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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

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Resilience, Risk and Vulnerability at Sida

Final Report

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**Final Report
October 2012**

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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Foreword

This evaluation has been commissioned by the Sida Working group on Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction. One general objective with the study was to, among other things, set a baseline for what Sida already does in terms of “increasing resilience in relation to natural hazards and extreme weather events”. The outcome will be used in the drafting of a Concept Note – as a guide to how Sida should work with resilience in the near future and post MDG 2015. The collection of material for this report has been cumbersome which has complicated the work of the consultant.

The working group wishes to emphasize that this report is not an evaluation in strict terms, but merely a report and analysis of experiences (lessons learned) of Sida’s support to activities with the objective to enhance resilience among people and communities. Recommendations on how Sida can strengthen its work are included in the report.

Some conclusions expressed in the report are those of the consultant, and not always shared by the working group. Also, some of the comments in the report are, according to Sida, not totally in conjunction with reality, however, this is the work of the consultant and Sida will make use of the conclusions and recommendations.

This report should be seen as a working document. Sida will continue to develop its approach to resilience and disaster risk reduction based on the report and other consultations.

For the working group

Kerstin Jonsson Cissé
Chair of the group

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACF	Action Against Hunger
ADB	Asian Development Bank
APWLD	Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development
ARC	African Risk Capacity
ASALS	Arid and semi-arid lands
AWRM	Advocacy for Sustainable Water Resource Management
BCCRF	Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund
CASP2	Core Agricultural Support Program Phase II
CEEPA	Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa
CEP-BCI	Core Environmental Program and Biodiversity Conservation Corridors Initiative
CDMP II	Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme Phase II
CSE	Centre for Science and Environment
DIN	Inland River Niger Delta
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
ECBI	European Capacity Building Initiative
EEPSA	Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
FMMP	Flood Management and Mitigation Programme
GEDEFOR	Mali Programme for Decentralisation of Forest Management
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GWP	Global Water Partnership
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
HRBA	Human rights-based approach
ICIMOD	International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
ICRAF	World Agroforestry Centre
IGAD	Intergovernmental Group on Development
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
INGC	Mozambican National Institute for Disaster Management
ISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
LACEEP	Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program
LRRD	Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
MRC	Mekong River Commission
MSB	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

NALEP	Kenyan National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme
NBD	Nile Basin Discourse
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
PACT EAC	Promoting Agriculture-Climate-Trade Linkages in the East African Community
PAGEIT	Support Project for the Management of Ecosystems
PNSP	Poverty Safety Net Programme
REDDIN	Niger River Project
SANDEE	South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics
SEACHANGE	Southeast Asia Community of Practice for Monitoring and Evaluation of Climate Change
SEAFDEC	Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Centre
SEAPA	Southeast Asian Press Alliance
SEARIN	Southeast Asia Rivers Network
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIWI	Stockholm International Water Institute
SMHI	Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute
TEI	Thailand Environmental Institute
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCWA	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia
WFP	World Food Programme
WRI	World Resources Institute
WRUAs	Water resource user associations

Preface

This evaluation was commissioned to Indevelop through Sida's framework agreement for reviews and evaluations. The assignment was carried out between April – November 2012. Quality assurance and technical input on the report was provided by Yasemin Aysan, and Project Management was carried out by Jessica Rothman.

The assignment was carried out by the following key members:

Dr. Ian Christoplos, Team Leader: In his work at Indevelop Ian Christoplos is the director of Sida's framework for evaluations and reviews with Indevelop. He is also a researcher in Natural Resources and Poverty at the Danish Institute for International Studies. He has worked as a researcher, evaluator and consultant for over twenty-five years focusing on local institutions involved with agriculture, food security and natural resource management. This has included a broad range of long- and short-term assignments in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Western Balkans.

Dr. Yasemin Aysan, Technical Advisor: She is a senior disaster risk reduction expert who has undertaken extensive assignments for UN agencies and bilateral organizations. Yasemin's PhD's case study was on socio-cultural acceptability of post-disaster recovery/reconstruction by the affected communities.

Minnie Novaky, Research Assistant/Junior Consultant: Minnie holds a Master's Degree in International Humanitarian Action (NOHA) from Uppsala University. She has experience of consulting assignments for Sida Gender Helpdesk focusing on gender equality, gender mainstreaming, gender based violence, and gender in conflict and development.

We wish to thank Sida's Working group on Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction who provided valuable input and guidance throughout the evaluation. Very special thanks are due to Therese Sjomander-Magnusson and Kerstin Jonsson Cisse who managed this evaluation project within Sida.

Executive Summary

This review of Swedish interventions and potential future directions in supporting resilience and reducing vulnerability in relation to natural hazards was commissioned by a thematic group at Sida in March 2012. It constitutes the final report of this consultancy and has been prepared together with a case study on resilience in relation to agriculture and food security in Kenya.

Identification of how resilience and risk are addressed in Swedish programming has involved looking both at specific programmes focused directly on risk reduction, and also at the ways that resilience is mainstreamed within Sida's overall development and humanitarian portfolios. An overall finding is that *resilience* is closely associated with climate change adaptation programming, whereas risk tends to be addressed within *disaster* risk reduction efforts. It is often difficult to discern the level of attention to risk related to smaller recurrent and seasonal crises. This may, however, relate to the different terminologies and ways that these themes are addressed in different programming modalities.

Sweden provides considerable support to global and regional networks and institutions working with policy issues and capacity development of national actors. The concepts and approaches to resilience and vulnerability promoted by these international organisations are an important contribution to international efforts, but are not consistently reflected in national level Sida programming, with the partial exception of projects financed through the Special Climate Change Initiative.

The *disaster risk reduction* (DRR) portfolio is dominated by support to the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), in addition to initiatives emanating from links to humanitarian programming. There are also many small risk reduction components (primarily addressing food security) within other humanitarian programming, but it has not been possible to obtain an overview of these initiatives. Some DRR programmes are supported through regional transboundary water initiatives and national programmes funded through the Special Climate Change Initiative.

Climate change adaptation efforts focus largely on DRR, water and food security. Given the fact that these are primarily financed through the Swedish Governments' Special Climate Change Initiative, which was expected to end in 2012 (recently extended for another year), there is reason for concern regarding the continued scale of these efforts when that funding window closes. This also raises concerns regarding how well such special initiatives function as a vehicle for mainstreaming new strategic approaches within Sida's overall portfolio.

Climate adaptation (and with that risk and resilience) components have been added to some new and older *agricultural programmes*. In many cases these components have not been accompanied by a fundamental rethinking of the implications of natural hazards for the design of these initiatives. It could perhaps be presumed that food security efforts would drive a greater concern for human vulnerability, but this is not apparent in the Sida agricultural portfolio. The new Horn of Africa initiative may pave the way for new approaches in this regard.

There are greater indications of a rethink in retrofitting the “old *water portfolio*” to reflect new concerns related to resilience and risk. Indeed, a resilience, risk and vulnerability perspective on food security is more apparent in water programmes than in agriculture. Some water and sanitation service provision initiatives are explicitly designed to respond to climate change scenarios. Transboundary water management institutions supported by Sida are increasingly becoming engaged in social learning processes as they shift from being structures for intergovernmental negotiations and technical support to acting as platforms for multistakeholder debate on issues of central relevance for regional resilience and local vulnerability.

This review has identified four overall strengths in the current Swedish portfolio:

Capacity development

In contrast to the “hard” investments made by many donors in infrastructure and direct service provision, the Swedish portfolio is characterised by a strong emphasis on enhancing the capacities of national actors to manage risks and support resilience.

Evidence-based policy formation

The various studies and policy dialogues undertaken with Swedish support, together with capacity development efforts, have contributed to enhancing evidence-based policy formation at national and regional levels.

Networking

A number of the supported initiatives promote evidence-based policy formation and capacity development through existing networks. Through these networks Sweden has experience and relationships with a broad range of partners -relationships that could be mobilised if resilience and risk in relation to natural hazards becomes a stronger focus in future development cooperation.

Entry points for promoting resilience-related coherence between different policy arenas

Sida is a trusted partner among humanitarian actors interested in linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD), in international agencies and some national authorities promoting DRR, in transboundary water management, in global water policy formation and also in areas where a resilience concerns are less self-evident, such as value chain development. Sida is therefore well-placed to bring these disparate actors together to contemplate how to achieve greater coherence in addressing natural hazard risk.

This review has also identified four overall weaknesses in the current portfolio:

Learning from disasters

Sweden has taken on a high profile role in the past in calling for partner countries and the international community to apply the lessons learnt from disasters about vulnerability, risk and resilience in subsequent recovery and development efforts. These calls have not been consistently applied in a coherent manner in relation to development priorities.

Food security

A major current “window of opportunity” for mainstreaming concerns for risk and resilience in agricultural programming is in the rapidly increasing global commitments to food security. These commitments have had a clear impact on Swedish priorities and programming within the water sector, but a resilience focus on food security is far less apparent in agricultural programming. This anomaly appears to be related to a failure to empirically assess food security risks and opportunities in commercially oriented agricultural programming.

Bringing lessons (and policies) home

As noted above, Sweden is a major actor supporting evidence-based policy formation. With the notable exception of climate change adaptation and water, the policies being promoted and lessons being learnt on a global level with Swedish funding are not clearly evident in overall Sida priorities and programming.

Connecting the dots

Sweden has a history of strong policy efforts related to risk, resilience and vulnerability in the wake of major disasters and in moving the climate adaptation agenda forward. Nonetheless the points above suggest that these themes remain largely confined within specific programming areas.

A central lesson learnt in the review is that resilience has no fixed standard characteristics and cannot be effectively promoted by checklists. The prevalence of rhetorical reference to resilience, vulnerable groups, etc. in current programming, and the dearth of clear evidence of results, suggests that it is more important to assess whether programmes reflect genuine common concerns about how natural hazards are impacting on factors that hinder resilience. This is especially important in relation to commitments to address the landscape of risk associated with (a) resource scarcities, (b) food insecurity, (c) the complex vulnerabilities of the poor, and (d) the challenges faced in developing capacities to adapt to climate change.

This review has identified six tentative entry points where Sida could better integrate a risk and resilience perspective in overall programming:

1. *Make food security a cross-cutting concern that links global policy commitments to the challenges facing vulnerable people dealing with natural resource scarcity and natural hazards.* A risk and resilience perspective on food security would need to “connect the dots” between agriculture, climate, water and humanitarian

programming in several respects, including: (a) emphasising risks inherent in both smallholder production and the livelihoods expected to be generated by increasing trade and commercialisation; (b) national imperatives to increase domestic food production amid growing water scarcity; (c) links between humanitarian recovery efforts and long-term food security strategies; and (d) in the design and implementation of social protection measures to safeguard the livelihood and nutritional security of vulnerable populations subject to increasingly recurrent extreme climatic events and seasonal stress.

2. *Adopt a more explicit risk and resilience emphasis in theories of change and in results frameworks.* This would be a way to highlight and create a constructive discourse on how to link (a) policies and practice, and (b) investments in adaptive capacities and the actual infrastructure, services and social protection mechanisms reaching vulnerable people. It is especially important to move risk analyses out of the “assumptions column” of logical frameworks to instead become an integral part of programme design.
3. *Transcend rhetorical assumptions about “win-win” processes through better design, monitoring and evaluation.* There is a tendency to accept simple assumptions about the resilience benefits of, e.g., “climate friendly agriculture” or value chain development for vulnerable populations. These assumptions may indeed prove valid, but they should be subject to critical, empirical analyses of actual resilience to natural hazards, built into design, monitoring and evaluation systems.
4. *Overcome categorisations of topics such as DRR and LRRD as “humanitarian” issues to instead promote policy frameworks which recognise that vulnerable people search for resilience strategies irrespective of whether the crises they face are eliciting humanitarian or developmental responses.* Resilience and risk reduction will never become mainstreamed at Sida if they are primarily seen as something to worry about at the end of a humanitarian operation.
5. *Use social protection as a cross-cutting concept to put resilience centre stage.* This could be a way of ensuring that resilience is seen as something more than post-disaster rehabilitation by drawing attention to the need to have systems in place to deal with seasonal stress and smaller crises that are not necessarily visible in either developmental or humanitarian programming.
6. *Link global/regional resilience-related policy and capacity efforts to national programming.* This would be a way to build on the strengths of the current portfolio, and perhaps equally important, be a way to ensure that the work of international partners extends beyond “talk” and is better related to the field level challenges of national and local institutional change. Resilience should be about fundamental changes in attitudes and approaches to development. These can and should be supported at international levels, but must be operationalised in local level action.

1 Introduction

As part of the Operational Plan for 2012, Sida's Director General instructed that the proportion of interventions aimed at preventing poor people's vulnerability to naturally caused crises and disasters should be increased. Sida should strengthen national capacities for risk management and enhance poor people's resilience to crises and disasters, with particular focus on the water and agriculture sectors.

“The prevention of crises and disasters is a priority for Sida. Effects of drought in the Horn of Africa show that countries with weak social and economic safety nets - often in conflict and without effective or legitimate institutions - are least equipped to deal with increasing pressures from, for example, climate change and rising food and energy prices. The capacity to anticipate crises and implement preventive measures that protect and equalize the risks are prerequisites for development effectiveness.”

The Department for International Organisations and Thematic Support at Sida was tasked to lead the work. The objective was defined as: “Leading the working group to develop proposals for program activities that will reduce human vulnerability, especially in water and agriculture, and to enhance overall capacity of Sida staff in this area.”

A thematic working group was formed, the objectives of which are: 1) to contribute towards a Sida Concept Paper and approach on how Sida strategically is to further integrate vulnerability and resilience aspects in its operations to reduce the negative effects of natural hazards and extreme weather events 2) to explore and increase knowledge and capacity as well as to enhance a common understanding among Sida's and the embassies' personnel 3) to support Sida's various processes and practices that have the potential to improve Sida's support to resilience. The working definition used by the group for resilience is: ...the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming livelihoods and poor people's quality of life in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earthquakes and drought – without compromising their long-term prospects. This definition places primary emphasis on human and societal resilience. Ecosystem resilience is perceived as being a condition of societal resilience but by no means a guarantee.

In this assignment Indevelop was commissioned to review Sida's interventions that have strong implications for increasing resilience and reducing vulnerability and to improve the understanding of how Sida has worked with these issues so far and how the work can be further strengthened. This report combines findings from a mapping phase with more in-depth analysis and one extended case study. The purpose of the report is primarily to: 1) Clarify the proportion and type of interventions aimed at or important for reducing people's vulnerability to naturally caused crises and disasters; 2) Identify gaps and linkages between humanitarian and long-term development cooperation, in order to increase understanding of possible opportunities for transition between the two and the value of interventions focusing on prevention of disaster. It also aims at identifying possible links and synergies between global DRR / vulnerability programs; 3) Identify and analyse common denominators for successful programmes, and provide initial suggestions for how Sida can improve its work to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to natural hazards and extreme weather events.

2 Methods

This review began with preparation of a glossary of relevant terminology followed by a review of Swedish country and regional strategies to identify how the themes of resilience, risk and vulnerability in relation to natural hazards are being addressed. It was expected that this information would provide an entry point to then identify specific programmes to look at further. After assessing ten such strategies it was recognised that it would be difficult to use this as an effective entry point since the references to these themes in the strategies were relatively general and there was very little indication of how these policy priorities were being realised in specific programmes and investments.

Instead, the team proceeded to undertake a range of key word searches on OpenAid.se to identify specific programmes. The focus of the review has been on programme (PROGSAM) and conflict (KONFLIKT) countries. Further queries were made with embassies and different Sida staff in Stockholm to identify additional programmes to be included in the mapping. Annual “U1” reports and other documentation from embassies on their activities related to resilience have also been collated. Embassy feedback has primarily been received from Bangkok and Nairobi. Initial interviews were also held with key informants at the Sixth International Conference on Community Based Adaptation in Hanoi and with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in Rome. Meetings were also held with the World Bank Social Resilience Cluster (now being discontinued) and the World Resources Institute (WRI). Reports were reviewed from all of these sources to obtain an overview of the programmes identified. This data was then grouped according to different criteria.

The team recognises that the searches on OpenAid.se and the direct queries to Sida staff have not yielded information about all relevant programmes. Some key embassies gave little or no response to requests for documentation, which has resulted in some significant gaps in the analysis. The specific queries made to embassy and Sida staff are also likely to have missed some stakeholders responsible for relevant portfolios since the issues being analysed are likely to be “embedded” throughout Sida’s work. It has been particularly difficult to obtain an overview of the specific resilience related components and activities undertaken as part of humanitarian projects. These are generally not visible on OpenAid.se. As such, some of the conclusions are drawn on what is acknowledged as being relatively anecdotal evidence. The range of programming covered in this report may be subject to a degree of bias due to the approach applied. It is also likely that some information is lacking, and due to time pressures the team did not have an opportunity to search for all relevant documentation when these were not available on OpenAid.se or from Sida programme officers. Although we feel that the information presented here provides a fair overall impression of trends in support to resilience, risk and vulnerability related to natural hazards, the actual scale and scope of Swedish support is probably somewhat greater.

In undertaking the review of documentation it has become apparent that the key concepts and terms applied in this review (resilience, risk, vulnerability, DRR, LRRD, food security, etc.) are applied in a variety of ways. Many programmes touch upon several of these concepts in inter-related ways. In order to avoid delving into what may be viewed as overly “academic” conceptual and semantic debates, this review does not attempt to apply a strict structure to these themes. The glossary in annex five presents definitions of these concepts but it has not been possible to consistently differentiate between these themes in the describing actual programming.

There was an expectation that the team would engage with not only the thematic working group in Stockholm, but also the Swedish embassies. A constructive dialogue was established with Nairobi and Bangkok, but it proved very difficult to generate interest in the assignment from other embassies, some of which failed to provide any response, even to requests for documentation. It is hoped that this report will itself provide a tool for stimulating greater interest from the embassies in this topic in the future. The difficulties in creating engagement from the embassies in this review is indeed a finding in itself and illustrates both the importance and the challenges in achieving the objectives set by the Director General regarding a strengthened focus on resilience and vulnerability in Sida programming.

A case study was undertaken of how resilience is reflected in changing Sida programming in Kenya, with a strong emphasis on the agricultural portfolio. This report is included in annex four. Data collection included review of documentation related to Kenyan policies, Sida financed agricultural programmes and other relevant programming, some of which was Sida financed. Stakeholder interviews were selected to reflect a similar pattern, primarily focusing on those actors with a link to Sida financed agricultural programming, and also including those involved in other sectors and non-Sida financed activities. A list of interviewees for the case study is included in annex three.

The plans for the case study originated in a video interview with Sida Nairobi on June 19. The team leader of the review was in Kenya during the period of July 8-17, 2012 (a small portion of this time was devoted to a different mission). A brief field visit was made to view ongoing food security activities in Kibwezi. It should be stressed that due to the brevity of the mission to Kenya and the richness of issues that arose in the agricultural portfolio it was not possible to undertake significant analysis of other parts of the portfolio with potential relevance to food security and resilience.

In addition to the Kenya case, two interviews were undertaken in Bangkok and Hanoi focusing on the Asian Development Bank (ADB) led Core Agricultural Support Program Phase II (CASP2) as a “mini-case study”.

Both case studies the interviews focused on answering three sets of questions:

1. What are the *theories of change* that underpin programming? How are the actions taken expected to impact on the resilience strategies of different categories among the rural population (smallholders, landless, those employed in different firms, particularly within value chains)? How do Sida programmes expect to mobilise and

enhance the approaches of partner institutions, including meso level agencies (a) providing agricultural services, (b) dealing directly with changing resource tenure regimes and (c) managing water resources? How are food security risk and resilience factors reflected in the theories of change inherent in national policy frameworks, partner priorities and donor harmonisation processes?

2. What different *scenarios* regarding the landscape of risk steer decision-making at strategic levels? To what extent are key stakeholders considering exposure to large scale disasters, increasing recurrence of smaller crises, changing effects of seasonality and potential tipping points where climate change or other hazards may suggest the need for a fundamental rethink of agriculture and livelihood strategies? Are these congruent with the scenarios described in Swedish regional and country strategies? When it is recognised that these scenarios suggest the need for a mixed portfolio of humanitarian and development interventions, what steps are taken to capitalise on synergies and avoid goal conflicts between these different modalities?
3. To what extent do results frameworks in general and risk analyses in particular reflect partners' *awareness of the likelihood and consequences of risks* related to natural hazards (in relation to the preceding two sets of questions) at programme level? Do partners have the tools and capacities to identify and use indicators that recognise hazards and support flexible responses to support resilience? How much has Sida supported access to data and information so as to ensure that these assessments are evidence based and monitored over time? Do existing results frameworks encourage or discourage ways to find mechanisms for shifting back and forth between humanitarian and developmental modalities as the circumstances change?

An important limitation of this review relates to the extent to which conclusions can be drawn regarding if and how the interventions under analysis address human vulnerability. The quality of resilience and risk reduction is ultimately related to the extent to which initiatives are designed based on an understanding of societal and individual vulnerability. These are factors that are mentioned in much of the documentation, but it is not possible in a review such as this to ascertain the extent to which programming is actually based on empirical analyses of these micro-level dimensions of vulnerability. Similarly, results must be assessed based on evidence of whether such vulnerabilities have actually been reduced, but there has been little follow-up regarding results related to vulnerability even where resilience is referred to as an objective in programme documents.

The lack of references to research, evaluations or other studies focused at this level in much of the documentation reviewed gives cause for considerable concern. In interviews it was often apparent that interviewees were basing their plans on prevailing narratives about vulnerability and the efficacy of Sida efforts to address it, rather than evidence about the nature of vulnerability and the results of efforts to enhance resilience. For this reason this review describes practices as presented in available documentation and as extrapolated from interviews, but does not state whether some of these initiatives are actually “best practices”. It is of significant concern that there is insufficient evidence to draw such conclusions

It has been a challenge to choose where to set a boundary when mapping Swedish investments deemed to be relevant in relation to natural hazard resilience and risk. In this review the following decisions have been made in this regard:

- Humanitarian relief distributions have not been included, even though they could be seen as part of resilience, whereas humanitarian operations with a clear focus on linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) have been included.
- Social protection programmes designed to respond to natural hazards have been included, but broader programming that could be labelled as “social protection” (e.g., in relation to chronic poverty not directly related to natural hazards) has not.
- Climate change adaptation and LRRD programming related to natural hazards have been included, even where these programmes have apparently not been designed based on explicit analyses of risk and resilience issues.
- Climate change programming with a primary focus on mitigation has not been included.

Finally, it should again be stressed that due to the unstructured nature of the relevant documentation and the elusive nature of the subject matter, these findings should be recognised as being more indicative than conclusive. Particularly in the limited case study efforts it became apparent that there is more happening in relation to resilience than can be ascertained from the documentation that is readily accessible. There are, for example, food security programmes that are not labelled as such. There are programmes that are cognisant of climate risks without a clear analysis presented in the main documents. The limitations of this study therefore reflect the problem that the study was intended to solve, i.e., that risk and resilience are not sufficiently apparent in Sida programming and Swedish policies.

Nonetheless, people at field level seem to find ways to address some of the gaps noted in this review in a pragmatic manner. They find their own ways to deal with risk and resilience. During the field visit to Kibwezi in Kenya it became apparent that Sida supported initiatives were well integrated into a web of efforts by local agricultural authorities, the Kenyan Red Cross, the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and of course the local communities struggling with recurrent drought. Without a field visit it would have been impossible to recognise these forms of collaboration from review of documents and interviews in Nairobi. The emphasis and the perhaps provocative calls in this report to design Sida resilience efforts around learning from the field are inspired by this recognition that local actors who are facing natural hazards are probably better at “linking the dots” than planners at central levels.

