Special feature
The Typhoon Haiyan response
This edition of Humanitarian Exchange focuses on lessons from the humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan, the worst disaster ever to hit the Philippines. Making landfall on 8 November 2013, the typhoon killed more than 6,000 people and affected more than 14 million. It also triggered a swift, large-scale national and international (Level 3) response. In the lead article, David Carden and Ashley Jonathan Clements highlight the important coordination role of the Philippines government in the response, while Katie Peters and Mirianna Budimir analyse why such heavy losses were sustained despite significant government investment in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Julie Hall analyses the World Health Organisation (WHO)’s long experience of responding to disasters in the Philippines, emphasising that government structures need to be able to handle multiple waves of health needs for months or even years after an event. Articles by Barb Wigley and Alex Jacobs reflect on the attitudes and tools needed to build a culture of accountability to affected populations, and Caroline Austin and Nicki Bailey discuss lessons learned from a review of support to enhance two-way communications with communities.

Articles by John Tipper, Anne Street and Michiel Hofman and Sandrine Tiller focus on the need to improve the quality of partnerships and engagement with local actors by clusters and individual agencies. Alesh Brown reflects on the collective cash response in the Philippines, one of the largest humanitarian cash-based interventions ever mounted, while Serena Brown points out the extensive and growing role of the private sector in the Haiyan response. The issue ends with articles by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Philippines and Victoria Maynard and Phil Barritt discussing key aspects of the shelter response.

As always, we welcome any comments or feedback, which can be sent to hpn@odi.org.uk or to The Coordinator, 203 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NJ.
THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE

Coordinating the response to Typhoon Haiyan

David Carden and Ashley Jonathan Clements

Typhoon Haiyan made landfall on 8 November 2013, cementing the position of the Philippines as one of the countries most at risk from natural hazards. Within days of the disaster the Emergency Relief Coordinator formally activated a system-wide level 3 (L3) response – a designation marking the highest level of humanitarian crisis. In responding to the needs of 14 million affected people, the Haiyan response became the first large-scale relief effort for a sudden-onset disaster since the Inter-Agency Standing Committee protocols under the Transformative Agenda were adopted, setting the parameters for improved collective action in humanitarian emergencies.

Scaling up
Accompanying the L3 declaration was a massive inter-agency surge that saw over 450 international staff deployed within the first three weeks. There was a particular emphasis on information management necessitated by the scale and geographic impact of Haiyan, and recurring high-impact disasters that had affected in-country capacities in the lead-up to the typhoon. The L3 declaration also made available $25 million through the UN Central Emergency Response Fund, and the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) brought in $468m of the requested $776m, including projects from over 50 UN agencies and NGOs. An additional $375m-worth of funding was recorded for projects outside the SRP, with a far larger amount not registered on the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking System.

This unprecedented scaling up of response structures and personnel was set against the backdrop of a middle-income country with strong national capacities and a well-developed disaster management system. Long-standing relationships meant that coordination with the government was strong from the outset. Government-led humanitarian clusters – enshrined in national law in 2007 – led and oversaw coordination for the response, with the support of international actors. Despite being heavily affected itself, the government provided an enabling environment for international responders, with visas being waived during the first months, and some Local Government Units (LGUs) hosting humanitarian agencies throughout the response. Even so, interoperability between the international humanitarian system and the national Philippines response framework was a challenge, particularly around strategic planning and how long humanitarian action should be pursued before giving way to recovery.

New ways of working
The social, political and economic environment in the Philippines was highly conducive to new initiatives, which humanitarian agencies were quick to embrace. Some were driven by field imperatives, others by global priorities. The Haiyan response saw advisors from a range of areas being deployed in support of the response, including gender, private sector engagement and the environment. OCHA established its largest sustained civil–military coordination operation to date, leading engagement with 22 militaries and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As well as being the largest single donor under the SRP (accounting for 26%), the private sector also responded directly from the very earliest stages. Significant efforts were made to engage the private sector at the local, national and international level, including briefing companies on how best to assist affected communities and partnering with businesses in the provision of cash-based assistance.

At least 45 international humanitarian agencies used cash transfers, reaching 1.4m disaster-affected people. In addition to emergency employment and livelihoods, cash assistance was used extensively in support of food security and shelter, constituting around a fifth of the response in each of these sectors. Due to the number of actors involved, the scale of cash interventions, and differing approaches within the sector, cash transfers were difficult to monitor and coordinate, particularly as many took place outside the established humanitarian coordination architecture. Preparedness work that encompasses planning around cash – in particular the role of financial service providers within the Philippines – is underway to ensure a more systematic and efficient approach to cash in future responses. More thinking is also needed at the global level to better define the role of cash during a response (and beyond), and the coordination structures needed to maximise its effectiveness.

Preparedness work by both national and international humanitarian actors ensured that effective systems and structures were in place prior to Typhoon Haiyan, even though the impact of the storm proved to be beyond what could be accommodated without external support. The Haiyan response has highlighted how critical adequate investment in emergency preparedness is, a point reinforced yet again following Typhoon Ruby in December 2014, where the government’s preparedness efforts have been widely praised.

Engaging communities
The Philippines became a priority country for global initiatives around Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) and Communications with Communities (CcW). Whilst AAP has its origins in civil society concepts of accountability and the importance of adapting interventions to the priorities of communities themselves, CcW focuses on meeting the information and communications needs of people affected by crisis.
At the outset of the Haiyan response these two areas were seen to have limited overlap. As the sectors matured, however, they became more closely integrated, culminating in a jointly-managed inter-agency community feedback mechanism. In several field locations the AAP and CwC working groups merged. The flow of information from affected communities was channelled through these mechanisms directly to relevant clusters and the inter-cluster forum, with the aim of increasing the quality of programming and to better inform decision-making.

Despite serving as a model to better integrate AAP and CwC activities, closing the feedback loop and keeping communities fully informed remains a challenge for the sector, as does monitoring the impact of these systems.

In search of durable solutions

In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippines government announced that it would take steps to enforce a national policy restricting the building of private dwellings in high-risk areas. Humanitarian assistance was restricted within these zones to activities that did not encourage permanent settlement in an attempt to discourage housing. Yet many of the most vulnerable families – and those most affected by Haiyan – have few alternatives, and so continue to reside within these restricted zones. This presents a dilemma between the imperative to meet short-term humanitarian needs and the longer-term objective of encouraging vulnerable families to relocate. LGUs in affected areas continue to pursue durable solutions for those displaced by Haiyan. One year on from the typhoon, around 5,000 families were still living in bunkhouses, tent settlements and evacuation centres, down from an initial caseload of 4m people displaced immediately after the storm. With estimates that over 200,000 families (up to 1m individuals) continue to live in areas deemed ‘unsafe’ across Haiyan-affected regions, the solution is likely to unfold over many years, and will form a critical component of the recovery. Identifying sufficient land to house these communities has proved difficult, and requires significant investment to ensure that adequate services are in place.

The transition to recovery

The immediate response was generally seen as timely and effective. Life-saving assistance was delivered at scale, reinforced by the L3 declaration and the subsequent system-wide support that was mobilised. Given the magnitude of the disaster – which would have overwhelmed the capacity of any country – the international community complemented national capacities by repositioning in-country personnel to affected areas and quickly ramping up operations with international surge deployments. Government leadership was at times overshadowed, particularly at the local level where national capacities were particularly stretched.

Despite the magnitude of the disaster and pre-existing levels of poverty, the response to Typhoon Haiyan took place in an environment of significant resilience and rapid self-recovery among affected communities. Displaced families were quick to rebuild where possible – albeit often to a lower standard than they had enjoyed before the typhoon – and the resumption of livelihoods rapidly became a key focus. Humanitarian actors on the ground proved sufficiently nimble to keep pace with these shifting
priorities as initial food and water distributions gave way to longer-term food security and water, sanitation and health programming.

Field hubs were established in centres of high humanitarian need and where large numbers of actors were present, and usually where local government capacity was good, but not necessarily where provincial authorities were located. This model proved effective for the initial phase of the response – which tended to be channelled through LGUs. But as recovery activities picked up pace, primarily through provincial actors, and the focus of the national authorities moved away from humanitarian interventions, a physical disconnect became apparent between international actors and provincial or regional structures. This posed a significant challenge for recovery coordination and a smooth transition to development.

With up to a million people still living in ‘unsafe’ zones, and many of the buildings used as evacuation centres during Haiyan now damaged, the ability of communities to cope with future disasters has been significantly reduced. In Eastern Samar, for example, only 8% of evacuation centres were still usable after the typhoon. Despite the speed with which recovery activities became possible, the lasting impact of the response will be determined largely by the extent to which these remaining vulnerabilities are addressed.

Typhoon Haiyan: pushing the limits of DRR?
Katie Peters and Mirianna Budimir

Compared to other countries in the region, the Philippines is well prepared in terms of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). DRR is embedded in local through to national policies. Over the past 40 years, the government has steadily evolved national policy, from disaster response to disaster management to disaster risk management and finally risk reduction. DRR is mainstreamed in development planning, with different government departments addressing each aspect of Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM). The Office for Civil Defense implements and monitors the overall scope of DRRM. Government spending on DRR is close to $800 million per year.

Despite these achievements, Typhoon Haiyan still resulted in massive destruction: almost 15m people were affected, 4m displaced and approximately 6,000 killed; losses were estimated at $830m. Why was this? The answer lies in two parts: the sheer scale of the typhoon, and the country’s underlying vulnerability and poverty. The scale of the destruction also raises an important question: are there limits to DRR?

Haiyan was possibly the strongest typhoon to make landfall on record globally in terms of windspeed, with 253km per hour winds and a storm surge that may have reached 7.5 meters high. Between 2 and 12 November 2013 most of the island of Leyte received rainfall totals greater than 500mm, with a peak of over 685mm in the south-east corner of the island. The wall of water caused by the typhoon was particularly devastating for many low-lying islands; Tacloban City is located in a particularly vulnerable position at the head of San Pedro Bay, with the majority of the city only five meters above sea level. Haiyan was, in short, an enormous event. Officials admitted that government systems were not adequately prepared for a disaster of this magnitude, in part because preparing for such adverse conditions is beyond the country’s means, despite substantial international support totalling $8 billion in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) loans between 2001 and 2011.

In addition to the scale of the typhoon, one of the clearest explanations for the Philippines’ lack of preparedness may, sadly, also be one of the most difficult to address: its poverty. The Philippines is ranked 165th in the world in terms of GDP per capita, and almost two million people live on less than $2 per day. In order to better cope with disasters, these high levels of poverty and vulnerability must be addressed.

The road ahead
At the one-year mark of the response a physical and strategic realignment had taken place to ensure that international actors were working in support of government recovery efforts, both at the national and local level. This transition is now broadly on track despite initial delays, but a transition framework could have helped build momentum and increased coherence earlier.

Reinforcing the successes achieved during the humanitarian phase of the Haiyan response hinges on this transition process, and more specifically on the effective management and coordination of recovery and development activities. The challenges faced by actors in the Philippines in overseeing this handover have highlighted the systemic disconnect between humanitarian and development approaches – a disconnect made all the more apparent during a rapid-onset emergency with early opportunities for recovery. More thinking and greater resources at the global level could ease this burden in future responses – particularly for a rapid-onset disaster like Typhoon Haiyan, in which national capacities and local resilience ensured a rapid move towards recovery. Investment in and planning for transition must begin at the earliest possible stage of the response.

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The scale of the typhoon also raises challenging questions about the level of acceptable risk and the limits to DRR and preparedness measures. Typhoon Haiyan stretched national and international response capacities to their limits; if a hazard on a similar scale faced the country again, what can we change now to ensure that its impact is less severe and the response more effective? A large part of what is needed to improve humanitarian response actually has nothing to do with humanitarians. While nationally the Philippines invests heavily (politically and financially) in DRR, more can and should be done by the international community:

• we need to get better at providing support for preparedness before a disaster and during recovery;
• we need to change the narrative: investing in DRR makes good economic sense; and
• we need to get tougher on making ODA investments risk-informed.

Preparedness and recovery
Evidence from the Philippines shows that there are fundamental gaps in financing for DRR, especially locally. The international community is notoriously poor at providing support for preparedness and recovery and reconstruction. Investing in one component of preparedness – early warning systems, for instance – is fruitless without investment in other components as well, such as evacuation plans. More investment is also needed in recovery. In the Philippines, less than half of the $788m required for recovery had been received by February 2014; six months after the typhoon, two million people were still living without adequate shelter or housing.

Greater support is also needed to enable national capacity to take over recovery in the aftermath of disaster. International agencies working in the Haiyan response struggled to hand over leadership and coordination of the recovery to the government and were unwilling to entrust a greater share of the response to national organisations, in turn leading to a further influx of internationals to build national capacity in key institutions. Addressing this requires more concerted attention on the part of the international community – as well as political will within the national government. It took a full year following the disaster for President Benigno Aquino to approve a $3.6bn reconstruction plan for affected areas. DRRM plans need to include processes to effectively transfer responsibility for post-disaster initiatives between different international and national actors. At present we lack examples of good practice for the effective coordination of national and international post-disaster finance; as the Philippines is one of the more advanced countries in thinking and acting on DRR, it could provide a good test case for trialling innovative financing arrangements.

DRR makes good economic sense
In addition to sufficient funding, preparedness can also be improved by changing the narrative, discourse and language typically used to encourage investment in DRR. Philippine efforts to mainstream DRRM are commendable, and the international community must reinforce and support this ambition by ensuring that mainstream development actors fully embrace sustainable development that takes risk into account in decision-making.

Investments come in many forms; here we focus on ODA. In an era where value for money (VfM) and cost efficiency dominate donor rhetoric, the argument for investment in DRR needs to be reframed. Currently, the economic case for DRR focuses on the measurement of costs and benefits: for every dollar invested in DRR, a certain amount is saved in terms of reduced losses and/or reduced expenditure on the response. This argument has failed to have impact at the scale required, for a variety of reasons: it does not compare like for like choices between DRR and disaster response; the ‘market’ for responding to disasters is much larger than the ‘market’ for risk reduction; cost–benefit approaches focus on losses, as directly compared to potential gains, which tends to ignore the wider macro-economic or foreign direct investment dimensions that can be associated with strong performance in disaster resilience; and the practitioners engaged in undertaking cost–benefit exercises are largely separate from those making large-scale economic decisions, and fail to communicate findings in ways that seem relevant to decision-makers.

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3 See the discussion on incentives in the 2014 World Development Report.
A new narrative is needed that draws on the language of VfM and the post-2015 agenda, based on economic growth, sustainable development, investment and benefits for other areas. Investing in DRR should not be framed only as preparation for a disaster that ‘might’ come: people are less likely to spend money on a ‘might’. Instead, DRR needs framing in terms of the benefits that will accrue from investment even if a disaster does not strike, including a more attractive investment climate, job creation, sustainable economic growth, improved livelihoods and the benefits of enabling local communities to manage risk.

**Tougher, risk-informed ODA**

It must become a duty and an obligation for ODA to be risk-informed. Transitions in and out of disasters, and underlying poverty and vulnerability to disasters, would be reduced if mainstream development interventions systematically sought to manage disaster risk. Projected climate and disaster risks in the Philippines make clear that failing to take account of risk in ODA is short-sighted; with an increase in the number of disasters, economic exposure to disasters is increasing faster than per capita GDP. The effect of climate change on the severity and frequency of hazards will accentuate existing trends in disaster losses in the future, as well as projected poverty rates for vulnerable people. Such economic exposure directly increases the level of risk for aid agencies across all development sectors with regard to their investment portfolio. The Asian Development Bank, for example, estimates that 58% of its portfolio is at medium to high risk from climate change impacts.

