

Workshop of lessons learnt on the national and international response to the Bam earthquake

Kerman, Islamic republic of Iran, 14-15 April 2004



Report

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Background

On 26 December 2003, an earthquake measuring 6.5 on the Richter scale struck the city of Bam and its surrounding villages in Kerman province. The earthquake killed more than 30,000 people, rendered more than 75,000 people homeless and severely damaged or destroyed about 85% of the houses, commercial units, health facilities and administrative buildings in the city of Bam and surrounding villages. The 2,500 year-old historic citadel of Bam (*Arg-e-Bam*), an internationally known heritage site, was almost completely destroyed.

Despite the enormous devastation caused by the disaster, the response of and cooperation between the Iranian authorities, Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) and the international community was swift and exemplary. Various government agencies including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, the Army and the IRCS launched a massive rescue and relief operation. Nearly 12,000 people were airlifted and taken to hospitals in other provinces. The IRCS mobilised 8,500 relief volunteers. The provincial government set up a six-member committee chaired by the Governor-General of Kerman to coordinate the relief efforts in the affected area. In addition, all sections of Iranian society came together to help the affected people.

Likewise, the international community showed tremendous solidarity in responding swiftly and generously. More than 1,600 Search and Rescue, Health and Relief personnel from 44 countries arrived in the affected area to assist in the rescue and relief operations. Within hours of the disaster, the UN dispatched its Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) to support the Government in coordinating this enormous international response. The UN Country Team and UN agencies mobilized massive quantities of relief items as well as technical support. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and various Non-Governmental Organizations set up field hospitals, distributed food items, tents and blankets. About 60 countries provided in-kind and cash contributions.

Such a strong national response paired with such a broad involvement of international actors provide an excellent setting to investigate key issues which are very relevant for the development of international policy concerning the response to natural disasters. OCHA, in cooperation with the UN Country Team in Iran, decided therefore to organize a seminar of lessons learnt on the response to the Bam earthquake, focusing particularly on the interaction between national and international responders.

The workshop, which took place in Kerman on 14 and 15 April 2004, saw the participation of some 95 senior representatives and experts from the Government of Iran, the Iranian Red Crescent Societies, UN

agencies, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as from national and international NGOs. A complete list of participants is attached as ANNEX I.

Opening session

The workshop was opened by the Governor General of Kerman, His Excellency Mohammad Ali Karimi.

In referring to the swift, joint response from both the Iranian people and the international community in support of the people affected by the earthquake, Mr. Karimi spoke highly about the national/international cooperation and described the relief operation undertaken by the UN as very valuable. He expressed hope that the workshop results will help the Government embark on a new policy with regards to coping with the natural disasters. He trusted that the workshop could forward the experiences learnt from the Bam earthquake to other countries.

In referring to the Bam reconstruction phase, Mr. Karimi emphasized an important aspect of the reconstruction - the need to rebuild a sustainable economy of the city in harmony with and in the context of the national economy.

Mr. Karimi was followed by the UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident representative to Iran, Mr. Frederick Lyons, who spoke about the involvement of the UN Country Team in the early phase of the response and about the excellent cooperation extended by the Iranian authorities. Mr. Lyons also stressed that the lessons learnt seminar on the response to the Bam earthquake was one initiative among many taken by national and international actors to learn from this tragic experience and that all these initiatives will culminate in the upcoming Conference on the Reconstruction of Bam.

Mr. Rashid Khalikov, the Deputy Director of OCHA Geneva, also gave brief introductory remarks, putting the seminar in the context of the broader cooperation between the United Nations and the Government of Iran in terms of disaster management.

Session 1: national and international response

The first session of the workshop aimed at providing participants with a consolidate, bird's eye view of the joint efforts made by the national authorities and the international respondents during the first eight weeks of the relief operation.