3 “Where to find” resilience, vulnerability and risk in Sida’s work

3.1. MAINSTREAMING

Resilience, risk and vulnerability are not sectors. Neither are they official cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed into all Sida programming (at least not yet). Where they are part of programming, they are embedded in Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in such a way as to make it difficult to accurately assess their prominence in the development agenda. Many aspects of vulnerability are (and should be) an integral part of how poverty is conceptualised. The development of capabilities to resist and rebound from shocks generated by natural hazards should be a core aspect of how poverty is alleviated. As such, success in “mainstreaming” these concerns can perhaps make these objectives more difficult to map in actual programming if they become part of the policy fabric that guides development work and humanitarian response.

At the same time, there are dangers in any mainstreaming agenda that the mainstreamed objectives may be ignored if they are not seen as explicit and well-defined task responsibilities and “results”. There are also dangers that certain terms may become clichés and as such enter the development vocabulary without frank analysis of their implications for the profound changes that may be required.

This review cannot draw verifiable conclusions about the quality or even the quantity of mainstreaming of risk, resilience and vulnerability concerns in Sida’s overall development portfolio. There are, however, indications that mainstreaming has been very uneven. Resilience appears to have entered the Sida vocabulary primarily in relation to climate change adaptation. Risk reduction efforts are largely conceptualised in terms of DRR, financed through humanitarian channels or through the Swedish Special Climate Change Initiative 2009-2012. As will be discussed throughout this report, there appears to be major gaps in how these concerns are addressed more broadly in current Swedish programming. For example, in many programmes in high-risk areas relatively limited attention is paid to the small recurrent crises (e.g., small floods and seasonal factors that lead to chronic food security stress) that do not elicit a humanitarian response. These are still largely treated as modest disturbances in much development programming and not as core concerns.

Based on a review of the comments related to risk and resilience in “U1” annual reports from Swedish embassies on country and regional programming, certain trends are apparent. In some regional programmes (Africa and Asia) these themes have been integrated to a significant extent into overall approaches. The same can be said for countries facing recurrent droughts (Mali, Kenya) or agro-ecological tipping points where a convergence of hazards may lead to a collapse of prevailing livelihood or production systems (Bolivia). In Zambia factors of risk and food security are conceptualised as being integral to support for economic growth and agricultural production increase, but such links are notably absent in other countries. In most conflict affected countries the integration of these concerns in overall programming appears to be very limited.

Box 1

Ending drought emergencies in Kenya, mainstreaming into which agenda?

In Kenya, after many years of repeated appeals for food aid after drought, a consensus has emerged that a more radical approach is needed to implement the national policy objective to “end drought emergencies in Kenya”. These new approaches involve a shift of focus from LRRD to instead invest more in growth oriented development efforts in drought-affected regions. The humanitarian led LRRD approaches of the past and efforts to support prevailing livelihood strategies are seen to have failed in relation to mainstreaming, and with this in achieving broad impact. There is therefore a need to invest considerable development resources in, for example, land preparation methods that can improve the utilisation of available rainfall. Large-scale investment in post harvest technologies for both food and fodder are needed to ensure that producers can manage recurrent droughts without outside assistance.

There is less consensus regarding what pace to take in moving toward these more radical approaches. Some recommend a rapid shift to mechanised methods, massive bush clearance, investment in food processing and support to the creation and strengthening of large-scale commercial farms. These approaches involve bringing concerns about how to promote economic growth in high-risk regions into the mainstream development agenda. Others propose looking for paths towards radical change in production systems that will retain the strengths of existing indigenous resilience strategies, such as traditional pastoral production methods, i.e., building on support to existing natural resource management systems. Some raise serious concerns about the land rights issues that need to be addressed when ‘going big’, and fear that too much mainstreaming undertaken without being anchored in solid analyses of the risks facing vulnerable populations could actually weaken resilience.

<http://africansact4africa.org/files/docs/Ending%20drought%20emergencies.pdf>

3.2. RESILIENCE IN RELATION TO OTHER CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Within the scope of this review it has not been possible to comprehensively and verifiably assess the extent to which resilience has been framed in relation to other cross-cutting issues. There are examples of where a rights-based perspective has been applied with a focus on risks arising in relation to dam construction, but these are relatively rare. This may be attributed to the uncertain position of social protection within the organisational structure and goals at Sida as social protection can be seen as an embodiment of a commitment to “protect” social and economic rights. Some programmes recognise and include strategies to address the fact that resilience is neither gender nor ethnically neutral. The Mekong River Commission’s Flood Management and Mitigation Programme emphasises women’s role in spreading information about impending floods and also highlights the need for gender aware approaches to evacuation and other forms of flood response. Peoples own resilience strategies in the face of natural hazards are strongly influenced by existing cultural norms, most notably the informal social protection mechanisms through which communities provide mutual support. Men and women have different roles in these systems. Many programmes seek to support “community resilience”, but the socio-cultural “baseline” for what this resilience consists of before the intervention receives little apparent analysis

Box 2

Women and Climate Justice in the Asia Pacific Region

Most Sida financed projects make some reference to gender, but in undertaking this review it has not been possible to assess how well the impacts of natural hazards on the differing power relations and vulnerabilities of men and women have been taken into account. A notable exception to this is the work of the Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD), which in one of its programmes has focused particularly on gender and climate justice in relation to natural hazards. In this programme APWLD takes a two-pronged approach. The first involves working directly with rural and indigenous women around issues related to climate change and post-disaster recovery. The second is engaging in advocacy at national, regional and international levels. These strategies come together in other programme activities such as women-led participatory research.

<http://www.apwld.org/our-work/women-and-climate-justice/>

Poor people’s perspectives on development should be reflected in the extent to which poverty has been (re)conceptualised to highlight diverse vulnerabilities in relation to natural hazards, including extreme events, seasonal stress and emerging scarcity. Again, this is briefly touched upon in many programmes but it is difficult to assess the extent to which a more profound reassessment has taken place. Poverty concerns are most concretely reflected in relation to food security, limited access to scarce land and water resources and weak public services. Each of these factors should/could be directly analysed in relation to natural hazard related risk (e.g., how are food security, resource access and provision of public services affected by a flood or drought and what could be

done to improve the situation), but apart from global/regional policy initiatives and some specific programmes, this form of analysis appears to be rare.

Growing international concerns about “green grabbing” suggest that a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to resilience is urgently needed to better reflect how, due to unequal access to scarce resources, vulnerability means different things (a) for men and women, (b) for wealthy and poor, and (c) for people with different abilities and livelihoods. Furthermore, efforts to promote ecosystem resilience may exclude the most vulnerable sectors of the population that are using these ecosystems if they are defined as “the problem” due to their natural resource management practices, such as swidden agriculture or pastoralism, being labelled as destructive.¹ This review has found that insufficient safeguards are in place to ensure that HRBA is used to prevent Sida programmes from contributing to “green grabbing” that may promote ecosystem resilience but exclude many vulnerable people from this enhanced resilience.

Box 3

Human rights-based approaches and climate change?

It would perhaps seem self-evident that synergies would be found between addressing climate vulnerability and HRBA. In undertaking this review, few examples were found where this link is being explicitly analysed in Sida programming. Perhaps this is because these synergies are taken for granted as resilience and rights are assumed to go hand-in-hand.

However, it may be time to start applying HRBA more concertedly. There are danger signs that the climate change discourse can be used by powerful actors to promote their own resilience, and in so doing ignore the vulnerabilities of weaker groups in society. In a forthcoming article on climate change processes in Tanzania by Smucker et al, drawing on their Local Knowledge and Climate Change Adaptation Project, the similarities are noted between the forced labour for terracing and other soil conservation practices during the colonial era and the ways that the current climate discourse ignores the complex and diverse adaptation needs of smallholders. Resilience in the area of their research is related to access to specific land and water resources (e.g., “wetlands in the drylands”) when the extent of these resources is shrinking and population pressures are increasing. The problem is not just how to use these resources for resilience, but *whose* resilience is given priority.

The macro level discourse on climate change in some countries and in the new plans for aid investments may ignore the multitude of coping strategies employed by smallholders and instead lean towards an undifferentiated picture of rural poverty that “blames the poor” for land degradation and favours larger commercial actors as the best way to act on the “imperative” of ramping up climate adaptation measures. This suggests that HRBA, tied to recognition and analyses of the diversity and complexity of local vulnerabilities and responses to climate change are essential if poor people’s resilience is to be addressed.

<http://tzclimadapt.ohio.edu/>

¹ Fairhead, J., Leach, M. and Scoones, I. 2012. Green grabbing: A new appropriation of nature? *Journal of Peasant Studies*. 39:2. 237-261.

Finally, in undertaking this review mention has been made of the relevance of applying lessons from efforts to mainstream other cross-cutting issues (e.g., gender, HIV/AIDS, HRBA) in Sida programmes when designing strategies to mainstream risk and resilience. It has been beyond the scope of this assignment to undertake such an analysis, but it would seem to be very relevant. If this were to be done it would also be useful to look at the challenges that have been faced in international efforts to mainstream risk reduction (especially the efforts of ISDR) and particularly the difficulties of mainstreaming issues that do not receive prominent attention in national poverty reduction strategies.

3.3. LOCAL, NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS

Sweden has a strong profile at the global level on these issues, being a major contributor to international networks and organisations responsible for raising attention to risk and resilience, particularly in relation to water, the environment and DRR. Sweden also supports some regional networks and capacity development programmes. Skills and knowledge relevant for international negotiations are given particular attention.² There are some innovative efforts to use regional initiatives to develop the capacities of national actors to influence global climate and trade negotiations.³ Regional initiatives are focused primarily on issues with transboundary and common resource use implications,⁴ and where similar challenges create economies of scale for capacity development and South-South synergies.⁵ There is some support to concrete field level pilot projects,⁶ though this is relatively limited and primarily supported indirectly through national funds managed outside of Sida⁷ or through the Special Climate Change Initiative.

It is difficult to identify the paths through which these global and regional efforts influence Sida programming at national levels. This is not to say that this does not occur, but rather that the connections and dialogue tools for this are not clearly apparent in the documentation reviewed. Interviews in Kenya demonstrated that those responsible for country level programming, including local partners and contracted consulting firms, had very little engagement with or channels to learn from global initiatives.

It is important to note that most support to global networks includes support to regional and national partners. Also, these networks and initiatives tend to combine capacity de-

² European Capacity Building Initiative (ECBI); Promoting Agriculture-Climate-Trade Linkages in the East African Community (PACT EAC)

³ PACT EAC

⁴ UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) Coastal Zone Management in Africa; Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC); Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), Mekong River Commission (MRC)

⁵ PACT EAC

⁶ International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Mangroves for the Future

⁷ Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF); IUCN Mangroves for the Future

velopment with their support to policy formation. It is therefore not possible to clearly disaggregate global versus regional support, or capacity development versus policy engagements. Also, within these networks it is not possible in a review such as this to judge the role of Sida in relation to the other actors engaged in these partnerships.

Within the regional efforts of potential relevance to resilience there are a number of research networks on environmental economics in Africa, Latin America, South Asia and South East Asia.⁸ It has not been possible to assess the extent to which these efforts have reflected risk and resilience concerns, but the potential relevance of these efforts is apparently considerable. One positive example of how a network has focused attention on resilience is the Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA), which is downscaling climate vulnerability assessment in the region.⁹ They have also made significant efforts to critically assess the outcomes of their training and workshops.¹⁰

A major focus of support through Southern regional institutions is in regional trans-boundary water management institutions such as the Mekong River Commission, the Nile Basin Initiative and the Nile Equatorial Lake Subsidiary Action Programme. In addition to the transboundary water programmes, a notable feature of regional policy/capacity development efforts is that some of the most innovative programmes are being led by Southern institutions.¹¹

As will be underscored below, with some notable exceptions the level of support to local, community-based DRR and climate adaptation activities through regular programming windows appears to be limited. Most such support has been found in the Special Climate Change Initiative and aid channelled through Swedish civil society framework organisations. This is not necessarily a problem, but it raises questions as to how well these efforts can be used to inform overall Sida approaches if they are “two steps removed” from the rest of the development portfolio due to being managed as part of a special initiative or within civil society programming that may not be visible to Sida programme officers

⁸ EEPSEA, South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE), Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program (LACEEP), Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa (CEEPA)

⁹ Yusuf and Francisco 2009

¹⁰ EEPSEA 2010

¹¹ Examples include Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) India; PACT EAC; Thailand Environmental Institute (TEI) Thailand; Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA): Journalism Fellowship Programme

Box 4**South-South linkages to address multiple risk in East Africa**

With Swedish support the Indian organisation Consumer Unity and Trust Society is implementing a project for Promoting Agriculture-Climate-Trade Linkages in the East African Community (PACT EAC) that is bringing together actors in East Africa to explore and address the food security implications of climate change for agricultural trade through research and advocacy. The project recognises that a large measure of the resilience of the rural poor in East Africa will be related to their capacity to take advantage of new opportunities and respond to the challenges that will accompany increased trade, and that climate change will influence both trading patterns and smallholders’ capacities to produce. This involves confronting the multiplicity of risk where market and climatic volatility converge. East Africa is likely to import more food in the coming years and regional trade will be affected as climate change has greater impacts on specific hot spots. This project recognises that this is not just a national issue, but will require joint analyses and advocacy across the region to ensure that countries in East Africa pursue trade negotiations and national policies that reflect this broader perspective.

<http://www.cuts-geneva.org/pactec/>

3.4. RISK AND RESILIENCE IN RELATION TO DISASTERS AND SMALLER RECURRENT CRISES

Risk reduction efforts at Sida are largely conceptualised in terms of *disaster* risk reduction, financed through humanitarian programming and the Special Climate Change Initiative. Insufficient attention appears¹² to be given to reduction of risks associated with smaller recurrent crises and increasing seasonal stress. This seems to relate to divisions between humanitarian funding sources (which are for obvious reasons channelled to disasters), and development programmes (where crises are usually addressed as risks or obstacles to programme implementation rather than central concerns).

This review has encountered a significant level of rhetorical mention of recurrent hazards in programmes, but there is less evidence that this has led to changes in on-the-ground programming.

¹² Here again, there may be more attention given to these smaller crises than can be surmised from the literature reviewed. There may indeed be significant efforts to respond at field level to emerging crises that are not apparent in programme reporting. The designs of programmes that are structured around relatively linear logical frameworks may overlook or underestimate the prevalence of these small crises if this implicitly puts into question assumptions about the probability of a steady path toward growth and economic development.

In Kenya, for example, the lessons learnt from responding to small recurrent droughts are not yet clearly apparent in new plans for value chain development,¹³ despite this being central to the viability of the commercialisation schemes that will be supported. It is important to stress that this finding cannot be verified and may relate mostly to difficulties in conceptualising the theories of change and risk analyses regarding response to these events. Actors on the ground may have found effective ways of working with climate variability and uncertainty that are not reflected in official documents.

Box 5

Linking social protection and humanitarian response in Ethiopia

The PNSP in Ethiopia is one the largest current efforts to move from a purely humanitarian response to recurrent drought to a national social protection system. But what happens when a drought is too severe to be managed within such a system? Are there defacto LRRD mechanisms that can “kick in” to buttress social protection schemes when droughts or floods become overwhelming? The PNSP has an associated Risk Financing Mechanism, which can be used for rapidly expanding support to current clients and new clients of the PNSP in emergencies. It seeks to build on and utilise ongoing structures for faster and more effective humanitarian response. For it to be effective, four factors must be present: early warning, contingency plans, contingency financing, institutions and capacity. In the response to the 2011 drought the aspect that was weakest was found to be early warning. This can perhaps be seen as somewhat of a paradox since humanitarian organisations have been working to develop early warning systems in Ethiopia for decades, whereas the institutions and planning structures related to the PNSP are

An important path for bringing together efforts to deal with resilience, risk and vulnerability in relation to disasters (and also smaller shocks) is to establish or strengthen social protection mechanisms, including insurance, livelihood support and food security measures. Indeed, the Director General’s instructions referred to in the introduction to this report highlight the importance of increasing these efforts. Some Sida staff interviewed recognise that these initiatives are of vital importance for linking humanitarian and development efforts and express frustration that Sweden currently has few such investments underway and that support has been discontinued for one of the most important international efforts in this regard, the Poverty Safety Net Programme (PNSP) in Ethiopia.¹⁴ Sida has had an active dialogue with WFP and the Social Resilience Cluster

¹³ Agricultural programming is increasingly focused on “value chain development”. This term is used to refer to a range of interventions intended to encourage commercialisation. This review does not attempt to unpack that different meanings associated with value chain development, but notes that this is a varied programming area.

¹⁴ Sida also supports a social protection programme in Mozambique, but it has an urban focus and would appear to address vulnerability in relation to food price volatility rather than natural hazards. For more information about the PNSP and the Risk Finance Mechanism described in box 5

at the World Bank on such innovative approaches, but has provided little direct support for these areas of activity. The current initiative to design a strategy to respond to the crisis in the Horn of Africa may provide a basis for highlighting the importance of (and opportunities for) a more strategic and concerted approach in this regard. Support to the design of the African Union led African Risk Capacity may also provide some impetus to expanding this part of the portfolio.

see Hobsen and Campbell 2012 <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-53/how-ethiopias-productive-safety-net-programme-psnp-is-responding-to-the-current-humanitarian-crisis-in-the-horn>

4 Disaster risk reduction, with and without LRRD

4.1 OVERVIEW

In 2009 Sida began making increased investments in DRR and a staff position was created to promote this process (discontinued in 2011). It is not possible to attribute the emergence or enhancement of DRR within specific programmes to this initiative. The fact that the new 2012 directives from the director general call for reinforced attention to DRR suggest that these efforts were seen as insufficient.

In interviews and discussions for this review it has become apparent that DRR efforts are often assumed to be inextricably linked to programming for LRRD. This implies a focus on “building back better”, i.e., in ways that address underlying vulnerabilities. This was in the past a major priority for Sweden (e.g., in the response to Hurricane Mitch,¹⁵ and the evaluation efforts after the South Asian Tsunami¹⁶). There are currently some smaller DRR projects based within LRRD programming.¹⁷ It has not been possible to gain a full overview of these latter efforts since they are largely embedded in humanitarian framework grants. Global support to linking DRR and LRRD is being provided as part of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) track three Sustainable Recovery Program.

However, it should be stressed that most of Sida’s DRR portfolio is not linked to LRRD. At global level Swedish support to DRR is strongly concentrated on support to global actors, primarily GFDRR and ISDR. In the past Sweden was a major financier of the ProVention Consortium. Examples of smaller Swedish support include encouraging greater integration of DRR concerns in climate change efforts by funding ISDR to engage actively in COP 17. National and regional DRR initiatives have been developed within regular programming structures or from the Special Climate Change Initiative, e.g., support to strengthen national disaster management capacities in Bangladesh.¹⁸

¹⁵ Christoplos. I. et al, 2010

¹⁶ Christoplos 2006; Brusset et al. 2009

¹⁷ e.g., FAO earthquake; ACF Bolivia; earmarked support for GFDRR’s programming in Haiti; there are said to be many more initiatives included in the work of humanitarian framework organisations, but it has not been possible to gain an overview of these activities within this review.

¹⁸ Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme Phase II (CDMP II); BCCRF

As these examples suggest, DRR is sometimes promoted within Sida programming as part of LRRD efforts, but this is by no means always the case. Whereas DRR is sometimes seen as a humanitarian responsibility, to be dealt with using short-term humanitarian funding windows and/or resources earmarked for responding to a specific disaster, DRR is also sometimes seen as more of a developmental concern unrelated to a specific emergency.

Box 6

From Cyclone Shelters to Mainstreamed Resilience in Bangladesh

Bangladesh has come to symbolise the effectiveness of investing in DRR. The construction of cyclone shelters has saved countless lives since they began being constructed over forty years ago. Despite being recognised globally as perhaps the most successful DRR programme, there are still unmet needs, with estimates of requirements at 5000 shelters, compared to the 3000 that currently exist, some of which require replacement.

Recently approaches to supporting resilience in Bangladesh have begun moving from specific projects (which have financed much of the existing cyclone shelters) to more systemic approaches. Sida is one of the donors supporting the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF), a World Bank managed trust fund that takes a more programmatic approach to supporting such infrastructural investments, together with a strong emphasis on institutional development and strengthening of government capacities to prepare for and respond to climate hazards. The BCCRF is an example of a step towards seeing cyclone shelters as a core development priority rather than something to be built with ad hoc or temporary resources drawn from humanitarian or recovery budgets. The BCCRF constitutes an important shift to a harmonised and coordinated donor response in a country and area of activity that in the past was subject to a high degree of fragmentation and projectisation.

Civil society organisations in Bangladesh have nonetheless expressed strong criticism regarding the structure of the BCCRF, wherein the World Bank will retain fiduciary responsibilities until 2018. They question whether this can be seen as a genuinely mainstreamed Bangladeshi process as long as the national government does not control the purse strings. This bypass of national systems may be interpreted as representing a quasi-humanitarian modality in a programme that is intended as a step toward full national ownership and leadership.

<http://www.unisdr.org/archive/26009> ; <http://www.sida.se/English/Countries-and-regions/Asia/Bangladesh/Programmes-and-projects1/Common-donor-fund-will-assist-Bangladesh-to-adapt/> ; http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/more.php?date=2012-05-11&news_id=129282

Regional DRR initiatives are relatively few, though some regional climate,¹⁹ transboundary water management²⁰ and coastal resource management initiatives²¹ have a strong DRR emphasis, notably in Asia. Sida had a major role in such work in the years following the South Asian Tsunami. Support continues to be provided for disaster preparedness (an aspect of DRR) in financing the regional tsunami early warning system,²² and coastal zone management, which may partly address tsunami risk.²³ FAO and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are working with governments in the Horn of Africa on developing a comprehensive food security initiative, which if financed may lead to further regional food security focused DRR programming in the future.

Box 7

African Risk Capacity

One of the most innovative and potentially important regional initiatives is support to the design of African Union led African Risk Capacity (ARC). This joint weather indexed risk pooling mechanism will apply lessons from national drought insurance mechanisms in Ethiopia and Malawi, and regional disaster risk pooling mechanisms from the Caribbean. If and when it is fully operational, the ARC will create a genuinely African owned response mechanism for major climate events that will not be dependent on ad hoc and often very slow international humanitarian appeals. It will also (perhaps most importantly) provide an incentive for African governments to prepare their own contingency and response plans, as these are required for accessing these funds. With such plans in place, African governments will be able to rapidly and effectively disburse the ARC resources.

<http://www.africanriskcapacity.org/>

Regional DRR programmes, or changes in programmes, appear to have often been inspired by a major disaster or series of recurrent disasters. Regional initiatives in Asia²⁴ related to flooding and both national and regional efforts in the Horn of Africa related to drought, are clear examples of this.

¹⁹ International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), 2009 Local responses to too much water and too little water in the Greater Himalayan Region; EEPSEA Climate change vulnerability assessment

²⁰ MRC

²¹ IUCN Mangroves for the Future; Coordinating Bodies on the Seas of East Asia/UNEP

²² UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Trust Fund for Tsunami, Disaster and Climate Preparedness

²³ Coastal zone programming that was (perhaps) inspired by efforts to address tsunami risks appear to be shifting to deal with tipping point concerns related to sea level rise and salinization. The implications of this change of conceptual framework would be worthwhile exploring further.

²⁴ Swedish Society for Nature Conservation support to the Foundation for Ecological Recovery in the Mekong region

Box 8**Flood management and mitigation in the Mekong**

Widespread flooding along the Mekong River and its tributaries in 2000 spurred the Mekong River Commission (MRC) to establish an initial Flood Management and Mitigation Programme (FMMP) in 2004. The systems that were established in that period are now being institutionalised through the creation of a Regional Flood Mitigation and Management Center in Phnom Penh which will both provide regional flood monitoring functions and transboundary dialogue on flood related issues, and also be the base for a regionally owned process of national capacity development for flood management and mitigation.