In many respects the Philippines government is ahead of the aid game in terms of embedding risk in legislation, policies and practice. The international community needs to catch up. A fundamental shift is required; we must manage risk responsibly through mainstream development interventions in order to reduce the burden on humanitarian response. Humanitarian actors should be banging down the doors of their development counterparts to ensure that this happens. Setting an appropriate international policy framework in the future would be a significant step forward in this regard. We must become more competent at ‘risk-informed’ decision making: to consciously make decisions around when to take risks, when to spread them and when to minimise them.

**Moving forward: post-2015 frameworks**

Although the Philippines invests heavily in preparing for disasters, Typhoon Haiyan showed that gaps remain and need to be addressed. The international community needs to get tougher on making existing ODA investments risk-informed; we can learn a lot from the Philippines’ approach to prioritising and integrating DRR in its policy, budgetary and decision-making frameworks. However, the underlying poverty and vulnerability of the Philippines complicated and worsened the effect of Haiyan, making the humanitarian response a much bigger task. To reduce the burden on humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, humanitarians should be collaborating with their development colleagues to enact DRR and preparedness measures before an event occurs. Here, the narrative used to encourage investment in DRR needs to change from one of costs and benefits to one of good economic sense. Finally, as Haiyan demonstrates, the process of transition out of disasters also needs to be improved, in particular the transfer of responsibility to governments and the coherence of funding streams.

Building DRR into the post-2015 development frameworks is one way to ensure longevity in efforts to mainstream risk reduction and ensure that we get better at transitions out of disaster and into recovery. Obtaining national and international commitment to take action to reduce existing risk, avoid new risk and manage residual risk – through the post-2015 frameworks for DRR, the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change agreement – is a clear, practical way for the humanitarian community to ensure that, when a response is not required, development efforts are mitigating the risk and severity of future disasters. Typhoon Haiyan also raises more challenging questions – questions that will be asked more frequently as climate extremes take their toll. What scale of disasters should we aim to undertake DRR measures, and be prepared, for? And with climate change making extremes the new norm, are there limits to DRR?

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4 http://cdkn.org/resource/highlights-south-asia-ar5/
Typhoon Haiyan was the deadliest natural disaster ever recorded in the Philippines. It left a massive trail of death and destruction, leaving thousands dead and millions more affected. Many families were left homeless; power lines were destroyed and communications and water facilities damaged. Fishing boats were wrecked and coconut groves crushed, leaving many families without a livelihood. Total damage and economic losses were estimated at $2 billion.

The Philippines has a well-designed and robust disaster risk management system, with a specialised institution for risk reduction and management through the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC)/Office of Civil Defense (OCD), and the country is accustomed to fearsome storms, floods and other hazards. Even so, it was not fully prepared for a disaster of the magnitude of Typhoon Haiyan. This article outlines the key findings of an assessment of early warning efforts prior to the typhoon, conducted by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in December 2013. Publicly available documents and interviews with 41 survivors were analysed under three aspects of early warning: risk knowledge, event detection and communication.

### Risk knowledge

Hazard maps contribute to risk knowledge by identifying which homes have to be evacuated and where safe places are located. In the context of tropical cyclones, storms, floods, landslides and storm surges, hazard maps are critical tools for preparedness planning. The Philippines weather agency PAGASA has yet to publish a wind/storm hazard map for the provinces that were affected by Haiyan, although such information is available. The only storm surge hazard map on hand prior to Haiyan, generated by PAGASA, indicated possible flooding across a much smaller area than was in fact affected (interestingly, the Philippines Institute for Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) produced a tsunami hazard map showing an inundation area closer to that produced by Haiyan). Nine out of 29 respondents said that they did not know that their houses were located in a potential storm surge area, or assumed that they were not. Almost all of the local government officials interviewed by GIZ claimed that they used the hazard maps to identify who would be evacuated and which evacuation centres were safe. Most evacuation centres were located outside the potentially flooded area shown on the PAGASA map, but since a much larger area was affected many were still flooded. For some rivers in Leyte detailed and verified computer flood models exist, but the PAGASA hazard map has yet to receive such verification. Rain-induced landslide areas are also displayed on a hazard map, but as approximately two-thirds of Leyte are marked as landslide-prone many local residents regard the map, which does not appear to be based on a detailed study of individual sites, as exaggerating the extent of the risk.

Several of the evacuation centres were single-storey buildings, typically schools, and were not strong enough to withstand the force of violent waves, so did not protect evacuees from the storm surges caused by the typhoon. The Office of Civil Defense was tasked with checking on the safety of the evacuation centres, though the fact that many of the people who took refuge in them died suggests that these safety checks were not properly done or not done at all. Essentially, the centres became deathtraps.

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1 See http://www.preventionweb.net/files/36860_36860gizassessmentofearlywaringyol.pdf.
Event detection

PAGASA and other national and international agencies noted the emergence of a powerful tropical cyclone several days before Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines, and its path was predicted quite well. PAGASA also forecast heavy rains leading to floods and landslides, as well as a storm surge.

Communication of warnings

The NDRRMC/OCD is responsible for the coordination of early warning to the public based on information from PAGASA. There are several ways for warnings to be communicated to the public.

PAGASA declared the highest alert level for provinces along the path of the typhoon. These warnings were published in the daily bulletins of the NDRRMC and were widely disseminated by the media. President Benigno Aquino appeared on television on 7 November 2013 to highlight the warnings and emphasise the dangers of the typhoon. From interviews GIZ concluded that there was enough time to prepare for the typhoon and evacuate to safe areas before it made landfall. However, in the eyes of the public neither PAGASA nor the NDRRMC conveyed the seriousness of the storm surge, instead issuing a rain warning. Many residents and political decision-makers openly admitted that they were not familiar with the term 'storm surge'; one interviewee said that, while he did not understand what 'storm surge' meant, had the authorities used the terms ‘tsunami’ or ‘tidal wave’ people would have evacuated. Media coverage of the tsunamis in the Indian Ocean in 2004 and in Japan in 2011 had raised public awareness of the dangers of tsunamis but not storm surges, although the effects of both hazards are very similar, even if their causes are not.

Although the authorities issued clear orders to evacuate to residents of Tacloban, some did not understand the nature of a storm surge and its dangers. Others stayed in their homes due to fear of looting, underestimated the height and force of the water or simply laughed off the evacuation order. Forced evacuation was carried out in very few areas. According to interviewees, in many places only half of residents left their homes. Government warnings, including those issued by the OCD and the local government, were not sufficient to persuade people to move to safer areas.

The death rate (i.e. the number of deaths in relation to population) in Guiuan in Eastern Samar, where Haiyan made its first landfall, was lower than in Leyte. This could be because settlements in Guiuan were protected from the full force of the winds by a chain of hills, and because the winds affecting the populated parts of Guiuan were offshore, reducing the danger of a storm surge. No such hills protected settlements in Leyte. From Tolosa to Tacloban the wind was onshore, producing a substantial storm surge in a densely populated area. The highest death tolls in Leyte were in the coastal barangays hit by the full force of the storm surge. Inland areas (Dagami, Jaro, Tabon-tabon, Alang-alang, Santa Fe and Pastrana) experienced the same wind speeds as coastal areas, but there was no storm surge and the average death rate was much lower (nine deaths per 10,000 residents, compared to 180 per 10,000 in Tanauan, Palo and Tacloban). The difference is most likely due to the absence of a storm surge.
Lessons

1. **Modify the storm hazard map for land use planning and disaster and emergency management**

The official storm hazard map should be modified in light of the experience of Typhoon Haiyan. This modified map will constitute a critical technical input into assessments of the risks to life and property, and should be incorporated into land use planning and disaster and emergency management. The modified map will enable the NDRRMC/OCD, local government and other agencies to provide more accurate information to the public and media on areas prone to storm surge hazards. Local authorities should identify and strictly enforce no-build zones in high-risk areas, as well as ensuring that stipulations in conditional-build zones, such as special reinforcements and building exclusively for business use, not residential, are observed.

2. **Strengthen dissemination and communication of early warnings**

The lack of effective dissemination and communication of early warnings was a notable weakness in the run-up to the typhoon. Critical information was not clearly communicated to those who needed it, and people were unaware of the severity of the hazard, or did not use the information appropriately. People simply did not understand that their lives were at significant risk. If the scale of the impending danger had been communicated properly, and coastal residents had been evacuated to safer ground, fewer lives would have been lost. Timeliness, clarity and coverage are essential if warning messages are to lead to sound decision-making, successful evacuation and other preparatory measures. The capacities of PAGASA, the NDRRM/OC and the local government to improve the accuracy of information and the dissemination and communication of early warnings should be enhanced. The OCD and the Philippines Department of Science and Technology (DOST) should include storm surges in the official warning system, as they do with tsunamis.

3. **Proper location and appropriate design of evacuation centres**

Many evacuation centres were located in storm surge areas. New centres should be located outside danger zones, and the hazards they are designed for clearly indicated. Evacuation routes, shelter locations and emergency services (hospitals, fire stations) should be designated and publicised, and evacuation routes and centres clearly signposted. Evacuation centres should consider the needs of children, women, the elderly and the disabled. In high-risk areas forced evacuation should be considered. While some of the reasons why people may be reluctant to heed evacuation warnings are beyond the government’s control – fear of looting, for instance – that does not mean that efforts to increase people’s understanding of the hazards they may face, and what they should do in response, should not be made.

Gemma Ocon and Olaf Neussner worked with GIZ in the Philippines at the time of Typhoon Haiyan.
Typhoon Haiyan: lessons from the response and how to prepare for the future

Julie Hall

Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) made landfall in the Philippines on 8 November 2013. Just over a year on, this article reflects on what the World Health Organisation (WHO) – the co-lead for the health cluster alongside the Philippines Department of Health (DoH) – has learnt, how these lessons have influenced the response over time and what this means for responses to health emergencies in the future. The article is based on internal information from WHO’s own work, though it is hoped that the main findings will also be useful to other agencies.

Responding to multiple disasters

The first lesson is that national agencies and the international community need to be ready to respond to multiple natural disasters each year in the Philippines. The country is one of the world’s most disaster-prone. Typhoon Haiyan was the third crisis to hit the country in two months, following conflict in Zamboanga and an earthquake in Bohol, which combined displaced 750,000 people. This meant that response services including national and international agencies and the Philippine army were already stretched.

WHO Philippines has been working with the DoH to set up Emergency Operations Centres in vulnerable areas of the country, and to establish a gold, silver and bronze command system¹ to direct disaster responses. The agency has also been restocking and pre-positioning medical supplies and equipment in anticipation of more natural disasters, and is developing toolkits with the DoH for emergency preparedness. These toolkits will provide guidance on procedures and practices to ensure a quick response in the aftermath of an emergency. Both national and local governments are working to ensure that health structures are disaster resilient.

Be prepared

A second lesson is that, in any emergency response, aid agencies need to be prepared for the situation on the ground. Foreign medical teams need to bring enough food, water, shelter, fuel and communications equipment to be self-sufficient, particularly in areas that are physically cut off and where communications are poor or non-existent. They also need to factor into their pre-arrival planning sufficient health supplies and capacity to deal with the health priorities and ground realities in the Philippines. Some teams came ready to treat the injured but had not considered the immediate demand for services for pregnant mothers or the need to replace daily medications. The country has a triple burden of disease: communicable and non-communicable diseases plus the impact of natural disasters on an already stretched health service. The Philippines also has the highest fertility rate in Asia: for some military medical teams accustomed to treating injuries it was a surprise to find they had to dust off their skills at delivering babies too. Some teams needed additional drug supplies from WHO Philippines to treat chronic heart disease and hypertension.

For efficient use of the medical personnel, facilities and medication brought in by foreign medical teams, it is essential to systematise the procedure for their deployment. WHO Philippines instigated a registration and briefing system to make sure foreign teams were prepared before they were deployed to areas needing support. WHO helped the DoH to coordinate over 150 foreign medical teams during the response. They held over 193,000 consultations, performed over 5,000 surgeries and assisted in over 1,200 deliveries.

Anticipate likely needs

A third lesson concerns anticipating what the needs will be during different phases of the response. In the first wave, the initial days and weeks are focused on treating the injured, providing equipment to newly disabled people and attending to pregnant women. A second wave of activity involves the prevention of disease outbreaks through the restarting of surveillance activities to track any potential outbreaks and an immunisation campaign across the whole affected area to protect children against measles, rubella and polio. This is coordinated by the national government, but UN agencies and foreign medical teams provide important support on disease surveillance and often participate in the delivery of immunisation campaigns. Measles is circulating constantly in the Philippines, and after a disaster children living in crowded conditions are particularly vulnerable to developing complications and even dying of the disease. In addition to poor living conditions, there can be large-scale migrations in the aftermath of a major disaster, which are likely to have an impact on immunisation needs. In the first wave of immunisations conducted in the typhoon-affected area, almost 110,000 children were vaccinated against measles, and an expanded catch-up campaign in the National Capital Region in January–February 2014 saw an additional 1.7 million children immunised. In addition, there is an urgent need to get those living with TB and multi-drug resistant TB (MDR-TB) back on treatment to prevent the spread of the disease and increased drug resistance. The typhoon-affected area had an estimated 26,249 TB cases with 356 cases of MDR-TB. By mid-December almost all TB patients were back in treatment services. There is also a need to prevent other communicable diseases such as dengue, which spreads quickly where mosquitoes are able to breed among debris.

Disasters such as Typhoon Haiyan magnify the threat from non-communicable diseases (NCDs) because they disrupt access to and delivery of essential interventions, including

¹ The colours signify different levels of control within a hierarchical framework: gold for strategic, silver for tactical and bronze for operational.

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the presence of bacteriological contamination in a third of the samples collected. There was a clear need for training and skills enhancement of water safety engineers to ensure safe water supplies. WHO has trained 340 sanitary inspectors on water quality management and distributed test kits to nine provinces and two cities.

Mental health needs

In the first few weeks after a disaster it is essential to provide psychosocial first aid, particularly to people who have lost family, homes or livelihoods. However, mental health impacts begin to really show after around six months, when the initial adrenalin rush dies away and morale and energy dip. Responding to mental health needs requires a fourth wave of activity. WHO estimates that, in humanitarian emergencies, the percentage of people suffering from depression or anxiety disorders can double from a baseline of 10% to about 20%, while the percentage of people with severe mental disorders can increase by up to 50%.

A ‘baby boom’

Finally, there is typically a ‘baby boom’ following a disaster. More women become pregnant than previously expected, leading to greater demand for prenatal care and for food and vaccines for children following their birth. This puts additional pressure on health services just as many aid agencies are pulling out. This fifth wave of health needs requires a scaling up of services and a longer-term plan to serve the needs of a growing population.

Strengthen long-term resilience

Given these multiple waves of health needs it is important that health teams do not all rush in at once, but that
assistance is staggered to make sure that people’s needs are met for months – not just weeks – after the disaster. This is a question of coordination and requires the support of donors and aid agency managers. WHO Philippines was particularly grateful to those teams that held back and took over once the initial rush had subsided and others had pulled out. It is important to recognise the work that was done after the TV cameras had gone. Considerable health needs remain more than a year after the typhoon, with implications for the management and funding of the health aspects of the response given that most funding tends to finish within 12 months. Ultimately, there has to be a sixth wave of activity: the transition from recovery to development, with a multi-year plan in place to ensure the full restoration of health services to all those in the affected areas. This requires investment in health planning, information management and capacity-building at all levels.

