacuation center Tried to earn as much cash as possible, preparing for a typhoon Few evacuation centers identified, but limited number of capacity	No information and no early warning. No evacuation center identified. Not able to bring out cash and important documents. No DRR law and no national/local structures established for DRR No knowledge on 'tsunami'.	Did not know a risk of landslides until advised by JICA experts. Based on the advice given, planted seedlings around a house.	Geographically disadvantaged, low land compared to neighboring Districts. No information and no early warning watched the water level of a river. No system for disseminating early warning information within a community, except a siren in a temple. Not prepared for a disaster bag (for important documents). Not able to move food to a upper place of the house or bring livestock in a higher place.
(2) Response	Tried to evacuate to a safer place, such as a evacuation center, private houses, or hill. Collected whatever was available and constructed a hut and ate any food available for survival	Most of Muslim and Tamil women not know how to swim. Run away from the house right after people saw a high wave coming toward them. Grabbed a boat, wood, etc. to survive Muslim women hesitated to go out without getting dressed up.		Jumped up on the table. Evacuated to the evacuation center of a school. Went back and forth between houses and the center due to continuous floods.
(3) Recovery	Well taken care of GBV/ VAWC issues by women facilitators in WFS. Bunk House well managed by male and female members of Camp Management Committee, including VAWC issues. Food aid and emergency housing assistance provided by the government. QIPs by JICA supported affected women association by providing equipment, training, and building. The women supported by JICA faced the problem of marketing in particular. QIPs did not address the social change in traditional gender role and unequal gender relations through gender sensitization.	Resettlement housings provided by JICA JICA shared with women information on possible housing models and disseminated information their land ownership of the housings. Provided skill training based on gender role to both men and women. Muslim women, in particular, did not use the skill for business purpose, but family consumption. Under micro-finance activities, Muslim women did not borrow money for their own business, but their sons and husbands.		Not formed a camp management committee, but managed mainly by male members of RDS. Women played role in cooking for evacuated people based on traditional gender role. Men felt difficulty with cleaning up their houses. Women felt difficulty with no privacy and children's health condition in the evacuation center at the stage of early recovery.



Findings	the Philippines	Sri Lanka		
Region/ District Major disaster	Region VIII 2013 Typhoon Yolanda	Trincomalee 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami	Rathnapura (Prone to disasters)	Batticaloa 2010/2011 Flood
(4) Prevention/ Preparedness	Some LGUs revised DRRM Plan and developed DRRMC. Some LGU tried to develop the system of evacuation ID cards while there are some problems. Preparedness at the GN level largely depending on the availability of external organization's interventions in terms of making a plan and hazard map.	DMC at District and Division established and accordingly DMP developed at District and Division level. Not so much recognized by some people.	DMC at GN level established Rain gauges were set up for risk assessment. Early warning system was established. After JICA project was terminated, no drill was conducted. How to carry elderly people and people with disability to a safer place is critical challenge. Livelihood activities not helpful to change gender role and gender relation due to no business training and no gender sensitization.	Based on traditional coping capacity, stock more firewood during dry season and make preserve food during dry season. Making a shed for livestock higher than the ground to protect them from a flood constructed a reservoir for flood and drought control. Female widows and people with disability given priority for cash for work for the construction of the reservoir.

Source: Developed by the authors.