<http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Programme-Documents/FMMP-2011-2015-Programme-Document-Volume-1-file-date-21042011.pdf>

It should also be noted that DRR encompasses a range of activities. Some of these are focused on increasing the resilience capabilities of vulnerable populations. Some consist of reconstruction and recovery investments with a focus on “building back better” so as to reduce the likelihood of future disasters. There are also activities sometimes referred to as “disaster preparedness” or “disaster management”, i.e., increasing capacities for rapid and effective disaster response.

Box 9**Consistent support to disaster management capacities in Mozambique**

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is working with the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) in Mozambique to develop skills related to disaster preparedness and response through improved communications and logistical coordination capacity. MSB has shown itself to be a reliable, long-term partner for INGC, in contrast to some other agencies who have failed to live up to commitments when donor interest in disaster management capacities has waxed and waned after major floods. Some of INGC’s erstwhile “partners” in capacity development have been reported to actually poach staff when disasters have occurred.

This is a new area of activity for MSB, as it is an agency that primarily focuses on direct operational response to humanitarian emergencies. As such it is uncertain whether this “pilot” effort represents a trend. INGC has requested further support, but MSB has been cautious in expanding further into this new role.

Anderson et al, forthcoming

4.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR MAINSTREAMING

There are basically three ways that DRR appears to become mainstreamed into ongoing development programming:

1. Through linkages made between relatively small-scale DRR projects led by humanitarian agencies and the work of longer-term development partners, usually as part of LRRD efforts.
2. Through risk reduction initiatives in longer-term development programmes that have apparently been inspired or informed by either major disasters or smaller recurrent disasters.

3. Through programming that is inspired or informed by new awareness and information about climate change or food insecurity scenarios or other information indicating that "disasters" are increasingly "normal".

This suggests that it is important to recognise that mainstreaming of DRR is only sometimes related to LRRD. Indeed, this can even be interpreted as indicating that assumptions that DRR is a humanitarian responsibility can constitute an obstacle to developing those aspects of the resilience-related development portfolio that have limited links with specific disasters and specific humanitarian/LRRD activities.

Furthermore, a linking of humanitarian and development efforts oriented toward developing capacities for resilience should include anticipatory aspects, i.e., investments *before* the disaster to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place. But this is not possible if DRR is financed from post-disaster recovery resources.

One reason that DRR is often funded as a component or mainstreamed theme within post-disaster LRRD programming is the presumed greater awareness of the importance of addressing underlying risks after a disaster. There were, for example, huge increases in global interest in disaster risk after the South Asian Tsunami, Hurricane Mitch and the Pakistan Earthquake. Funding for ISDR increased enormously and the HFA received strong global endorsement at the World Disaster Reduction Conference in 2005 due to this conference being held directly after the South Asian Tsunami.

The problem with this tendency is that commitments to genuinely mainstream DRR concerns (and concerns about risk related to smaller shocks and even many slow-onset disasters) may rapidly diminish as the memories of the major disasters that generated these commitments fade and as humanitarian funding windows for the affected countries close. The result of such processes is that there are many pilot projects, guidelines are produced, etc., but less attention is given to sustainable institutional development within national governments and civil society. The review has not found any ex post evaluations of LRRD driven DRR initiatives, therefore it cannot be verified whether the long-term institution building that DRR requires has come to full fruition in these projects or if some of these initiatives were prematurely discontinued due to ineffective LRRD transition mechanisms. Even if the latter is true (as seems likely), this does not necessarily imply that the solution for generating consistent commitments to DRR is therefore to establish better transition mechanisms. It may instead suggest that DRR should be promoted as a developmental concern managed through longer-term development programming at the outset, and not necessarily linked to humanitarian programming per se. This is not to claim that better coordination between humanitarian and development efforts is not important, but rather that a focus on obstacles to transitions may be a distraction from the central issue of *how to ensure that DRR becomes mainstreamed in development programming, drawing on lessons about risk that are (or should be) learnt after a major disaster.*

As noted above, LRRD related DRR is just one aspect of how Sida works with risk reduction. There are also development programmes that have been inspired or informed by either major disasters or smaller recurrent crises; and programming that is effectively a response to new scenarios indicating that "disasters" are increasingly "normal". The tendency to sometimes label DRR as a "humanitarian issue" is therefore not an accurate representation of what Sida actually does. As described in the next two sections, there are good reasons not to "put all the DRR eggs in the LRRD basket".

Box 10

GFDRR and mainstreaming of DRR

The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) functions as a link between national development policy processes (such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) and DRR by providing networking and development of the capabilities of national institutions to undertake planning and create institutional structures for risk reduction. It also advises World Bank country teams and supports ISDR to promote the DRR principles of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in national policy processes. An evaluation of GFDRR in 2010 found that skills had been transferred to local partners, but that it was too early to assess whether this led to significant changes in institutional structures and national policies. Some progress has also been made in engaging with and leveraging the efforts of the World Bank country offices.

From interviews conducted during this review it appears that there are few at Sida who are aware of GFDRR's work and given that this is a significant target of Sida investment in mainstreaming DRR and LRRD it would seem that there may currently be a missed opportunity to leverage this engagement to explore potential entry points through which Sida could engage at national levels in DRR and LRRD related resilience efforts. Embassies could, for example, engage both with the national expertise that GFDRR has helped to foster and also in the policy related resilience initiatives being supported by the World Bank and UN system.

http://gfdrr.org/docs/GFDRR_EvaluationReportVol-I.pdf

4.3 THE ELUSIVE "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY" FOR RISK REDUCTION IN POST-DISASTER RECOVERY

There is a common assumption that the post-disaster recovery phase provides a 'window of opportunity' for DRR. This assumption is supported by the hypothesis that the following factors encourage DRR efforts:

- *New awareness of risk after a disaster leads to broad consensus:* The disaster experience is expected to generate new knowledge, which is in turn expected to bring various stakeholders together around a shared awareness of the nature of risk.
- *Fault lines in development policies revealed:* The mistakes of past development policies and strategies, which resulted in increased risks, have been revealed and are better understood.

- *Institutional weaknesses exposed:* The corruption, lack of human resources and otherwise weak institutional structures that allowed high risk planning and discouraged appropriate monitoring before the disaster have been exposed.
- *Old vested interests weakened:* Those actors whose actions have contributed to creating risks have been discredited and have lost political and perhaps economic clout.
- *Bad infrastructure washed away:* The disaster has destroyed much of the infrastructure that was improperly designed, creating a “blank slate” for “building back better”.
- *Development and humanitarian agencies “reminded” of disaster risks:* Official DRR goals that had been “forgotten” before the disaster gain renewed prominence in recovery policies, plans and programmes.
- *Enhanced political will:* The desire to act (and be seen to act) to reduce the risks of future disasters is stronger than usual (due to the risks of inaction), resulting in more proactive political leadership.
- *Money available to do things better:* Reconstruction funding is provided more generously than that which is normally available to address risks

Indeed, past experience shows that these factors are present after a disaster. The question is whether they are enough. The obstacles to the window of opportunity include the following:

- *Humanitarian principles do not mesh well with DRR:* Even though they would appear to be natural allies of the DRR agenda, humanitarians are primarily concerned with addressing acute human suffering and maintaining independence, neutrality and impartiality. Many of the factors behind the window of opportunity theory constitute obstacles in their work. In sum, even if “in principle” they support DRR, their “principles” sometimes point them in a different direction.
- *Reconstruction requires weighing, prioritising and sequencing of policies and programming:* There are hard choices that need to be made after a disaster and “building back better” is just one such priority.
- *Inflation of mainstreaming pressures:* The “solution” to the aforementioned factor is usually assumed to be to mainstream DRR. But there are too many mainstreaming agendas and DRR is just one of them.
- *Development policies are forgotten in recovery:* Many strategies to promote DRR assume that inclusion in government policies is the best way forward. These documents may have little influence on the post-disaster recovery agenda when the pressures for quick results can override alignment with declared policies and goals.
- *Speed versus quality and rights versus sustainability:* The “rights” of people to rapidly obtain homes and livelihoods may lead to depletion of natural resources and increased risk. Getting people out of tents and into houses and off of food aid and into jobs become the most pressing issues for politicians, donors and disaster affected people. Abstract fears of future disasters are put on the back burner. This shift of interest is aggravated by the media, on the hunt for “victims” who have “had their rights violated”, and by donors who want to have their money spent fast.

- *Stylised images of villains and heroes discourage empirical understanding of risks and vulnerabilities:* Real DRR needs to be anchored in reality, but reality is not a driving force in how many agencies design their recovery programmes. They like to see small-scale fishermen in fragile little boats and picturesque peasants hoeing hillsides and planting trees. These images are not sufficient for understanding the political economy of why people dig shrimp ponds and the choices faced by a disaster affected person trying to decide whether to start a new farm in the jungle or to try to get a job as a hotel waiter.
- *Institutions may matter, but they are often simply not there:* Many of the recommendations put forth by the DRR community include long lists of the things that governments, particularly local authorities, are supposed to do, or at least do better. After a disaster a major part of the civil service may have perished. Rebuilding human resources may take years. International agencies may have "poached" the best and the brightest from the public sector, and may have gutted local civil society as well. A pragmatic DRR agenda needs to include an understanding of these limits and their implications for what can actually be done.

4.4 ENSURING THAT DRR DOES NOT GET CAUGHT IN THE LRRD GAP THROUGH A SHIFT TO RESILIENCE THINKING

A senior staff member of the United Kingdom Department for International Development has recently suggested that resilience should not be seen as a vehicle to solve long-standing problems in LRRD. Resilience should rather be seen as a concept that can transcend mistaken assumptions that LRRD is the most appropriate vehicle for generating commitments to DRR. Macrae claims that renewed efforts to address transitions between relief and development projects are unlikely to lead to a revitalisation of efforts to address the core issue of reducing human vulnerability, and may even constitute a distraction.²⁵ Recognition of the uncertainties regarding to overall landscape of risk, associated with climate change and other factors is interpreted as implying that resilience is a more appropriate basis for generating commitments to DRR than the somewhat linear and technical concept of LRRD. A question emerging from this review is whether resilience can indeed actually carry with it a new perspective, or if it will be subject to the same conundrums facing the LRRD "window of opportunity" noted above.

²⁵ Macrae, J. 2012. The continuum is dead, long live resilience. VOICE Out Loud. Issue 15. May 2012.

The ToRs for this review seem to be based on assumptions that more concerted efforts to focus on DRR can largely be achieved by more effectively and appropriately addressing transitions between relief and development programming.²⁶ This in turn suggests that solutions lie restructuring the aid architecture to bridge humanitarian and development structures.

Improvements in the aid architecture for LRRD may be part of the solution, but this review shares Macrae's view that this can lead to a narrow perspective.²⁷ Her recommendation that resilience should replace the LRRD continuum perspectives of the past is based on many years of research and practice wherein it has been found that the technical focus on "who does what" among humanitarian and development actors is not conducive to finding constructive analysis of how to help vulnerable people reduce the risks they face. Sometimes this can be done by humanitarian agencies, sometimes by development agencies and sometimes (but by no means always) by bringing both together. But if the starting point is assumptions that LRRD collaboration mechanisms are the primary solution, there is a tendency to lock-in discussions around intervention forms that may be narrow and inappropriate. DRR can be managed quite well from either end of the LRRD spectrum, and ownership is often best fostered within the national level discourse on issues such as food security, rather than in mechanisms to "fix" the LRRD continuum. If LRRD is viewed by national actors as a "non-starter" due to fatigue with repeated and failed attempts to use humanitarian programming to reduce disaster risk (as was found in the Kenya case study for this review), this does not mean that DRR is dead. Rather that it should be addressed differently in humanitarian and development programmes, perhaps without the transaction costs of trying to bring everyone around a common programming framework.

²⁶ Purpose two of the assignment is "To identify gaps and linkages between humanitarian and long-term development cooperation, in order to increase our understanding of possible opportunities for transition between the two and the value of interventions focusing on prevention of disaster..."

²⁷ The inception report for this review highlighted the importance of focusing on resilience outcomes rather than issues related to the aid architecture noting that: "Regarding the links between humanitarian and development interventions, it is understood that the focus shall be on the extent to which the policies and programmes derived from these linkage efforts *reflect the extent to which the risks and vulnerabilities that have been revealed by the disaster or crisis are incorporated into how resilience is perceived and promoted*. This may include aspects related to the aid architecture, but the review will not provide a comprehensive overview of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) more generally."

Box 11**DRR/LRRD linkages after the South Asian Tsunami and Hurricane Mitch**

It is common that large-scale recovery efforts after major natural hazard induced disasters are expected to reduce disaster risks. After Hurricane Mitch Sweden led a process that culminated in the “Stockholm Declaration”, which focused on perceiving recovery as societal “transformation” with the overriding goal being to “Reduce the social and ecological vulnerability of the region”. After the South Asian Tsunami the UN Special Envoy William J. Clinton presented Key Propositions for Building Back Better (2006), one of which was that “Good recovery must leave communities safer by reducing risks and building resilience.”

In both cases subsequent evaluation and research have shown that the initial efforts during the most intensive relief phases included rhetorical attention to these goals, but achieved limited results. Over the years, however, risk and vulnerability have been addressed more concertedly in both regions, presumably spurred by these earlier goals. This implies that integration of risk reduction measures may be less effective in the humanitarian led relief-rehabilitation transitions than in the later development focused rehabilitation-development linkage processes. This in turn suggests the importance of engaging larger development actors in DRR at an early stage to establish comprehensive approaches to addressing these national policy commitments, rather than assuming that smaller DRR projects within humanitarian operations will simply be scaled-up.

http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/declaration.htm ;

<http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=2054> ;

5 Resilience initiatives within Climate Change Adaptation

5.1 OVERVIEW

A broad range of climate change adaptation activities are currently receiving Sida support, including:

- Funding mechanisms for small projects to which (primarily) NGOs can apply
- Urban and peri-urban water projects designed to address climate risks
- Global/regional/national networks dealing with climate policy and capacity development
- Biodiversity conservation programmes
- Core funding for strategic global partners

The primary current channel and vehicle for support to climate adaptation at national level is the Special Climate Change Initiative. The projects funded within the Special Climate Change Initiative range from relatively large integrated rural development programmes, to peri-urban water projects, to NGO networks. Some of these initiatives are focused on DRR implemented by development partners (i.e., not as part of LRRD or humanitarian-development collaboration efforts).

In addition to the Special Climate Change Initiative there are a broad range of climate related efforts at global and regional levels, including a significant proportion of the aforementioned global and regional policy/capacity support,²⁸ the International Training Programme on climate change led by the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI), and regional initiatives combining capacity development and research, particularly in Asia.²⁹ It is notable that Swedish support to the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) is focused generally on climate change (both adaptation and mitigation) but does not explicitly stress resilience and risk issues and excludes support for UNEP's strategic focus on "Disasters and conflict".³⁰ As this example illustrates, the extent to which resilience to natural hazards has been given special attention within the broader climate adaptation agenda varies considerably.

²⁸ WRI; ISDR; Wetland Alliance; ICIMOD; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (UNESCWA); University of Queensland

²⁹ ICIMOD; UNESCWA; University of Queensland; EEPSEA; SANDEE; LACEEP; CEEPA; Stockholm

Regional support to developing national capacities for climate change adaptation is in many cases addressed through long-standing cooperation with regional environmental economics networks.³¹ It has not been possible to assess the outputs of these research networks in this review,³² but there may be aspects of the work of these networks that could provide guidance for rethinking risk analyses in the future.

5.2 CLIMATE RISK SCENARIOS IN RESULTS FRAMEWORKS

For the purposes of this review it is assumed that all climate adaptation measures, by definition, should be related to resilience, risk and vulnerability. The key question is whether there is a clear theory of change³³ that describes the specific scenarios regarding emerging climate related hazards and vulnerabilities and how climate change adaptation measures would be expected to actually alleviate these risks. These theories of change would need to be supported by comprehensive risk and vulnerability analyses and systems to monitor risks over time against a baseline drawing on analysis of natural hazards and household vulnerability. Even if there is rhetorical recognition that climate change adaptation is about resilience and risk reduction, in the documentation reviewed there is little evidence that such analyses are being undertaken. For example, the Kenyan National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Component (NALEP ASALs) was explicitly focused on reducing disaster risks, but when it was evaluated there was no evidence found that risks had been reduced and there was only passing reference to this seemingly glaring gap in the overarching theory of change to justify the project. This example is not unique. The ADB supported CASP2 refers to resilience, but lacks an explicit and consolidated explanation of how climate-related hazards are likely to affect poor farmers and how the interventions will address this vulnerability.

Environment Institute-UNEP Regional Resource Centre for Asia and the Pacific

³⁰ Programme Cooperation Agreement between Sweden and UNEP 2010-2013

³¹ EEPSEA; SANDEE; LACEEP; CEEPA

³² The "impact assessment" undertaken by EEPSEA is a notable exception.

³³ A theory of change describes the ways that programme activities and outputs are expected to lead to the intended outcomes, including basic assumptions about the factors influencing the problem that the programme is intended to address. In monitoring and evaluation efforts increasing attention is being paid to clarifying the logic behind these *causal linkages*, as a way of overcoming tendencies to overly focus on targets rather than the processes required to achieve intended results.

Box 12**New approaches to monitoring and evaluating climate change adaptation**

Climate change adaptation (and to a large extent DRR as well) is not an easy area to evaluate. This is due to several perplexing problems that accompany design, monitoring and evaluation of these interventions:

- Given the long timeframes that characterise climate change it is impossible to assess adaptation to climate trends when there is little certainty (and no chance to assess) what those trends will eventually be.
- Disasters may be happening more frequently, but may not occur during project implementation; how then to assess whether risk have been reduced or if capacities have proven appropriate?
- If efforts have been appropriate and people have been able to cope with a drought or a flood more effectively (i.e., it did not turn into a disaster); how to evaluate the disaster that did not happen? How to assess the contribution of an intervention to averting losses?
- Sida support often focuses on *adaptive capacity*, i.e., institutional development, in recognition of the fact that there is a multitude of evidence that *adaptive actions*, such as construction of infrastructure, are unsustainable without investment in institutions. Is this compatible with the new demands for tangible “results” if these new institutions are not always put to a test within the project timeframe?
- Risk management tends to be assessed in a separate risk analysis framework, outside of the main results chain. Monitoring and evaluation systems tend to give priority to following the main results indicators and not the risk analysis. Resources are seldom earmarked for monitoring and evaluating this “peripheral” topic.
- Sida risk analysis structures sensibly differentiate between internal and external risk (the latter being most important for resilience), however, the current draft of Sida at Work places primary focus on internal risks, which may also discourage analyses of how climate related risks were mitigated.
- Climate change problems are enormous and are often characterised as a “crisis”. For this reason there is often a vast gap between the intended outcomes of what are often small, pilot projects and the overall problem. Unrealistic and implausible results frameworks are an obstacle to assessing the contribution of these small projects to addressing the massive problems associated with climate change.

There are several international organisations that have recognised the need to establish design, monitoring and evaluation systems to respond to these challenges. It is important to stress though, that addressing some of these issues requires more than a new method; but rather demands a political readiness to accept that appropriate resilience programming will involve a high degree of risk taking, flexibility and learning, features which are not always apparent in current approaches to development cooperation.

<http://www.seachangecop.org/node/519> ; <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10031IIED.pdf> ; http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/monitoring-and-evaluation-for-adaptation-lessons-from-development-co-operation-agencies_5kg20mj6c2bw-en

5.3 CLIMATE CHANGE AS A PLATFORM FOR LEARNING ABOUT RESILIENCE

It is important to note that climate change adaptation is a relatively new area of activity for Sida. Investments have increased rapidly and it has not always been possible to rely on past precedents and experience in assessing projects. As such, it has been acknowledged that the expansion of this portfolio through the Special Climate Change Initiative has been undertaken together with partners in a “learning by doing” approach.³⁴ As such, the findings here should be seen in light of the need to find better ways to learn about resilience and vulnerability reduction as a new type of “result”. The results frameworks analysed in this review remain overwhelmingly oriented toward more traditional aims, such as increasing incomes, growth, access to water or food production. The need to choose different indicators for measuring resilience per se, in order to understand if adaptation has been achieved, seems not to have been considered in most planning processes.

In a very general sense, the scale of Special Climate Change Initiative makes it Sida’s strongest current opportunity to broadly reflect on the realities of resilience efforts in terms of exploring results achieved through local level service provision, community-based adaptation initiatives and small-scale infrastructural investments. This review has uncovered relatively few such investments outside of the Special Climate Change Initiative, which could be interpreted as indicating weak mainstreaming into general programming.³⁵ These investments are very recent and given the way that this time-bound investment package is structured it is not clear how these projects are expected to translate into climate resilience eventually becoming part of Sida’s mainstream approaches to development cooperation. A number of pre-existing projects have been “retrofitted” with these funds to better focus on resilience, but it has not been possible to assess whether these new elements are now seen as integral aspects of these programmes or if the approaches will return to “business as usual” if/when these earmarked funds are no longer available. The problematic experience of gradually declining interest in DRR in the years after a major disaster may be replicated in the future, after the end of the support provided through the Special Climate Change Initiative, if efforts are not undertaken soon to better anchor lessons learnt from these investments in future country and regional strategies and sectoral policies.

³⁴ Årsrapport 2011 Klimatsatsning

³⁵ There may be more such programming within the humanitarian and civil society portfolio, but it has not been possible to obtain an overview of this programming, which may also be interpreted as indicating that there are related difficulties in learning from such programming in Sida’s overall efforts.

Box 13**Retrofitting for Resilience Through Improved Indigenous Natural Resource Management in Mali**

Indigenous knowledge and local participation are considered key success indicators that increase the local ownership of natural resources management, which in turn strengthens the likelihood of sustainability. In Mali the Special Climate Change Initiative included a contribution to the existing Programme for Decentralisation of Forest Management (GEDEFOR). The adaptation contribution adds value to the former programme by building capacity of the stakeholders on climate change for sustainable land resources and forest management, and by identifying and supporting successful local resilience systems for local vulnerability reduction. Investing in stronger local ownership is assumed to increase the sustainability of outcomes.

Sida believes that the most efficient, feasible and sustainable way of halting deforestation is to support the local population to manage the forest through a well-organised equitable and transparent system. As part of GEDEFOR a participatory and structured mapping study on climate change initiatives and perspectives in Mali showed that with a sound management of the forests in the regions of Koulikoro and Bamako, the pressure of forests resources exploitation could be reduced on the biodiversity conservation forests. Five biodiversity conservation forests, among others the “Mandingo Mountains’ Forest surrounding Bamako, which were not fully taken into account in GEDEFOR’s initial plans, are now included in the programme.

Sida 2009, Support to La direction nationale pou la conservation del la nature in Mali

Resilience is apparent as an explicit objective within climate change adaptation programming, for obvious reasons. However, the tendency to associate resilience with climate change alone can be seen as problematic if this is interpreted as an indication of a failure to mainstream resilience within (non-climate focused) development programming more generally. There is also a danger that if resilience is only associated with climate risks, this may thereby lead to a narrow perspective that ignores seismic risk and other natural hazards that cannot be associated with climate change.

Resilience is needed in relation to other natural hazards, such as earthquakes and tsunamis. A notable exception to this limited climate resilience focus appears to be in water programmes, where these broader linkages are more apparent. It might be expected that resilience and climate adaptation would feature strongly in agricultural programming

focused on food security in relation to response to climatic shocks (even if these shocks should not be automatically attributed to climate change). This review has encountered relatively few examples of where climate factors are strongly emphasised, and those examples found were of relatively small projects.³⁶ Exceptions to this are PROAGRO in Bolivia and some elements of NALEP in Kenya.