A final lesson therefore concerns how to strengthen resilience for the future, particularly given the frequency and severity of natural disasters in the Philippines. We know that the health facilities that best withstood the typhoon were often originally built and supported by the community. It is at the level of communities that this resilience has to be forged. To build resilience at local level requires improving the skills of community health workers. First aid training can help ensure that communities are able to assist the injured before national and international teams have reached them. Resilience also needs to be built into the construction and management of health facilities, and WHO has included building plans, design parameters and guidelines for rebuilding health facilities in two photobooks published by the DoH, entitled Rising Anew: Health at the Heart of Healing. These health facilities require a predictable supply of clean water and electricity – services that are sadly lacking even in areas not hit by the typhoon. To improve this situation, local officials need to understand where these services are absent and take charge of rectifying this. WHO Philippines has worked hard with the DoH to map the status of health infrastructure and health services. This process is ongoing and will guide recovery operations.

The Philippines faces multiple natural disasters each year, and to respond to them we need to have the right emergency services and systems in place. The structure created to deal with disasters has to be able to handle multiple waves of health needs over months and, in the case of a disaster on the scale of Haiyan, for years after the event. This requires investment in health planning, information management and capacity-building at all levels. WHO Philippines continues to work with the national government and international partners to ensure the full restoration of health services to all those in typhoon-affected areas.

Dr Julie Hall MBE is the WHO Representative to the Philippines.

Constructing a culture of accountability: lessons from the Philippines
Barb Wigley

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)’s Task Team on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) aims to promote a system-wide ‘culture of accountability’ within humanitarian organisations. A systems approach to AAP – including Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) – should, in theory, increase the impact of individual agency efforts, offer resource efficiencies and provide more coherent and accountable services to the people the system seeks to assist.

The declaration of a Level 3 emergency in the Philippines in late 2013 presented an opportunity to test this theory in practice. Following the declaration, an AAP coordinator was deployed (the first such deployment to a humanitarian response). The coordinator – a World Food Programme (WFP) secondee – arrived just ten days after the typhoon made landfall. After the one-month deployment ended, consultants were brought in to continue the work. Drawing on this experience and learning from the application of AAP in other emergency responses, this article reflects on what counts when trying to build a culture of accountability. The interrelated threads of these reflections can be summarised under three overarching conclusions:

1. Accountability will not happen without the engagement and commitment of those in leadership positions at all levels of the system.
2. Retaining a clear focus on the core mission of this work is critical.
3. Joined-up thinking\(^1\) between cross-cutting issues makes each better.

**Leadership**

Leadership is one of the most critical elements in keeping the agenda and mission on track. Tools and systems alone will not result in effective change without strong and visible commitment from the highest levels. This is the only thing that keeps AAP, PSEA and CwC on the agenda and mission. Leadership is a question of coordination and requires the support and commitment of those in leadership positions at all levels of the system, particularly senior leaders in the sector whose commitment of their leaders to the cause, rather than the specific tools they chose to implement it, that makes it stick. It was senior leaders in the sector that

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\(^1\) Thanks to Patricia Colbert, Senior Gender Advisor at WFP, for this description.
put AAP on the map in the Philippines, and it was faltering leadership commitment and a lack of understanding of the core mission that caused it to struggle from time to time.

The mission
Numerous systems, standards, tools and processes have been developed in recent years to improve the quality of humanitarian aid. It seems, however, that an attraction to the functional and structured language of tools and mechanisms has been accompanied by a drift away from the primary purpose of a culture of accountability that seeks to make accountability to the people we seek to assist ‘the way we do things around here’. The tools and mechanisms have increasingly become an end in themselves rather than a means through which the primary purpose of AAP can be achieved. AAP is about using power responsibly and seeing the people we seek to assist as our equals.\(^2\) AAP should reinforce the right of affected people to receive and have influence over assistance safely and with dignity and choice. Understanding why we are doing AAP should help guide every decision as to what and how we do it, as should remembering that accountability to affected populations has a rights agenda as well as a political and social one. The business process and structured systems approaches used to implement AAP form just some of the means for change, and not the end game.

Somewhere along the way in the struggle to get the humanitarian system on board with new ways of thinking and doing, the tools and the mechanisms have become an ‘as if’ primary purpose, where the ultimate goal is rewritten as if it is the regulation of organisations, having certain processes in place, ticking certain boxes and even mobilising certain technology. Without the foundational underpinning of a consistent dialogue regarding the needs, experience and input of each segment of communities affected by conflict and disaster, these mechanisms can be ineffective, dislocated and even counterproductive. If we put ‘accountability mechanisms’ in place, but fail to ensure that the most vulnerable and marginalised can access them, or if we speak only to those with political and social power, we risk strengthening social exclusion and marginalisation.

In the Philippines, the small team of AAP and Communicating with Communities (CwC) specialists agreed at the outset to find out what typhoon-affected girls, boys, women, men and the elderly had to say about the response. As a start, with the support of the Philippine Information Agency, we spent two days at evacuation centres in Tacloban and Palo, where in small teams we talked to typhoon survivors in groups and on their own, filtered by gender and age. The idea was not to be scientifically or statistically representative, but simply to start a conversation and see what we could learn.

We found that people were cut off from their usual information and communication sources (including television, radio and print media), and that only some people (mostly teenagers) had managed to save their mobile phones. Adult women and men especially found the lack of both general news and specific information about the response a source of additional anguish and requested detailed information about their rights and entitlements.

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\(^2\) This definition comes from the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership.
and agency plans that far exceeded the simple messages the humanitarian community was inclined to transmit to them. Women and men of all ages highlighted their need for telephones and radios, and the means to recharge them, so that they could receive information.

Beyond the basic needs of food, water and temporary shelter, adults said that their highest-priority needs were financial assistance, housing, tools, building materials and livelihoods; children and adolescents wanted more food and to return to school. Adolescents and young adults were more likely than other groups to notice and be concerned by lack of fairness and corruption in distributions, and were also more inclined to be disturbed by exposure to dead bodies. The elderly, both women and men, were particularly distressed by a lack of appropriate undergarments and requested specific attention to their health needs related to ageing and pre-existing conditions.

When asked how we could improve the response, the elderly and young people called for information to be a higher priority, for the specific needs of different groups to be taken into account more in the delivery of aid, and for the most vulnerable to be more clearly targeted. Adolescents and young adults also called for improved dignity, order and transparency in aid distributions.

Simple exercises like these, alongside analysis of feedback received through an Internews radio station, were written up in brief reports and issue papers and disseminated as widely and rapidly as possible as a common service to all agencies. This reinforced the point that the voices and opinions of ordinary people affected by the emergency were as important and as instructive as input from what are usually more privileged, better educated and more powerful ‘key informants’. This approach also demonstrated that, contrary to what an initial review suggested, it is possible, using a small team of AAP, CwC and reports officers, to consult a broad range of people of different ages, genders, abilities, backgrounds and needs from the beginning of an emergency, and without detracting from lifesaving interventions.

Feedback on these initial reports was overwhelmingly positive, and agencies and clusters reported making rapid adjustments to programming based on the information provided. Consultation findings influenced decisions and protocols; UNFPA added radios to their NFI kits for women, FAO incorporated recommendations in their distribution protocols, HelpAge International addressed the lack of underwear for elderly women and men and ActionAid coordinated information and feedback in a way that was informed by the reports. These outcomes suggested that the provision of synthesised feedback from communities could prove a valid centralised way to keep such feedback flowing to all agencies throughout the response.

Overall, the rapid deployment of the team meant that AAP, PSEA and CwC were on the agenda from the very early stages of the response, including at cluster level. The value of having dedicated expertise available to conduct consultations was demonstrated through the extremely positive reception across the humanitarian community to the existence of the role and the information it provided, as did the ongoing demand for input and advice, including from the UN, NGOs and government agencies. For the first time, projects that were either specifically oriented to AAP, CwC and PSEA, or which had strong elements of them, were included in the revised appeal, including proposals for interagency common service projects. Unfortunately, the novelty of this approach meant that initially these projects were not funded by donors, and further lobbying and negotiation were needed to get them off the ground. For example, through the determination and persistence of Plan International, with support from actors such as the IASC Task Team, the community consultation project described above was taken over and developed into the Pamati Kita project (see the following article by Alex Jacobs).

**Linked-up thinking**

While NGOs in particular have been working on improving their accountability to the people they seek to assist, collective efforts in this area have been weak. A joint mission conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), WFP and the global Food Security Cluster to investigate AAP in Pakistan in 2012 found that, even in a setting where more national and international agencies than anywhere else were openly implementing commitments on accountability, very little was happening collectively aside from peer support and a few joint mechanisms.

Added to this tendency for agencies to work alone on accountability is the siloed nature of what are in fact cross-cutting issues. Worthy causes raising the importance of gender, age, accountability, communication and disability find themselves competing against each other for resources and attention. Rather than joining forces constructively and creatively, or being encouraged to do so by donors, the politics and competition between agencies can prove counterproductive. As a result, programme officers become overwhelmed by the requirement to consider each issue separately and to report on growing numbers of disconnected and unrelated indicators.

In the Philippines, as in other settings, through the efforts of the OCHA CwC team and the CDAC Network, it has been demonstrated that addressing the communication, information and connectivity needs of communities is a clear first-line priority in any humanitarian response. The work done together as a team during the first month of the response also showed that the quality of this approach is enhanced by an AAP lens that encourages community involvement at a deeper level, clear problem definition, consideration of cross-cutting issues according to gender, age, diversity and protection, and greater follow through and response to two-way communication. The two together effectively combine technological expertise with social science.

The AAP role allowed for more coherent advocacy around the different needs and experiences of the women, men, girls and boys affected by the disaster. By supporting and linking up gender, GBV, protection, CwC and other cross-cutting issues, AAP coordination reduced the demands on...
the time of humanitarian responders, providing already analysed and processed information which could be immediately used and applied, and a clear framework for the provision of quality services to all segments of affected communities through the application of existing accountability guidance.1

While this experience demonstrates how ‘joined-up’ thinking and action can be achieved through leadership and collaboration at country level, building these links at a global level will be much more challenging. Initiatives and thematic areas that have higher and more established visibility and funding may not be easily persuaded to share their hard-won gains with others, despite the potential that a fresh approach might bring.

Conclusion
The deployment of an AAP coordinator to the Philippines typhoon response highlighted the importance of leadership, retaining focus on the mission rather than just the tools, and ‘joined-up thinking’ and action around cross-cutting issues as things that count in constructing a culture of accountability in humanitarian relief.

Simply put, if we are not thinking about issues such as gender, age, diversity, disability, information, two-way communication and protection as part of a cohesive whole, we cannot claim to be working accountably. AAP is not only about tools, but also a framework for enhancing the way we provide humanitarian relief to the women, men, girls and boys affected by conflict and disaster. It ensures their participation, establishes the means for two-way communication with them and allows them to give us feedback and complain if our aid has brought unwelcome consequences. It also provides a means to coherently advocate on the range of issues that confront the people we seek to assist during an emergency, and ensure that they are our partners in the response, not just the objects of our actions. Ultimately, AAP has to bring together and add value to what is already there, not compete with other issues for attention and funding or contribute to ‘issues fatigue’.

In order to construct a culture of accountability, current attitudes, which see people-related issues as non-essential and encourage competition between issues rather than ‘joined-up’ thinking and action, need to change. While a lot of progress has been made in certain areas, infighting and competition have prevented a more meaningful outcome. While addressing this may present a long-term challenge at the global level, experience from the Philippines suggests that practical collaboration at the local level can produce results.

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Pamati Kita: ‘Let’s Listen Together’
Alex Jacobs

The humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan demonstrated that the concept of accountability to affected people (AAP) is firmly established on the agenda of humanitarian agencies.2 It also showed that agencies could still benefit from better practical ways to achieve it in practice. Within the first month of the response, a number of major initiatives had been launched, including establishing an IASC AAP Coordinator position, building accountability activities into the work plan of the Humanitarian Coordinator and individual agencies deploying specialist staff and developing accountability activities.

The operating context in the Philippines created genuine opportunities for enhancing accountability to affected people. This included factors such as the very high level of mobile phone and social network usage, established and respected barangay structures and agencies’ previous experience of similar disaster responses, albeit on a smaller scale. It is unclear whether these opportunities have been fully realised. A number of obstacles restricted accountability, notably the pressure within agencies to mount large-scale responses in a short time. Other obstacles included limited staff capacity, the effort that agencies had to invest in developing contextually appropriate approaches and tools, the fragmented nature of decision-making across the response and confusion between related sector-wide initiatives, including Accountability to Affected Populations, Preventing Sexual Exploitation & Abuse, Communicating with Communities and the HAP Standard. Drawing on previous experience, Plan International worked with the IASC task force on accountability to initiate a practical response to these issues. This became the Pamati Kita project.

The concept
The Pamati Kita project supports and encourages agencies to use contextually appropriate common tools and services for accountability. A concept note produced in December 2013 identified three categories of common tools and services that humanitarian agencies could use to improve the quality and accountability of their work.2

1 The terminology in this field is disputed and confusing, with considerable overlap between ‘Accountability to Affected Populations’, ‘Communicating with Communities’ (CwC) and other concepts. For simplicity’s sake, this article uses the term ‘Accountability to Affected Populations’.

2 ‘Revised Concept Note: The Pakikinig Initiative. Common Services for Humanitarian Agencies to Improve Accountability Together’, 20 December 2013. This included drafts of the proposed common tools.
1. Common tools

- A common feedback tool designed to generate broad insights into local perceptions of agencies’ work. This would be based on a short set of standard questions to generate a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data on recipients’ experience of aid, some of which could be aggregated.
- A common methodology for community consultations, with a focus on dialogue, while also capturing some qualitative data using standard reporting formats.

2. Common services

- A public information campaign, promoting short, simple summaries of agencies’ major commitments to local communities, along with agencies’ contact details and actions that members of the public can take if agencies fall short of those commitments.
- A joint hotline to allow members of the public to ask questions, lodge complaints and get answers. This would provide a single means for people to address concerns to all participating agencies, through a single phone number and online contact methods.
- Common analysis of feedback data. This would allow each agency to benefit from all the data generated by participating agencies. Agencies would be able to build up a collective picture of the response as a whole, and also compare their feedback to other agencies’.

3. Regular reports

- Based on the combined data of participating agencies, the original concept was that the initiative would publish a regular summary report, about every two months, of what local people were saying about agencies’ work, along with responses from the agencies involved. This was intended to be promoted to a variety of important actors, including the government, donors and local media, in order to enhance transparency and accountability, as well as to support continual improvement and advocacy.

The initiative was designed to generate significant benefits for participating agencies, affected communities and other key actors. Agencies would benefit from cost-effective, best practice tools and services specifically designed to enable them to meet their existing commitments in ways that were relevant to the operating context. This would reduce costs for each agency and for the response as a whole by reducing duplicative efforts to design appropriate tools. In addition, agencies would benefit from the ability to collaborate on implementing the tools (again, potentially reducing costs), and to aggregate their data, which could enable them to understand how their work fits into the bigger picture, and to compare their data in ways that generate insights for continual improvement.

Affected communities would benefit from convenient, consistent and simple ways of communicating with agencies. For instance, a joint hotline could provide community members with a single point of contact for multiple agencies. Community members would no longer need to identify which specific agency to contact for any specific service and how to contact them, reducing confusion.