**Table 5.3.2 Important Points and Possible Interventions for Future DRR Projects**

Project Cycle	Points to be taken into account	Actual Interventions/Actions
(1) Planning	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Mechanism of inequality at local level which shapes gendered vulnerability</li> <li>2) Possibility of social change in gender role and gender relations</li> </ol>	<p>To conduct gender analysis and identify the power dynamics embedded in the target areas.</p> <p>To identify any critical constraints preventing women and other marginalized people from participating any DRR activities provided by the projects and possible measures.</p> <p>To include the transformation of gender role and gender relations as a project goal.</p> <p>To include gender sensitization workshops and skill development taring programs free from traditional gender role as activities.</p> <p>Not to increase women's work due to the involvement in the project, but promote the share of the work between men and women.</p> <p>To involve women in DRR committee as they can be fully benefitted from their decision-making.</p> <p>To give women the role in making a DRR plan, including making a hazard map; housings; search &amp; relief; and early warning which are not regarded as women's work, but suitable for them.</p> <p>To provide not only skill development training, but more business specific training, particularly marketing and product development, etc.</p> <p>To promote leadership of women not limited to livelihood activities, but DRR and community development activities.</p> <p>To promote the share of knowledge, skills, and information as well as responsibility among the members of livelihood activities, avoiding the concentration of overwork on the leader.</p> <p>To consider possible support to reduce a risk of</p>

<b>Project Cycle</b>	<b>Points to be taken into account</b>	<b>Actual Interventions/Actions</b>
(2) Implementation	Obstacles or control by men and other dominate groups	women against GBV. To encourage/motivate women. To encourage men to share the work/ responsibility with men at home. To convince men and other dominant groups to involve women in decision making process of DRR and other activities. To conducted the activities helpful for the transformation of gender role and gender relations as planned.
(3) Monitoring/ Evaluation	Gender disaggregated data. Self-evaluation.	To monitor the data, disaggregating by gender and other social factors. To conduct self-evaluation workshops in which women themselves think how they have changes as well as their role and power over decision at household and community levels have changed.

Source: Developed by the authors.

## **6. Conclusion**

### **Summary of the Findings from the Field Research**

Findings from the field research in the Philippines and Sri Lanka show us some key implications of disasters in terms of gendered vulnerability and coping capacity, as well as differences among women. Despite differences in the types of the disasters and the backgrounds of the countries, cases of the Philippines and Sri Lanka lead to similar implications of gendered vulnerability in particular. This is mainly because they share a problematically strict ideology and social norms on the gendered division of roles and space, and unequal power relations between men and women. Surprisingly and interestingly, women suffered from the invisible “gender,” embedded deeply in the societies of both countries, especially the Philippines, where women seem to enjoy superficially-equal status to men, compared to other developing countries. The gender biases and strict social norms of women as good mothers can be regarded as root causes for the vulnerability of women in the research sites of both countries, which problematically prevented them from achieving their decision-making power or agency and taking the role of main actors in the post-disaster recovery and DRR.

In all research sites in the Philippines and Sri Lanka, women and ethnic or religious minority groups suffered little discriminatory access to information about the disasters, if information and weather forecasts were generally available. This was mainly because the literacy rates of women are relatively high, and television is available in both countries. Whether or not people are prepared for a risk in a pre-disaster context, evacuate in advance, and reduce a risk of future disasters, is ultimately a matter of choice, as it is closely related to financial poverty or class, if accurate information is available and the right to choose is available, and institutions and administrative arrangements are properly done. For example, people whose residence area was identified as highly risky in Ranhotikanda, Ratnapura District in Sri Lanka had little choice, and lived with a risk because they were unable to afford to move to a safer place by themselves or the local government was not able to offer appropriate alternative land for their resettlement. On the other hand, despite their well aware of their risk, men and women in the research sites of the Philippines had unsafe places for evacuation due to geographic reasons and a lack of proper institutional and administrative arrangements.

Based on a case of the tsunami in Sri Lanka, in particular, both Muslim and Tamil women were systematically excluded from the camp management and put in the position in which they had to rely on their male partners and were unable to consider or make a decision by themselves for better and more convenient lives in the temporary housing. Not only a religious organization, but also a local NGO overlooked or ignored women’s role as main actors, and excluded them from the camp management. Based on stereotyped gender roles, Sinhalese