The Government provided relief AND facilitated the work of other responders

Mr. Seyed Abbas Jazayeri Director General of the Natural Disasters Department of the Ministry of Interior provided a brief presentation on the efforts deployed by the government. From Mr. Jazayeri presentation, it was evident that the Iranian Government provided massive relief, but also played a key role in facilitating the provision of assistance by Iranian civil society and international actors. From the technical point of view, it was interesting to note that, in working with their international counterparts, the Iranian national civil defense could see the latest search and rescue technology in action and, as a result, intends to get equipped with the same means.

As a grassroots organisation, IRCS could intervene literally minutes after the disaster, providing massive relief, but also coordination and fundraising activities

Mr. Mehrdad Eshraghi, Director General for International Affairs of the IRCS, presented the impressive activities carried out by the IRCS. The IRCS is a nationwide organization, strong of some 2 million members and has the responsibility of leading the rescue operations in case of disasters. Literally minutes after the earthquake in Bam, the IRCS was already active with its local branch and only a couple of hours later with relief personnel sent from the provincial capital of Kerman. Five hours after the disaster, a Task Force was set up at national levels and already within the first 24 hours massive human and material resources were deployed to the affected area.

A total of 18,660 persons comprised of 1,402 staff members, 1,122 medical doctors, 1,288 nurses, 14,848 relief workers and volunteers of IRCS participated in the operation. 2 helicopters, 26 rescue machines, 10 rescue dog teams, 1,798 heavy vehicles, 1,186 light vehicles, 284 ambulances, 2 Bus hospitals were used during the operation. The IRCS engaged in a number of crucial activities such as search and rescue, distribution of relief items, health services (nearly 65,000 people treated during the first 8 weeks) and also played a key role in the coordination of national and international assistance and for the collecting and channeling of donations from all parts of Iran.

By complementing and not replacing the Government's

Ms. Kari Egge, the UNICEF representative to Iran, provided a presentation on behalf of all the international responders. Already during the first two days, rapid assessments were undertaken to establish

action, international aid agencies quickly provided relief, but were also instrumental in mobilizing international support.

needs on the ground; the UNDAC Team was deployed, WHO and UNICEF deployed staff/technical experts. Initial discussion began on Flash Appeal at the UN Country Team (UNCT) level and humanitarian flights were organized carrying 82 MTs of relief items. Meanwhile, a large number of NGOs came to the site of the disaster and started relief operations.

During the first week, emergency funds were mobilized by various UN agencies. NGOs started large-scale water/sanitation programmes and distribution of Non Food Items. Before the end of the first month, the UN Flash Appeal was launched in Bam jointly with IFRC; a strategy for "Support to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran Following the Bam Earthquake of 26 December 2003." was developed by the UN Country Team. Agreements were signed with national authorities for reconstruction/rehabilitation programmes already during the second month. NGOs continued initiatives to address health, water, sanitation, child protection, education and housing problems. A chronology table with the interventions of all the major international partners is attached as ANNEX 2.

The presentation and the ensuing discussion stressed that international actors complement and do not replace the actions taken by the government. It was also mentioned that aid organisations on the ground quickly provided relief assistance but also played a crucial role in mobilizing international support. Specific to the Bam response was the development of Flash Appeal and a Strategy Document.

It was noted that rehabilitation/reconstruction concerns were taken into account as early as the fourth week after the earthquake. NGOs played a crucial role in many fields, especially in final distributions. The area of psycho-social support, however, was not well covered. Delays in the actual availability of financial resources provided by donors were also a concern.

Session 2: the national set up for disaster response

This issue was placed on the agenda as there has been, in recent years, considerable and growing interest concerning the legal aspects of international disaster response. Unlike what happens in the case of complex emergencies, which are covered by a vast and detailed body of international law, international disaster response happens outside any international legal framework (be it "hard law" such as international conventions or "soft law" such as UN GA resolutions). In many cases, disaster-prone countries don't even have a piece of national legislation covering disaster response.