Local media, government and donors would benefit from a single source of credible reports of community members’ views about the response. Collectively, this would provide important data on the quality of the response, disaggregated by implementing agency. This could inform their decision-making and improve their ability to hold agencies to account, helping to improve quality across the entire response.

The concept note was developed with considerable input from international agencies and specialists in the field. The tools and services were aligned with key international standards, including the Sphere Core Standards and the HAP Standard. This aimed to enhance the tools’ credibility and relevance, and their use for internal management and external accountability processes. The tools were built on established and emerging good practice from leading initiatives across the sector, and were designed to provide accessible, cost-effective and high-quality ways for agencies to meet their existing commitments.³ The approach was designed to enable collaboration, accommodating increasing numbers of agencies during the

³ This includes Keystone’s ‘Constituent Voice: Technical Note’, September 2014, and a wealth of material brought together by HAP, as well as specific agencies’ experience of hotlines.
project’s lifetime rather than relying on resource-intensive and potentially exclusive coordination mechanisms. It was designed to appeal initially to major international agencies, as a pragmatic way of adding value to the response at scale, and also to be relevant and open to national agencies and smaller agencies.

**Initial progress**

The concept note developed into a formal partnership between Plan International, World Vision International and the International Organisation for Migration on an innovative project funded by the UK’s Department for International Development. The project’s name is Pamati Kita, ‘Let’s Listen Together’.

The initial concept was developed further in order to build on relevant work undertaken by the partners and to respond to changes in the operating context. The work has been coordinated with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and its Working Groups on AAP/CwC. These Working Groups have delivered some of the functions originally envisaged for Pamati Kita. For instance, the Community Feedback Forms have consolidated feedback from humanitarian agencies and fed it into the cluster system. Many agencies moved quickly to set up their own hotlines, complemented by independent initiatives such as Radyo Abante, a ‘humanitarian radio station’ that broadcasts programmes on the humanitarian response and invites listeners to phone in and discuss their concerns with agency staff.

The project is currently taking on the leadership of the Working Groups on AAP/CwC in Tacloban, Ormoc and Roxas, as OCHA withdraws. It is promoting a variety of accountability tools and communication materials using media including radio and comics. A training element has been added, to build capacity within humanitarian agencies on accountability and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse. It also aims to build on the IOM’s Community Response Map, an online data platform to track and respond to community feedback. Alongside this, a learning component has been established to document the experience, locate it in the wider context of related efforts in the sector and identify lessons and recommendations for the future.

**Commentary**

This project is based on the concept that, in the early stages of a response, contextually appropriate approaches should be developed to implement international standards, and that these approaches can be used by multiple agencies, reducing costs, enhancing collaboration, improving quality and strengthening accountability. The concept has attracted a high degree of interest. If successful, it may establish practical ways to enhance the quality and accountability of humanitarian response at a sector level. It provides a practical alternative to other approaches, such as certification. It resonates with other wider initiatives in the sector, suggesting that perhaps these are ideas whose time has come.

With the engagement of major agencies and donors, there is potential to develop the approach for implementation in major responses. It could even potentially be extended to other areas, such as Sphere’s technical standards, if suitable leadership for the process of contextualisation can be established. The project is consistent with the emerging Core Humanitarian Standard. It could offer a realistic way of implementing key aspects of the standard and assessing performance in relation to it.

The project has also faced practical challenges. Foremost has been the difficulty of focusing management attention on it during a major humanitarian response, and the familiar issue of staff turnover. There has been some confusion about how the project fits with the established priorities of different actors and initiatives, at cluster level, among donors and among implementing agencies. It has proved harder to retro-fit common approaches across agencies during the response than it would have been to develop them in advance, as part of the preparation for the response. Looking ahead, it appears likely that advance preparation will be crucial in taking the approach further. This would include developing key relationships and intentions, as well as practical tools. It would also include clarifying leadership and complementarity across the various initiatives of AAP, CwC and other overlapping initiatives.

Plan, World Vision and the IOM will publish our experiences of the project by May 2015. We are excited about continuing the pilot and learning from it, and hope that it can contribute to broader efforts to strengthen quality and accountability in the sector.

**Alex Jacobs** is Director of Programme Quality, Plan International.

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4 See http://communityresponsemap.org/haiyan.

Sudden-onset emergencies are typically chaotic, making effective communication between communities, humanitarian responders and governments, whether local or international, challenging.

Building on experience from the response to Typhoon Bopha in Mindanao in 2012, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) supported the coordination of communication with disaster-affected communities following Typhoon Haiyan with the deployment of an interagency Communications with Communities (CwC) Coordinator and other CwC field staff. CwC cross-sectoral working groups were set up in the typhoon-affected area, convening local and international NGOs, UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, media development actors, local media, mobile operators and local government, with the aim of coordinating two-way communication across the humanitarian response.

This article provides a summary of findings from the Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) Network Learning Review on the Typhoon Haiyan response.¹

**CwC coordinator**

Following Typhoon Haiyan, information and communication access was severely impeded for weeks, with very little access to communication channels. Most people were unable to contact their families to tell them they were alive. Government and humanitarian responders also faced significant challenges in sharing lifesaving information with communities. In the immediate aftermath of the typhoon, two emergency humanitarian radio stations were set up by CDAC Network members in Tacloban City and Guiuan, and the government and telecommunications companies set up telephone charging stations and internet points. For the first time, the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, in partnership with Ericsson Response, the Vodafone Foundation Instant Network and GSMA, provided mobile connectivity to affected communities, rather than just humanitarian responders.

As part of the response, OCHA deployed CwC staff to coordinate communications with communities in affected areas. CwC focal points from CDAC Network members and other international and national agencies began coordinating as the typhoon approached landfall, sharing

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existing data on the communication preferences of Filipinos, contact information, project plans and hardware through the CDAC Network’s Field Coordination Community of Practice (CoP).

At field level, OCHA deployed surge staff to support CwC coordination. CwC Technical Working Groups were established in all five operational coordination hubs to provide technical advice to the clusters, and to give agencies a space within which to coordinate on CwC approaches. These groups, co-chaired by the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), OCHA and World Vision International, operated as part of the humanitarian cluster system and worked with the clusters to integrate communication and information within response and recovery planning. They brought together representatives from international organisations, local government, local NGOs, church organisations, media development organisations, local media and telecommunications companies. The knowledge and experience brought to this forum by national partners contributed to the effectiveness of the coordinated communications response, providing cultural context and connections within communities on which to build.

**Factors enabling CwC coordination**

Respondents involved in the Learning Review noted the benefits of coordination, such as avoiding duplication and conflicting information reaching communities, collaboratively addressing community information gaps and ensuring that community feedback was acted on. Respondents felt that sharing project and technical information and open and transparent leadership within the Technical Working Groups created an environment that supported coordination.

Although understanding between local media actors and international humanitarian responders took time to develop, a collaboration between First Response Radio, local journalism network PECOJON International, World Vision International and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), to keep the humanitarian radio station Radyo Abante on the air in Tacloban, was noted as an example of a collective commitment to accountability on behalf of the humanitarian response. Radio also played an important role in psychosocial support and improving connectivity between community members. Radyo Bakdaw (set up by Internews with local journalists) broadcast distribution schedules from organisations operating in the area, including the ICRC and the Philippines Red Cross, so communities knew what relief goods to expect and when, as well as gathering feedback from recipients and forwarding this to humanitarian organisations.

The development of a ‘Community Feedback Form’ (CFF) in an attempt to systematically consolidate community feedback being collected by different agencies was praised as a shared project goal within the technical working groups.

Regular interaction and strong and transparent leadership in the CwC Technical Working Groups addressed and moderated issues of power between agencies. The CwC and AAP Technical Working Groups provided a forum to build a ‘history’ between their members, particularly media actors which may not have previously participated in such forums. Interaction and communication built relationships over time, and gave context to members of the Technical Working Groups on organisational mandates and programming around CwC. In some cases, this led to collaboration over CwC initiatives. Some respondents commented that Technical Working Groups were a ‘seeding ground’ for initiatives now underway in the Iraq response.

Respondents in part attributed the success of coordination to strong brokerage skills by experienced coordinators at the beginning of the response, but also noted that the more remote operational hubs would have benefited from more direct engagement and technical support from CwC/AAP Coordinators during the initial phase of the response.

**Obstacles to CwC coordination**

Obstacles excluding or reducing the participation of agencies in coordination included lack of resourcing for CwC coordination activities (attendance at meetings was cited as a main obstacle for stakeholders outside the coordination hubs) and lack of management understanding of the importance of CwC, which led to a focus on agency mandates over collaborative initiatives. Some respondents also noted that the size of the CwC Technical Working Group in some hubs meant that outcomes were slower to produce, and coordination of joint communication and information needs assessments and monitoring of communication initiatives during the response was not as efficient as it might have been.

Many smaller agencies did not have the staff to attend sometimes weekly or fortnightly coordination meetings. Flexible alternative techniques were established, including coordination and communication via email and phone for agencies located outside humanitarian hubs.

**The future of CwC coordination**

When asked what CwC coordination should look like in future responses, respondents had a variety of answers. Responses were commonly situated on a continuum between ‘CwC coordination as a minimal activity’ (i.e. preventing duplication though coordinated information provision) and ‘CwC coordination as an integrated activity’ as part of an overarching and collaborative strategy for communication with communities, with less focus on organisational or agency objectives. Suggested models and functions of CwC coordination included access to funding to incentivise coordination, particularly in the early stage of response, to reduce competition for funds and to lead to more common CwC projects.

The disbursement of funds directly to actors at field level could address some of the challenges associated with obtaining funding through traditional mechanisms, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Important caveats on how this funding might be administered were noted, including the brokering of funding democratically, with a focus on long-term
Figure 2: The community feedback process

CFF TACLOBAN PROCESS

COMMUNITIES GIVE FEEDBACK TO AGENCIES

FORMAL MECHANISMS
- Focus groups
- Community consultations
- Feedback during distributions
- Post distribution monitoring reports
- Hotline numbers
- Needs assessments
- Feedback boxes in communities
- Household surveys

INFORMAL MECHANISMS
- Discussions with project stakeholders
- Feedback from community leaders
- Drop-in visits to UN/INGO offices
- Spot checks to verify distribution of materials
- Discussions with community members
- Personal interviews
- Interactive radio programs
- After Action Review real time evaluation

Agencies feed responses back to communities

HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES

Agencies consolidate data and complete CFF fortnightly/monthly

OCHA AAP/CwC officers consolidate the data

WG members take feedback and/or answers back to own agency programme teams

Cluster members take feedback and/or answers back to own agency programme teams

Data discussed and prioritised at AAP/CwC working group

Priority points taken to Tacloban Intercluster Coordination Meeting (ICCM)

IF URGENT

IF NECESSARY

National ICCM

Humanitarian Country Team
partnerships. Access to funding could also be improved by modelling the costs of CwC response options, so agencies know how much to budget for effective CwC. This costing is underway within the CDAC Network. Costing of CwC response options, mapping of flexible programme funds within existing networks and establishing funding at field level for coordinators would ensure that funding is available for collaborative or common service projects, and incentivise CwC coordination.

There was a call for an exploration of common service initiatives in the CwC field by some agencies. Many respondents were critical of the lack of collaboration over CwC initiatives that could serve the whole sector, while recognising that their own organisational environments and donor requirements often prevented this collaboration.

Future common service initiatives that could be explored include:

- **Common service logistics for CwC hardware.** Attempts to coordinate the distribution of radio sets were unsuccessful, with duplication in some areas and gaps in others. Radio sets should become a standard part of distribution kits where a need for them is identified.

- **Common service CwC printing services.** Agencies reported problems in access to printed materials such as maps or posters. Printing critical CwC materials and disseminating these for all to use was a useful initiative.

- **Common service database or technology for information management.** Information management between humanitarian actors will improve information flows outwards to communities.

- **Common resource mobilisation efforts for funds for system-wide responses such as hotlines or databases to manage feedback.** Respondents mentioned barriers associated with privacy and confidentiality, as well as concerns that feedback would not be effectively referred or addressed. The ongoing common service project between Plan, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and World Vision aims to address these concerns by increasing accountability to people affected by Typhoon Haiyan through the use of common approaches to participation, information provision, complaints, response and feedback mechanisms and ‘closing the feedback loop’ of follow-up, action and response.

- **Common advocacy initiatives.** Common advocacy initiatives could include developing a common language around CwC, common templates for advocacy strategies and preparedness agreements and developing capacity to generate evidence-based advocacy in CwC coordination.

Donors also have a role to play in supporting implementing agencies to prioritise effective communication with communities in their agency and cluster-specific planning and broader accountability efforts.

Finally, the majority of respondents felt preparedness activities that built on relationships developed through the AAP/CwC Technical Working Groups were crucial. Media agencies in particular emphasised the need to improve understanding between humanitarian agencies and the local media, focusing on each other’s roles in disaster response. Building CwC into the overall National Preparedness Strategy led by OCHA, and integrating it into multi-sector preparedness activities, such as minimum preparedness training and emergency simulation exercises, will hopefully ensure that effective communication is seen as an essential part of future emergency response in the Philippines. Preparedness and advocacy will require closer partnerships with government, clusters, programme staff and communities to ensure that communication interventions are tailored and streamlined to take advantage of the limited CwC funding currently available.

Ultimately, effective coordination and engagement between communities, humanitarian responders and governments, whether local or international, is critical. This will not happen without commitment and the provision of sufficient resources for effective and consistent communication with, and meaningful engagement of, crisis-affected people in their own response and recovery. Links must also be made between humanitarian work and development and preparedness efforts to achieve sustainable solutions. Realisation of effective coordination is dependent on a proactive approach to these issues.

Caroline Austin is an independent consultant. Nicki Bailey is the CDAC Network Research and Learning Officer.
Engaging with clusters: empowering and learning from local organisations

John Tipper

Shortly after Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in November 2013, I was employed as an advisor by a long-standing national NGO based in Cebu city, which in turn worked with a number of community-based organisations in Cebu Island, Bohol Island and the wider Tacloban region. The NGO, which went on to receive close to $1 million in funding for relief activities, wanted professional guidance to ensure that it was applying good principles in its work in the food, non-food, shelter and health sectors. This article is based on observations of the experiences of these local organisations as they attempted to engage with various clusters.

A number of positives can be taken from the NGO’s experience of interacting with the cluster system. Initial online submissions of data to cluster coordinators received prompt and helpful responses, with good guidance for further submissions. The UN flight system UNHAS was used by the NGO and its partners on over 40 occasions, greatly increasing the time available on the ground to work on projects. In the weeks and months following Haiyan the Shelter cluster in particular has been a source of very useful and relevant information as the NGO works on reconstructing over 500 homes. These positive experiences notwithstanding, however, the cluster system in the Philippines largely failed to involve local civil society. This article highlights the multiple problems caused by this failure, and suggests a number of solutions.

Failure to engage with local actors

One of my first tasks as an advisor was to register the national NGO with relevant clusters. However, it was only thanks to my knowledge of the cluster system that engagement was possible – the NGO itself was unaware of this system of aid coordination, and there was scant evidence of clusters proactively engaging non-cluster actors. In one example, in the immediate aftermath of Haiyan a local businessman in Cebu city donated large quantities of foodstuffs to a sizeable inner-city church, for distribution in villages in Northern Cebu. The congregation included a number of truck owners and this, combined with voluntary labour, allowed for the distribution of over 17,000 food packs. Church members were unaware of the existence of the Food Security cluster; had they known about it, their relief efforts would probably not have been duplicated in the days following their distributions. In fact, two or sometimes three distributions were made to the same village by different agencies. Furthermore, the church’s resources, including trucks, drivers and interpreters, could have been made available to newly-arrived international NGOs as the church’s distributions were scaled down.