women participants in the FGDs in Ranhotikanda which is a landslide-prone area were not involved in search and rescue work, though in the discussion they demonstrated their willingness to take the role of rescue and search which was often regarded as men's work. In Tacloban City in the Philippines, on the other hand, Oxfam tried to transform the stereotyped gendered divisions of work by training affected women on carpentering and giving the trained women an opportunity to take "cash for work" through carpentry. Unfortunately, this trial failed to take root in the society, mainly due to deeply embedded gender biases and the basic skill level the women attained from the short-term training. Similarly, in the Batticaloa District in Sri Lanka, Oxfam intentionally appointed women to take the role of "early warning" and "relief and rescue" which were traditionally men's rather than women's roles. Those challenges show us the importance of transformation in not only the gendered division of roles, but power relations, by which women can develop their agency and avoid the excessive utilization of their "patience" and "sense of responsibility", or their sacrificing themselves for the sake of other family members. This is the most meaningful lesson learned from the research.

We also learned drawing on the cases of the Philippines and Sri Lanka that the CCT and micro-finance programs are not always an all-purpose cure, particularly for women's agency, empowerment, and leadership. The research finding led us to a better understanding of a huge gap in the ideal strength of CCT and micro-finance programs and their actual outcome if no interventions are undertaken to develop their technical and business skills and transform the pre-existing traditional gender roles and gender power relations. Based on the social norms deeply embedded in the patriarchal society of both countries, "4Ps" in the Philippines and the Women's Coop's activities in Sri Lanka utilized the pre-structured role of women as mothers and care-takers for their family members. Both programs facilitated women to organize a group not because women were able to develop individual agency and collectively work for the protection of women's rights and a social change, but because group work was efficient and convenient for implementing organizations. In this light, livelihood programs, conducted in the post-disaster context, should directly aim to change both men and women's negative attitudes and behavior towards women's roles and value through gender sensitization programs, as well as to develop their agency and leadership to change their economic and social status.

UNFPA's program in the Philippines, as well as the Oxfam's community-based disaster management program in Sri Lanka mainstreamed the combat of sexual and GBV in DRR. GBV, especially domestic violence, was a common and critical gender issues faced by women in the Rathnapura and Batticaloa Districts in Sri Lanka as well. GBV is first based on unequal power relations between men and women, but also closely related to poverty and alcoholism as shown by the cases in those districts. GBV can be regarded as the product of social, economic, and

political processes in everyday life, drawing from the conceptualization of a disaster by Blaikie et al. (1994). Thus, as disasters occur, GBV can be more frequent and intense. The DRR plan and camp management at the phase of early recovery and recovery/reconstruction should include an element for the protection of women, especially those with disabilities, and children from the risk of GBV.

Proactive actions for DRR by developing countries, including the Philippines and Sri Lanka, tend to concentrate on preparedness for future disasters, such as awareness-raising activities. Unless it is financially affordable and/or technically feasible, it would be hard for these countries to establish large-scale infrastructures to prevent or reduce the risk of future disasters. Instead, to evacuate to a safer place early enough would be a more realistic and proactive approach. For this to occur, people need access to accurate information and appropriate institutional arrangements. However, it is also difficult because power dynamics always exists at all levels from the national to the community levels in a country. For example, due to partially economic and political power relations, the Batticaloa District in Sri Lanka is unable to negotiate with its neighboring districts to develop any mutual measures for flood control, either with institutional or structural measures.

Reflecting on the re-examination made above, we call for future research focusing more on the relationship between interventions within post-recovery and DRR projects and women's agency and leadership. During this study, due to time constraints, we were unable to conduct in-depth interviews, but instead were limited to key informant interviews and focus group discussions. For future research, we recommend conducting research or more detailed case studies of any comparative good practices, addressing both DRR, livelihood enhancement, and women's empowerment and transformational leadership. It is important to identify key and driving factors to change the attitudes and behavior of men and women in a community and motivate them to work for change, especially in unequal gender relations. Furthermore, we need research or ethnography-like study, focused on changes over time of a certain group of women engaged in group business with some interventions from external organizations in terms of the progress of their business, responsibility and power dynamics within the group, and gender roles and gender relations at the household and community levels. Such research or study may identify the advantageous aspects of women's collective work in terms of their meeting strategic gender needs.