A series of landmark studies carried out by the IFRC investigated these issues in depth, from the legal and practical point of view, concluding that the establishment of the natural disasters equivalent of the Geneva conventions would neither be politically feasible at this point in time (primarily because of sovereignty infringement issues) nor particularly useful in terms of making assistance more efficient and effective. The experts agree that the way to follow is the development of good national disaster response laws, which should include trigger mechanisms for the request of international assistance and mechanisms for the interface between national and international responders.

The session aimed at identifying issues that can be taken into account by countries who are developing or revising a national disaster response plan/law, particularly concerning trigger mechanisms for international assistance and the interaction between national and international response mechanisms.

A comprehensive disaster management structure that includes risk reduction

Mr. Seyed Abbas Jazayeri provided a detailed description of the Iranian national set up for disaster management. In Iran, the overall responsibility for disaster management rests with the Ministry of Interior. Operational and policy matters are dealt with by a Task Force comprising representatives of all concerned ministries and agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides an interface with international actors. As the level of decision-making varies with the extent of the disaster, Task Force structures are present with the same composition at the provincial level (chaired by Provincial Governor, who has the power to call upon national bodies for assistance) and at city level (where the chair can call upon the Province for assistance). Auxiliary Provinces can step in as required.

All Task Forces have hazard-specific Committees

(earthquakes, floods, droughts, etc.), chaired by a representative of the Ministry responsible for responding to that particular hazard.

The Task Forces also have thematic working groups (Prevention Working Group, Operations Working Group, Communications Working Group, Training Working Group, Media Working Group, Foreign Aid Working Group). Significantly, these working groups deal with all phases of the disaster management cycle – disaster response is therefore integrated in a much broader risk management concept.

In addition to the IRCS, large and capable NGOs (some funded by public sources and some independent) are key in the implementation of relief programmes, in full coordination with the governmental structures.

During the discussion, it was recommended that international agencies should engage more with national/local NGOs.

Session 3: Policy and administrative issues

Aware of the extent of the devastation, the Government of Iran, despite being able to count on very strong civil defence capacities, was quick to welcome the assistance provided by third countries and later appealed for international assistance through the United Nations. This is very important in policy terms, as recent studies, as well as the experience of the international relief agencies, show that different governments have very different attitudes towards international assistance following natural disasters. Some governments are very reluctant, to the point of refusing international assistance as such. Others go as far as “welcoming” international assistance, but would not make an official request. Some others, like in the case of Iran, issue, typically through the United Nations, official requests for financial and material assistance.

Furthermore, the Government of Iran took some crucial decisions concerning visa and customs during the acute phase of the response to the Bam earthquake. These are amongst the most sensitive issues in the international policy debate, to the point that they contributed significantly to the failure of the attempts to develop an international convention on urban search and rescue assistance.

The session aimed at identifying policy decisions and administrative measures that can be usefully adopted by other countries in the aftermath of a sudden-onset disaster.

The advantages of the "open doors" and "open skies" policy vastly outnumbered disadvantages

Ambassador Bozorgmehr Zyaran Director General for the International Economics and Specialized Agencies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided an extremely interesting account of the process through which the Iranian government made such important decisions.

These were taken in the framework of a Task Force where all relevant government actors were represented, and focal points were appointed in the key bodies (such as Foreign Affairs and Customs) for the actual implementation of such measures. Embassies in all assisting countries were alerted accordingly. Key to these swift decisions was the high level of authority entrusted to the Task Force.

During the ensuing discussion, strong agreement emerged that the positive outcomes of the "open doors" policy vastly outnumbered the negative ones. Representatives of the Ministry of Interior and of Law Enforcement, who were somewhat reticent in the beginning due to security concerns, acknowledged that the entry of a large number of foreign aid workers did not cause any particular problems.

The Law Enforcement agency was praised for an excellent management of security in a very tense environment and despite the presence of large numbers of expatriate aid workers and large quantities of relief supplies. Some difficulties were mentioned in the implementation of less strict custom procedures at some border points, but this was deemed to be practically inevitable.