In addition to engaging with the Food Security and Shelter clusters and the Child Protection working group, I advised the local NGO I was working with to attend Logistics cluster meetings. In later discussions, the Filipina director of the NGO admitted to being intimidated by the meeting environment. As an experienced manager with years of international exposure, she was not daunted by foreign styles of meeting. What was offputting was the overwhelming number of international workers (only one other Filipino in a room of approximately 30 people), the jargon and acronyms being used and the brusque ‘you’re assumed to know what we’re referring to’ style of interaction between the meeting participants. While the director and her colleagues arguably possessed much greater knowledge of the operating environment in the Philippines than almost every newly arrived foreigner in the room, they ended up feeling like ‘poor relations’ (their description). They did not have the agency T-shirts and caps, the VHF radios, the satellite phones and the other trappings of international NGO responders – at that point they did not even have agency ID cards. The overall impression they received from the Logistics cluster meeting – no doubt unintentionally – was that their knowledge was of limited value.
In subsequent operations on Leyte the local NGO enjoyed a considerable level of access to key resources. The senior military commander in Ormoc, a schoolfriend of a volunteer, provided transport between Ormoc and Tacloban; the deputy mayor of Tacloban, a college friend, provided an in-depth description of needs in Tacloban based on reports from his staff and the wider community; and the local chaplain to the Filipino emergency services at Tacloban airport arranged access to Hercules flights between Tacloban and Cebu at a time when UNHAS capacity was stretched. The local NGO would have gladly extended the benefits of these local relationships to international counterparts if they had known the mechanisms for involving them.

One of the most disturbing aspects of the lack of coordination was that, although local community-based organisations were providing accurate information about remote areas where aid had not been received, this information was not being transmitted to the clusters. Had the appropriate cluster been informed, this information could have been disseminated to those members with the resources to help. One of the main criticisms levelled at the response to Haiyan has been that the majority of aid followed the main roads. This is understandable given that newly-arrived NGOs generally had little knowledge of the remotest parts of the affected islands. Several of these neglected areas were not geographically distant from the aid hub in Tacloban, yet went unserved due to lack of knowledge about them. This was only to be expected given the absence of local contacts, exacerbated by poor infrastructure and insecurity, but this information was held by some Tacloban community organisations and could have contributed both to the initial Multi-Agency Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) and to subsequent assessments. Again, however, these local organisations were unaware of the mechanisms for sharing the information they had.

The way forward
In the aftermath of Haiyan the clusters undoubtedly proved very useful in inter-agency coordination and resource sharing among UN agencies and international NGOs. However, to derive even more benefit from the cluster system adaptations are required to allow for the involvement of local actors, many of which are of significant size and have well-developed management and accountability structures – structures which are well-suited to interaction with inter-agency coordination mechanisms.

A significant goal in this process must be to develop a culture of inclusivity within the cluster approach which sees local actors as equally-contributing partners. The cluster system has made progress in bringing international NGOs onto a more level footing with UN agencies; now they need to advocate for the inclusion of local NGOs and community-based organisations in the cluster process.

The key issue here is preparedness. A number of steps need to be taken, beginning with identifying the areas of the world where a disaster is most likely to occur, and where local capacity indicates that a multi-agency international response would be one likely outcome of such a disaster. Subsequently, for each area identified, an assessment should be made of the UN agencies and international NGOs working in the area, requesting that they put forward a list of suggested local organisations that could play a local cluster liaison role. Those local organisations should be familiar with the humanitarian system and possess staff with considerable experience at a managerial level. While the personnel that they second to the clusters need not be natives of the affected area, fluency in the local language would be essential. Above all, they should be in regular touch with the wealth of other local agencies on the ground in their region. The need to identify and include local organisations could be built into the operating guidelines of clusters at a global level and incorporated in terms of reference by individual cluster groups working in an emergency.

This process could be undertaken through consultations between the UN and international NGOs and the local organisations they are in contact with. In the process of consulting to find suitable individuals, an information campaign can simultaneously be conducted informing local NGOs and CBOs of the cluster approach. The twin goals of such a consultation would be to identify suitably skilled cluster liaison personnel in advance and ensure that local organisations are aware of the role of coordination.

Another critical component of any future cluster activation following a disaster must be a greatly improved information campaign notifying local organisations of the presence and purpose of cluster meetings in their area. This should be seen as being of equal priority as, for example, the creation of good-quality maps showing the locations of food distributions. Such maps are useful and play a major role in a response, but if the data which they contain is limited due to lack of input from locally active groups then their value is greatly diminished. Herein lies an example of the culture shift required, moving away from a top-down approach with maps based on data from very limited sources towards a ground-up approach that places a premium on data from a much wider range of sources.

The early engagement of local groups could also allow for the identification of important infrastructure before a crisis strikes, including offices where cluster meetings can be held and local accommodation, such as community halls. This would shift the focus of cluster meetings away from UN camps and expensive hotels to locations more accessible to local groups.

There is also much that international NGOs in an area prone to disaster can do in advance to enhance the capacities of local groups to work effectively following a major catastrophe. In addition to advising local groups of the existence of the clusters and the benefits they can bring to a response, NGOs can raise awareness and provide training on issues that affect a local group’s ability to engage effectively with them, including education on humanitarian principles and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Code of Conduct. This is of particular importance for faith-based groups or organisations that receive significant amounts of local government funding, as many may naturally seek to work exclusively with counterparts.
that share their own religious or political viewpoint. Also of importance would be training local groups on issues including civil–military coordination, do no harm principles, Sphere standards and the value of timely information collection and dissemination.

**Conclusion**

Including local groups in the clusters in the initial days following Typhoon Haiyan would have resulted in information about existing needs and completed distributions by local groups being submitted earlier, and locally available assets such as vehicles, local accommodation and translators being made available to international NGOs quickly and at much less cost. This in turn would have greatly increased coverage and improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the response. It is hoped that the proposals outlined above will generate discussion on ways to ensure greater involvement of knowledgeable local groups in future emergencies.

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**Humanitarian partnerships: reality lags behind the rhetoric**

Anne Street

Just over a year after Typhoon Haiyan devastated parts of the Philippines important lessons need to be learnt about how international actors partner and work with national organisations. The Philippines has considerably more local and national capacity to manage disaster response than many countries in the region. It also has a great deal of experience in dealing with disasters. Despite this, the scale and nature of the typhoon, and the storm surge it triggered, was initially overwhelming. In the weeks that followed, however, local and national humanitarian actors were also undermined by the international response. Despite being some of the earliest to respond to the emergency, many Filipino organisations faced huge challenges in delivering assistance. One national NGO, ECOWEB, noted: 'We were able to mobilize some funding but it was not enough. We approached some big INGOs but they chose not to fund us. It took some time before we were able to raise enough funds to cover the transport of goods. However, nobody would fund us for the community organising and the cost of distribution that would ensure participation and reach to isolated communities'. Speaking at an ECOSOC Humanitarian Affairs Segment Side Event meeting in New York in June 2014, Nannette Antequisa, the Director of ECOWEB, neatly summed up some of the challenges that local organisations faced in delivering humanitarian aid after Typhoon Haiyan:

Our long term partner, CREST Malaysia, and a new partner, Foodbank Singapore, were among those who immediately responded. However, although we had the relief goods, our first problem was where to store the goods. Fortunately we had connections in Cebu and a local businessman offered his warehouse at much reduced cost. Our next problem was how to distribute the goods so they could reach communities in the islands affected. We tapped the logistics support from the UN and government but it was not easy and caused much delay to our distribution.

Nanette was speaking at an event to launch Missed Again: Making Space for Partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan Response, a study commissioned by a group of five NGOs, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Action Aid and Tearfund, to assess the extent of partnership working in the aftermath of the typhoon. The research followed an earlier desk-based study, Missed Opportunities, which focused on the effectiveness of humanitarian partnerships in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Horn of Africa, Haiti and Pakistan. The Missed Again study sought to answer two questions: first, how has partnership increased

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the effectiveness of the humanitarian response?; and second, in what ways have national actors (government and national NGOs) been involved in the international humanitarian response in the Philippines?

Using the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, connectedness, effectiveness and coverage, the study found that humanitarian partnership can strengthen the contextual relevance of assistance, that partnerships can offer efficiencies and enable a more connected response, offering greater sustainability, and can deliver effective assistance. Against this, the findings also revealed limitations in the capacity of national NGOs which made it difficult to scale up partnerships.

The scale of the destruction caused by Haiyan challenged the response capacities of humanitarian actors in all parts of the system, from UN agencies, national and international NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement to the humanitarian donors that fund them. Many Filipino NGOs operational in the affected areas, as well as government capacity from barangay village level upwards, were hard hit, losing staff, family members, assets and infrastructure.

Pre-existing humanitarian networks played an important role in enabling member organisations to initiate joint approaches. Supported by Oxfam, the Humanitarian Response Consortium, formed a number of years prior to Haiyan, brought together five national NGOs with complementary specialisms and strategic operations across all three major island groups in the Philippines. When Haiyan struck, Oxfam immediately linked up with one of the consortium members, A Single Drop of Water (ASDW), undertaking a joint needs assessment in the Tacloban area, and four days later had started a response. Drawing on Oxfam’s logistical experience and financial resources and ASDW’s knowledge of the Philippines water sector, the agencies identified the Leyte Metropolitan Water District as a partner, and were able to put in the necessary resources to enable staff to get back to work and re-establish services. Christian Aid supported nationwide disaster preparedness and response capacity across both development and humanitarian partners (CARRAT), which was able to rapidly initiate a response programme in the affected area. Although both networks relied to a large extent on international NGO funding for their work prior to Typhoon Haiyan, they approached the arrangement as a partnership, rather than a sub-contracting relationship.

Although national NGOs were among the earliest responders to the typhoon, as the response rolled out they played a relatively minor role compared to international NGOs, which generally had far greater access to funding and better logistics capacity, enabling them to work at significant scale. As a result the response was largely internationally led, coordinated and implemented. In many cases international NGOs de-prioritised partnerships, particularly in the initial months of the response, and assistance delivered through partnerships was modest compared to assistance directly delivered by international NGOs. A large number of Filipino NGOs either had to draw on their own limited resources and fundraise however they could, or had to wait for funding to trickle down the aid chain.

The Missed Again research found that affected communities in Leyte and Cebu related differently to international NGOs than national ones. They used the word ‘help’ to describe the support of international NGOs, but national organisations were described as ‘muiban namo’ (‘to journey with us’), signifying that a relationship is built up over time and is about more than just giving aid. In Visayas, several national NGOs interviewed considered that one of the key reasons for limited national capacity was that international organisations had done little to support capacity development or strengthen partnerships for response prior to November 2013.

Whilst the research identified some positive examples of good partnerships, overall it is clear that international NGOs and the wider humanitarian sector need to do a lot more. Greater investment is needed to support Filipino NGOs to build their capacity and increase preparedness for future emergencies. Donors also need to increase their direct funding for national capacity development and support national coordination mechanisms and strengthen the capacity of local government and civil society in the Philippines to respond. They need to ensure that timely funds are available directly to national organisations, both government and non-government, to enable them to respond at greater scale.

With the scale and frequency of disasters expected to increase globally, what President Benigno Aquino has called the ‘new normal’, the research raises important questions about the ability of partnerships to respond at scale to mega-disasters. If the international system is to meet its aspiration to place national actors at the centre of humanitarian response it still has a long way to go. The challenge for the international humanitarian system in the run-up to the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 is to see contexts like the Philippines as places where the system must make real its aspirations to cede power and resources to affected people and national organisations. If emergency response cannot be locally and nationally led in the Philippines – a middle-income country with a strong civil society and a capable government – can it happen anywhere?

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Recently noticed’ aid actors: MSF’s interaction with a changing humanitarian landscape

Michiel Hofman and Sandrine Tiller

In an attempt to better understand the new aid landscape, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) conducted three studies to see how MSF field teams interact with ‘new’ aid actors, and how decisions on these relations were made. Three countries where MSF was involved in emergency response in 2013 were selected: Mali, Syria and the Philippines. Actors encountered during these studies included international NGOs from the Middle East and Asia, non-European Red Cross and Red Crescent societies working internationally, diaspora groups, regional organisations, governmental agencies, local NGOs and private sector organisations.

Mali

Following the resumption of a rebellion in 2012 and a military coup in Bamako, Mali has been beset by one of the worst crises in its history. In January 2013 the former colonial power, France, launched a military intervention aided by African troops to tackle armed opposition groups in northern Mali. In a country where aid actors had been engaged in development work for most of the past 40 years, events in 2012 completely transformed the nature and landscape of assistance.

The security context forced traditional aid actors to limit the presence of mainly Western (white) expatriates. This gap was partially filled by regional Red Crescent societies engaging in Mali for the first time, whilst ‘non-traditional’ donors such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the African Union offered funding to Islamic NGOs willing to work in the country. Some Red Crescent Societies were quick to respond in Gao, but were mistrusted by local people and also by the traditional aid system, which suspected that their presence was linked to the agendas of their governments.

With international organisations absent on the ground, local actors took a prominent role in providing health care. Many chose to operate outside the aid system because of a deep mistrust of the United Nations. This was in part a reflection of the longstanding tensions between Bamako and the north, with the United Nations seen as representing the interests of the central government. Another factor was the UN cluster system, which was regarded as inefficient and unnecessarily substituting for the existing state-run and local coordination mechanisms that have linked local organisations with each other for decades. Some local organisations were created in response to the crisis; others predated it.

Relations between MSF and these ‘new’ aid actors were mixed. MSF teams in Gao, where the biggest Red Crescent Society was based, decided to adopt a ‘no contact’ policy because of rumours about its political allegiance; meanwhile 100 miles down the road in Niger another MSF team had developed a close working relationship with the same Red Crescent Society in a refugee camp. Relations with local Malian organisations were erratic: with some groups a close collaboration was established, whilst with others relations were strained as MSF was perceived to be dominated by patronising staff who did not understand local sensibilities. According to a representative of a Malian civil society platform, interviewed in Bamako: ‘MSF is not very open to locals ... This is a very French culture. The Americans, British and Dutch do not operate the same way, they work in partnership. The French are very paternalistic. This attitude must be abandoned’. As a result, delivery of medical assistance was uneven. MSF had little impact on secondary care in Gao, whereas in Timbuktu, where good relations were established with local actors long before the crisis, MSF was able to provide good support to the hospital.

The Philippines

Typhoon Haiyan tore through the central islands of the Philippines on 8 November 2013, causing widespread destruction and leaving 6,201 people dead and 28,000 injured. The main needs following the disaster were shelter and livelihoods. The Philippines government has extensive experience in responding to disasters and created an enabling environment for international assistance, with proactive government departments and a very easy entry system – the One-Stop-Shop – at Cebu and Manila airports which covered registration formalities in one step.

The UN categorised the typhoon as a ‘Level 3’ emergency, and injected huge numbers of staff and goods into the response. However, the aid effort was top-heavy, with too few staff in operational roles and too many in Manila. The UN Cluster system worked in some ways in parallel with – and possibly overwhelmed – national coordination mechanisms and was not very effective. Logistics was key to the success of the operation; only the most experienced humanitarian operators were active in the first weeks of the response, and military assets from 29 countries played a crucial role.