## **Recommendations for the Formulation of JICA's Future DRR Projects based on the National Plan of Action for UNSCR 1325**

In accordance with the UNSCR 1325 (2000) and other succeeding resolutions on women, peace and security,<sup>15</sup> the Government of Japan developed a National Plan of Action (NAP) in 2015. The NAP aimed to review policies and activities relevant to the prevention of conflicts and peace building as well as DRR through a gender lens, ensuring that they contribute to women's empowerment and leadership development. The NAP is consisted of 5 core pillars: 1) participation; 2) prevention; 3) protection; 4) humanitarian/DRR supports; 5) monitoring/evaluation. In terms of DRR, more focus is put on the protection of women and girls from GBV/DV, as well as promotion of women's active participation in decision-making processes for recovery/reconstruction from a disaster and prevention from/preparedness for a risk of future disasters, and women's empowerment.

In order to assess the extent to which JICA took actions specified in the NAP, JICA conducted an internal review of its on-going relevant projects in 2015–2016.<sup>16</sup> The review found that as of April 2015, JICA implemented 55 DRR-related projects, including loans, grant aid, technical assistance, and grass-roots aid projects, as well as the dispatch of individual experts. Out of those projects, a gender perspective was integrated in only a few, which were mainly preliminary study for loan/grant aid projects, some small-scale livelihood sub-projects in recovery and reconstruction projects, and grass-roots aid projects that Japanese NGOs implemented with a JICA grant. More importantly and critically, the integrated gender perspective was confined to the assessment of women's survival or daily-based needs, but not the involvement of women in decision-making processes and empowerment, as well as the protection of girls and women from a risk of GBV, for ensuring social justice.

For example, in Bangladesh, a grass-roots aid project was implemented to enhance the capacity of local women necessary for community-based DRR, by using the information provided by the radio. In the project, a needs survey was conducted, divided into women-only-groups and men-only-groups. Staff members of the project, including local women volunteers, tried to create the environment where women's voices were heard so that their needs could be reflected in a community DRR plan. Similarly, in a preliminary survey for a loan project, the meetings of stakeholders, including members of women groups (127 women out of 507 participants), were conducted eight times and women's opinions were shared in the

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<sup>15</sup> Other UN Security Council Resolutions on WPS are 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013).

<sup>16</sup> The Gender Equality and Poverty Reduction Promotion Office under JICA conducted Study on How to Implement NAP in JICA in Feb. 2016.

project's report, while how their opinions were reflected in the community DRR plan is uncertain. In a development study in Nepal and a feasibility study for a loan project in the Philippines, women, especially women heads of households, and other marginalized groups of people were targeted for needs assessment surveys to enhance their livelihoods. Based on the results of the surveys, sub-projects on livelihoods and others were to be implemented.

Drawing on the above review, as well as the results of this gender and DRR case study of the Philippines and Sri Lanka, it is recommended that JICA should further promote gender mainstreaming in its DRR policies, programs, and projects at all the relevant aspects and stages. Even in the limited number of the projects in which a gender perspective is integrated, it is mostly confined to the assessment of women's practical or daily-based needs in the planning process. This implies that JICA still take women as passive beneficiaries, not active agents. In a post-disaster and pre-disaster context, a risk of GBV cannot be ignored; therefore, JICA needs to pay special attention and undertake any relevant prevention action as a part of project activities. It is also necessary for JICA to further enhance the economic empowerment of women not only in the post-disaster, but also pre-disaster stages to increase their resilience to the adverse effect of a disaster. The most important point, however, is that JICA should take into account the necessity to ultimately aim at women's development of agency and their empowerment, for it should involve women in decision-making processes at all the stages of a disaster and even from the normal times. This would be the most assured way by which women can take an advantage of it as an opportunity to be economically, socially and politically empowered, and enhance their leadership, so they can bring about a change and sustainable development as main actors.