Many speakers were of the opinion that the "open doors" policy towards international relief agencies should become a permanent feature of the Iranian disaster management set up, also to promote exchanges between national and international responders. Some national NGOs said to have benefited greatly by working alongside international agencies, and suggested that such actors should be allowed to come and stay in Iran not only under emergency conditions.

Session 4: International stand-by arrangements

The session aimed at identifying specific areas where improvements are needed, both in terms of the management and utilisation of existing arrangements or capacities, or of the creation of new ones.

Existing tools worked well during the response to the Bam earthquake – disaster prone countries should know them better.

Mr. Jesper Lund of the Field Coordination Support Section of OCHA Geneva provided a presentation on the well-developed set of stand-by arrangements and capacities managed by OCHA on behalf of the international community and available for response to sudden-onset natural disasters, and on how they were used in the response to the Bam earthquake.

During the discussion, a particularly interesting point emerged on the need for Iranian national authorities to be more aware not only of the international stand-by arrangements and capacities for disaster response, but more generally of the entire system for international assistance. It was suggested that this need, which is common to many developing and disaster-prone countries, should be addressed through sensitization course organized by the UN. At the same time, it was recognized that the government of Iran lacks, in the framework of its Task Forces system for disaster management, an institutional capacity specifically dedicated to interacting with international actors.

Although the stand-by arrangements and capacities were generally perceived to have worked well in the Bam context, a number of recommendations emerged:

- the mechanism for cash grants should be expanded – 50,000 Dollars is not enough.

- the UNDAC system should be expanded to include more experts from developing countries, but these experts should be made available by their governments at very short notice. In the specific case of Bam, the deployment of the UNDAC Team could have been quicker if it could count on its own transport capacity.

- the Search and Rescue system is improving, but some issues remain such as excess capacity and insufficient “quality”.

- in order to avoid gaps and, especially, overlaps in assistance, information provided in the early stages

should become even more detailed and tailored on the needs of different audiences.

- NGOs could be taken on board even further in information sharing and early-stage coordination mechanisms put in place by UNDAC.

- more "education" is needed for both recipient (working with international system) and donor (appropriateness of assistance) governments.

Session 4: Needs assessment, joint planning and resource mobilisation

These issues were placed on the agenda as the link between the needs of the affected population, the programmes designed to meet them and the resources mobilised to support such programmes has often - in previous relief operations - been quite ambiguous. The questions concerning what kind of data should be collected during the emergency phase, by whom, from which sources, and how such information can be consolidated and reported in a consistent format remained largely unanswered. And, what is more important, an evident connection between such needs and the programmes was often missing.

Moving from programme design to resource mobilisation, then, the need for a more standardized approach for launching appeals in response to natural disasters is felt strongly, in order to ensure maximum speed and effectiveness in resource mobilization and to build on the experience gained in complex emergencies.

Finally, the issue of resource mobilisation in the wake of sudden-onset disasters has always been a difficult one. The debate focused on whether a strategic component (*a la* CAP) can at all be built into an inter-agency appeal issued with such urgency, and, if not, whether having an appeal which runs the risk of being just individual appeals stapled together has any actual value.

Based on information collected from various local sources and through joint assessments UN and Red Cross

The IFRC Head of Delegation reported that the organisation managed to issue a preliminary appeal on the very day the earthquake thanks to information provided by local structures of the IRCS. A more comprehensive operational plan was drafted by the 29th, based on the assessments carried out by the Field Assessment and Coordination Team (joint assessment with IRCS, beneficiaries interviews, governmental

managed to produce meaningful and well-coordinated appeals

sources, other relief agencies through UNDAC). Assessments were met with a number of challenges, chiefly the inconsistency among different data sources and the difficult access to local authorities, themselves affected by the disaster.

Later the preliminary appeal was revised, in close coordination with the UN to achieve full complementarity, and launched jointly with the UN on January 8.