Although many actors responded, the majority were too small or arrived too late. Many ‘new actors’ arrived unprepared or with inexperienced teams. Many large agencies from the traditional system were very slow to mount operations despite already being present in the country, and despite having raised large sums of money earmarked for the disaster. Some took time to shift from development to emergency response, and others had to renegotiate partnerships with local actors.

The private sector in the Philippines was heavily involved, raising money and sending teams to carry out relief activities and repair infrastructure. Others combined relief with business continuity, for example by restocking small shopkeepers with key items such as fridges and shelving,
and local mobile phone companies re-established connectivity. Many religious organisations also responded to the crisis, predominantly Christian, but also some Muslim and Buddhist groups. These organisations carried out a wide range of activities, from medical care to agricultural support. They played an important role in the distribution of relief items to the most vulnerable, and provided pastoral care to distressed or bereaved families. By and large these organisations worked through their own coordination mechanisms organised by the churches, in part because of distrust of local and national government. Only the larger international religious NGOs participated in the cluster system.

MSF ran a massive operation, spending €17.6 million within about seven weeks, and deploying 171 expatriates providing medical care, shelter and water and sanitation services. Although a wide range of actors were involved in the response, MSF’s interaction with them was entirely pragmatic and based on operational need. MSF invested in relations with national government departments through a dedicated position in Manila. This paid significant dividends, both practically in terms of facilitating the response, but also in terms of MSF’s longer-term relations with the Philippines government. With local actors, MSF’s interaction was entirely practical – loan of a digger by a local company, assessments with the local municipality, joint health messaging – and effective. There was virtually no structured interaction with the private sector or with church-led groups, which meant that MSF may have missed important opportunities to improve community relations and deepen understanding of the wider context. A more strategic approach that looks beyond the traditional sector may pay off in the long term as national capacity grows stronger in countries like the Philippines.

**Syria**

The way in which the war in Syria has been fought – and the regional geopolitical dynamics that frame it – has resulted in a polarised aid environment: either aid is provided officially through Damascus, and subject to a series of administrative and bureaucratic procedures, or it is provided directly into opposition-controlled areas without the consent of the Syrian government. The two modes of delivery are entirely dependent on one or the other party to the conflict and are incorporated into their military tactics and strategies. Although some ‘official’ aid crossed frontlines from Damascus (half of the World Food Programme (WFP)’s food convoys in 2013, for example), in areas controlled by the opposition or under siege aid is provided through armed opposition groups, informal networks of activists, regional organisations, solidarity networks and newly formed foundations.

Many of the estimated 1,000 armed opposition groups include service delivery as part of their activities. In some cases this comes with the responsibility for controlling an area, and in others there is a clear programme to build administrative structures and engage in state-building. The aid environment in opposition-held areas is plagued by the same tensions at work in Syria as a whole: factionalism, sectarianism and a deep divide between internal and external actors. The traditional aid community has relied on old models of accountability and contractual...
arrangements that are not suitable and are potentially compromising. The result has been a growing gap between the provision of funds and the delivery of services, with multiple layers of bureaucracy either slowing down or obstructing any adequate response.

MSF began negotiating for an official presence in Damascus soon after the uprising began, but when this failed the agency established support programmes from across the Lebanese and Turkish borders. Operational alliances were created with independent relief activists who supported MSF in smuggling medical supplies into areas under the control of the opposition, under siege or in government hands. Initially, teams took a cautious approach, focusing on one network, but then realised that this group had exploited MSF's support for political purposes. This was later addressed through a more extensive networking process and more diversified contacts. Medical support was provided to local medical staff with whom a relationship of trust had been established through consistent delivery and discretion around their identities.

Many of the organisations interviewed saw MSF as arrogant and reliant on expatriates, and regarded its medical standards and protocols as below the quality expected by both patients and local health professionals. However, they also acknowledged MSF's flexibility in other areas and its capacity to innovate and work outside the usual aid modalities.

Conclusion
These case studies show that MSF is interacting with a variety of ‘new’ aid actors, and in some cases, such as Syria, is dependent on them. This choice is pragmatic and practical. Some of these groups may have political links, but this has not prevented MSF from engaging with them as long as operational alliances are based on clear criteria and are responding to needs. However, MSF is inconsistent in its dealings with ‘new’ actors and can be perceived as arrogant. The agency has a natural bias towards familiar, traditional aid actors and little understanding of who these ‘new’ actors are or how to work with them. This has led to very contradictory levels of collaboration regionally or even locally, leaving the ‘new’ aid actors very confused about MSF's identity. MSF would benefit from investing in a better understanding of, and a more open attitude towards, these ‘new’ actors, many of which have been around for years, but have only recently been noticed by MSF and others as access has become more difficult for the traditional aid system.

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Are cash transfers the ‘new normal’ in the Philippines? Challenges and opportunities from Typhoon Haiyan

Alesh Brown

As Typhoon Haiyan made landfall on 8 November 2013, aid agencies and donors alike realised that, if ever there were an environment where cash transfers would be appropriate, it was the Philippines. Some 16 million people were affected; 1.1m houses were damaged or destroyed, 4.1m people were displaced and around 6,200 lost their lives. In response, at least 45 international humanitarian agencies implemented cash transfer programmes in one of the most sophisticated humanitarian cash interventions to date. This article reflects on the author’s experience of delivering cash in the Philippines and draws out some key observations, challenges and opportunities for moving forward.

The cash response
At an estimated $338m, equivalent to roughly 40% of the response, the cash transfers following Haiyan constitute one of the world’s largest humanitarian cash-based interventions.¹ According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking System, three-quarters of transfers were conditional, restricting expenditure to a set range of items or asking recipients to participate in training or some other specified activity (e.g. cash for work). The remainder was given as unconditional transfers, without requirements. About 60% of the conditional cash transfers were to support livelihood rehabilitation, primarily through cash for work. Table 1 describes some of the cash transfer modalities deployed in the Philippines.

Targeting
As in most emergencies, targeting was an issue in the absence of more in-depth assessments and better baseline data. Although efforts were made to standardise targeting criteria, agencies often used different conditions – e.g. female-headed households, having partially or fully damaged houses and being registered with the government 4P’s social safety net.²

While publishing inclusion/exclusion criteria on public billboards helped to improve transparency, some communities argued that using standardised indicators failed to reflect the nuances of debt and vulnerability. For example, one community member noted that she was not selected because she had used credit to buy fish cages before the emergency, and as such was seen as less ‘vulnerable’ than her neighbour who did not have the same assets. During the emergency she lost her boat, could no longer fish

¹ This figure does not include the substantial cash contribution made by remittances, the private sector and government and civil society organisations.

² The Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino conditional cash transfer programme.
Table 1: Types of humanitarian cash transfer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Primary objective</th>
<th>Secondary objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unconditional cash grant</td>
<td>Providing people with cash without conditions</td>
<td>• To help restore purchasing power of affected communities and enable them to prioritise their own needs at the household level</td>
<td>• To support market recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash for work</td>
<td>Employing/paying people in exchange for their participation in works of public, private and/or individual utility. Payment is usually pegged to local daily wage rates.</td>
<td>• Early onset: To provide immediate income and restore purchasing power</td>
<td>• To support market/labour force recovery, community cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional grant</td>
<td>Providing cash with conditions, such as participating in hygiene training, school enrolment</td>
<td>• To meet immediate consumption needs of affected families</td>
<td>• To support market recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash or commodity voucher</td>
<td>Restricting expenditure to one or more goods or services in order to meet a specified need/outcome</td>
<td>• To meet immediate needs for specific products/services (e.g. shelter tools, CGI sheets and other materials, or services) • To improve the quality of humanitarian assistance to crisis-affected people by ensuring cash/voucher links them to durable goods/services (set by SPHERE standards)</td>
<td>• To support market recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid: grant + loan (microfinance)</td>
<td>A grant mixed with a loan which needs to be repaid. The grant component can be conditional or unconditional</td>
<td>To meet immediate consumption needs</td>
<td>• To promote responsibility and ownership over expenditure/payback • Promote savings • Increase coverage (the number of people targeted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community grant/loan</td>
<td>Providing cash to more than one person. This can be deployed in both conditional or unconditional format, as a grant, loan or combination</td>
<td>Restore production, income and/or employment</td>
<td>Build cohesion via shared ownership over activities and/or loan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and was incurring increasing debts, raising questions about how to include debt in targeting frameworks. To overcome this, some agencies implemented blanket cash for work programmes, offering everyone the opportunity to participate. While this helped in overcoming targeting errors, some businesses complained that they lost employees and were no longer able to source labour due to the impact of the programme on a small island economy.

Payment
The Philippines probably has one of the most developed and efficient mobile cash transfer systems in the world. Yet hand-to-hand payments, either directly by aid agencies or through remittance companies, were often the first choice, with organisations such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) piloting more sophisticated e-payment systems some four to 12 months into the response.3 While remittance companies were fast, had good coverage and were flexible in terms of ‘know your customer’ ID requirements to verify the identity of their clients, their ability to scale up was restricted by each office’s processing capacity and cash-out liquidity (the ability of customers to access physical cash or buy goods using an electronic payment) – both of which were put under pressure as multiple agencies used the same provider. Similarly, although electronic payments (e.g. mobile payments) offered real-time reporting and reconciliation, a lack of under-

3 UNDP provided beneficiaries with a mobile phone, a SIM card with PhP30 airtime load and a Landbank ATM cash card, the idea being that people could cash out using both the mobile phone and pre-paid ATM card.
standing about available services, patchy cellular coverage and questions over cash-out liquidity slowed uptake. As such, cash in hand, either directly or through a third party, was often the most popular mechanism, with more sophisticated electronic systems introduced as the infrastructure became more reliable and better understood.

Cash for work policies
Filipino legislation requires any public work programme, including cash for work, to follow laws on labour rights and conditions of employment, namely accident and health insurance, tetanus vaccinations and a contribution to the Social Security Service (SSS). Although on paper these carried logical benefits, some questioned whether households would pay their SSS contributions given that they only receive SSS benefits after one year’s payments have been made. Similarly, when added up, the cost of insurance, vaccinations and SSS contributions could account for between 20% and 40% of the value of the transfer, depending on the wage rate and number of days employed. As a result, the Inter-Cluster

Table 2: Cash for work guidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Wage rate</th>
<th>Work activity</th>
<th>Mandatory requirements</th>
<th>Optional requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash for asset recovery</td>
<td>Minimum 5 days</td>
<td>100% of minimum wage</td>
<td>Light debris clearance and reconstruction of personal property</td>
<td>Provision of protective gear Safety training Monitoring of work conditions</td>
<td>Tetanus vaccinations Accident insurance Communication with nearest health clinics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency employment through cash for work</td>
<td>Minimum 15 days</td>
<td>100% of minimum wage</td>
<td>Light and heavy work to restore public infrastructure and spaces, creating immediate income and social protection</td>
<td>All the above plus: Tetanus vaccinations Enrolment in the Social Security System (SSS) if engaged for 6 months or more Accident insurance Health workers on site</td>
<td>Provision of health insurance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Coordination Group worked with the government to update policies, dividing optional and mandatory requirements by work type (see Table 2). While this helped to install minimum conditions of employment in terms of protection and insurance, further research is needed to understand the costs and benefits of transferring money directly versus through the government social security service.

Wage distortion
From the outset, the government set cash for work rates at 100% of the minimum wage, rather than below it, in order to encourage self-targeting. As noted, some government and private sector employees participated in cash for work projects, rather than resuming their normal jobs, either because their employer paid below the minimum wage or the work was seen as easier than their current job. Similarly, skilled labourers such as carpenters undertaking boat repair complained that aid agencies were inflating costs for labour and goods, and unskilled cash for work employees were being paid the same or sometimes more than skilled labour. While some communities argued that the cash injection helped, others suggested that the increase in income was cancelled out by inflated prices for goods and services – especially for people not participating in the programme, who were asking how long it would take prices to settle back to their pre-emergency levels.

Conclusion
Cash is both a product and a driver of change, pushing the sector to envisage a system that is radically different. Rather than delivering physical goods, aid agencies are engaging with local economies, banks and mobile companies to deliver cash. They are trying to pay households the same amount, follow common targeting criteria and in some cases help link recipients to longer-term development projects – all in the midst of an emergency response. As such, the move to cash and market-based programming signifies a significant shift in the way aid works by uniting multiple actors to meet multiple objectives.

Recommendations
1. Implement a SWOT analysis to understand the strengths and weaknesses of using the 4Ps Social Safety Net to deliver and coordinate cash transfers in the next emergency. Covering 3.93m households, the safety net aims to provide a modest but stable source of income for the poorest families. Until now, there has been very little experience of or experimentation with using social protection programmes in the Philippines for emergency response. Further research is needed to understand the costs and benefits of delivering cash directly versus using the government’s protection system.
2. Identify opportunities to expand cash for work programmes to restore and improve pre-emergency employment. To date, the majority of cash for work programmes have focused on debris removal, managed by individual aid agencies. Where possible, cash for work programmes should be used to re-employ people in their previous employment, leveraging the capital injection to meet consumption needs and improve wage rates and job security for the target population.
3. Develop shared contingency plans with financial service providers. Digital delivery systems are one of the most transparent ways of making financial transfers and help root out leakage and corruption. Similarly, working in consortia offers opportunities to negotiate lower fees, develop common standards and streamline coordination through the use of common payment lists.
4. Pilot new payment models. Where appropriate, try out new models for transferring cash. For example, www.worldremit.com is what is known as a ‘Wholesale FSP’, which can deliver cash to multiple countries through its various partners. Such organisations often have more nuanced knowledge of issues such as regulation, compliance and coverage, and could help agencies to understand the risks and opportunities associated with different payment mechanisms. Similarly, working through one provider could reduce transfer costs and improve coordination by using common payment lists.
5. Develop an online marketplace (website) to compare and coordinate payments. Delivering cash can be complex because there are multiple types of modality, financing and channels of delivery. As a result, many aid workers commented on the usefulness of a report documenting the locations, services and requirements associated with different payment mechanisms in the Philippines. Such a model could be expanded by developing a website (online marketplace) where aid workers can compare different payment options. Such a platform could be extended into a shared payment and monitoring system using digital payments and shared service models to coordinate and reduce transfer costs.
6. Cash coordination. Fitting cash into the current UN coordination system is complex as the can be given for one purpose but spent on another. As a result, project managers have problems creating indicators, as they often don’t know what the cash is spent on. Diagram 2 below presents a modification to the current cluster model, the main difference being the creation of a shared needs and market assessment unit that works across clusters to calculate needs and convert this into the local monetary equivalent. Distributions can then be tracked through a shared payment system/database or through an online coordination system which allow users to register the location, modalities and amounts of cash/assets being transferred, providing a composite picture about the distribution of resources and associated gaps.