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## Annex

### 1. Socio-economic and Gender Conditions of the Philippines

The Republic of the Philippines (the Philippines) is an island country in Southeast Asia, located in the western Pacific Ocean. It consists of 7,107 islands, bordered by the Philippine Sea to the east, the South China Sea to the west, and the Celebes Sea to the south. It is divided mainly into three islands: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. With a population of approximately 99.14 million,<sup>17</sup> the Philippines is the 12<sup>th</sup> most populated country in the world. An additional 1.2 million people live overseas, one of the largest immigrant groups. According to the 2000 Census, 28.1 percent of the population are Tagalog, 13.1 percent Cebuano, 9 percent Ilocano, 7.6 percent Bisaya/Binisaya, 7.5 percent Hiligaynon, 6 percent Bikol, 3.4 percent Wayay, and 25.3 percent as others. With such a diversity of ethnicity, there are 182 living language spoken in the country, while its national or official languages are Tagalog and English. Around 65 percent of the population are Catholic while around 10 percent are Muslim (See Table A-1 for a socio-economic profile of the Philippines).

**Table A-1 Socio-economic Profile of the Philippines**

Major Indicators	Number/ Rate/ Rank	Unit	Year/ Source
Population	99.14	million people	2014/ World Bank
Rural Population	55.5	%	2014/ World Bank
GDP (at market prices)	289.7	billion USD	2014/ World Bank
GDP per Capita	2,872.50	USD	2011-2015/ World Bank
Agriculture (Value Added) (Percentage of GDP)	11.3	%	2014/ World Bank
National Headcount Poverty Ratio at National Poverty Line	25.2	%	2012/ World Bank
Unemployment Rate (Male/Female)	7.1/ 7.0	%	2014/ World Bank
Employment in Agriculture	30.4	%	2014/ World Bank
HDI Ranking out of 187 countries	117th	-	2014/ UNDP

Source: World Bank<sup>18</sup> & UNDP (2014, 159)

The Philippines has a democratic government in the form of a constitutional republic with a presidential system. It is governed as a unitary state while the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao is, as an exception, largely independent of the national government. For an administration purpose, the Philippines is divided into 18 regions, 81

<sup>17</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/country/philippines> (Accessed November 20, 2015)

<sup>18</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/country/philippines> (Accessed November 20, 2015)

provinces, 144 cities, 1,490 municipalities, and 42,029 barangays<sup>19</sup>. Manila, a capital city of the Philippines is located in the National Capital Region while the Tacloban City in the Leyte, one of the research sites, is a regional center of the Eastern Visayas Region (Region VIII).

The Philippines gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 was USD 289.7 billion, the 39<sup>th</sup> largest in the world.<sup>20</sup> The economy of the Philippines has shifted from one based on agriculture to one more focused on manufacturing and services. The agriculture sector accounts for 14 percent of the GDP and employs 32 percent of the total labor force. On the other hand, the industrial sector accounts for 30 percent of the GDP and employs 14 percent of the labor force while the service sector accounts for 56 percent of the GDP and employs 47 percent of the total labor force.<sup>21</sup> Main exports include semiconductors and electrical products, transport equipment, copper products, and garment well as coconuts oil and fruits, which are exported mainly to the US, Japan, China, Singapore, and so on. Remarkably, the economy depends heavily on remittances sent by people living overseas, which surpass foreign direct investment as a source of foreign currency.