Box 14

Situating Climate Risk in Agricultural Value Chain Development in Kenya

The newly started Kenyan Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP) is designed with a natural resource management component that will be used to underpin value chain development that is environmentally sustainable and climate change resilient. From a resilience perspective there are two core questions. First, how can attention to resilience for drought-affected populations be maintained when the Kenyan policy agenda is overwhelmingly focused on increasing production and productivity? Second, whether value chains interventions can be identified that actually *include* populations that are highly vulnerable to natural hazards and *reflect* how natural hazards are likely to impact on their ability to engage in or benefit from value chains. In interviews for this review it was stated that it is intended (though not explicitly stated in the programme document) that ASDSP will continue the learning process on these issues underway in the current LRRD activities, and as such these may become the main testing grounds in relation to whether or not the ASDSP concept is appropriate for reducing risk in the ASALs. It must be stressed that in general value chain development has rarely been developed with a resilience focus and trends in value chain investments may point towards a shift away from high-risk areas and smallholder production systems.

<http://www.nafis.go.ke/2012/05/agricultural-sector-development-support-programme-asdsp-programme-document/>

³⁶ Exceptions to this include Kirkens Nödhjälp; Action Against Hunger (ACF) Bolivia and others.

Climate change adaptation involves various aspects of resilience, risk and vulnerability with different implications for integration into other development cooperation efforts. The most pressing concerns in many contexts are to address increased recurrence of extreme climate events and variability. This involves DRR and also reduction of the risks related to smaller crises and shocks. Climate change adaptation is also about resilience to gradual environmental change wherein sea level rise, increasing temperatures and other changes are leading to so-called tipping points in relation to potential collapse of agro-ecological systems and potential drastically reduced availability of scarce natural resources. This is not just a rural problem, as the latter includes water for urban and peri-urban areas.

These two aspects of climate change (extreme events and tipping points) suggest different but overlapping response strategies to support resilience and address risk and vulnerability. Broadly generalised, it appears that water related climate adaptation programming seems to be more focused on addressing gradual changes leading to tipping points,³⁷ whereas agricultural programming and more general DRR support are focused on extreme climate events and climate variability.³⁸ There are however many exceptions to this dichotomy when, for example, transboundary water management efforts address both flood monitoring and tipping points and related conflicts over access to water supplies. The tendency toward water programming focusing on tipping points appears to be due to the emphasis on trends of increasing scarcity of and demographic pressures on water resources, whereas climate related agricultural programming often focuses on marginal, relatively sparsely populated areas where hazards relate to inability to exploit available resources, rather than absolute scarcity per se.

Furthermore, it is important to stress that to a large extent agricultural research and extension has always had a focus on gradual climate change adaptation. The development of new seed varieties and livestock breeds and production methods has, by nature, focused on adaptation to prevailing natural conditions for farming. These core functions of agricultural programming have often not been sufficiently focused on risk scenarios (due perhaps to overriding targets for production increase and commercialisation), but this implies that there are inherent capacities in agricultural innovation systems that could presumably be applied to climate adaptation efforts.

³⁷ Most notably Programa de Apoyo al Sector agropecuario de Potosí Bolivia

³⁸ An exception to this generalisation is the FAO project looking at gradual climate change impact on tea in Kenya.

6 Resilience initiatives in agriculture

6.1 OVERVIEW

Agricultural programming related to risk and resilience can be seen as falling into the following categories:

- Agricultural rehabilitation programming as part of LRRD
- Food security and DRR components within agricultural development programmes
- Agricultural commercialisation (value chain) programmes with consideration given to risk and resilience
- Support to changes in agricultural policy and enhanced negotiation capacity
- Pilot efforts to address the impacts of climate change on commercial farming and food security
- Livelihood focused programming with major agricultural components
- Production related social protection programmes

Sweden has relatively few agriculture programmes with an explicit and empirically grounded focus on resilience. Those that do exist are primarily either LRRD efforts³⁹ or part of the Special Climate Change Initiative.⁴⁰ There are some agricultural programmes that have climate resilience *components*.⁴¹ In addition, Sida has had an active dialogue with WFP on innovative tools for managing risk and supporting resilience in relation to food security, but due to Swedish policies to encourage WFP to focus on its core mandate of humanitarian food aid distribution, Sida has discontinued funding for these initiatives with the exception of African Risk Capacity.

6.2 COMMERCIALISATION AND RESILIENCE PERSPECTIVES

It has been difficult to assess the extent to which programmes that focus on value chain development and commercialisation (which appear to constitute the majority of the agricultural portfolio) take resilience into consideration, and it is here that changes may be required if these concerns are to become a more significant aspect of agricultural programming.

³⁹ E.g., ACF Bolivia; Kirkens Nödhjälp Mali; various support to organisations with humanitarian framework agreements

⁴⁰ e.g., Cambodia Community Based Adaptation; PROAGRO Bolivia; BCCRF

⁴¹ NALEP; PROAGRO Bolivia

It is important to stress that food security is the most obvious entry point for relating agricultural programming to resilience. Surprisingly, resilience and resilience-related factors seem more apparent when water sector programmes take up food security (which they increasingly do), than in agricultural programming per se. In the documentation reviewed as part of this review, references to food security seemed to be more common in water programmes than in agriculture.

This relatively limited attention to resilience, risk and vulnerability in agriculture relates to the uncertain position of food security as an objective when agriculture is primarily seen as a form of private sector development giving primary attention to results related to economic growth. Until recently Swedish agricultural programming had moved away from explicit food security goals, in favour of commercialisation, and it appears that this shift away from food security has distracted attention from risk and resilience in relation to natural hazards. There are some projects with an explicit focus on resilience in relation to food security,⁴² but these are surprisingly few given the scale of these challenges. Some projects with a broader climate adaptation focus include food security elements, with an acknowledgement that this is a core aspect of resilience and vulnerability.⁴³

There are combined food security and economic growth aspects of broader agricultural programming that have the potential for contributing to resilience, but wherein there may also be goal conflicts. For example, support to the Zambia National Farmers Union has increased their capacity to lobby for governmental support for higher grain prices, which has in turn led to significantly increased food production and enhanced national food security. For vulnerable smallholders who lack the resources to produce a marketable surplus and who must purchase food to meet part of household consumption needs this may have had a negative impact on their household food security.⁴⁴ Those who must purchase food as a way to manage the consequences of droughts and floods are particularly vulnerable to increased food prices.

⁴² PROAGRO Bolivia; Kirkens Nödhjälp Mali; NALEP Kenya

⁴³ BCCRF; the work of the Global Water Partnership (GWP)

⁴⁴ Chipeta et al 2012

Box 15 Possible advantages and disadvantages of value chain development from a resilience perspective	
<i>Advantages</i>	<i>Disadvantages</i>
May generate investments (e.g., in mechanised water harvesting for improved rainwater infiltration) on commercial farms that would be economically unviable on small plots	Faith in the advantages of value chain development may lead to government policies that legitimise land dispossession and violate the rights of vulnerable pastoralists and smallholders
Can generate wage employment and thereby diversify income sources for those who have lost their crops or livestock due to drought or floods	Doubtful whether smallholders facing severe climate uncertainty will be able to (or be prepared to make investments to) meet quality standards/certification demands, produce in a timely manner or produce in sufficient bulk to take advantage of value chain opportunities
May promote migration to urban areas as a better alternative where rural livelihoods are no longer viable and to generate remittances for consumption and post-disaster reinvestment by household members remaining in rural areas	Coping strategies reliant on on-farm diversification, with very small quantities of a broad range of crops, are unlikely to lead to production that meet the above mentioned requirements of value chains
May be the only alternative for commercial production where shifts to supermarkets and other forms of retail lead to a decline in traditional markets for smallholders	Given their ability to shift to new markets, value chain investors may not be concerned with the long-term sustainability of local production systems and may mine nutrients, water resources and other scarce natural resources in an unsustainable manner before shifting their investments elsewhere
Can create incentives for smallholders to organise, which can have positive additional affects as these groups may also provide mutual aid in dealing with climate and market variability and uncertainty	It is uncertain whether the most vulnerable sectors of the population will be welcome in producer organisations engaged in value chains as the risks and uncertainties inherent in the production systems of the poorer households can reduce the credibility of these organisations in their dealings with buyers

6.3 DIVERSIFICATION AS A ROUTE TO GREATER RESILIENCE

Smallholders are dependent on complex and diverse livelihood strategies and are therefore also likely to benefit most from resilience efforts that reinforce this range of strategies. This can be by crop diversification on-farm, to ensure that even if droughts or floods damage some crops others will survive. It also involves off-farm livelihood diversification ranging from small enterprises to wage labour on larger farms to urban migration. This suggests that there is a danger in relying on narrow analyses and assumptions about how a given production or livelihood strategy is a route to greater resilience.

Box 16

Alternative income generation opportunities to improve resilience in Mali

Development indicators for the Niger River Delta are among the lowest in Mali and women are the most vulnerable segment. Resilience is reliant on households being able to diversify their revenue sources to increase their capacity to withstand shocks and crises. The Niger River Project (REDDIN) contributes to increasing income of households, particularly women, by facilitating their access to micro credit, the mobilisation of local savings, income diversification through the development of market gardening, and the processing of agricultural and forest products. These approaches require long-term support to become viable alternatives to dependence on diminishing ecosystem resources. The outcomes of this may not be fully achievable in this three-year project. The Sida approach compensates for this by building on previous similar experiences in the region.

IUCN 2009

It should be noted, however, that the term “diversification” has two different connotations with different implications for resilience. Diversification of household livelihoods is clearly a strategy to enhance resilience. At a national level efforts to diversify agriculture general imply the need to support smallholders to specialise in more high value crops in order to produce in sufficient quantities to access commercial markets. This is usually a core justification for value chain support. This specialisation may narrow household production strategies and focus them on value chains for relatively untried products, production methods and markets. This is not to imply that such efforts always increase risk, but that the risks deserve close analysis. Box fifteen above outlines the advantages and disadvantages of value chain development from a resilience perspective.

6.4 FROM COMPONENTS TO MAINSTREAMING OF RESILIENCE

Some long-term agricultural programming has been expanded with components related to resilience in geographical areas subject to natural hazards. NALEP in Kenya had an arid and semi-arid land (ASAL) component with a clear DRR focus. However, the rest of the programme was based on explicit assumptions (in the logical framework) of favourable climatic conditions, which suggests limited mainstreaming of climatic change considerations in terms of both extreme climate events and tipping points. The embassy has recognised that approximately 80% of Kenya is classified as ASALs, which would seem to suggest that a rethink would have been required of the assumptions behind the overall programme and not just a specialised component.

Box 17

PROAGRO: From a climate component to a central focus

PROAGRO in Bolivia is an example of transition in a programme that initially addressed climate resilience as a specialised component. Sida began its engagement in PROAGRO by providing modest support to a climate change adaptation (primarily water harvesting) component in phase one in order to see if there were prospects for reorienting a programme that was initially focused on general investments in water and agriculture outputs to instead look more at how these investments could be better targeted to support resilience. When Sida support increased (through the Special Climate Change Initiative) in phase two of PROAGRO, these issues were mainstreamed throughout the programme. It should be noted that this profound conceptual shift created significant initial discomfort among the “doers” responsible for specific technical and infrastructural aspects of the programme. The concept of mainstreaming resilience and the need to shift focus from output targets to resilience outcomes was initially treated with suspicion and an extensive dialogue was required to build consensus around a new, outcome oriented theory of change.

<http://proagro-bolivia.org/>

6.5 REASSESSING THEORIES OF CHANGE

Box 18

CASP 2: Environmentally friendly, but resilient?

The Asian Development Bank led Core Agricultural Support Programme Phase 2 (CASP2), in the Greater Mekong Sub-region, focuses on certifying and promoting “climate smart agriculture”, which highlights the “comparative advantages of the disadvantaged”. The programme’s theory of change is grounded on assumptions that by certifying the safety and “environmental friendliness” of the crops of poor smallholders they will increase their resilience through the encouragement of improved farming techniques and greater profitability.

Thus far the programme (which will soon expand significantly with Sida support, but which has been operating on a modest scale since 2002) sees these resilience benefits as self-evident. These assumptions may deserve closer attention as there is evidence from international research (Henriksen et al 2010; Riisgard and Ponte 2011) that the poor face considerable obstacles in benefiting from standards and certification. This is not to say that this is impossible, but it would seem appropriate to take a proactive stance in gathering empirical evidence and look critically at the theory of change upon which the programme is based.

Little explicit attention has been paid in the programme thus far to supporting natural hazard resilience. There are activities in the programme document that are specifically directed at these objectives (insurance and meteorological information), but ADB has chosen to give priority to using the Sida funding for other activities and these activities may not actually be implemented.

Sida has recognised that this is a high-risk programme. Agricultural ministries in the region have not shown strong ownership of resilience objectives and ADB would seem an appropriate partner to support dialogue on these goals. In order to do so, however, the programme may need to produce stronger evidence that the “win-win” claims regarding “climate smart agriculture” actually reach those vulnerable to climate hazards.

<http://www.adb.org/publications/core-agriculture-support-program-phase-ii-2011-2015>

Regarding the limited attention paid to agriculture’s impact on household vulnerability and food insecurity, it is possible that the heated debate in Sweden over whether “conventional” or “sustainable” agricultural development approaches are “better” may have distracted attention away from empirical analyses of the different landscapes of risk that arise in these two models. As noted above, diverse household livelihood strategies are a way of dealing with shocks related to natural hazards. Indeed the rural poor combine elements of “sustainable agriculture” with access to wage labour on “conventional” commercial farms as a way of managing risk. This could be interpreted as suggesting that the polemic Swedish agricultural debate may be detrimental to efforts to recognise and support the risk and resilience strategies of the most vulnerable rural poor.

Within the agricultural portfolio there appears to be an emerging focus on how climate change is impacting on links to trade and markets, with two projects specifically focused on this (one at policy/negotiation level⁴⁵ and one at production level⁴⁶). This would seem to be a unique and important Sida niche that could build constructively on the substantial attention being paid to commercial agriculture in recent years. This emphasis is notably important in light of recognition of the “double exposure” that the rural poor face due to multiple risks related to climate change and globalisation.⁴⁷

It is important to note that natural hazard related food insecurity is not just a rural problem. There are clear (but complex) knock-on effects from climatic hazards on food prices, access and availability. Many urban households have family members in rural areas and the transfer of resources between urban and rural households is part of strategies to deal with droughts and other hazards.

Box 19

Pilot social protection efforts to address food insecurity in Nairobi

In 2009 support was provided to Oxfam and Concern International to provide cash transfers, using mobile phones, to 5000 selected vulnerable households in Nairobi in response to drought related rising food prices. Though the project was deemed successful, there were challenges in convincing the government to accept hand-over of the responsibilities for the system afterwards. This small project, financed with humanitarian resources, exemplifies how humanitarian efforts to move toward social protection measures to address food insecurity are emerging, but also how influence on development policies from small pilots such as this is likely to be limited.

<http://www.opml.co.uk/projects/evaluation-oxfam%E2%80%99s-emergency-food-security-livelihoods-urban-programme-nairobi>

⁴⁵ PACT EAC

⁴⁶ FAO support to tea production in Kenya

⁴⁷ See Leichenko and O'Brien 2008

7 Resilience initiatives in relation to water

7.1 OVERVIEW

Water programming in relation to risk and resilience falls into the following categories:

- Global/regional networks for policy and capacity development
- National/local infrastructure and service provision investments
- National institutional development support
- Integrated watershed management programmes
- Transboundary water management programmes
- Studies and policy papers

Sweden has a long-standing profile in water issues and an important aspect to assess is whether the “old water portfolio” has been updated and perhaps retrofitted to reflect newer emerging concerns about resilience and vulnerability. The picture appears to be mixed in this regard. A recent evaluation of one such programme (UN Development Programme Water Governance) makes virtually no specific reference to these issues apart from relatively generic recognition of the link between water management and climate change adaptation.⁴⁸ By contrast, the Global Water Partnership (GWP) Strategy highlights challenges related to disaster risk and food security as central to their work.⁴⁹ The Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) Strategic Framework makes reference to resilience and devotes attention to the importance of addressing climate uncertainty and variability in water policies and programming, even though these are not explicitly mentioned in the current “focus areas”.

As noted earlier, a major aspect of Sida’s work with water and resilience is in support to transboundary river management institutions. These efforts appear to be shifting from a primary focus on increasing basic institutional and technical capacities to also include social learning on a regional basis. Sida staff note that in the past Sida generally did not actively engage in the highly contentious question of the politics of dam construction (apart from the support to civil society organisations). A range of partners are increasingly recognising how these political debates impact on the landscape of risk, and the choices that will ultimately determine *whose risk* will be reduced. As such, Sida can be seen as being almost pulled by its partners and partnerships into a more strategic and less purely technical role.

⁴⁸ Holmberg 2011

⁴⁹ GWP 2008?

As noted elsewhere in this report, water programming increasingly emphasises food security, and as such the perception of food security as primarily an agricultural issue is somewhat misleading. There is a widespread recognition that water scarcity is impacting on agriculture and food security. This is not to state that agricultural programming ignores water scarcity, but rather that the emphasis on vulnerability and risk is more explicit in water programming related to agriculture

Box 20**World Water Week 2012: Water and Food Security**

This year's World Water Week focused on Water and Food Security, particularly emphasising the need to increase efficiency of water use in agriculture; links between water use in agriculture and health; urbanisation; and commercialisation related issues. The analytical lens applied in this conference exemplifies how, within the water sector, trends toward commercialisation tend to be analysed in a perspective that highlights natural hazards, seasonal stress, resource scarcity and exclusion of vulnerable populations to a greater extent than programmes that give primary attention to increased production, productivity and profitability. It would therefore seem that increased exchange between the water and agriculture sectors in looking together at food security could be a way to better mainstream natural hazard risk awareness in the efforts of ministries of agriculture.

<http://www.worldwaterweek.org/purposeandscope>

7.2 CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON RESULTS AND RESILIENCE OUTCOMES

Box 21

Social learning on a transboundary level

Sida has been a long-term supporter of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and also supports the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). These initiatives are intended to support social learning as they potentially bring together government in the region in discussion of policies and specific investments with major implications for managing floods and in some instances droughts and the “tipping point” of salinization in coastal areas (e.g., the Mekong Delta). Risk and resilience are increasingly on the agenda as state-led initiatives to undertake large hydropower investments clash with civil society concerns about the uncertain nature of how these fundamental changes in ecosystems will impact on flooding and other issues.

Jensen et al (2012) note that the former dominance of the member states in the MRC is currently being fundamentally challenged by the Xayabury dam and hydropower project, where Lao government plans to become the “battery of South-east Asia” are coming into conflict with a range of concerns related to the vulnerability and resilience of the huge populations living along the Mekong. MRC has taken on a role providing evidence and dialogue about environmental impacts among governments and increasingly among other societal actors. This broader “double loop learning” is new for MRC and its efforts appear to be creating tensions among the governments while also greater credibility for its role in wider society. Jensen et al stress that this social learning process is a way for normative goals (such as resilience) to be translated into actual governance practices without ignoring the realities of power and politics in a given region.

The Nile Basin Initiative is in many respects similar to the MRC, though much younger having been established in 1999. In 2002 the Nile Basin Discourse was created as a civil society counterpart to the NBI. Though the capacity and roles of these two organisations are still in flux they may together provide an important forum for social learning about how major investments could impact on societal resilience. Efforts are currently underway to strengthen both organisations and to promote more constructive collaboration between them to ensure that the voices of affected communities are reflected in the decisions made regarding water resource management and development of the Nile Basin.

http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2012/WP2012-03%20_pigs-praws-Kurt-M%F8rck.pdf ; <http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/> ; <http://www.nilebasindiscourse.org/>

Challenges have arisen in the water sector when introducing new goals and conceptual frameworks within bureaucracies oriented toward “results” in terms of expanded infrastructure and services. In Kenya, support was provided for a Flood and Drought Mitigation Sub-component as part of investments in water resource management. This initiative focused on institutional development and appears to be an example of how a focus on risk and resilience can be enhanced in an area where Sweden has long-standing engagements. This support proved to be problematic however, with very slow disbursement rates. These efforts have become part of an official window for support as part of the government’s Water Service Trust Fund, which is being scaled up with engagement from other donors. Within this support floods and droughts are mentioned (partly in relation to climate change) but are less prominent and Sida is starting to look into the extent to which risks are considered and addressed. This highlights how specific concerns related to risk and resilience may need to be raised in a proactive dialogue to ensure that infrastructural and service provision expansion targets do not overshadow the need to achieve resilience outcomes.

Box 22**Rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems in the Inland Niger River Delta**

The Inland River Niger Delta (DIN) in Mali is a wetland of international importance, the largest in continental West Africa. It experiences alternating floods of high intensity feeding various bodies of water, followed by prolonged periods without any rain. Despite the great advances made in recent decades through governmental and NGO projects and programmes, the delta and its ecosystems remain threatened, especially by climate change. The DIN is essentially dependent on the rainfall. Reduced rainfall, its irregularity and poor distribution in time and space have led to a persistent dry climate in the country. The DIN is also subject to sharp drops in its water flows. Forest ecosystems and local people are experiencing severe impacts from climate change.

Increases in population, over-exploitation of forest resources for timber, together with deteriorating weather conditions and widespread siltation have contributed to the virtual disappearance of forests in the delta. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), with financial support from Sida and the Embassy of the Netherlands, undertook a Support Project for the Management of Ecosystems (PAGEIT) in four floodplains of the DIN. PAGEIT created a consensus among different categories of stakeholders, strengthened the capacity of key actors and the environmental awareness of low-income groups, promoted income-generating activities and demonstrated the capacity for regeneration of degraded forests.

The Niger River Project (REDDIN) builds on the achievements of the PAGEIT and applies a climate change lens to this development programme. It aims to consolidate the achievements of the earlier interventions and expand the piloted action to a larger scale to ensure that population growth, persistent poverty and climate change will not undermine the significant progress achieved through the combined efforts of communities and authorities. REDDIN project activities are grounded in raising community awareness on climate change so that they are able to develop appropriate adaptation strategies. In the project IUCN proposed to systematically use planning tools to reduce the effects of climate change in Burkina Faso and Mali. Socio-economic, ecological, hydrological and climate change findings from action research were made available to the communities for informed decision making. Particular attention was given to strengthening the coping strategies of local communities.

Management of rivers is an important aspect of maintaining the ecosystem along the Niger Delta. Floods can increase siltation and winds can damage the banks of the channels along the Delta. The rehabilitation of the Channel Diangoudie in 2006 produced good results initially, but the lack of maintenance since then raises the question of whether channel rehabilitation is a sustainable and viable way to improve the ecosystem, and with that the economic resilience of the communities around it. An objective of REDDIN was to find durable solutions and provide useful lessons for the restoration of other channels in the Inland Niger Delta. A diagnostic study to better understand the ecological and socio-economic constraints affecting the proper functioning of the channel, sensitising the local communities and the authorities were the first steps. The objective was to increase the awareness level of local actors on the role of the Channel in preservation of the environmental goods and services on which they depend.

There are some infrastructure programmes strengthening urban and peri-urban water systems with an explicit focus on addressing climate change related risk scenarios.⁵⁰ PASAP Bolivia is designed around scenarios wherein the shrinking of glaciers, more intense seasonal variability, and more extreme climate events are expected to create a tipping point in relation to peri-urban and urban water availability.

7.3 LINKS BETWEEN WATER AND OTHER PROGRAMMING AREAS

Some integrated watershed management programmes are being supported as part of LRRD efforts. The reporting on one such programme refers to environmental protection, but does not make explicit reference to whether there have been results in terms of vulnerability to future disasters having been reduced.⁵¹ Rural water and sanitation efforts are also an area where Sida is active in promoting greater links between humanitarian and development efforts, most notably in Kenya where support has been provided to the government to strengthen their coordination role while also providing water and sanitation services.