Alesh Brown is director of aptinfo (www.apt-info.org).
Figure 1: Proposed cash coordination model

Donors put cash into a common pool for a shared humanitarian safety net

Humanitarian Coordinator

Inter-Cluster Coordinator

Demand analysis
Multi-Sectorial Needs Assessment and Registration Unit

Supply analysis
Multi-Sectoral Market Assessment Unit

Food security
Early recovery
Shelter plus NFI
Health
Education
Protection
WASH

Cash Champion
Cash Champion
Cash Champion
Cash Champion
Cash Champion
Cash Champion
Cash Champion

Cash transfers packages designed to meet multi-sectoral consumption needs, then restore production, income and employment

NGO Area A
NGO Area B
NGO Area C
NGO Area D
NGO Area E

Shared registration, Payment, Tracking and Coordination System

Affected population

4 Figure 1 has been developed from http://www.urd.org/Review-of-coordination-mechanisms.
The private sector: stepping up

Serena Brown, KPMG International

The private sector response to Typhoon Haiyan was more sophisticated than for any preceding natural disaster. It responded at scale, with a wide array of resources and expertise, mainly in close collaboration with the government and traditional humanitarian actors (civil society, the Red Cross and the United Nations). Most companies responded out of a sense of shared humanity: Filipinos often expressed this as the spirit of ‘Bayanihan’ (mutual cooperation for the common good). Although most large companies had limited direct economic exposure to affected low-income island communities, companies present in the Philippines know that their employees, customers and the government expect them to assist in the event of a major natural disaster. For foreign investor companies ‘it shows how we feel about the country we want to invest in; that we respect it. You cannot drive investment where you only have commercial benefits; you need to employ people and gain support from local authorities’.1

This article draws on interviews with over 30 representatives from the private sector, civil society, the UN, the IFRC/Philippines Red Cross and the government of the Philippines. The interviews probed private sector alignment with the OCHA-WEF ‘Guiding Principles for Public-Private Collaboration for Humanitarian Action’ and contributions to the five pillars of the ‘Hyogo Framework for Action on Disaster Risk Reduction’.2

Quicker, bigger and better

The private sector made the humanitarian response quicker, bigger and more effective. Companies with local presence were often the first responders, leveraging their networks, people, assets and products. They donated relief items (for example water, food, tarpaulins, water filters, solar torches, blankets, clothes, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and hygiene items), logistics (vehicles, air and sea freight, warehouses), services (including communications, passenger flights, port services), expertise (such as project management, financial and logistics surge capacity) and volunteers for packing, distribution and rapid assessments.

After the early relief phase, one of the primary contributions of the private sector was to revive distribution chains for essential items, reduce predatory pricing (many prices increased between four and ten times their pre-typhoon levels) and rebuild livelihoods.3 For example, Coca-Cola provided 15,000 Sari Sari store (small convenience store) owners with temporary structures, and together with Procter & Gamble it partnered with USAID to rebuild (with permanent structures, sometimes including a small dwelling), and to restock 1,000 Sari Sari stores and train their owners. According to Adel Tamano, Vice President for Public Affairs and Communications at Coca-Cola: ‘One of our core tenets is that sustainability is part of everything we do so we are moving away from a philanthropic model … We don’t see a conflict that our support for Sari-Sari stores helps our business and also has a humanitarian purpose’.

The private sector also made substantial contributions to recovery and reconstruction in the form of financial donations from companies, corporate foundations and employee giving campaigns, and donations of products and expertise. These resources have been channelled into repairing and constructing houses, schools, healthcare facilities and other infrastructure, as well as helping people to recover and diversify their livelihoods.

Companies also provided financing for relief and recovery through payment of insured losses. Given low insurance penetration in the Philippines (ranked 65 out of 88 countries by Swiss Re in 2013), insured losses were estimated at $1.5 billion, including losses from public infrastructure insurance, compared to estimated total losses of around $13bn. Insurance thus comprised a small, though important, proportion of disaster loss financing. Some microinsurers were able to settle claims promptly, starting within three days of the typhoon, by using their grassroots networks, easing documentation requirements and, for the first time, using satellite imagery and crisis maps for damage assessments. However, in most cases claims payments took longer than normal because staff and infrastructure had been affected by the typhoon. It also proved difficult to locate displaced people and identify the missing.

In addition, companies used their networks and customer base to increase giving from third parties. In the UK, for example, the airline easyJet asked passengers to donate on flights; mobile network providers EE, Orange and T-Mobile texted customers to ask them to donate £5 to UNICEF; and UK retail store H&M asked people visiting its 200 stores to donate spare change into buckets at tills. Technology also proved to be a key enabler. Facebook’s News Feed and Twitter’s home timeline (together accessed by 1.5 billion users every month) launched a banner campaign encouraging people to click and donate. The Yahoo-owned Tumblr and Apple’s iTunes ran similar campaigns. BT’s MyDonate technology platform powered and securely processed donations raised through the UK’s Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), and BskyB’s interactive giving facility enabled viewers to use the interactive ‘red’ button to donate.

Locally led, rehearsed and coordinated

Three critical success factors stand out. First, as a middle-income country with an active private sector, Filipino companies – together with the Philippines arms of international businesses – led the private sector response. These companies understand the local context,
they have established relationships with local government and civil society and they were able to quickly deploy local resources. For example, 90% of the pro bono personnel deployed by the Logistics Emergency Teams were Filipino.

Second, the frequency of natural disasters in the Philippines has given the local private sector plenty of practice in responding. There is a conducive legal framework, and over recent years companies have refined their approach to disaster risk management, complemented by other actors improving the ways in which they leverage private sector support. This created the foundation for a strong and proficient private sector response when Typhoon Haiyan struck. Companies activated tried and tested protocols, collaborating with NGOs that had already earned their trust.

Third, the private sector response was generally well coordinated with the government and other humanitarian actors. Coordination mechanisms included bilateral relationships between companies and government ministries at national, provincial and local levels; private sector platforms; and the humanitarian cluster system (Typhoon Haiyan was the first disaster where OCHA and the UN Global Compact deployed private sector focal points to help inform and coordinate the private sector response).4 To help coordinate private sector rehabilitation efforts, the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) is taking the novel approach of securing a private sector sponsor for each of 24 Areas of Intervention and Development: ‘The sponsor adopts an area and becomes an overall shepherd to make sure rehabilitation in that area is in accordance with the building back better approach under the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP), working with OPARR, the local governments and other private sector donors and partners in that area’.5

The power of platforms

The Philippines has several well developed private sector platforms/consortia. These platforms galvanise private sector resources for disaster management, improve the quality of preparedness and response, cluster activities for greater impact, and coordinate with the government and other humanitarian actors. A few examples are particularly noteworthy, although the range of their activities is far wider than can be discussed here. The Philippines Disaster Recovery Foundation funded relief and rehabilitation activities, and acted as the main national coordinator of private sector efforts and link to the government. The Philippines Business for Social Progress (PBSP) foundation, which is supported by 250 private companies, identified north-ern Cebu as a priority; under its Project ‘New Dawn’, it designed five major social investment programmes including health and school infrastructure, disaster risk reduction training and mangrove protection. The Corporate Network for Disaster Reduction has a flagship project, Noah’s Ark, which develops government capacity through a series of seminars and workshops including risk assessments, emergency procedures and evacuation drills.

Several Chambers of Commerce also secured and coordinated private sector support. For example, the Cebu Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which has a permanent disaster committee in its External Affairs Division, led local private–public coordination of relief efforts and (amongst other things) provided logistical support to the development of Cebu Mactan Airport as an international hub for relief flights. The French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Philippines established ‘France–Philippines United Action’ as a taskforce to coordinate and cluster the activities of French businesses; it evaluated and selected projects to support, led engagement with other stakeholders and developed collective communications. The Philippines Chamber of Commerce and Industry launched the Eastern Visayas Business Recovery Center, in partnership with the Department of the Interior and Local Government, to increase the viability of businesses affected by the typhoon.

The potential of global industry associations was clearly demonstrated by the GSMA (which represents the interests of 800 mobile operators around the world) and the Global VSAT Forum (which represents the interests of SatCom companies around the world). Both have established a


5 Interview with Atty. Karen Jimeno, Director for Communications, OPARR, 18 August 2014.
Disaster Response Programme and are Observer Members of the UN Emergency Telecommunications Cluster. GSMA supported Filipino mobile operators with preparedness in advance of Typhoon Haiyan, and was well positioned to deploy a representative to act as a link for mobile operators in the typhoon’s aftermath, collating, synthesising and sharing information on network availability and other services (e.g. mobile money) with humanitarian actors, and aggregating and coordinating NGO, UN and government requests for support.

Opportunity knocking?
Many leading companies now integrate social and environmental considerations into their core business, rather than viewing them as the preserve of a Corporate Social Responsibility department. Increasingly, companies are catching on to the ‘shared value’ opportunity: i.e. they are seeking to create economic value by creating societal value. However, when it comes to natural disasters the large majority of companies are still thinking only in terms of philanthropy (i.e. donations of funds, goods and services) and business continuity. The next opportunity is to re-imagine products and markets for a world characterised by escalating disaster risk. As Butch Meily, President of the Philippines Disaster Recovery Foundation, commented: ‘CSR budgets are finite; we need to unleash the commercial muscle of the private sector’. The Philippines, as a highly disaster-prone middle-income country, is an obvious market in which to ‘hot house’ game changing solutions.

Next year heads of state will adopt the Sustainable Development Goals and the successor to the Hyogo Framework for Action. The private sector has been a significant voice throughout the global consultation processes, and 2015 will shine a spotlight on the centrality of the private sector to resilient, sustainable development. With its well-developed private sector platforms, the Philippines can further enhance its global reputation by becoming a beacon of good practice for public–private collaboration which accelerates resilient development.

Serena Brown, Global Development Initiative, KPMG International.

Urban shelter and settlement recovery: a ‘menu of options’ for households

Catholic Relief Services Philippines

Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines on 8 November 2013, killing 6,300 people and injuring another 29,000. An estimated four million people were displaced from their homes. This article reflects on Catholic Relief Service (CRS)’s urban shelter and settlement recovery programme in Tacloban City. The programme, which offers a ‘menu of options’ to households, works closely with affected communities to find shelter solutions by putting decision-making power in the hands of households themselves.

The USAID/OFDA and CRS urban shelter and settlements recovery programme

The Humanitarian Communities’ Strategic Response Plan for Typhoon Haiyan, approved by the national government, states that families with destroyed or damaged homes, including displaced people, should attain appropriate and sustainable shelter solutions. Likewise, the Shelter Cluster’s Recovery Guidelines highlight the need for shelter assistance programmes to ensure that families have ‘adequate appropriate and safe shelter supporting them to transition along the pathway to permanent durable housing, prioritizing the needs of the most vulnerable, ensuring participation, freedom of choice, and access to basic services to ensure a life of dignity’.

Within this context, CRS, with funding from the US Agency for International Development – Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), has taken an integrated approach in its urban shelter and settlements recovery programme, which has placed neighbourhoods at the centre of the project. The Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Program aims to complement the Tacloban City government’s relocation project, which has focused on one main site approximately 15 kilometres north of the centre, in a largely undeveloped area called New Kawayan. Other smaller-scale relocation projects include permanent shelters for approximately 14,000 households in coastal barangays. However, the sites selected are considered too far away by the majority of affected households, and many are finding it difficult to create new livelihoods or maintain their previous livelihoods in the proposed relocation sites.

CRS’ approach offers alternative shelter options to typhoon-affected households. Working at community and
At the household level, the programme has focused on helping households to find their own shelter and settlement solutions close to their original homes, livelihoods and social structures. CRS is targeting 3,000 affected households in 17 of the 31 high-risk coastal barangays in Tacloban City.

Whether households can legally return and rebuild on the land they occupied before the typhoon has been a central question in planning shelter and settlement assistance. In the early days after the typhoon, the national government announced a blanket 40-meter buffer zone along the coastline, which it designated a ‘No Dwell Zone’ (NDZ). This blanket ban was later lifted, and it has been left to local governments to set the parameters of these zones according to hazard assessments. Twelve months on, information from the assessments for Tacloban City is still not widely available; the local government has yet to make a decision about zoning, and is unlikely to do so in the near future. The widespread lack of secure land tenure adds a further layer of uncertainty.

The lack of clarity around zoning and tenure issues has led CRS to develop a twin-track approach, in consultation with neighbourhood residents and the local government. This provides a menu of options for assistance which caters to households in both the ill-defined ‘Dwell Zone’ (DZ) and the NDZ. For the purposes of this project CRS has come to an understanding with the City to use a main costal road to define the boundary. Households that are in the DZ and which own land are relatively easy to assist through on-site shelter and latrine reconstruction and repair. The most vulnerable households – those in the NDZ which share a house or do not own land – are much more difficult to assist.

### Table 1: Vulnerabilities according to land tenure and zoning classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing and land tenure</th>
<th>Post-Haiyan Land Zoning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Dwell Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharer</td>
<td>Most vulnerable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Least vulnerable</td>
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</table>

‘Menu of Options’ for households in the Dwell Zone

DZ households are offered on-site assistance to repair or rebuild their houses calibrated according to the level of damage. Following assessment by CRS engineers, cash payments and materials are provided in conditional tranches to assist with rebuilding or construction of transitional shelters and latrines. A team of engineers and foremen oversees and monitors construction or repairs and ensures that ‘Build Back Safer’ techniques are incorporated into the design and construction. These activities in the DZ allow displaced households to return to their place of origin and provide households with a safe, secure and durable home. An estimated 41% of the 3,000 households assisted by CRS in this project fall into this category.

One CRS beneficiary household that sought emergency shelter in a nearby church in the face of the storm lost most of their possessions, but their house was found to be sound. Under the project they received PHP 20,000 (approximately $500) and corrugated iron sheets to repair the roof. With the cash the household bought lumber and...
other materials and hired carpenters to build their new roof. The beneficiary said: ‘my family and I can sleep comfortable and secure without worrying about the rain’. Other families that have received support have prioritised the building of strong second floors, in case of another storm surge.

‘Menu of Options’ for households in the No Dwell Zone

The NDZ is considered a high-risk area and the local government will not permit humanitarian organisations to provide onsite assistance beyond emergency shelter distributions (plastic sheets and non-food items). The absence of humanitarian assistance in these areas meant that unsupported reconstruction was being undertaken without adequate materials or expertise. Many households took out high-interest personal loans from local lenders to purchase materials or hire labour, only to begin building inadequate and inappropriate shelters.

CRS worked with the neighbourhoods to develop a ‘Menu of Options’ for households in the NDZ to enable them to relocate to safer areas within Tacloban, while staying as close as possible to their place of origin in order to limit disruption to livelihoods and education, and to maintain households’ familial and community support systems. After substantial debate, assessments and consultations, CRS finalised four two-year options that households could choose from:

1. **Rent to own** land subsidy: financial support to move to a safe location where families can potentially own land, together with a full shelter and latrine package.
2. **Land rental subsidy**: financial support to rent a plot of land in a safe location, together with a full shelter and latrine package.
3. **Apartment rental subsidy**: financial support to rent an apartment or house in a safe location.
4. **Host family subsidy**: Financial support to live with a family member or friend in a safe location.

After working directly with the Mayor’s Office and local landowners without much success, CRS found that it was more effective to place the responsibility on each household to find a piece of land, apartment or host family to which they would be happy to relocate. Once decision-making power was shifted to households, solutions started to emerge. In one case, 38 households living in the San Fernando evacuation centre identified a plot of land in a safe, inland barangay two kilometres from the project neighbourhood, and negotiated the monthly rental payment. CRS then determined whether the land was suitable and began construction of individual shelters, latrines, communal septic tanks, water taps, hand pumps and electrical connections. Families have been able to determine their own future, providing continuity of social connections between households within the original barangays and fostering a sense of community (what is known locally as ‘Bayanihan’) in the relocation areas.

CRS has also enabled households to find solutions through the use of aerial photography and participatory community mapping exercises to find potential areas for urban densification. In one barangay with a large number of households located in the NDZ, the barangay captain and community members identified the owner of a plot within the barangay and negotiated to ‘infill’ his plot to accommodate 75 shelters, through a community-driven selection process, for the most vulnerable households in the NDZ.