The Government of the Philippines signed the CEDAW on July 15, 1980 and ratified it on August 5, 1981. It is the first country to do so among Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries (see Table 4.4.2). As a national machinery for promoting gender equality, the PCW was given a mandate to make the government work for the promotion, protection, and fulfilment of women's human rights to enable women and men to contribute to and benefit equally from development. As shown in Table A-2, the Philippines was ranked 9<sup>th</sup> out of 142 countries in 2014 on the Gender Gap Index (GGI) developed by the World Economic Forum, with a score of 0.7814 (the highest score of 1 as equal and the lowest of 0 as unequal). Looking at the distribution of the index in 4 major sectors, it is ranked 24<sup>th</sup> in "Economic Participation and Opportunity," 1<sup>st</sup> in "Education Attainment," 1<sup>st</sup> in "Health and Survival," and 17<sup>th</sup> in "Political Empowerment."

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<sup>19</sup> [http://nap.psa.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/NSCB\\_PSGC\\_SUMMARY\\_June2015.pdf](http://nap.psa.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/NSCB_PSGC_SUMMARY_June2015.pdf) (Accessed November 20, 2015)

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=54&pr.y=9&sy=2012&ey=2019&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=566&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC&grp=0&a=> (Accessed November 20, 2015)

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.nscb.gov.ph/sna/2009/3rdQ2009/2009gnpi3.asp> (Accessed November 20, 2015)  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20120711125757/http://www.census.gov.ph/data/quickstat/qs0909tb.pdf> (Accessed November 20, 2015)

**Table A-2 CEDAW in the Philippines**

<b>Status</b>	<b>Date</b>
Signature of CEDAW	15-Jul-80
Ratification of CEDAW	5-Aug-81
Latest report submitted (combined 7th & 8th reports)	January 2015

Source: PCW<sup>22</sup> and UN Women<sup>23</sup>

**Table A-3 Gender Gap Index in the Philippines**

	<b>2014</b>		<b>2015</b>	
	<b>Ranking</b>	<b>Score (1=equal)</b>	<b>Ranking</b>	<b>Score (1=equal)</b>
Gender Gap Index	9th (142 countries)	0.781	7th (145 countries)	0.790
1) Economy	24th	0.778	16th	0.799
2) Education	1st	1.000	34th	1.000
3) Health	1st	0.980	1st	0.980
4) Politics	17th	0.368	17th	0.382

Source: World Economic Forum<sup>24</sup>

Note: The ranking of the Philippines for Education 2015 is 34th with the score of 1.00. On the other hand, the ranking for Education 2014 is 1st even with the same score of 1.00. Those rankings are based on the statement on the website of the World Economic Forum; therefore, original data can be incorrect.

## **2. Socio-economic and Gender Conditions of Sri Lanka**

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka) is an island country in South Asia. Sri Lanka has maritime borders with India to the northwest and the Maldives to the southwest. It has a population of 20.64 million people whose ethnicities, religions, and languages are diverse. The population is divided into a majority of Sinhalese, as well as Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil, Moors (Muslims), Burghers, Malays, Kaffirs, and the aboriginal Vedda. The Sinhalese believe mainly in Buddhism, the Tamil mainly in Hinduism, and Muslims in Islam. Sinhalese people, accounting for about 75 percent of the total population, speak the Sinhalese language while the Tamil and Muslims, particularly in the North and East, speak the Tamil language. Because of ethnic conflicts, the country and people went through a

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.pcw.gov.ph/international-commitments/cedaw/philippine-participation>  
(Accessed November 20, 2015)

<sup>23</sup> <http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/focus-areas/cedaw-human-rights/philippines>  
(Accessed November 20, 2015)

<sup>24</sup> <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/economies/#economy=PHL>  
(Accessed November 20, 2015)

30-year-long civil war which ended only in 2009. The socio-economic profile of Sri Lanka is shown in Table A-4.