⁵⁰ PASAP Bolivia; Sumaj Huasi Bolivia

⁵¹ FAO Pakistan earthquake

Box 23**Similar but different water and agriculture programming in Kenya**

In 2008 Sida started providing support for a Flood and Drought Mitigation Sub-component of the larger Kenya Water and Sanitation Programme. The intention has been to build upon the institutional development of Water Resource User Associations (WRUAs) as a basis for community led activities, in much the same way as the Common Interest Groups (becoming Value Chain Groups) have led community level implementation of programme activities in NALEP.

A significant difference in modalities is that the WRUAs are not seen to be creating commercial enterprises. WRUA support has always been in the form of grants, which is notably different from the intentions of ASDSP, which will use credit. If ASDSP's work in ASALs continues to focus on water (as is the case with NALEP) this could create conflicts, especially when targeting vulnerable populations.

The need to address these different and contrasting 'logics' may become even more urgent in the near future as the Water Resources Management Authority is proposing to initiate a system of Livelihood Micro Grants that are extremely similar to plans for support to Value Chain Groups, but rely on grants rather than credit. This would seem to suggest an area of conflict as it could undermine willingness to repay loans. But the emergence of this proposal can also be seen as an indication of the need to consider transparently how credit, grant and humanitarian modalities need to be reviewed to ensure that efforts reach the most vulnerable sectors of the population, retain a human rights based perspective (particularly regarding access to water) and contribute to the creation of sustainable institutions to support commercial development.

This discussion could also become a vehicle to discuss openly what subsidies may be required to promote livelihoods that combine environmental and societal resilience. This discussion would also be an important way to bring to light differing perspectives from the different Kenyan ministries regarding such subsidies and grants and thereby ensuring that readiness of the state to cover eventual costs of these programmes is factored into design at an early stage. As such this ultimately relates to a recognition that programmes such as this must come to be seen as more than quasi-humanitarian inputs, to instead become part of country-owned social protection structures. By raising attention to the need to harmonise approaches across sectors, the embassy in Nairobi has taken steps to look at livelihood related grants and credit schemes in a perspective of how these small programmes fit into the bigger picture of how Kenya perceives and prioritises livelihood assistance for vulnerable sectors of the population. Source: Interviews with embassy staff in Nairobi

The seeming anomaly that water programmes emphasise food security, but that water and agriculture programming are often weakly coordinated may be partially attributed to the fact that Sida has chosen not to emphasise irrigation. It is in irrigation programming that these links would seem to be most apparent, or even unavoidable, but irrigation has not been seen to be an area where Sweden has a comparative advantage and therefore there are few programmes where irrigation plays a significant role. As water scarcity and the need to make optimal use of existing water resources becomes a more central focus due to concerns about food security and climate change, this "gap" in the Swedish portfolio may need to be reassessed.

8. Summary findings and lessons learnt

8.1. STRENGTHS IN THE SWEDISH PORTFOLIO

1. Capacity development

In contrast to the “hard” investments made by many donors in infrastructure and direct service provision, the Swedish portfolio is characterised by a strong emphasis on enhancing the capacities of national actors to manage risks and support resilience. This is a central feature of Swedish development cooperation in general, and is being effectively managed through support to regional and national institutions.

2. Evidence-based policy formation

The various studies and policy dialogues undertaken with Swedish support, together with the aforementioned capacity development efforts, have contributed to enhanced evidence-based policy formation at national and regional levels. Indeed, it is somewhat of a paradox that Sweden has been stronger at supporting the mainstreaming of these themes in international policy efforts than it has within Sida itself.

3. Networking

A number of the supported initiatives promote evidence-based policy formation and capacity development through existing networks and regional fora. This is particularly true in relation to water programming. Through these networks Sweden has experience and relationships (albeit perhaps indirectly) with a broad range of partners - relationships that could be mobilised if resilience and risk in relation to natural hazards becomes a stronger focus in future development cooperation.

4. Entry points for promoting resilience-related coherence between different policy arenas

Sida is a trusted partner among humanitarian actors interested in LRRD, in international agencies and some national authorities promoting DRR, in transboundary water management and also in areas where a resilience concerns are less self-evident, such as value chain development. Some Sida dialogue partners are deeply involved in emerging social protection efforts (even if Sida itself has a modest role in these programmes). Sida is therefore well-placed to bring these actors together to contemplate how to achieve greater coherence in addressing natural hazard risk.

8.2. WEAKNESSES IN THE SWEDISH PORTFOLIO

1. Learning from disasters

Despite its high profile role in the past in calling for partner countries and the international community to apply the lessons learnt from disasters about vulnerability, Sida has been weaker at taking risk and resilience into account in subsequent development efforts. The concentration of these efforts in DRR programmes funded through the humanitarian budget, often as part of LRRD efforts, suggests that these calls have not been consistently applied in a coherent manner in relation to development priorities. LRRD has not become a vehicle to promote a more coherent and consistent approach to resilience (but resilience efforts may, in the future, prove to be a way to promote a more coherent approach to LRRD).

2. Food security

A major current “window of opportunity” for mainstreaming concerns for risk and resilience in agricultural programming is in rapidly mounting global commitments to food security. Outside of Sweden a significant proportion of the programming coming out of this new global food security agenda appears to take risk seriously. This review has found evidence that this trend has thus far had significant impact on Swedish priorities and programming within the water sector, but significantly less so in agriculture. This anomaly appears to be related to a failure to empirically assess food security risks and opportunities (through livelihood diversification) in commercially oriented agricultural programming.

3. Bringing lessons (and policies) home

As noted above, Sweden is a major actor supporting evidence-based policy formation in a range of topics touching on resilience. With the notable exception of climate change adaptation and water, the policies being promoted and lessons being learnt on a global level with Swedish funding are not clearly evident in overall Sida priorities and programming.

4. Connecting the dots

Sweden has a history of significant support to global policy efforts related to risk, resilience and vulnerability in the wake of major disasters and in moving the climate adaptation agenda forward. Nonetheless the points above suggest that these themes remain largely confined within specific programming areas (climate change adaptation, water and DRR), and are still driven by short-term commitments originating in high profile disasters (rather than smaller recurrent crises and increasing seasonal stress). Sida has been strong in supporting humanitarian actors to link relief and rehabilitation, but has been weaker in ensuring that development actors learn from these experiences and take subsequent steps to apply resilience thinking in development programming. Special funding windows, such as the Special Climate Change Initiative, do not automatically lead to strategic change within Sida. Sweden has recognised the need to “connect the dots” globally, but has not consistently applied these lessons internally.

8.3 FROM COMMON DENOMINATORS TO COMMON CONCERNS

The ToRs for this assignment call for identification of “common denominators for successful programmes”. A lesson learnt from this review is that programming most successfully addresses resilience where it is focused on certain common *concerns*.⁵² In other words, verifiable commitments (in country strategies and in individual programme documents) need to be in place to address key aspects of the landscape of risk. Such concerns need to be apparent in both single sector programming and also in efforts to achieve greater coherence among the different sectors working towards these aims. The experience of “good” but small humanitarian-led DRR projects that were never replicated or scaled-up suggests that there is a need to look further than at what constitutes a “good project” to instead reflect on whether commitments are in place to pursue these aims on a broader front. There are four overarching concerns that characterise programming with a clear commitment to resilience:

Confronting resource scarcity:

- If, for example, agriculture and water programmes (or joint initiatives) recognise the scarcity of land, water, grazing, etc., and the conflicts that this scarcity can generate, *programming is likely to reflect the challenges facing poor people as they struggle to access resources in ways that mitigate the risks they face* and provide a basis for recovery from shocks.
- This scarcity may not always be related to an absolute lack of these resources, but may even be due to insecure resource tenure or a failure to address issues of power in access to resources. This suggests that *a human rights-based approach to addressing resource scarcity is needed to ensure that programmes do not use resilience promotion as a justification for “green grabbing” of scarce resources.*
- Confronting resource scarcity in ways that acknowledge access issues almost inevitably involves cross-sectoral coherence, if not collaboration. When, for example, farmers give priority to addressing water scarcity so as to improve production in drought years, this may indicate where and how goals should be harmonised between agriculture and water programmes and perhaps even humanitarian interventions targeted at transitory scarcity when acute water scarcity overwhelms development interventions. *If resource scarcity is to be addressed in ways that re-*

⁵² The term “denominators” may carry with it assumptions that good resilience initiatives can be identified through a simple checklist. The term “concerns” is preferred in this case as it points to the importance of transcending tendencies to include mere references to resilience and catchwords in programme documents, to instead focus on genuine cross-cutting commitments and accountabilities.

flect climate and seasonal variability, this will inevitably require closer coordination across sectors.

Ensuring household food security:

- The “bottom line” for the poor is usually having enough to eat. *If programming is designed based on analysis of whether or not it will contribute to ensuring that vulnerable people are food secure in the face of climate uncertainty and variability and other hazards, this is likely to be a proxy indicator for whether programming is supporting their overall resilience.*
- This may also indicate where humanitarian and development programming should come together to address this “bottom line” (perhaps in linking humanitarian response to social protection measures, as in Ethiopia). In some countries this could involve pursuing resilience as part of alignment with the national food security policies of partner countries, since policy commitments to food security are often stronger and more explicit than the more rhetorical concept of resilience.

Vulnerability analysis:

- It may seem self-evident that a focus on resilience is synonymous with a commitment to reducing vulnerability. However, this review has noted that many programmes are weak in explicitly stating what vulnerabilities the programme will address, who it is that experiences these vulnerabilities, why they are vulnerable, and what the intended paths are for reducing these vulnerabilities (i.e., the theory of change for vulnerability reduction). Passing references to doing something for “vulnerable groups” is not sufficient to ensure that strategies are in place to address the factors that make such groups vulnerable to natural hazards. *Quality vulnerability analysis is a hallmark of programming that is genuinely focused on resilience.*
- *Vulnerability analyses can also be used to map common concerns across sectors.* For example, DRR led analyses of how people are vulnerable to recurrent hazards can demonstrate where social protection programming is a more appropriate response than repeated humanitarian appeals. Furthermore, a vulnerability analysis can indicate where lessons from humanitarian programming focused on the acute effects of vulnerability should inform development thinking related to recurrent shocks and chronic vulnerabilities. As such, these analyses can be used to identify specific lessons from response to a given drought that should be reflected in subsequent development programming (e.g., whether or not men and women, or people with different abilities and forms of livelihoods were enabled to recover through these interventions).

Climate change adaptation:

- Resilience is largely about adaptive capacities. Vulnerable people do not only need capacities to adapt to climate change, as other natural hazards may be equally if not more important. But the climate agenda has drawn attention to scenarios that demonstrate the need to think beyond the narrow resilience efforts of the past, focused on a single major crisis, to instead focus on creating societal structures to respond to increasingly recurrent natural hazards. *Initiatives should reflect institutional development outcomes in terms of enhanced adaptive capacities.*

- Serious analysis of the implications of climate change for vulnerable people is also starting to become a vehicle to mobilise broader commitment to enhance resilience. It is, for example, widely recognised that there is a major overlap in the DRR and climate change adaptation agendas. Attention to mechanisms such as insurance as a more reliable way of addressing recurrent shocks indicates that social protection is also becoming part of new approaches to climate change resilience. *The urgency of climate change adaptation should encourage a fresh look at how a range of development (and humanitarian) interventions should contribute to joint aims.*

The points above suggest that checklists are not enough to ensure that resilience becomes a core, cross-cutting concern. This review has encountered many examples of where the “right words” are included in introductory chapters of programme documents, but where, in the actual activities, outcomes and assumptions in the results frameworks there is insufficient indication of if and how there will be follow-up to unpack these rhetorical commitments and hold development actors to account for actually reducing risk. For example, if a programme explicitly assumes that there will be “favourable climatic conditions” during implementation, despite evidence that such conditions should not be taken for granted, it will not be subsequently possible to hold the programme to account for taking resilience seriously. If, on the other hand, programme design includes solid baseline analyses, risk assessment, monitoring procedures and evaluation systems anchored in one or (preferably) more of the four concerns listed above, these programmes are likely to be built around a genuine commitment to responding to risk. Resilience must be reflected in the stated outcomes and the indicators used to measure progress and stakeholders must be held to account for achieving these aims. The four common concerns listed above are areas where these outcomes are likely to be found and where appropriate indicators are likely to be identified.

It is of course acknowledged that many of Sida’s partners do not share commitments to resilience and may not be concerned with vulnerability due to policies that overwhelmingly emphasise economic growth and overall productivity increase. This is probably the main reason that resilience has been difficult to anchor in agricultural programming. It is very often seen to be “somebody else’s problem”, either humanitarians or other sectors. Also, some of the rhetorical and perhaps half-hearted commitments noted in this review may be seen as an evidence of where Sida concerns have been at odds with partner priorities, and as a result agreement has been reached on insertion of catchwords rather than fundamental reassessment of priorities and approaches. Sida has long experience in confronting similar challenges when, for example, trying to ensure that gender, environmental impact and human right are addressed in a concerted manner. Since this is an issue with regard to so many of Sida’s efforts to promote cross-cutting issues and, as noted in section 3.2, lessons could be learnt from efforts to mainstream gender equality and human rights based approaches when considering how to proceed with the recommendations below.

9 Tentative conclusions and recommendations

This review is based on a range of reading, interviews and a limited set of field visits. As noted throughout the report, it has not been possible to obtain a sufficiently broad or structured overview of this somewhat elusive topic to present definitive conclusions and recommendations. This report, and the case study from Kenya in annex four, should be seen as tools for drawing tentative conclusions that can inform Sida's ongoing process to develop a new approach to resilience.

Sweden has a strong niche related to resilience, risk and vulnerability at global policy level and in strengthening capacities at national levels. Its engagements at local level are not being sufficiently used to draw broader strategic lessons about natural hazard resilience, and it is not yet clear how the many time-bound initiatives linked to the Special Climate Change Initiative and humanitarian funding will impact on Sida's overall approaches and direction. Furthermore, the lack of empirical analyses of the micro-level dimensions of societal and individual household vulnerability creates a danger that programming can focus on technical solutions and models for economic growth with uncertain implications for resilience, rather than proven strategies to address natural hazard related risks. Even where Sida invests in global level structures that are focused on societal vulnerability, it is difficult to find evidence that lessons are being "brought home" and reflected in Sida programming.

Furthermore, cross-sectoral learning and collaboration has been weak. There are lessons that have been insufficiently shared between agriculture and water in relation to food security and regarding how the different modalities being used to support production of very similar outputs (e.g., water harvesting) should be harmonised. Links between humanitarian and development portfolios are also limited, but this review concludes that higher priority should be given to encouraging mutual learning, than in creating joint programming modalities in LRRD contexts. There is a role for the latter, but this is just one means to ensure that lessons are learnt about vulnerability and risk reduction in the wake of a disaster.

Before presenting recommendations, it is important to highlight that this report is a contribution to Sida's reflections over its future level of ambition regarding an enhanced focus on resilience, risk and vulnerability. The instructions of the director general notwithstanding, the review has found that there is as yet no consensus on what Sida needs to achieve in this area. Views expressed by Sida staff indicate that there are four categories of ambition levels:

1. Sida is addressing these issues quite sufficiently already, and only needs to find ways to better highlight what is already being done.
2. There should be more DRR initiatives led by the humanitarian department, largely in conjunction with LRRD initiatives.
3. There should be more DRR initiatives led increasingly by development departments.
4. Resilience and risk should be better mainstreamed in a wide range of programming.

The initial discussions with the thematic group undertaken in this review indicated that the ambition level should primarily lie in mainstreaming and that more needs to be done. Feedback from programme officers on earlier drafts of this report indicate that many disagree and also that there is rejection of findings suggesting that Sida should be accountable for addressing resilience in programming focused primarily on other objectives. The recommendations below are primarily directed toward achieving greater coherence and mainstreaming, but it is hoped that they may provide some guidance even if more modest ambitions are chosen. This review has identified six tentative entry points where Sida could better integrate a risk and resilience perspective in overall programming:

1. *Make food security a cross-cutting concern that links global policy commitments to the challenges facing vulnerable people dealing with natural resource scarcity and natural hazards.* The current lack of a consolidated, risk-focused food security policy, strategy and portfolio is one of the main obstacles to more resolute concentration on how people resist and respond to natural hazards. A risk and resilience perspective on food security would need to “connect the dots” between agriculture, climate, water and humanitarian programming in several respects, including: (a) emphasising risks inherent in both smallholder production and the livelihoods expected to be generated by increasing trade and commercialisation; (b) national imperatives to increase domestic food production amid growing water scarcity; (c) links between humanitarian recovery efforts and long-term food security strategies; and (d) in the design and implementation of social protection measures to safeguard the livelihood and nutritional security of vulnerable populations subject to increasingly recurrent extreme climatic events and seasonal stress.

For example:

- a. Forums should be initiated (and where they already exist, be better utilised) for dialogue and joint planning among agricultural agencies, water sector actors and agencies responsible for flood/drought management to consider food security trends and scenarios associated with scarcity. This could lead to better integration of programmes in relation to seasonal stress, recurrent drought and floods and potential tipping points.
- b. Sida should commission a review to learn from partners being supported to analyse climate change-food security-market-trade linkages in East Africa.

- c. Agricultural extension support should be reassessed to ensure that these services present a coherent message to their farmer clients in relation to resilient market orientation and risk aware natural resource management.
 - d. Sida should require that humanitarian seed distribution programming is “nested” in climate information systems (seasonal and short-term weather forecasts) and development plans to ensure that national seed systems are reformed to provide varieties that meet market demands and are appropriate to variable climatic conditions.
2. *Adopt a more explicit risk and resilience emphasis in theories of change and in results frameworks.* This would be a way to highlight and create a constructive discourse on how to link (a) policies and practice, and (b) investments in adaptive capacities and the actual infrastructure, services and social protection mechanisms reaching vulnerable people. It is especially important to move risk analyses out of the “assumptions column” of logical frameworks to instead become an integral part of programme design.

For example:

- a. Risk assessment methods should be developed and applied that include scenario planning to introduce analyses of the probability of hazards becoming increasingly recurrent and/or severe. These scenarios would also need to look at the likely exposure of different populations to these risks.
 - b. The implications of such scenarios should be considered for programmes as a whole and not just be applied to risk reduction components within programming that is otherwise designed around “development as usual”.
 - c. Methods should be developed and guidance should be provided for vulnerability analyses which assess “double exposures” wherein natural hazard and market risks and uncertainties converge, and especially how vulnerable people themselves are diversifying their livelihood strategies to manage their “double exposures” to market and environmental risks.
 - d. Vulnerability and risk analyses should also be used to identify harmonised outcome and impact results indicators for humanitarian and development programming. This could highlight where synergies are possible and goal conflicts can be avoided. Above all this could provide strategic direction for ensuring that these different modalities reflect common concerns and joint visions of societal resilience.
3. *Transcend rhetorical assumptions about “win-win” processes through better design, monitoring and evaluation.* There is a tendency to accept simple assumptions about the resilience benefits of, e.g., “climate friendly agriculture” or value chain development for vulnerable populations. These assumptions may indeed prove valid, but they should be subject to critical, empirical analyses built into design, monitoring and evaluation systems.

For example:

- a. Sida should find tools for such critical reflection by partnering with global initiatives to develop new climate adaptation indicators and monitoring and evaluation systems.⁵³
 - b. Of particular importance here is investing in better analyses of the actual resilience *outcomes* of programming claiming to support resilience or reduce disaster risk.
 - c. Programming should be based on rigorous baseline analyses linked to explicit theories of change explaining *what* vulnerabilities the programme will address, *who* it is that experiences these vulnerabilities, *why* they are vulnerable, and *what the intended paths are for reducing these vulnerabilities*. These theories of change should be reflected in agreed results frameworks. This should replace vague references to “helping vulnerable groups”. Guidance notes could be developed to support Sida staff and partners with such analyses.
 - d. Such efforts would send a clear (and needed) message to Sida partners regarding what Sida expects in terms of results; and thereby discourage the tendency to address resilience through “talk”.
4. *Overcome categorisations of topics such as DRR and LRRD as “humanitarian” issues to instead promote policy frameworks which recognise that vulnerable people search for resilience strategies irrespective of whether the crises they face are eliciting humanitarian or developmental responses. Resilience and risk reduction will never become mainstreamed at Sida if they are primarily seen as something to worry about at the end of a humanitarian operation.*

For example:

- a. Closer partnership with GFDRR (i.e., dialogue and not just humanitarian financing) could be used as an entry point into World Bank efforts to address risk reduction and recovery within national policy frameworks and could be a way to attain stronger initiative and ownership of mainstreamed DRR among national policy makers.

⁵³ The World Bank Social Resilience Cluster, the SEACHANGE Community of Practice, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and TearFund are some of the organisations working to develop better monitoring and evaluation approaches for climate change adaptation and their findings may be relevant to resilience in a broader perspective as well.

- b. A major entry point for ensuring that DRR is seen as more than just a humanitarian issue is in Sida support to the current process in many countries of developing climate change adaptation policies. But it is important that climate adaptation is not viewed as a separate sector, as this could create yet more inappropriate institutional divides between climate and development, or between climate and DRR (as is apparent in some countries).
 - c. The Humanitarian Department could prepare an information and guidance package on “what development actors should know about DRR” explaining current experience and resources supported with humanitarian financing. The objective of these materials would be partly to raise awareness of common concerns and areas for potential cooperation between humanitarian and development programmes, and also for how development actors can use these DRR resources themselves, often without direct links to humanitarian programming.
5. *Use social protection as a cross-cutting concept to put resilience centre stage.* This could be a way of ensuring that resilience is seen as something more than post-disaster rehabilitation by drawing attention to the need to have systems in place to deal with seasonal stress and smaller crises that are not necessarily visible in either developmental or humanitarian programming.

For example:

- d. Investments in insurance mechanisms may be a way forward, but it is important to address this programming area at a strategic level (e.g., by engaging with the major insurance companies such as Swiss Re and Munich Re that are developing these programmes on a larger scale). Small pilot projects or components are easily perceived by national policy makers as constituting humanitarian-style interventions with little relevance for broader development agendas.
 - e. Sida should also take a more proactive role in learning from and applying lessons (both positive and negative) from new food security related social protection systems in Ethiopia and elsewhere.
 - f. Guidelines should be prepared to ensure that design, monitoring and evaluation systems describe and analyse how a given programme is expected to contribute to (or at least interface with) social protection. In many programme documents today there are brief statements to the effect that “somebody else” will address the needs of vulnerable people affected by natural hazards. This is insufficient.
6. *Link global/regional resilience-related policy and capacity efforts to national programming.* This would be a way to build on the strengths of the current portfolio, and perhaps equally important, be a way to ensure that the work of international partners extends beyond “talk” and is better related to the field level challenges of national and local institutional change. Resilience should be about fundamental changes in attitudes and approaches to development. These can and should be supported at international levels, but must be operationalised in local level action.

For example:

- g. A series of introductory workshops or even webinars should be used to raise awareness about resilience in general, and also to inform embassies and partners about organisations that have developed relevant knowledge (many of which are currently receiving Sida support). It is important that such training is not seen as a one-off event, but rather as an opportunity to forge contacts with relevant organisations for future collaboration.
- h. Given the quantity and diversity of organisations with relevant expertise, there is likely to be a need for a focal point within Sida, or a small, dedicated help desk function, that can stay abreast of new developments among Sida partners in resilience and spread relevant information. It is essential that such a position or help desk is not perceived as being part of a specific sector (agriculture, water, climate, humanitarian) but is clearly designated as being a function that transcends these divisions.

Annex 1 - Terms of reference

Ref. no.: Date: 2012-03-29 Draft Terms of Reference

Overview of Sida's current interventions with a particular relevance for disaster risk reduction and resilience and with a focus on the agricultural and water sectors

1. Background

1.1. Sida's focus on DRR/Resilience

In the DG's instruction to Sida's Operational Planning for 2012, one strategic area highlighted was to increase the number of interventions aimed at preventing poor people's vulnerability to naturally caused crises and disasters. Sida should strengthen national capacities for risk management and enhance poor people's resilience to crises and disasters, with particular focus on the water and agriculture sectors.