The UN resident Coordinator highlighted that the United Nations was faced with the challenge of integrating its own country-level disaster response plan with the recently-approved national disaster response plan, and to integrate planning/management concerns with the need for immediately providing assistance. An initial assessment was carried out the day following the earthquake and immediately after the coordination process with the government started, which resulted in a formal request for international assistance.

A formal inter-agency UN assessment followed on January 3rd. Each of the sectoral assessments was led by a governmental official and strongly coordinated with similar initiatives by IRCS/IFRC. Reconstruction and cultural heritage concerns were fully taken into consideration already at that stage. Areas of improvement mentioned during the presentation included:

- contacts with Headquarters, that should be sought at a very early stage;
- stronger information management, towards both donor governments and beneficiary population;
- staff rotation, that should be kept to a minimum;
- better and more coordinated follow-up after the launch of the flash appeal.

Working group on coordination

The United Nations, through the Resident Coordinator system supported by UNDAC, has a time-proven mechanism for the coordination of international assistance during the response to natural disasters. This system interacts with the coordination mechanisms put in place by the Government of the affected country (what is technically referred to by Local Emergency Management Agency) and previous experiences have demonstrated that this interaction is sometimes difficult, sometimes duplicative.

Furthermore, other major international players (such as the European union) have recently started deploying their own capacity for in-country coordination of international assistance, and this is seen by many with considerable concern.

During the second day of the workshop, Working Group 1 discussed how did the coordination role evolved for the national and international responders, and how did the national and international levels of coordination interact.

As a result of the discussion, Working Group 1 recommended:

1) A comprehensive planning process, taking into account national and international capacities

- The process of developing disaster management plans should be open (i.e. inclusive of all sectors of society and – possibly – of international actors) and coordinated;
- All levels in a country (national, regional, provincial and local) should participate in the development of specific contingency plans;
- Such national and local plans should take into account the capacities of the international responders, and include “trigger mechanisms” that would lead to the request for international assistance when needed;
- Clear links should be identified between the plans and the implementation mechanisms;
- New contingency plans should capitalise upon past experience, building on past efforts and revising existing plans;
- Clear roles and responsibilities should be assigned, including at Ministerial level;

2) A permanent, full-time structure for disaster management

- A permanent structure should be established at various levels in the national administration for disaster risk managements, including contingency planning, response preparedness, disaster response and monitoring/evaluation;
- Such national committee should including the main national response organisations, NGOs, civil society and – notably – representatives of the international community;

3) “International exposure” for crisis managers

- Crisis managers at all levels should be trained in coordination activities;
- In particular, managers should be given a chance to participate in simulation exercises of large-scale emergencies with the participation of international actors;

4) More “discipline” on the part of internationals

- It should be constantly emphasized that local authorities are responsible for the coordination and the international organisations are only there to support their efforts;
- Therefore, during the initial phase of a crisis, NGOs should refer only to the UN for coordination purposes and not seek contacts directly with the local emergency managers (one focal point and not several);
- In more general terms, the central coordinating role of the UN vis-à-vis international actors should be strengthened;
- International agencies should also strive to keep staff rotation to a minimum during the acute phase of an emergency;
- Internationally agreed-upon technical standards and operating procedures should be strictly adhered to;

5) Proactive information sharing

- Information concerning assessment results should be shared proactively among international responders;
- In this sense, a centralised “information sharing centre” should be a permanent feature.

Working group on quality of international assistance

International assistance often plays an absolutely crucial role in alleviating the suffering of the populations affected by natural disasters. Problems arose in some cases, however, due to the quantity or quality of the assistance provided by international actors. This is particularly evident following earthquakes, when a large number of search and rescue teams usually arrive in the affected country immediately after the disaster: many of these teams are extremely well trained and equipped but some aren't, and end up being a burden rather than a resource. Medical assistance has been at times criticised for being too sophisticated and not appropriate in terms of quantity/capacity, and food assistance is sometimes provided without taking into account the needs and preferences of the population. Lastly, some resources are provided only for a limited time, and are withdrawn by donor countries when they are still much needed.