**Table A-4 Socio-economic Profile of Sri Lanka**

Major Indicators	Number/ Rate/ Rank	Unit	Year/ Source
Population	20.64	million people	2014/ World Bank
Rural Population	82	%	2014/ World Bank
GDP (at market prices)	78.82	billion USD	2014/ World Bank
GDP per Capita	3,819.20	USD	2011-2015/ World Bank
Agriculture (Value Added) (Percentage of GDP)	8.3	%	2014/ World Bank
National Headcount Poverty Ratio at National Poverty Line	6.7	%	2012/ World Bank
Unemployment Rate (Male/Female)	3.4 / 7.0	%	2014/ World Bank
Employment in Agriculture	30.4	%	2014/ World Bank
HDI Ranking out of 187 countries	73th	-	2014/ UNDP

Source: World Bank<sup>25</sup> & UNDP (2014, 171)

Sri Lanka is a democratic republic and unitary state which is governed by a combination of a presidential system and a parliamentary system. For administration purposes, Sri Lanka is divided into 9 provinces and 25 districts which are each administered under a Provincial Council and District Secretariat, respectively. Those 25 districts are further divided into 256 divisions, and these divisions, in turn, are divided into 14,008 GNs. Each of the division and GN is administered under a Divisional Secretariat and GN, respectively. In addition to those, there are other three types of local authorities, originally based on feudal counties: Municipal Councils (18); Urban Councils (13); and *Pradeshiya Sabha* or divisional councils (256).

According to the World Bank, the GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity of Sri Lanka (2011-2015) is USD 10,527.5 which is second to the Maldives in South Asia. The poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty line dropped from 22.7 percent in 2002 to 6.7 percent in 2012, while there was still a gap of 5.5 percentage points between urban and rural poverty headcount ratios. The GDP of Sri Lanka in 2014 was around USD 74.91 billion with an annual growth rate of 7.4 percent. As of 2010, the service sector made up about 60 percent of GDP, the industrial sector 28 percent, and the agriculture sector 12 percent.<sup>26</sup> The main economic sectors of the country are tourism, tea export, apparel, textile, rice production and other agricultural products. In addition to those sectors, remittances from people living overseas, mainly the Middle East, contribute highly to foreign exchange.

<sup>25</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/country/sri-lanka> (Accessed November 20, 2015)

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.treasury.gov.lk/reports/annualreport/AnnualReport2010-eng.pdf> (Accessed November 20, 2015)



The Government of Sri Lanka signed the CEDAW on July 17, 1980 and ratified it on October 5, 1981 (see Table A-5). As a national machinery for promoting gender equality, the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs aims to ensure the rights and empowerment of children and women by formulating, executing, and regulating relevant policies aligned to practices of good governance. In the GGI 2014 by the World Economic Forum as shown in Table A-6, Sri Lanka is ranked 79<sup>th</sup>, with a score of 0.69 (the highest score of 1 as equal and the lowest of 0 as unequal), out of 142 countries. Looking at the distribution of the index across 4 major sectors, it is ranked 109<sup>th</sup> in “Economic Participation and Opportunity,” 59<sup>th</sup> in “Education Attainment,” 1<sup>st</sup> in “Health and Survival,” and 50<sup>th</sup> in “Political Empowerment.”

**Table A-5 CEDAW in Sri Lanka**

<b>Status</b>	<b>Date</b>
Signature of CEDAW	July 17, 1980
Ratification of CEDAW	Oct. 5, 1981
Latest report submitted (combined 5th, 6th & 7th reports)	2009

Source: CEDAW South Asia<sup>27</sup>

**Table A-6 Gender Gap Index for Sri Lanka – 2014 & 2015**

	<b>2014</b>		<b>2015</b>	
	<b>Ranking</b>	<b>Score (1=equal)</b>	<b>Ranking</b>	<b>Score (1=equal)</b>
Gender Gap Index	79th (142 countries)	0.690	84th (145 countries)	0.686
1) Economy	109th	0.591	120th	0.577
2) Education	59th	0.994	57th	0.995
3) Health	1st	0.980	1st	0.980
4) Politics	50th	0.196	59th	0.193

Source: World Economic Forum<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> <http://cedawsouthasia.org/country-status/sri-lanka> (Accessed December 20, 2015)

<sup>28</sup> <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2014/economies/#economy=LKA> (Accessed December 20, 2015)