"The prevention of crises and disasters is a priority for Sida. Effects of drought in the Horn of Africa shows that countries with weak social and economic safety nets - often in conflict and without effective or legitimate institutions - are least equipped to deal with increasing pressures from, for example, climate change and rising food and energy prices. The capacity to anticipate crises and implement preventive measures that protect and equalize the risks are prerequisites for development effectiveness."

The Department for International Organisations and Thematic Support at Sida was tasked to lead the work. The objective was defined as:

"Leading the working group to develop proposals for program activities that will reduce human vulnerability, especially in water and agriculture, and to enhance overall capacity of Sida staff in this area."

There are already a number of important processes within Sida on DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction), resilience (reducing human vulnerability) and related issues. Reports from our embassies and cooperating partners, however, show a strong need to strengthen risk management and resilience in our long-term development cooperation. Much is probably being done that strengthens resilience, though many interventions are not necessarily framed in such a way. There is also a need to enhance the linkages between short-term and long-term development programs. A cross sectorial working group has been assigned the responsibility to contribute to meeting the demands of the Director General. The group is led by the Department for International Organisations and Thematic Support.

The objectives of the group are: 1) to contribute towards a Sida position and approach on how Sida strategically is to further integrate vulnerability and resilience aspects in its operations to reduce the negative effects of natural hazards and extreme weather events 2) to explore and increase knowledge and capacity as well as to enhance a common understanding among Sida's and the embassies' personnel 3) to support Sida's various processes and practices that have the potential to improve Sida's support to resilience. A first step is to identify and map Sida contributions within this field of work⁵⁴.

Sida will, in this work, use the following modified version of DFID's broad definition of DRR/resilience ("Defining Disaster Resilience – a DfID approach paper", 2011).

However, this definition might be adjusted during the working of the group.

The working definition for resilience of human systems is in the present terms of reference the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming livelihoods and poor people's quality of life in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earth quakes and drought – without compromising their long-term prospects.

2. Assignment

2.1. Objective and purpose of the assignment

The objective of this study is to map out Sida's interventions that have strong implications for increasing resilience and reducing vulnerability, to improve the understanding of how Sida has worked with these issues so far and how the work can be further strengthened. The purpose is primarily to:

Increase /clarify the proportion and type of interventions aimed at or important for reducing people's vulnerability to naturally caused crises and disasters.

To identify gaps and linkages between humanitarian and long- term development cooperation, in order to increase our understanding of possible opportunities for transition between the two and the value of interventions focusing on prevention of disaster. It also aims at identifying possible links and synergies between global DRR / vulnerability programs, particularly national efforts through the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction and Swedish bilateral aid in the same countries.

To identify and analyze common denominators for successful programs, according to criteria agreed by the working group and the consultant, and suggest how Sida can improve its work to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to natural hazards and extreme weather events.

⁵⁴ The Regional Units in Addis and Nairobi are presently working on a specific Horn of Africa Initiative that will also include a mapping exercise. The two groups will work in close cooperation in order to take advantage of synergies and avoid duplication.

The mapping exercise shall cover Sida’s current humanitarian interventions as well as long-term cooperation programs (bilateral, regional and global) and should particularly focus on Swedish support to disaster prone areas interventions.

2.2. The Assignment

The review shall cover, the following types of interventions based on information from all attribution accounts (regional, humanitarian, civil society and research).

- Humanitarian assistance, within the areas of water, food security and livelihoods;
- Agricultural and forestry programs including integrated social protection that could increase resilience;
- Water resources management and water sector reform programs;
- Climate change adaptation;
- Support to international organizations focusing on risk reduction and/or resilience issues.

The assignment consists of three main phases: 1) To suggest an approach and method for implementation of the assignment as well as listing and collecting international accepted definitions of relevant concepts. 2) To conduct a mapping in most vulnerable countries representing all continents as well as regional and global level. 3) After consultations with the working group, conduct a few case studies to further our understanding of the issues. This phase should also include some recommendations for capacity building within this subject and as well as the conclusions of the whole assignment.⁵⁵

The assignment will include interaction with the working group and relevant embassies. The working group will need to accept the approach and the papers of each phase before starting the next step.

The mapping shall identify all relevant current contributions both stand-alone contributions and contributions embedded as ”components” in other programmes. The mapping shall include interventions that aim or are important for ‘reducing vulnerability to naturally caused crises and disasters. Many of these interventions specifically targeted at addressing resilience to particular kinds of shocks and stresses, while others might be as important even though they don’t explicitly have resilience as the objective, as they might focus on specifically relevant issues or on a particularly drought prone area. Some programs – such as building education or health systems – are important to enhancing resilience, but are outside the scope of this study.

⁵⁵ The choice of countries for the case studies will be done in collaboration with the embassies; particularly as a few are already conducting certain mapping initiatives. The case studies can also include programs and institutions that are relevant but not funded by Sida.

2.3. The Outline of the Report

Sida is allocating four weeks (i.e. 20 working days)

for this study and the work is envisaged to include the following components:

A concept note on methods and approaches: A short concept note (max 3 pages) with suggestions for a method and approach for the assignment, and including an annex of definitions of relevant concepts in English and Swedish. The method and approach shall be discussed with and approved by the working group at Sida, before starting the mapping in part B.

Written report on the mapping exercise: A written report (max 10 pages) presenting the findings from the mapping.

A complete report (max 15 pages) including the case studies should be presented to the working group. An annex should also be included with suggestions for capacity building, including material, suggested activities etc. The paper should highlight the findings of the whole assignment and make summary conclusions and suggestions on the way forward. The mapping report in B above, shall form an annex to this report.

The reports shall be written in English. The reports under B and C above should include executive summaries.

The consultant should present the response to the call of no later than 12th of April. The mapping exercise shall be completed no later than 20th of May and a draft complete report should be presented to Sida the 20th of June. Sida will then give its comments to the consultant who will finalize the report by 15th of July.

This assignment shall be process oriented, ie the consultant, the working group and other relevant units at Sida will take an active part of the work during the whole study. This also means that the assignment might entail certain activities that will be identified during the process, such as specific video conferences with embassies, certain capacity building inputs etc.

3. Qualifications of the consultant

The consultant shall have thorough experience from Swedish development cooperation and from performing evaluations and/or assessments. The consultant shall also have documented experience of exploring issues that span over several development areas, disciplines and sectors. Experience from the area of resilience and DRR is a prerequisite.

4. Time frame

It is estimated that the assignment will take 20 work days in total. A limited budget for reimbursable expenses will be added to the consultancy fee. The work will start in April 2012 and be finalised by 15th of July 2012.

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Annex 3 - Persons met

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Kenya case study

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Maria Vink	Embassy of Sweden
Protase Echessah	Embassy of Sweden
Elphas Ojiambo	Embassy of Sweden
Tom Bonyo	NALEP
Benjamen Ndegwa	NALEP
Saidi Fwamba	NALEP
Mary Nduru	NALEP
Monica Olala	NALEP
Rose Marie Magambo	NALEP
Bernard Mwangangi	NALEP
David Nyantika	NALEP
Mikael Segerros	Niras Natura
Jean-Philippe Deschamps-Laporte	Consultant ASDSP
Meshack Odera Muga	Kenya Forestry Research Institute
Johannes Orodhi Odhiamdo	University of Nairobi
Ramesh Thampy	SNV
Alphonse Muriu	SNV
Saadia Juma	Kenya Red Cross, Kibwezi
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Annex 4 - Case study on how Sida's Kenyan portfolio (with a primary focus on agriculture) has addressed resilience and risk

Executive summary

This case study consists of a review of Sida programming in Kenya, with a primary focus on how resilience, risk and vulnerability are conceptualised and addressed agriculture, from the perspective of the following three sets of questions:

1. What are the *theories of change* that underpin programming? How are the actions taken expected to impact on the resilience strategies of different categories among the rural population (smallholders, landless, those employed in different firms, particularly within value chains)?
2. What different *scenarios* regarding the landscape of risk steer decision-making at strategic levels? To what extent are key stakeholders considering exposure to large scale disasters, increasing recurrence of smaller crises, changing effects of seasonality and potential tipping points where climate change or other hazards may suggest the need for a fundamental rethink of agriculture and livelihood strategies?
3. To what extent do results frameworks in general and risk analyses in particular reflect partners' *awareness of the likelihood and consequences of risks* related to natural hazards (in relation to the preceding two sets of questions) at programme level?

The mission to Kenya included interviews with a range of stakeholders, but primarily focused on the progression of approaches to resilience reflected in the following programmes:

1. The National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP)
2. The NALEP arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) component
3. The Improved Food Security in the ASALs Project (IFSAP)
4. The Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP)

The transition between these programmes reflects the changing nature of the Kenyan discourse on how to respond to natural hazards. There is a consensus among those interviewed that a more “radical” approach is needed to implement the national policy objective to “end drought emergencies in Kenya” (i.e., to move from humanitarian response to developmental solutions for resilience). There is less consensus regarding what pace to take in moving toward these more radical approaches. Some recommend a rapid shift to mechanised methods, massive bush clearance, investment in food processing and support to the creation and strengthening of large-scale commercial farms. Others propose looking for paths towards radical change in production systems that will retain the strengths of existing pastoral production methods.

The primary focus of the case study is on the agricultural portfolio but it is important to highlight that the large majority of the activities in Sida's ASALs agricultural program-

ming relate to water. Therefore it is somewhat misleading to see the water portfolio as separate from the agricultural portfolio, even if integration between these two programming areas has been limited. The differences often relate to institutional entry points, underlying principles (e.g., relative emphasis on rights versus economic development) and modalities, rather than the actual types of activities actually supported. This has implications for perspectives on the nature and causes of vulnerability and how “radical” the approaches are in water and agricultural programming respectively.

The most drought affected areas of Kenya have for many years been “stuck in second gear” in terms of widespread attempts to link relief to rehabilitation, but with little progress in linking quasi-humanitarian rehabilitation efforts to development. The slogan “ending drought emergencies in Kenya” is largely seen as a call to transcend incremental linking of relief, rehabilitation and development, i.e., approaches led by humanitarian organisations, to instead ensure that commercially focused development efforts are used to prevent droughts turning into emergencies.

Current trends in the agricultural portfolio suggest that value chain development is expected to be a vehicle for such a transformation in ASAL livelihoods. However, this case study questions whether resilience and risk can actually be mainstreamed in Swedish agricultural development programming through value chain development alone. Internationally, the vast majority of disaster risk reduction programming foresees resilient livelihoods in drought prone rural areas as including a strong element of smallholder production for consumption and local markets. These systems will not meet all livelihood needs, but they are seen to be the most effective means to shore up coping strategies. Livelihood resilience may be supported through commercialisation, but value chain development experience suggests that this will need to be complemented with continued attention to smallholder subsistence production and social protection for those who are unable to take advantage of the new livelihoods generated through value chain development.

This case study concludes that the dialogue on agricultural development in Kenya has not sufficiently brought together concerns related to the landscape of natural hazard risk and the thrust for greater commercialisation. Coherent policies would require finding ways to see how, for example, a seasonal forecast indicating a likelihood of severe conditions may require a mix of responses related to economic development, subsistence production and even a continued element of humanitarian response.

Another central priority if resilience is to be better mainstreamed in the programmes analysed is the need to develop robust results frameworks and monitoring and evaluation systems that measure whether disaster risks are ultimately being reduced. These frameworks should recognise the diversity and complexity of factors affecting vulnerability and opportunities for resilience among different sectors of the population. Past programming has included resilience goals, but emphasis on production and productivity increase has distracted attention from the need to empirically assess results in terms of whether or not risks have actually been reduced and whether new livelihoods have proven to be drought-resilient.

Introduction

Testing the hypothesis

The case study initially set out to test the relevance and implications of the following hypothesis:

Many of the core factors impinging on risk and resilience relate to how well global food security commitments reflect the challenges facing vulnerable people dealing with climatic and other natural hazards. Insufficient clarity, coherence and consolidation in food security strategies (both Swedish and within partner countries and organisations) and related development and humanitarian portfolios are obstacles to a more concerted focus on how people resist and respond to major disasters, smaller crises, seasonal stress and agro-environmental tipping points. A risk and resilience perspective on food security would need to emphasise both smallholder production and the agricultural and non/off-farm livelihoods expected to be generated by increasing investment, trade and commercialisation.

The first part of this hypothesis, regarding food security strategies does not appear to be broadly valid. Food security is a significant aspect of the convergence of these efforts, and is central to the approaches of some agencies, e.g., the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), but the nexus of how risk is understood and resilience is supported through government is primarily in the discussion of if or how droughts⁵⁶ can be managed through investments leading to commercialisation (primarily related to infrastructure and value chain development). Vulnerability in relation to climate variability, recurrent drought, demographic changes and increasing seasonal stress, is increasingly conceptualised as an outcome of failures to include drought affected areas in commercialisation. This is a more central concern than finding better ways to deal with transitions linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) or attention to incremental efforts to shore up existing food security strategies.

Furthermore, it must be highlighted that it is inappropriate to assess rural risk and resilience in isolation from the broader context of demographic change. Swedish support to Kenya recognises that migration, urbanisation and issues related to urban poverty, markets and livelihoods frame how vulnerable people respond to natural hazards, what markets they have for their production and how they choose to deal with stress and scarcity of water and other natural resources. In understanding the implications of climate information and early warning systems in rural areas, for example, it is important to recognise that one major response may be for people to leave their drought affected

⁵⁶ This report focuses on drought as the greatest natural hazard facing rural Kenyans. It must be stressed, however, that there are also significant flood and landslide risks in some areas, some of which are part of the Kenyan and regional portfolios. The mission upon which this review is based did not provide an opportunity to analyse these issues in detail.

homes and move to urban areas to access temporary or permanent alternative livelihoods.

Given the initial hypothesis behind this case study, the report primarily analyses agriculturally related programming. It should be highlighted, however, that the emphasis of even the agricultural portfolio in high risk areas has been concentrated on water, as water scarcity and limited capability to utilise rainfall are recognised by both rural people and national policy makers to be the main constraints to agriculture and food security.

This case study primarily follows the evolution of four programmes:

1. The National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP)
NALEP ran from 2001 to 2011 and was for much of this period Sida’s largest agriculture and rural development programme. It was designed to implement the National Agricultural Sector Extension Policy and focused on demand-driven, equitable, pluralistic and participatory provision of extension services in a transparent and accountable manner. During Phase 1 (2001-2005) a major focus was on scaling-up the application of lessons from Sida’s former support to the National Soil and Water Conservation Programme. In Phase 2 the overall goal was “The contribution of agriculture and livestock to sustainable and equitable social and economic development, poverty alleviation and natural resource base enhanced” and the outputs continued to focus on development of the national extension system. NALEP Phase 2 was expected to reach approximately 700,000 farmers per year through over 4000 extension staff. The Sida contribution to the programme was SEK 327 million.

2. The NALEP arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) component
The NALEP ASALs component ran from 2007-2011 and differed from the mainstream NALEP efforts in that there were three additional outputs: (1) disaster risk management/mitigation, (2) embedding of basic needs in agricultural extension, and (3) alternative livelihoods/basket of opportunities. In effect, the NALEP ASALs component went beyond the institutional and methodological focus of the rest of the programme, primarily by providing direct investments in the livelihoods of programme beneficiaries. With a budget of approximately SEK 85 million the component implemented 250 community level projects with 477,000 beneficiaries. 150 of the projects involved water harvesting.

3. The Improved Food Security in the ASALs Project (IFSAP)
IFSAP was initiated due to a Swedish government decision to fast track food security assistance to the Horn of Africa during 2012. In order to accomplish this Sida supported the former NALEP team to continue to operate after the formal close of the project. The overall objective is “sustainable food security and improved income opportunities for strengthening livelihoods among targeted ASAL communities”. The activity categories are categorised similarly to the NALEP ASALs components, but the mode of operation involves larger scale and more rapidly implemented initiatives due to the considerable quantity of resources (SEK 30 million) that needs to be disbursed during the one year lifespan of the project.

4. The Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP) ASDSP is currently in its inception phase, and it is likely that the approaches in the original programme document will be modified and refined before being implemented. The comments regarding the transition to ASDSP in this report should therefore be seen as contributing to this learning process. The overall goal of the programme is “to support the transformation of Kenya’s agricultural sector into an innovative, commercially oriented, competitive and modern industry that will contribute poverty reduction, improved food security in rural and urban Kenya.” It will have three components: sector wide facilitation and coordination, natural resource management and value chain development. The emphasis in the programme appears to be primarily on the latter component. ASDSP is explicitly designed as a vehicle to implement the Kenyan Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 2010-2020, which is aligned with the Kenya Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Compact. The budget for ASDSP will be over SEK 400 million and will be implemented over a five-year period.

This review also looked relatively briefly (due to time constraints) at related water programmes and efforts were made to assess how water-related resilience initiatives within the four programmes were driven by food security concerns and also the extent to which water programming itself was driven by food security objectives.

Towards a radical approach to “ending drought emergencies”, but how radical?

The transition between the different programmes listed above reflects the changing nature of the Kenyan discourse on how to respond to natural hazards. There is a consensus within the government⁵⁷ and also among the researchers and NGOs interviewed that a more “radical” approach is needed to implement the policy objective to “end drought emergencies in Kenya”.⁵⁸ The LRRD approaches of the past and efforts to support prevailing livelihood strategies are seen to be insufficient. There is recognition that the losses in livestock that many pastoralists have experienced in recent years cannot be addressed by mere restocking. With increased population densities in ASALs there is a need to invest considerable resources and employ new land preparation methods that can significantly improve the infiltration of water where high levels of run-off are a greater limitation to production than lack of rain per se. Large-scale investment in post harvest technologies for both food and fodder are needed to ensure that producers can manage recurrent droughts without outside assistance.

There is less consensus regarding what pace to take in moving toward these more radical approaches. Some recommend a rapid shift to mechanised methods, massive bush clearance, investment in food processing and support to the creation and strengthening

⁵⁷ Policy analyses from the Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit stress this direction. In interviews different terms were used for this “radical” agenda. For example, some referred to the need for a “game changer”.

⁵⁸ Republic of Kenya 2011

of large-scale commercial farms. Others propose looking for paths towards radical change in production systems that will retain the strengths of existing pastoral production methods. Some raise serious concerns about the land rights issues that need to be addressed when “going big.” There are some who see the radical new approaches as not so much related to scale or choice of technological option, but rather in terms of the need to take a more holistic, comprehensive and multidisciplinary analytical planning approach to the agroecological, biophysical and socioeconomic factors in a given district or county.

It is generally acknowledged that the conditions and opportunities for these new agendas are very different in arid areas, dominated by fulltime pastoralists, and semi-arid areas, where there are a range of smallholder production systems. Commercial investments and market access also vary enormously. Men and women have different challenges in taking advantage of new opportunities due to prevailing production and market systems, cultural factors and their differentiated membership in farmer organisations. The prospects for men and women, children and adults, and members of different ethnic groups to become more resilient in the wake of a shift to more radical approaches cannot be generalised.

As the radical approaches have yet to be scaled up among the populations in ASALs, there are apparent risks in these risk mitigation alternatives due to lack of experience. Even if there are small success stories, there is no clear evidence that, for example, mechanised bush clearance and conversion to large-scale crop production will generate the resilience reinforcing alternative livelihoods that are envisaged when justifying these measures. Even if the small and perhaps piecemeal food security efforts of the past have been proven ineffective in ending drought emergencies, it is uncertain whether a shift in scale and focus will solve these problems. The fact that large-scale commercial farmers have used the technologies for transformation of ASAL production systems effectively to manage droughts and make better use of available water resources is frequently used as a justification for proposing such a transformation. However, this experience does not automatically indicate that these technologies will benefit pastoralists, either as producers on new types of farms or as employees within value chains. Similarly, the fact that Kenya has had success in developing profitable and livelihood generating value chains in higher potential areas does not automatically mean that these institutional relationships can be replicated in areas where natural hazards are greater, conflicts are endemic and where high levels of risk impact on private sector investment strategies. In sum, the theories of change behind the radical approaches being proposed have yet to be verified.

There is limited discussion in Kenya regarding social protection measures to address the needs of those whose past livelihood strategies have reached a “tipping point” in the face of recurrent droughts (especially pastoralists who have lost their livestock) and who perhaps cannot access the alternative livelihoods that are envisaged as emerging in the wake of the transformations being promoted. There has been some experience with cash transfers, largely managed within humanitarian programmes. The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) is exploring options for index-based livestock insurance

for pastoralists, but these mechanisms have not become widespread and generally appear not to be at the mainstream of the development agenda in high risk areas.

Finally, the interviews conducted during this mission uncovered a surprising lack of new approaches to deal with climate change. There is a widespread consensus in the agricultural community in Kenya that climate change is a justification for greater urgency in promoting a radical new approach, but it does not imply a different toolkit from that being applied to dealing with drought more generally. This is notable as the commercialisation approaches being called for in Kenyan agriculture may not be an effective way of responding to increasing occurrence of extreme climate events. The climate change literature tends to instead recommend reinforcing subsistence production and shying away from globalisation as a way to deal with “double exposure” to climatic and market hazards.⁵⁹

The shifting focus of Swedish programming

Sida has, over the years, invested in a broad range of strategies that have, to varying degrees, taken resilience into account. This experience and the scope of the current portfolio, provides an excellent vantage point to learn about how to promote resilience in a coherent and evidence based manner. While this brief review has noted some areas of concern, the focus of the new Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP) and the current Improved Food Security in the ASALs Project (IFSAP) place Sida efforts at the centre of this debate. This case study will attempt to interpret and briefly summarise how resilience and risk are addressed in these plans and efforts, suggest ways that these efforts could address these concerns in a more coherent manner in Kenya and draw broader conclusions about the lessons that could be learnt from this experience for Sida’s work internationally.

Methods

As noted above, the case study was initiated to test a working hypothesis. This was discussed with stakeholders within three sets of questions, these being:

1. What are the *theories of change* that underpin programming? How are the actions taken expected to impact on the resilience strategies of different categories among the rural population (smallholders, landless, those employed in different firms, particularly within value chains)? How do Sida programmes expect to mobilise and enhance the approaches of partner institutions, including meso level agencies (a) providing agricultural services, (b) dealing directly with changing resource tenure regimes and (c) managing water resources? How are food security risk and resilience factors reflected in the theories of change inherent in national policy frameworks, partner priorities and donor harmonisation processes?

⁵⁹ Liechenko and O’Brien 2008

2. What different *scenarios* regarding the landscape of risk steer decision-making at strategic levels? To what extent are key stakeholders considering exposure to large scale disasters, increasing recurrence of smaller crises, changing effects of seasonality and potential tipping points where climate change or other hazards may suggest the need for a fundamental rethink of agriculture and livelihood strategies? Are these congruent with the scenarios described in Swedish regional and country strategies? When it is recognised that these scenarios suggest the need for a mixed portfolio of humanitarian and development interventions, what steps are taken to capitalise on synergies and avoid goal conflicts between these different modalities?
3. To what extent do results frameworks in general and risk analyses in particular reflect partners' *awareness of the likelihood and consequences of risks* related to natural hazards (in relation to the preceding two sets of questions) at programme level? Do partners have the tools and capacities to identify and use indicators that recognise hazards and support flexible responses to support resilience? How much has Sida supported access to data and information so as to ensure that these assessments are evidence based and monitored over time? Do existing results frameworks encourage or discourage ways to find mechanisms for shifting back and forth between humanitarian and developmental modalities as the circumstances change?