**Facilitating permanent solutions**

CRS, through cash and material support, is facilitating a permanent solution for those households in the DZ who can repair and rebuild in their original location. In addition, the organisation is providing transitional solutions for the majority of households in the NDZ through the Menu of Options, to facilitate relocation to safer areas nearby. Experience in Haiti, elsewhere in the Philippines and in other countries indicates that these transitional solutions are likely to evolve into permanent shelter solutions. However, concerns remain about what will happen at the end of the project. Many households were unwilling to leave the relative security of their communities within the NDZ, especially with so much uncertainty about long-term plans. Households were concerned about maintaining their current livelihoods, the additional cost of transport to schools and their long-term ability to pay for alternative shelter options as humanitarian support declines. Many households initially opted to remain in the danger areas, investing their limited resources in rebuilding in situ in the hope of a place in the government’s permanent relocation site. The confusion around the possibility of eviction, and initial calculations by many households that housing would be ready and available in a permanent relocation site, led many to delay thinking about their immediate future.

To support informed decision-making, CRS facilitated site visits for over 1,100 households to the land in the government’s permanent relocation site to see the permanent shelters that households might receive. CRS invited government officials to discuss the plans for permanent relocation and the selection criteria that they would use to determine who would be eligible. CRS also discussed the ‘Menu of Options’ and encouraged households to find transitional shelter solutions to facilitate work towards a permanent solution, which could be in their current site, in New Kawayan or elsewhere. Once households understood the full picture and timeline of government and CRS support, they became more enthusiastic about finding transitional shelter solutions. In the weeks after the visit, the number of transitional shelter solutions that households presented to CRS for assessment increased significantly.

CRS and the Tacloban City government are offering complementary shelter and settlement solutions to affected people in Tacloban. There are real challenges in ensuring an inclusive process, particularly in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable, but the CRS shelter and settlement programme is finding solutions by putting decision-making power in the hands of households themselves.

This article was developed collaboratively by **Holly Fuller** (Program Manager – CRS Philippines), **Seki Hirano** (Senior Technical Advisor, Shelter and Settlements – CRS), **Vera Kreuwels** (Technical Advisor, Shelter and Settlements – CRS), **Joshua Kyller** (Emergency Coordinator – CRS) and **Jane Strangways** (Masters candidate – Oxford Brookes University).
Supporting shelter self-recovery: field experience following Typhoon Haiyan

Victoria Maynard and Philip Barritt

Affordable housing experts have long argued that housing is 'both the stock of dwelling units (a noun) and the process by which that stock is created and maintained (a verb)'. They have also advocated for 'supporting' rather than 'providing' approaches: enabling families to upgrade their own housing situation through improved access to and management of land, finance, services, materials, skills and labour rather than the provision of completed houses. Over 30 years after Ian Davis described shelter after disaster as 'a process, not as an object', process-oriented approaches to post-disaster housing are still rarely implemented on the ground.

From policy to practice

This article documents the experiences of CARE International, Habitat for Humanity and their local partners in implementing self-recovery shelter programmes during the first six months after the Typhoon Haiyan.

Prior to the typhoon most affected families lived in lightweight timber buildings which they had either built themselves, or paid local carpenters to construct. Many families had agreements with landowners which prevented them from building more permanent structures, while others were informal settlers in hazardous areas close to the sea. In response to Typhoon Haiyan, supporting half a million families to repair or rebuild their homes through a participatory process and the provision of construction materials, tools, cash and technical assistance was a strategic objective of humanitarian shelter agencies. Yet despite longstanding backing for support to self-recovery following disasters, and the appropriateness of this approach to the context in the Philippines, translating policy into practice was far from easy.

Following the distribution of emergency shelter kits (tarpaulins, fixings and tools), Habitat began providing construction materials to families in Cebu and Samar two weeks after the typhoon, including plywood, timber, corrugated iron sheets, nails and tools. CARE accelerated its planned shift from emergency support to support for self-recovery at the end of December as its assessments highlighted that many families had immediately begun to repair or rebuild their homes themselves. CARE’s self-recovery support included the distribution of construction materials, cash transfers through local cooperatives and household-level technical support. Both CARE and Habitat also offered community-level technical briefings on safe construction techniques.

Six months after the typhoon both agencies had assisted around 13,000 families to begin repairing or rebuilding their homes through their self-recovery programmes. According to the Shelter Cluster these were two of the largest such programmes implemented within the first six months of the response, with around 20% of households – 5% of the overall target for humanitarian shelter agencies for the first year of the response – provided with 'support to self-recovery of shelter' at that point. Programme monitoring completed by both organisations indicated that this assistance had enabled many families to quickly begin repairing their houses and move on to livelihood recovery.

Challenges and solutions

Funding

Existing partnerships meant that both organisations received rapid in-kind and financial support from major humanitarian donors in the immediate aftermath of the...
disaster. However, self-recovery programmes distributing construction materials had a higher cost per household than emergency shelter programmes distributing tarpaulins. In the first few days of the response one donor required Habitat to reduce the cost of assistance provided per household (through reducing the amount of construction materials provided) in order to align its costs with those of agencies providing emergency shelter assistance. This imposed significant limitations on the impact of the assistance provided. In contrast, CARE was able to reallocate some funding from its emergency programming to self-recovery shelter programmes (although it was unable to reallocate funding already committed to emergency relief – see Figure 1). Some of CARE’s donors allowed the transfer of funds from emergency to self-recovery programmes, while additional funds were provided from CARE’s own fundraising efforts to meet the higher costs per household.

Beneficiary selection
In a context of limited resources and overwhelming need the process of identifying which families should receive assistance can be complex and time-consuming, and can cause tensions between families who are and are not selected. To overcome this challenge both organisations worked closely with communities to identify which households should receive assistance and provided relatively low levels of shelter support to almost all families in the first few months of the response. This approach ensured community involvement, supported the recovery of the whole community and reduced the likelihood of conflict. The simplicity of selection criteria and processes also ensured the minimum possible delay in the provision of shelter assistance, while more detailed assessments were undertaken to inform ‘top-up’ programmes later in the response.

‘No-build zone’ policy
In common with previous disaster response operations in the Philippines, the government quickly announced a ‘no-build zone’ policy prohibiting families from repairing or rebuilding houses within 40 metres of the coast. This caused confusion for families living within these areas (many of whom were informal settlers) and for organisations trying to assist them. One of Habitat’s donors would not permit the organisation to provide self-recovery support to families living within the no-build zones despite their urgent need for shelter assistance. This created significant conflict between families living inside and outside the no-build zones and eventually forced Habitat to work in a different municipality which had fewer families living within the no-build zones. More generally, Habitat was able to provide self-recovery assistance to families living within no-build zones after reaching agreements with each Local Government Unit (as they had done in previous disasters) and with support from more flexible donors. In general CARE chose to work in inland municipalities as initial assessments highlighted that these areas were underserved, but even in these areas some families were living in high-risk sites such as river banks, where they did not want to rebuild. In these instances CARE provided the household with shelter assistance and worked with the whole community to identify safe plots of land nearby.

Material procurement
Both organisations aimed to support economic recovery through local sourcing of construction materials, either through direct purchasing or the provision of cash grants. However, local purchase of construction materials in the immediate aftermath of the disaster was virtually impossible due to damage and disruption to supply chains. Habitat initially purchased construction materials from suppliers in Cebu, which was relatively unscathed,
then identified local suppliers within the disaster-affected region as the construction industry recovered and expanded in response to demand. In Cebu demand from international agencies far exceeded supply in the first few months of the response. Suppliers were not able to fulfil orders on time or substituted inferior-quality materials, requiring Habitat to instigate higher levels of quality control. CARE purchased large volumes of items such as corrugated iron sheets in Cebu and Manila as these were not available in local markets in sufficient volume or quality to meet demand. CARE was able to rapidly procure due to early funding, initially avoiding problems, but experienced similar difficulties with later procurement rounds. Recognising that levels of damage, needs and capacities varied between households, CARE also provided conditional cash grants to be spent on house repair or reconstruction, allowing households to purchase materials or hire skilled labour, depending on their specific needs. This approach meant that families could prioritise how they spent the cash, and encouraged local processing of fallen coconut timber.6

6 Over 33 million coconut trees were destroyed in the storm and processing the fallen timber before it started to rot and pest infestation affected undamaged trees was a crucial task. See http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/212957/icode.

Logistics
As with other agencies, both CARE and Habitat experienced transportation challenges in the first few weeks and months of the response. The transportation and distribution of construction materials was also more difficult than tents or tarpaulins due to their greater weight and volume. A combination of procurement delays on particular items, transportation challenges and a lack of secure warehousing meant that, in some instances, in the first three months after the typhoon Habitat chose to distribute partial rather than full packages of materials to affected families (returning later with the outstanding items). While this was a compassionate response to the needs of affected families in the immediate aftermath of the disaster it significantly increased the complexity of the programme and the number of distributions required. In later stages of the response both agencies distributed directly from trucks carrying complete packages to reduce the need for warehousing in the field. Despite CARE having made the decision to move from emergency to self-recovery support in the first few weeks of the response the organisation (and its local partners) was already committed to delivering its emergency shelter programme. This, combined with shipping delays caused by tropical storms in January, delayed significant scale-up of the organisation’s self-recovery programme until three months after the typhoon (see Figure 1).

Different needs, different solutions
Both CARE and Habitat initially provided the same package of assistance to all selected families. However, the success of self-recovery programmes is dependent on the level of damage and the capacity of each household to use the assistance provided. CARE’s partners brought valuable expertise in mobilising communities to help the most
vulnerable, but nonetheless both organisations found that, in some cases, their support was not sufficient for families to achieve shelter recovery. In Guiuan, Habitat realised that many families needed additional support in order to continue with construction due to the extremely high levels of damage and lack of local capacity to recover. To meet this need Habitat worked with a small, flexible donor to develop a ‘top-up’ project providing a bespoke package of materials and labour to each household. This enabled families to continue rebuilding by combining salvaged materials from their pre-disaster home with additional materials donated by Habitat or other agencies, or purchased following the typhoon. Recognising that markets for construction materials were being re-established CARE provided a greater proportion of assistance in cash rather than materials when the organisation expanded its programme from Leyte into Panay. CARE also provided an additional ‘top-up’ cash grant and technical support to 4,300 particularly vulnerable households, with the support of the same donor from the earlier phase.

**Safer construction**

Academics, policymakers and practitioners advocate using the ‘window of opportunity’ created by a disaster to ‘build back safer’ and reduce vulnerability to future disasters. This is particularly difficult in self-recovery programmes, however, where the responsibility for building back safer lies not with the assisting organisation but with disaster-affected families—who may or may not view investment in increasing the resilience of their houses to future disasters as a priority compared to spending time or money reducing other risks. To overcome this challenge both organisations adopted participatory approaches to working with communities to encourage both understanding and adoption of safer construction techniques. Like other organisations, CARE and Habitat provided technical briefings to the whole community. In addition, CARE simplified technical guidance provided by the Shelter Cluster into a four-point catchphrase – ‘foundations, bracing, connections, roofing’ – to provide easy-to-remember minimum standards for both staff and communities, emphasised by printing on T-shirts and through other media including song and dance. To supplement the technical briefing CARE also paid ‘roving teams’ consisting of one community mobiliser and two carpenters from each community to provide ongoing technical advice for a two-month period, with frequent monitoring by CARE’s and its partners’ technical staff. Programme monitoring and evaluation indicates that CARE’s comprehensive strategy for the communication of safer construction messages resulted in high levels of knowledge and implementation of basic safer construction techniques, leading to safer buildings. It also found, however, that increased technical support and capacity-building of local partners could have further increased the robustness of the buildings and widened uptake beyond the direct beneficiaries of the kits.

**From practice to theory**

Every disaster response poses unique challenges. The experiences of CARE and Habitat following Typhoon Haiyan, however, suggest that a set of common factors within humanitarian organisations is key to the efficient and effective provision of support to shelter self-recovery, irrespective of the context.

**Sectoral commitment and capacity**

Habitat works solely on housing and settlements, while shelter is one of CARE’s four core emergency sectors, with a dedicated technical team to support its disaster response operations. Both organisations try wherever possible to support owner-driven approaches to post-disaster shelter. Institutional commitment meant that both organisations had high levels of technical capacity to rapidly deliver self-recovery programmes. This included standard humanitarian capabilities, such as financial management, quality control and logistics. It also included shelter and construction expertise at both strategic and operational levels, which enabled both organisations to identify appropriate responses and provide technical assistance to affected families.

**Local knowledge**

Habitat’s knowledge of pre- and post-disaster housing processes in the Philippines meant that the organisation rapidly identified an appropriate package of familiar construction materials. CARE’s existing partnerships with local NGOs and cooperatives enabled the organisation to adopt and implement a mixed material/cash-based approach at the speed and scale required. Both organisations were also experienced in working with communities, community- and faith-based organisations and local government to identify households eligible for assistance, manage the distribution process and negotiate local solutions to land and tenure issues.

**Flexibility**

CARE responded to the findings of its initial assessment by accelerating the switch from emergency to self-recovery assistance. Later in the response ongoing monitoring prompted both organisations to develop ‘top-up’ programmes to respond to remaining needs. Critical to the ability of both CARE and Habitat to take this responsive approach was the support of their donors in reallocating emergency funding to self-recovery programmes (accepting higher up-front costs per household than emergency shelter programmes and recognising that savings would be made in avoiding on-going support or additional recovery funding), implementing ‘top-up’ programmes and providing assistance to families in no-build zones.

Based on the field experience of CARE and Habitat during the first six months following Typhoon Haiyan, it is clear that the barriers to greater adoption of approaches which support affected families’ own shelter recovery process are institutional, rather than conceptual. Tackling such barriers should be the focus of future research, policy and practice for implementing organisations, policymakers and donors.

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Counter-terrorism laws and regulations: what aid agencies need to know

Jessica Burniske, with Naz Modirzadeh and Dustin Lewis

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Over the past two decades, states and inter-governmental bodies have adopted increasingly robust counter-terrorism laws and policies. At the same time, humanitarian crises in countries like Somalia, Mali and Syria have reaffirmed the continued importance of principled humanitarian action. Counter-terrorism laws and humanitarian action share several goals, including the prevention of attacks against civilians and of diversion of aid to armed actors. Yet tensions between these two areas of law and policy have emerged in recent years, resulting in challenges for governments and humanitarian actors alike.

States and members of the humanitarian community have increasingly engaged in dialogue on these issues, and efforts to address the many challenges posed by counter-terrorism law are under way. Despite this progress, and despite the significant need for humanitarian assistance among the civilian populations concerned, the threat of harm or criminal liability has caused many humanitarian actors to curb or halt some of their work in certain regions. Some of these challenges may become more complicated as crises become more pressing. Already, there is evidence of this complexity in the Gaza Strip, Somalia, Mali and Syria. These conflicts raise considerable challenges for humanitarian actors, especially those seeking to operate in areas controlled by listed armed groups. Humanitarian actors should be aware of the challenges that may arise when counter-terrorism law intersects with humanitarian action in these quickly evolving environments.

This Network Paper provides a brief primer on counter-terrorism measures and an overview of some of the most salient questions that humanitarian actors are grappling with in planning effective, principled and lawful operations in high-risk environments. It outlines the legal bases for both counter-terrorism law and humanitarian action, discusses the challenges and possible consequences of legislation for humanitarian actors, discusses some of the key challenges anti-terrorism laws and regulations pose to humanitarian action, and sets out some questions and approaches humanitarian actors may wish to consider when facing these challenges.
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HPN's aim is to improve the performance of humanitarian action by contributing to individual and institutional learning.

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