Data collection has included review of documentation related to Kenyan policies, Sida financed agricultural programmes and other relevant programming, some of which was Sida financed. Stakeholder interviews were selected to reflect a similar pattern, primarily focusing on those actors with a link to Sida financed agricultural programming, and also including those involved in other sectors and non-Sida financed activities.

The plans for the case study originated in a video interview with Sida Nairobi on June 19. The team leader of the review was in Kenya during the period of July 8-17, 2012 (a small portion of this time was devoted to a different mission). A brief field visit was made to view IFSAP activities in Kibwezi.

This case study was undertaken as part of a global review of resilience, risk and vulnerability at Sida.

Historical context of Sida's rural resilience related efforts in Kenya

From soil and water conservation to production to risk reduction

Sida has been closely identified with soil and water conservation in Kenya since the 1980s due principally to the work of the Regional Soil Conservation Unit, followed by the Regional Land Management Unit and a variety of other smaller projects. In the early years these programmes had a primary focus on conservation, and later devoted increasing attention to livelihoods.

In some respects NALEP, which ran from 2001-2011, was a reaction to the gap between the conservation focused programmes and more mainstream agriculture and food security efforts, as some at Sida felt that environmental protection had too much overshadowed issues of production and productivity. There has, over the past decade, been a shift from emphasis on conservation toward agricultural production and productivity.

The introduction of an ASAL component in NALEP (2007-2011) can be seen as a recognition that, due to concerns about recurrent drought and climate change, a renewed focus on natural resource management was needed. This time, however, the emphasis was targeted towards reducing disaster risks and enhancing food security rather than conservation per se.

Parallel processes in humanitarian response and social protection

Humanitarian assistance is nothing new in the ASALs of Kenya, but over the past fifteen years the provision of humanitarian assistance, primarily food aid, has shifted from being an exception to being the norm. This is especially true in arid areas. The justification for this has not just been drought, but also conflict. During this period Kenya has been a testing ground for many small innovative efforts to promote LRRD and social protection (e.g., cash based responses), but the vast majority of aid has nonetheless gone toward traditional food aid, sometimes provided as “food-for-assets”.

The humanitarian response to the current drought (2011-2012) has been described as being overly based on existing programming structures. Learning from past experience about how to respond to severe drought was “more evident in program design and strategy than in practice”.⁶⁰ In general it has been found that the humanitarian agencies are in principle eager to pursue alternatives to past practices, but this has not been matched by access to donor resources for programmes that address vulnerability and has been hindered by the agencies’ own institutional inertia.

This review did not encounter any large-scale social protection systems and the embassy in Addis Abeba has primary responsibility for regional Swedish initiatives. One of these is African Risk Capacity, which is a programme that has been approved in principle by the government of Kenya. Support for national recovery plans linked to African Risk Capacity could be a way to link Kenyan disaster risk reduction plans to regional initiatives and learning processes in the future.

Through both humanitarian operations and development efforts experiments are underway in use of more modest cash transfer measures for social protection and response to smaller recurrent droughts and seasonal stress. It was not possible in this review to obtain an overview of this area of programming, but it appears that the challenge here is to find ways to institutionalise the lessons being learnt from small pilots. A recent Oxfam/Concern project piloting such approaches in Nairobi was deemed a success, but failed to obtain government support for continuation or scaling-up.

⁶⁰ Darcy et al 2012 page 4-5

Parallel processes in the water sector

NALEP was seen to be an agricultural programme, but 80% of the activities financed through the ASAL component related to water, with only 10% for food crops and 10% for livestock.⁶¹ Therefore it is somewhat misleading to see the water portfolio as separate from the agricultural portfolio, even if integration between these two programming areas has been limited. The differences often relate to institutional entry points, underlying principles (e.g., relative emphasis on rights versus economic development) and modalities, rather than the actual types of activities actually supported.

Sida also has a long history of support to the water sector in Kenya. Given that such a large proportion of activities in the NALEP ASALs component and in IFSAP consist of water related interventions there is a considerable overlap of efforts in the two sectors. This is not a criticism. On the contrary, the two contrasting points of departure can potentially add depth of understanding of the complex factors that create vulnerability and the range of options for promoting resilience.

In 2008 Sida started providing support for a Flood and Drought Mitigation Sub-component of the larger Kenya Water and Sanitation Programme. The intention has been to build upon the institutional development of Water Resource User Associations (WRUAs) as a basis for community led activities, in much the same way as the Common Interest Groups (CIGs, now becoming Value Chain Groups) have led community level implementation of programme activities in NALEP/IFSAP.

A significant difference in modalities is that the WRUAs are not seen to be creating commercial enterprises. WRUA support has always been in the form of grants, which is notably different from the intentions of ASDSP, which will use credit. If ASDSP's work in ASALs continues to focus on water (as is the case with NALEP/IFSAP) this could create conflicts, especially when targeting vulnerable populations.

The need to address these different and contrasting “logics” may become even more urgent in the near future as the Water Resources Management Authority is proposing to initiate a system of Livelihood Micro Grants that are extremely similar to plans for support to Value Chain Groups, but rely on grants rather than credit. This would seem to suggest an area of conflict as it could undermine willingness to repay loans. But the emergence of this proposal can also be seen as an indication of the need to consider transparently how credit, grant and humanitarian modalities need to be reviewed to ensure that efforts reach the most vulnerable sectors of the population, retain a rights based perspective (particularly regarding access to water) and contribute to the creation of sustainable institutions to support commercial development.

⁶¹ Republic of Kenya 2012 page 9, note that this figure varies somewhat in the different documents received.

This discussion could also become a vehicle to discuss openly what subsidies may be required to promote livelihoods that combine environmental and societal resilience.⁶² This discussion would thus be an important way to bring to light differing perspectives from the different Kenyan ministries regarding such subsidies and grants and thereby ensuring that readiness of the state to cover eventual costs of these programmes is factored into design at an early stage.

Current policy context of agricultural resilience efforts in Kenya

Swedish Strategy for Development Cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013

“The overall goal of Swedish development cooperation with Kenya is a Kenya where all poor women, men, girls and boys have the opportunity to improve their living conditions, and where human rights are realised.”⁶³

The agriculture and water sectors are both given priority in Swedish development cooperation with Kenya under the sector of natural resources and environment, the objective of which is “Improved management of natural resource utilisation with a focus on sustainable growth that benefits poor people.” No explicit mention is made of resilience, vulnerability or risk reduction in the description of the priorities within this sector. There is a brief statement under aid modalities that “Humanitarian aid may also be needed in the event of recurring drought and flooding”, which could be interpreted as at best ignoring and perhaps even discouraging attention to how other sectors could promote resilience. In this respect Swedish priorities would seem not to be entirely harmonised with the country analysis in the strategy that makes explicit mention of vulnerability to climate change and increasing occurrence of droughts and floods.

Agricultural policies and the CAADP Compact

Kenya’s Agricultural Sector Development Strategy⁶⁴ describes the plans for agricultural development during the period 2010-2020. It is summarised as the Kenya Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Compact, and is thereby aligned with regional African agricultural development strategies. The strategy makes surprisingly brief mention of ASALs (3 pages out of a 94 page strategy), but within this section the emphasis is on “flagship” and “targeted” projects and programmes that seem to focus on the ‘radical’ agenda noted above.

⁶² Resilience is used as a justification for a range of activities. The meaning of the term varies. The official OECD definition refers explicitly to ecological resilience; “...the capacity of a natural system to recover from disturbance” (<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2330>), which in this report is referred to as environmental resilience. The term is increasingly used in the discourses on climate change adaptation to with respect to social or societal resilience, and there are some who promote a hybrid between the two (for a review of the different definitions applied to resilience, see Brand and Jax 2007). This report uses environmental and societal resilience as contrasting concepts in order to highlight the issues involved in finding synergies between the two.

⁶³ Regeringskansliet 2009

⁶⁴ Republic of Kenya 2010

“Ending drought emergencies in Kenya”

The Government of Kenya’s proposal for “ending drought emergencies in Kenya”⁶⁵ summarises and justifies a ten-year approach for transcending the cycles of humanitarian assistance that have characterised drought response in the ASALs. It is an acknowledgement that the strategies of the past have not overcome drought emergencies and have not even led to effective humanitarian response since early warning systems have failed to trigger effective and timely response.

The proposals in this document are somewhat general, but it was nonetheless referred to during interviews as somewhat of a rallying cry for more forceful and largely commercially oriented investments in the ASALs. It notes, for example, that commercial agriculture outside of the ASALs has been subsidised, but that pastoralist livelihoods have only (and inappropriately) been subsidised through humanitarian assistance.

Current institutional actors in resilience efforts in Kenya*The institutional calm before the constitutional and election storm*

Kenya is in a period of uncertainty as the new constitution, which includes a far reaching decentralisation process and merging of ministries, is about to be rolled out. The implications of these changes are not entirely clear and it is likely that Kenya will undergo a period of uncertainty during 2013. Also, presidential elections will take place in the Spring, and some crucial decisions related to new strategies will need to be confirmed by the newly elected president before being implemented. For this reason it should be recognised that the structures and policies described in this report may change considerably in the near future.

The merging of ministries should provide opportunities for a more effective dialogue around risk. Decentralisation may support more effective resilience since local actors are likely to be more aware of the effects of natural hazards and therefore respond more quickly and effectively. These are hypotheses, however, which will need to be monitored closely in the coming year.

National Drought Management Authority and Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit
“Ending drought emergencies in Kenya” mandated the establishment of a National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) in November 2011, which largely took over the staff and resources from the World Bank supported Arid Lands Resource Management Project II. This new authority will have primary responsibility to coordinate LRRD efforts, early warning systems, etc. in the ASALs of Kenya. It is under the authority of the Ministry of State for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands. Such a focal point appears to be an appropriate structure to bring together risk and resilience concerns. An important aspect of the NDMA’s coordination with other actors appears to be

⁶⁵ Republic of Kenya 2011

the “Kenya Food Security Meeting”. There are, however, two dangers with such a structure. First, the existence of such a structure is reliant on strong political support, which may change after the elections. Second, by being placed outside of the agricultural ministries an institutional separation may emerge wherein drought is seen to be “somebody else’s business” detached from the mainstream agricultural agenda. NDMA should of course work with a range of actors, but it is important that agriculture is part of drought response.

Ideally this interface should be dealt with via the Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU), and indeed this is recognised. Sida plays a key role in supporting the ASCU as a way of promoting sectoral harmonisation and alignment. ASDSP’s first component is centred on support for the ASCU and it can be surmised that ownership for ASDSP is also very strong within the ASCU. The ASCU is dedicated to working closely with the NDMA on issues related to agriculture and drought. Therefore, ideally ASCU should ensure that agricultural programming is aligned with the risk and resilience focused efforts of NDMA. Thus far it would appear that the link between Swedish supported agricultural programming efforts and NDMA is still weak. For example, during the field mission for this case study the meeting held with the NDMA was the first time the NALEP/IFSAP team had met the NDMA.

The private sector

This case study has not provided an opportunity to undertake an analysis of overall private sector development in the ASALs. Nonetheless, given the centrality of the private sector in the theories of change in the current Swedish development portfolio in Kenya it is essential to highlight the relevance of core assumptions in relation to addressing risk and resilience among vulnerable populations.⁶⁶ Agricultural development programmes increasingly assume that the private sector will play a key role in promoting increased smallholder production and/or alternative livelihoods. ASDSP, for example, assumes “...that the private sector has the will and ownership to promote a prioritized and efficient coordination of value chains...”⁶⁷. It is safe to assume that the private sector will have its own priorities (which may not necessarily include investments that benefit those vulnerable to natural hazards). Given that many private sector actors exploit inefficiencies in the current system (including those related to isolation in the ASALs) it is not a safe assumption that the private sector will promote efficient coordination.

Farmer organisations

⁶⁶ It can be noted that during the early years of the programme NALEP was frequently criticised for not being sufficiently focused on mobilising private sector actors and this was one reason that NALEP was entirely Swedish funded and did not turn into a harmonised, multidonor initiative as was originally hoped.

⁶⁷ Republic of Kenya 2011 page 85

As with the private sector, this case study has not provided an opportunity to review the complex history and processes of creating viable farmer organisations in Kenya, but this is also one of the pivotal aspects of the institutional developments upon which agricultural interventions will rely. The basis of NALEP's theory of change was the assumption that the Common Interest Groups (CIGs) which were organised to work with extension would provide a basis for demand driven technological innovation and that many would eventually develop into cooperative-like entities. IFSAP has assumed a transitional approach whereby the CIG structures have begun to be reconceptualised as Value Chain Groups with an increasing focus on cooperative-like roles. In relation to risk and resilience it is important to assess whether these relatively weak institutional forms can grow in the face of high levels of environmental stress. In the field visit during this case study the representatives of these newly formed groups were already requesting project payments for their organisational work given their need to obtain daily income to support their families (this despite the fact that many were also receiving heavily subsidised support for their agricultural activities from the programme). This illustrates the issues related to dependency on aid assistance in areas where projects have been providing "food-for-assets" and other support over a long period of time. Cooperative development can therefore be seen as another area where there will be trade-offs between targeting ASALs where drought risk is very high (but where dependency is entrenched and development of sustainable farmer organisations is therefore difficult), versus working in areas where there is less dependency but also lower levels of vulnerability to drought. ASDSP recognises that dependency is an important issue and it is noted that for recipients of grant support "it will be necessary to wean them off for long-term sustainability"⁶⁸, but the particular challenges in this regard in highly vulnerable/dependent areas are not specifically mentioned.

National and international partners in implementation

NALEP and IFSAP have worked closely with national (Kenya Forestry Research Institute) and International (World Agroforestry Centre) research institutions, with NGO partners (SNV Netherlands Development Organisation), UN agencies (World Food Programme, WFP) and Kenya Red Cross in designing and implementing programming. These partners have both been subcontracted and also have come with additional resources. In Kibwezi, for example, ICRAF, WFP and Kenya Red Cross are prepared to continue the work that has partly been developed through IFSAP after the project ends. These partners are an important source of new ideas and in-depth knowledge about working with drought affected populations and ecosystems. Some of these partners have strongly differing views about whether or not commercialisation efforts focused on large scale producers are an appropriate way to promote resilience (e.g., SNV and some research partners at the University of Nairobi have diametrically opposed views). Such disagreements could be seen to be a resource to bring up crucial but unresolved questions

⁶⁸ Republic of Kenya 2011 page 86

about how different paths to rural development will ultimately impact on different vulnerable populations.

Resilience in NALEP

Theories of change related to impacts on vulnerable populations

NALEP was initiated in 2001 to implement the new Kenyan extension policy. That policy did not have an explicit emphasis on vulnerability and resilience and therefore risk was not a significant feature of the original plans. The Kenyan Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture 2004-2014 included significant focus on ASALs and drought risk, which in turn led to changes in NALEP. Vulnerability and drought resilience became a focus within NALEP with the introduction of the ASALs component in 2007. As part of planning for this component sources of information and other institutions were mapped in detail and analysis was made of the hazards facing ASAL areas.⁶⁹ Considerable emphasis was given to early warning systems as they were apparently deemed to be a pivotal element of disaster preparedness. It is not clear if or how this analysis led to an integration of understanding related to the impact of climatic and weather hazards on vulnerability and specific measures to lessen detrimental effects within NALEP activities. The many detailed recommendations made to the programme were primarily concerned with general rural development approaches for the region and paid relatively little specific attention to risk, vulnerability and resilience per se. It appears that disaster risk management came to be largely synonymous with development efforts in the ASALs more generally.

NALEP and the ASALs component achieved an impressive number of outputs. It is difficult, however, to ascertain the extent to which these activities led to reductions in disaster risks. The Internal Evaluation of the NALEP ASALs Component⁷⁰ briefly notes that there was little evidence that drought risks had been reduced or that the programme had been able to actually focus on reducing disaster risk. Despite this finding the evaluation contains no recommendations for reinforcing attention to disaster risk reduction, which may indicate a lack of tools within the programme to analyse and develop concrete strategies to address vulnerability and resilience. The evaluation's analysis of vulnerability pays significantly greater attention to vulnerability related to HIV/AIDS and drug abuse than to drought.⁷¹ This may be attributable to clearer and stronger policy guidance from Sida in relation to these forms of vulnerability.

The internal impact assessment of NALEP II as a whole⁷² did not analyse resilience nor assess whether disaster risks were actually reduced, but instead focused solely on

⁶⁹ NALEP 2011

⁷⁰ 2011

⁷¹ The emphasis on noting the limited role of ASDSP in addressing these forms of vulnerability, rather than drought, in the ASDSP programme document may be attributable to these evaluation findings.

⁷² 2011 Internal Impact Assessment

productivity increase that can be attributed to technological adoption. Findings were not disaggregated between ASAL and non-ASAL areas. No specific analysis was made of the extent to which drought and climate uncertainty affected adoption rates.⁷³ Drought was not mentioned as one of the “disabling or vulnerability factors”. These gaps could be interpreted as being indicative of a failure to internalise risk and resilience goals as core concerns. Indeed, one of the dangers in evaluating extension programmes based on technological adoption is that it may skew incentives toward targeting farmers who are already able to manage risk and away from vulnerable populations.⁷⁴

Scenarios of risk that guided NALEP

Apart from the ASALs component, NALEP paid relatively little attention to risks related to natural hazards and their impact on vulnerable populations. The term “vulnerable” was generally used in relation to the identification of “vulnerable groups” with relatively limited apparent analysis of the natural hazard scenarios that contributed to these vulnerabilities. As noted above, an exception to this is that greater attention has been given to vulnerability related to HIV/AIDS and drug abuse.

Resilience in IFSAP

Scenarios of risk that are guiding IFSAP

The scenario of risk that guides IFSAP is largely that of increasing recurrence of drought and the ineffectiveness of traditional LRRD efforts in mitigating, much less preventing, these risks from leading to suffering and declining livelihoods. The declining resilience of populations’ livelihoods due to drought is in particular evidenced by weak recovery of livestock herds in recent years. This scenario is seen as justifying the radical approach noted in this report.

Regarding the scenario of risk, one component of IFSAP is the creation of a “Food Early Warning System” that could presumably contribute to realtime monitoring of how this scenario is playing out. The focus of the system is primarily on providing farmers with climate information related to scientific advice. This component was justified due to assumptions that existing information systems were not reaching the “last mile” to farmers and also that there were insufficient systems for integrating farmers’ knowledge about climate into extension activities. It is as yet not entirely clear what this system will consist of and it does not appear that this activity, or indeed IFSAP in general, is linked to the extensive national scenario development efforts and early warning system coordination being initiated by the NDMA. The pressures to achieve rapid results in a tangible manner seem to have taken priority.

Theories of change related to impacts on vulnerable populations

⁷³ There is brief mention that farmers report that weather and drought affected their agricultural enterprises, but the implications of this are not analysed.

⁷⁴ Christoplos et al 2012

IFSAP could be described as an effort to respond to a drought emergency by applying developmental modalities within a humanitarian time frame. The programme team has expressed strong concerns that the programme has been unrealistic in its attempts to achieve a paradigm shift and create local institutional structures that would require far more time to undertake. The ways in which IFSAP activities may (or may not) eventually feed into ASDSP programming has been unclear, so it has also been difficult to determine how these activities might be carried on beyond the closing of IFSAP.

IFSAP has engaged the NALEP team in programme implementation, and effectively aims to scale up and speed up the NALEP ASAL modalities through increased use of mechanisation and other adjustments to the modalities used in the last years of NALEP. As such, IFSAP is an effort which links development to recovery, rather than engaging humanitarian agencies in these activities, as is the most common practice in efforts focused on the LRRD continuum. At field level, however, IFSAP works closely with Kenya Red Cross, various WFP food-for-assets programmes, and other humanitarian efforts, so these categorisations fade in actual implementation. Such flexibility across the humanitarian – development divide can be seen as an indication of how a pragmatic “contiguum” approach supports resilience.

The theory of change of IFSAP is that, in order to end drought emergencies, it will be necessary to employ radical development responses during the periods of recovery from drought. Through mechanisation and rapid formation of groups that are expected to function as cooperatives, the programme is expected to constitute part of the paradigm shift that was initiated in the NALEP ASAL component.⁷⁵ If production methods and commercialisation are strengthened at such times, it is assumed that the likelihood of drought being accompanied by catastrophic impacts on the population will be greatly reduced.

The radical approaches promoted with IFSAP are phrased in terms of value chain development, but at field level there is relatively little discussion of how value will be added at different stages within market relations. The main focus of this “value chain” development remains that of increasing production (by increasing cultivated areas) and productivity (by improving rain water infiltration and reducing run-off). Links to markets are predominantly expected to be improved through turning the NALEP style CIGs into small de facto cooperatives and by increasing the quantities produced, which would then attract more buyers. Given the very short timeframe of IFSAP, the core institutional infrastructure of cooperative development naturally carries with it internal risks if corruption or mismanagement of the resources provided lead to reduced community

⁷⁵ The strong focus on mechanisation in IFSAP is partly related to the need to produce results in a very short period of time. Partners such as WFP, Kenya Red Cross, SNV and ICRAF expressed preferences for labour based methods, and this may therefore mean that these initiatives will be reoriented after the end of the programme if ASDSP does not take over support.

trust. Within IFSAP a notably large amount of capital and equipment are to be placed under the control of very young and inexperienced local organisations.

A rapid response piloting of some of the value chain concepts from ASDSP among vulnerable populations can be seen to be a useful test of whether these approaches can be effectively used to support the resilience of populations struggling with the effects of drought. It is important to note that the pressurised timeframe (one year) will not be present in ASDSP. However, if ASDSP is to focus on the resilience of drought-affected populations, it is likely to need some form of comparatively rapid response capacity. This could, for example, involve integrating subsidised weather indexed insurance into value chain investment packages to ensure that resources reach households in need. It might also involve links to WFP or other humanitarian organisations that can respond to needs identified by ASDSP with modalities that do not conflict with those used in the programme.

Possible advantages and disadvantages of value chain development from a resilience perspective	
<i>Advantages</i>	<i>Disadvantages</i>
May generate investments in improved rainwater infiltration that would be economically unviable on small plots	Faith in the advantages of value chain development may lead to government policies that legitimise land dispossession and violate the rights of vulnerable pastoralists and smallholders
Can generate wage employment and thereby diversify income sources for those who have lost their crops or livestock due to drought or floods	Doubtful whether smallholders (particularly very smallholders) will be able to achieve quality standards, meet certification demands, produce in a timely manner or produce in sufficient bulk to take advantage of value chain opportunities; even if they can they may not be ready to take the risk of making the investments needed to meet these demands
May promote migration to urban areas as a better alternative where rural livelihoods are no longer viable and to generate remittances for consumption, investment and restocking by household members remaining in rural areas	Coping strategies reliant on on-farm diversification, with very small quantities of a broad range of crops, are unlikely to lead to production that meet the above mentioned requirements of value chains
May be the only alternative for commercial production where shifts to supermarkets and other forms of retail lead to a decline in traditional markets	Given their ability to shift to new markets value chain investors may not be concerned with the long-term sustainability of local production systems and may mine nutrients, water resources and other natural resources in an unsustainable manner
Can create incentives for smallholders to organise, which can have positive additional affects as these groups may also provide mutual aid in dealing with climate and market variability and uncertainty	Uncertain whether the most vulnerable sectors of the population will be welcome in producer organisations engaged in value chains as the risks and uncertainties inherent in their production systems can reduce the credibility of these organisations in their dealings with buyers

ASDSP*Theories of change related to impacts on vulnerable populations*

ASDSP is designed with a natural resource management (NRM) component that will be used to underpin value chain development that is environmentally sustainable and climate change resilient. The primary focus is on value chain development and natural resource management is seen as a means to sustainably achieve these commercial aims. From a resilience perspective there are two core questions. First, how can attention to resilience for drought-affected populations be maintained within a policy agenda that is overwhelmingly focused on increasing production and productivity. Second, whether value chains interventions can be identified that actually *include* populations that are vulnerable to natural hazards and *reflect* how natural hazards are likely to impact on their ability to engage in or benefit from value chains. In interviews it was stated that it is intended (though not explicitly stated in the programme document) that ASDSP will continue the work, and with this the learning process, in the current IFSAP sites. As such these may become the main testing grounds in relation to whether or not the ASDSP concept is appropriate for reducing risk in the ASALs. It must be stressed that in general value chain development has rarely been developed with a resilience focus and trends in value chain investments may point towards a shift away from high-risk areas and smallholder production systems (see table above).⁷⁶

Moreover, it should also be noted that the urbanisation pressures that are likely to accompany a shift toward more commercial production methods may both be an effective way of reducing risks related to natural hazards while also being a generator of other forms of vulnerability. The Swedish portfolio in Kenya, with its parallel focus on urban poverty, may provide a good basis for assessing these wider aspects of the landscape of rural and urban risk. It is not clear if these cross-sectoral discussions are influencing resilience strategies.

Some value chain efforts in agricultural frontier areas in other parts of the world have resulted in increased *ecosystem* resilience (e.g., in some of the extensive livestock production regions of Latin America), but this has not necessarily led to *societal* resilience as these large farms tend to generate few labour opportunities and are generally not good examples of inclusive development. Societal (or social) resilience focuses on the processes by which communities and households are able to rebound and rebuild their livelihoods after a shock.⁷⁷ In rural areas in particular this is dependent on ecosystem resilience, but ecosystem resilience can also be achieved by excluding or dispossessing

⁷⁶ Bolwig et al 2010

⁷⁷ The working definition of resilience (in general) used by the Sida thematic working group that commissioned this case study is "...the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming livelihoods and poor people's quality of life in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earthquakes and drought – without compromising their long-term prospects."

vulnerable people from their rights and access to ecosystem resources. Much of the extreme societal vulnerability that has been generated in some areas of Kenya (e.g., Kibwezi) is an outcome of forced resettlement efforts that were justified by the goal of reducing population pressures on vulnerable ecosystems.⁷⁸

Vulnerability in the ASDSP programme document is *not* explicitly described as being related to natural hazard risk. Given this definition of vulnerability it would seem that there is a danger that resilience will not be linked to vulnerability analysis. In some places in the ASDSP programme document (strategy two) vulnerability is perceived as being a factor of chronic disease and drug dependency requiring a health and social service response. This is in turn seen as being largely outside of the mandate of an agricultural programme.

Furthermore, in the programme document (p.36) “improving responses to food emergency crises” is foreseen as being addressed through “Promoting access to finance – all actors, male and female”. In general the approach emphasises access to credit as a way of overcoming poor people’s constraints to capitalising their production systems and thereby joining value chains. It may be questioned whether credit is an appropriate tool for injecting capital into enterprises that experience very high levels of natural hazard risk. In discussions in Nairobi it was stated that this aspect of the original programme design would be revisited. In looking at the application of developmental approaches such as credit in highly drought prone areas it would seem important to consider what will happen to credit recipients and to the financial systems that serve them if the drought continues for a second year after the loans have been provided. This is an example of how it is important to recognise natural hazards as an ever-present feature of the development landscape and not at extraordinary events requiring extraordinary measures.

The impact assessment of NALEP phase two did not look at whether households that are affected by recurrent drought have access to credit, so it is difficult to gauge whether they are likely to be perceived as credit worthy. Given that only 9% of households participating in NALEP phase two were able to access credit it can be assumed that access among the more vulnerable population groups is likely to have been very low. This is particularly important to reflect upon with regard to credit as a response to emergencies given the strong culture of dependence on both food aid and grant support to agricultural production in drought affected areas, both of which would create incentives for loan defaults. As noted above, conflicts between programmes are likely to arise in places where credit programmes operate alongside grant modalities. If ASDSP responds to these problems by avoiding areas where these grant-based modalities are being used

⁷⁸ Mwanzia and Lawrence 2007

(presumably the most drought affected ASAL regions), then it is unlikely that ASDSP will retain a focus on resilience among Kenya’s most drought affected populations. The programme document is, however, unclear and at times even contradictory in how vulnerability is described and addressed. A major deficiency in the programme approach to vulnerability is that it seems to focus on how the programme will (or will not) benefit so-called “vulnerable groups”, rather than focusing on what these groups are actually vulnerable to, e.g., natural hazards. When vulnerability is framed in terms of targeting beneficiaries, as is the case with ASDSP, rather than a hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis, this results in weaknesses in identifying how to focus on resilience. The ASDSP programme documents states that “[t]he NRM component is designed to provide an enabling environment for the value chain component while building wider ecosystem resilience.”⁷⁹ Resilience is also mentioned in relation to production, but ensuring resilient production in aggregate terms is not necessarily congruent with supporting societal resilience among those most affected by natural hazards as they may contribute little in aggregate terms to overall production. These factors, and the narrow view of vulnerability noted above, could be interpreted as suggesting that the focus will be on ensuring that value chains ‘do no harm’ or even support ecosystem resilience. The ways that vulnerable people’s resilience (as opposed to ecosystem or production resilience) is supported would then be directly related to the extent to which they are engaged in the value chains that are being developed in an ecosystem resilient manner, i.e., whether their resilience is an indirect outcome of environmentally sustainable value chain development. Attention is given to NRM aspects of engendered value chain development, suggesting a degree of targeting, but no mention is made of populations living in ASALs or ways to link drought management to the NRM support function for value chain development.

Scenarios of risk and information management

Provision of climate information and forecasts is a major aspect of the ASDSP NRM component, but it is not clear who will access this information within value chains and how they would be expected to use this information. For example, wealthy large scale and poor small-scale farmers have very different uses of information⁸⁰. Different forms of information are required for different purposes along the value chain.⁸¹ There are even anecdotal examples in Kenya of where climate information led to insurers withdrawing coverage for high-risk areas.⁸² In the programme document it is not clear how these different information needs and trends would be linked with investments in early warning systems. From interviews it appears that links have not yet been established with the NDMA, which is the responsible for overall coordination of these systems. In

⁷⁹ ASDSP Programme document p46

⁸⁰ O'Brien and Vogel 2006

⁸¹ Christoplos 2013 (forthcoming)

⁸² Hansen et al 2011

general, it does not appear that the programme design has been informed by current research and analyses of climate and seasonal forecasting or early warning systems.

The highly complex draft monitoring and evaluation system currently being designed⁸³ appears to be oriented toward fulfilling the kinds of tasks that are associated with the CAADP Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) process elsewhere in Africa, i.e., collecting data on overall sectoral performance (though no mention is made of ReSAKSS in the current document). The proposed system is not aligned with the ASDSP results framework and makes no reference to the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria upon which Sida programmes are evaluated. It is unclear whether it will be able to assess and attribute volatility in sectoral performance to natural hazards, as hazards are seen as “external” to the programme.⁸⁴ No links are proposed with the early warning systems managed by NDMA. Despite one passing reference to the potential use of the information collected to trigger humanitarian response (p26) the proposed system is not likely to constitute a tool for monitoring resilience.

Information systems are not just a tool for monitoring resilience. They are key to defining which scenarios of risk a programme is going to address. If they are anchored in assumptions based upon scenarios of linear development processes directed at productivity and production increases they may actually constitute an obstacle to mainstreaming ways to address vulnerability since they may inadvertently focus attention on those populations with a strong potential for following a linear development path or for achieving these production and productivity increases.

Conclusions regarding coherence of resilience efforts

Is LRRD a non-starter?

The most drought affected areas of Kenya have for many years been “stuck in second gear” in terms of widespread attempts to link relief to rehabilitation, but with little progress in linking quasi-humanitarian rehabilitation efforts to development. Despite some positive examples of LRRD efforts, including the partnerships within IFSAP, on the whole funding for emergency appeals tends to go to food aid, with relatively little provided for LRRD investments. WFP’s food-for-assets may have positive impacts, but it is unlikely to be effective as the core of LRRD transitions. The slogan “ending drought emergencies in Kenya” is largely seen as a call to transcend incremental LRRD approaches led by humanitarian organisations to instead ensure that development efforts are used to prevent droughts turning into emergencies. As such, the old LRRD discourse

⁸³ Deschamps-Laporte 2012

⁸⁴ For example, in the evaluation section it is stated that “Those effects, they might be external shocks or other agriculture support programs, together with natural trends in production and livelihoods, need to be taken away from the ASDSP-specific impacts.” P 29

is a non-starter in defining current approaches to resilience in the agricultural sector in Kenya (though this may be different in other sectors).

However, at field level collaboration between humanitarian and development agencies remains strong and it is uncertain if the new calls for radical shifts will change this. The experience of short term development support from Sida being carried on by much longer term support from WFP and the Kenyan Red Cross in Kibwezi illustrates how these humanitarian organisations have well established relationships. The flexibility in joining together in pragmatic relationships across the “contiguuum” is a positive in terms of addressing resilience, even if the traditional LRRD continuum links are unlikely to develop.

Can private sector development and social protection be linked in value chain development?

If resilience and risk are to be mainstreamed in Swedish agricultural development programming it will not be through value chain development alone. In other countries synergies between commercialisation and risk reduction/social protection have been found in programming using insurance or warehouse receipts, for example. It is thus far not clear if or how such modalities may be brought into ASDSP. “Ending drought emergencies” may rely on hopes that LRRD will be replaced by stronger links between commercial development and social protection mechanisms. Currently, however, WFP’s food aid is a far more widespread and reliable form of social protection than insurance or other more innovative mechanisms.

Smallholder production and/(or) alternative livelihoods

Internationally, the vast majority of disaster risk reduction programming sees these goals being achieved in drought prone rural areas through reinforcing smallholder production. It may be recognised that these systems will not meet all livelihood needs, but they are seen to be the most effective means to shore up coping strategies.

Some such systems may be supported through commercialisation, but value chain development experience suggests that this will need to be complemented with continued attention to smallholder subsistence production and social protection for those who are unable to take advantage of these new livelihoods.

Avoiding conflicts of goals and modalities

Development efforts in Kenya in general and the Swedish portfolio in particular include a range of potentially conflicting goals and modalities in relation to reaching and supporting vulnerable populations. Preserving ecosystem resilience may increase the exposure of populations to droughts if they are displaced to marginal areas. Modalities to promote sustainable commercial relations through a shift from grants to credit may constitute an obstacle to participation of those who are not credit worthy and may ignore the need to design systems to subsidise environmentally sustainable investments that will not generate sufficient direct profits to cover their costs. These conflicts can be resolved if they are discussed openly. The two preconditions for this are empirical analyses of the factors that generate vulnerability and recognition that resilience cannot be pursued with one-size-fits-all mechanisms.

Conclusions regarding strategies to understand and manage natural hazard risks

Weak interfaces between commercialisation and natural hazard risk analysis

The dialogue on agricultural development in Kenya has not sufficiently brought together concerns related to natural hazards and the thrust for greater commercialisation. Coherent policies would require finding ways to see how, for example, a seasonal forecast indicating a likelihood of severe conditions may require a mix of responses related to commercial production (large and small), credit, grants and perhaps even food aid. This would require finding ways to support joint planning between both ASCU and NDMA.

In search of a natural hazards risk and resilience aware results framework

The ASALs component of NALEP recognised natural hazards as part of the justification for activities. However, analysis of whether disaster risks were ultimately reduced by the programme was inconclusive, and the impact analysis done of the overall programme ignored this objective. ASDSP does not yet have a clear approach regarding how it will address risks related to climatic hazards. Such an approach would need to recognise the diversity and complexity of vulnerability and opportunities for resilience among different sectors of the population. Resilient results for a smallholder will be different from those that are relevant for a pastoralist. Conditions vary enormously between arid and semi-arid areas.

It is likely that the establishment of indicators that would indicate whether or not risks have been reduced, paired with a monitoring and evaluation system to follow these indicators will be a “make or break” factor in promoting the mainstreaming of resilience in future Sida programming.

Lessons for ASDSP

If societal resilience is to be integrated into the programming approach it will be essential to shift away from approaches that merely target “vulnerable groups” to instead base strategies on a hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis.

If ASDSP is to have an impact on societal resilience, it will be essential to complement the focus on ecosystem resilience with an understanding of how drought affected populations may (or may not) be able to engage in commercial production when recovering from and coping with drought, and also the extent to which they actually benefit from the alternative livelihoods that are expected to be generated, i.e., an understanding of the challenges involved in attaining societal resilience.

Droughts are not something unusual in Kenyan ASALs. As such, a resilience focus suggests that they should not be treated as factors that require deviations from development processes. Response to drought should be seen as part of development and not an obstacle to development. Information systems should therefore be designed in a way that integrates early warning systems and includes scenarios of climate variability and uncertainty as part of the core problem that the development intervention is intended to address.

Towards a checklist of resilience issues to consider in the Kenyan portfolio

- Recognise that drought will continue to have severe impacts on vulnerable households for some years to come and that commercialisation is just part of the solution.
 - For example, intended results should explicitly reflect analyses of the differentiated resilience strategies among pastoralists and smallholders.
- Accept and encourage pragmatic combination of commercial, subsistence and even humanitarian modalities in ASALs.
 - For example, do not let programming categories become an obstacle to finding ways to address the needs of drought-affected people at field level.
- Do not forget that there are links between urban and rural livelihoods and urban and rural food security. Some of the lower risk alternative livelihoods that may be generated in value chain driven programming may be far from the drought affected areas.
 - For example, ensure that assessments look at the coping strategies of multi-locational households and not just those in the affected areas.
- Use credit with caution during severe droughts and design strategies for how to prevent potential defaults through insurance and humanitarian support to sustain livelihoods.
 - For example, study the experience from Ethiopia in insurance programming when designing ASDSP strategies
- Adapt results frameworks to include the ability to deal with setbacks caused by natural hazards as part of programming and not as an external obstacle to programme implementation.
 - For example, during the inception phase of ASDSP take a fresh look at the risk management strategy to see if some elements should be “mainstreamed” as intended results in the programme activities.
- Devote significant efforts to joint planning with ASCU and NDMA as a way of linking recovery/resilience efforts to ongoing development planning.
 - For example, explore opportunities to support Kenyan contingency plans being development as part of the Sida supported African Risk Capacity programme.
- Analyse and build upon existing NDMA led mechanisms and emerging research findings related to early warning and climate/seasonal forecasting.
 - For example, pay particular attention to the lessons learnt within NMDA regarding the disconnect between early warning and adequate response.
- Recognise that the users and uses of climate information will be varied and may require different tools and approaches in order to respond to the information provided.
 - For example, review evaluations that are being initiated of existing climate information programmes in other countries.
- Do not assume that production and productivity increases can be used as a proxy indicator for reduced vulnerability to drought.
 - For example, monitoring systems should focus on the viability of the alternative livelihoods and social protection systems supported by ASDSP in years (and even in seasons) with high levels of environmental stress.

Lessons for Swedish development cooperation

Disaster risk reduction needs to become more than a label for development activities undertaken in disaster affected areas. Disaster risk reduction, by definition, should be based first on an analysis of hazards and vulnerabilities, second on explicit strategies to respond to the resulting risks, and third in active monitoring of indicators that measure whether the measures employed have actually enhanced resilience among the most vulnerable sectors of the population. Sweden has supported a range of global efforts to develop tools to undertake these tasks but has been very weak in bringing this knowledge to the attention of those responsible for programme design. Furthermore, in many countries (including Kenya with the NDMA) the basic empirical data in vulnerability and hazards is often available, so much of these tasks will involve synthesising existing information and applying it in new ways.

The weak faith in Kenya regarding the potential of improving outcomes of LRRD efforts stems from limited sustained performance and unrealistic expectations of what humanitarian agencies can and should do in this regard. In Kenya the humanitarian agencies are effectively linking relief and rehabilitation where donors provide them with appropriate support. Sida is playing a positive and flexible role in enabling this relief-rehabilitation linkage. They generally lack the scale/timeframe of operations and capacities to engagement with policy makers to effectively manage the subsequent links between rehabilitation and development. This part of LRRD transitions should be led by development actors, with good communication and readiness to learn lessons from humanitarian partners. NDMA may provide a platform for ensuring that development actors learn lessons about risk and resilience from humanitarian agencies, especially to avoid exclusion of vulnerable populations, in the transition between rehabilitation and development.

Valid concerns about the failures of LRRD efforts to resolve the root causes of vulnerability can easily feed into rhetorical calls for radically different, but insufficiently tested, alternatives. Such alternatives may indeed be highly relevant for promoting resilience among a significant sector of the population and for enhancing ecosystem resilience. However, it is important to critically reflect on the potential for different vulnerable populations to benefit from these new, radical approaches.

Adding natural hazard risk components to existing programmes is a useful and manageable way to adapt existing portfolios to respond to the need to promote resilience. The next step, learning from these components for how to rethink overall strategies, is often harder. This requires asking fundamental questions about how risk should inform development programming more generally. It may also involve questioning the basic assumptions behind policies (e.g., about the inclusive nature of commercialisation-led development).

There needs to be greater clarification of the difference between ecosystem resilience and societal resilience, while recognising that the former is generally a condition, but not a guarantee of the latter.

When targeting populations that have been receiving support through humanitarian or quasi-humanitarian modalities for long periods there are particular challenges in moving

toward market-driven and more “sustainable” institutional approaches. Failure to recognise these challenges could lead to a tendency to work in “easier” areas where dependency is less entrenched, which may in turn lead to a failure to target those who are most at risk from natural hazards.

Even if national debates focus on choices between different development paradigms, it is important to recognise that at field level flexible “contiguum” approaches often prevail that make use of a variety of humanitarian and development modalities simultaneously. These may provide an appropriate and pragmatic way to address local needs and take advantage of lessons learnt and established institutional relationships.

New social protection mechanisms show promise, but for many of those living in areas affected by repeated droughts the existing systems, based on food aid, may still provide more reliable access to support in dealing with natural hazards.

There is no single “sustainable” model for investing in livelihoods, businesses and access to water in drought prone areas. These three factors are intertwined and credit, grants and cash/food for work are all relevant interventions. The crucial challenge is to avoid allowing sectoral and institutional divisions to stand in the way of transparency in exploring how these modalities may be employed in ways that avoid goal conflicts and encourage synergies.

Information systems and results frameworks that focus on measuring linear progress toward predetermined goals tend to distract attention from the plight of those who are unable to follow these paths to development. They also tend to portray natural hazards as “surprises” rather than patterns that need to be dealt with as part of the underlying theory of change. For these reasons it is essential that risk is dealt with as part of internal processes within the programme. Indicators are needed that highlight how well the programme responds to the unexpected and how inclusive the development process is for those people who are highly exposed to natural hazards.

Annex 5 - Glossary of terms

Concept	English definition(s)	Swedish term(s)	Additional comments by the team
Climate Change Adaptation (CCA)	<p>UNISDR: “The adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.”ⁱ</p> <p>IPCC: “In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate.”ⁱⁱ</p>	<p>Klimatanpassning</p> <p>UNISDR: Hur naturliga eller mänskliga system anpassar sig till faktiska eller förväntade klimatrelaterade stimuli eller dess effekter, som dämpar skador och utnyttjar fördelaktiga möjligheter.</p>	
Build Back Better (BBB)	<p>DIPECHO: “BBB principle ensures that humanitarian actions take into account hazards, vulnerabilities and risk analysis and therefore improves the quality and efficiency of humanitarian assistance”.ⁱⁱⁱ</p>	<p>BBB principen innebär att humanitära insatser genom riskanalys tar hänsyn till faror/risker, sårbarhet och utsatthet och därmed förbättrar kvalitet och effektivitet i humanitära insatser/bistånd.</p>	
Capacity	<p>UNISDR: “The combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within a community, society or organization that can be used to achieve agreed goals”^{iv}</p>	<p>Kapacitet</p>	
Contingency planning	<p>UNISDR: “A management process that analyses specific potential events or emerging situations that might threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations.”^v</p>	<p>(kris)beredskapsplanering</p>	<p>Somewhat different connotations in the (broader) Swedish translation</p>
Crisis	<p>No specific definition found in glossaries related to resilience</p>	<p>Kris, nödsituation</p>	<p>This term is rarely used in a technical manner in</p>

			relation to DRR, CCA and resilience.
Disaster	UNISDR: “A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources”. ^{vi}	Katastrof	
Disaster risk reduction	UNISDR: “The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events”. ^{vii}	Minskning av risken för katastrof Risk reduktion	<i>Riskhantering</i> is sometimes used in Swedish but connotations of riskhantering are closer to disaster risk management (which includes response) than disaster risk reduction
Exposure	UNISDR: “People, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses”. ^{viii}	Utsatthet, exponering	
Hazard	UNISDR: “A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage”. ^{ix}	Risk, fara	In English there is a clear distinction between hazard and risk that is less clear in Swedish
Linking relief, rehabilitation and development	No single definition presented here as it could be misleading, see comments.		This term has a range of connotations, some of which relate to technical coordination within the aid architecture, others to finding conceptual synergies.
Mitigation	UNISDR: “The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters.” ^x		The DRR discourse originally used the term mitigation to re-

	UNFCCC: “In the context of climate change, a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels more efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation, switching to solar energy or wind power, improving the insulation of buildings, and expanding forests and other "sinks" to remove greater amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.” ^{xi}		fer to largely the same area of activity as that referred to as adaptation in the climate discourse. Now this term is used less often to avoid this confusion.
Preparedness	UNISDR: “The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions”. ^{xii}	Beredskap	Disaster preparedness is a component in disaster risk reduction and management.
Recovery	UNISDR: “The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors”. ^{xiii}	Återhämtning, återuppbyggnad	
Resilience	UNISDR: “The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions”. ^{xiv}	Resiliens: “... förmåga att klara av förändring och vidareutvecklas” ^{xv}	
Response	UNISDR: “The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected”. ^{xvi}	Insats	
Risk	UNISDR: “The combination of the probability of an event and its nega-	Risk	See comment above about the

	tive consequences” ^{xvii} .		Swedish term “risk” also encompassing “hazard”
Social protection	UNRISD: Preventing, managing, and overcoming situations that adversely affect people’s well being. Social protection consists of policies and programs designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by promoting efficient labour markets, diminishing people's exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to manage economic and social risks, such as unemployment, exclusion, sickness, disability and old age.	Socialt skydd/trygghet	
Vulnerability	UNISDR: “The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard” ^{xviii} . UNFCCC: “The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity” ^{xix} .	Sårbarhet, utsatthet	
Vulnerability profile	World Bank: “Vulnerability profiles provide descriptive information about the major characteristics of a particular social group that make people vulnerable including: physical factors, lack of assets and/or access to resources, socioeconomic trends, cultural or political factors and institutional issues” ^{xx} .	Sårbarhets/ utsatthetsprofil: En bedömning som beskriver vad som kännetecknar en social grupp och som orsakar deras sårbarhet eller utsatthet, inklusive: fysiska faktorer, brist på tillgångar och/eller resurser, socioekonomiska trender, kulturella eller politiska faktorer och institutionella frågor.	

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Resilience, Risk and Vulnerability at Sida

This review of Swedish interventions and potential future directions in supporting resilience and reducing vulnerability in relation to natural hazards was commissioned by a thematic working group at Sida to provide analysis and recommendations for expanded efforts. It highlights how Sida has a wide range of relevant engagements in water, agriculture and climate change, as well as in disaster risk reduction. Programmes include both development and humanitarian efforts and sometimes involve links between the two after disasters. The review also notes that resilience is an elusive concept, and that Sida's ambitions related to mainstreaming such concerns are sometimes unclear. Greater and more effective emphasis on resilience in future programming would rely on better assessment of vulnerability and ensuring that results frameworks explicitly reflect an awareness of natural hazard risk and the strategies that are needed to reduce vulnerabilities related to food insecurity, resource scarcity and climate change.

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