Working Group 2 discussed whether there were any major "quality" problems with the assistance provided by international actors during the response to the Bam earth quake, whether any form of assistance was grossly inappropriate and whether there was any under-capacity or excess capacity problem.

The Group concluded that situation was far from optimal, as:

- Offers for certain kinds of assistance were officially turned down, and still such assistance was rendered (e.g. search and rescue, food, field hospitals);
- Relatively precise needs were established and communicated, both by the Government and by the UN, and still much assistance came on top and outside these needs;
- Specific quality issues concerned:
 - type of commodity (e.g. the distribution of "25% broken rate" rice, which is suitable for human consumption but is not acceptable for the Iranian population);
 - timeliness of assistance (e.g. the arrival of large quantities of stoves as the winter in Bam was over and the climate was quickly turning to the very hot spring/summer);
 - cultural sensitivity (e.g. the distribution of high-protein biscuits marked "gift for the children of Afghanistan");

- technicalities (e.g. medicines not known to Iranian doctors).

It was also noted that expatriates are sometimes a trouble themselves, as individuals may lack cultural sensitivity and teams may lack basic self-sufficiency and end up being a burden for the already stretched capacities of the local authorities..

Recommendations to address these issues included:

1) The Government needs to establish stronger institutional mechanisms to deal with international assistance.

2) More effective mechanisms should be available to decline offers for assistance and/or prevent unwanted assistance from reaching the country.

3) More commitment should be put by agencies and donor Governments towards respecting a) the will of the Government, b) the indications provided by the United Nations and c) existing technical standards.

Working group on involvement of beneficiaries

The standard operating procedures of virtually every international relief organisation, as well as broadly adopted documents such as the SPHERE standards or the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct make numerous and explicit references to the need of involving the affected population in the assessment of the needs and in the planning and execution of assistance programmes.

This, however, is often not the case, especially in the aftermath of sudden-onset natural disasters, when time is of the essence and the rapidity in the response often overrules any other consideration.

Working Group 3 discussed to what extent the affected population in Bam was involved in the planning and execution of immediate assistance programmes and what – realistically - could have been done better.

The Group agreed that:

1) The involvement and participation of beneficiaries is indeed fundamental.

- It makes activities more efficient;

- It makes relief programmes more cost-effective;
- It adds value by supporting psychological rehabilitation.

2) As it was the case in other disasters, the participation of the population in Bam was limited.

- As usual, the affected population, despite the shock, was the first and by far the most effective actor in search and rescue;
- Only a few organizations involved people from Bam in the assessment and planning phase;
- The degree of participation of beneficiaries in the implementation of assistance programmes varied among between organizations, but some people from Bam have said repeatedly that they would like to be more involved.

3) A number of practical and easy-to-implement procedures for a greater participation of beneficiaries should become standard for international agencies.

- Social structures do survive earthquakes: supporting them should be a priority;
- Local volunteers, structured or not, should be utilised as much and as early as possible;
- The recruitment of local staff is completely feasible and contributes to psych-social rehabilitation;
- A basic inventory of people's skills can be collected during the registration phase;
- People should be involved especially in the process of deciding the location of temporary residence;
- The zoning system adopted in Bam was effective for dividing a huge emergency into communities (helped all organizations to get to know their areas and made the contact with local population easier);
- Local cultural features such as mourning schedules should be acknowledged – activities and participation should take those into account;
- The significance of cultural events and rituals such as the early re-start of schooling activities and marriage ceremonies should also be emphasized.

Working group on information management

In the aftermath of a devastating earthquake, the affected population, the public opinion in the affected country and the international donors often experience great difficulties in obtaining accurate, balanced and exhaustive information on the relief efforts. This can be the source of serious problems in the affected country, when, for instance, information on the assistance provided by national or international actors is manipulated for whatever reason or false rumors are spread among the affected population, and internationally, when, for instance, donors are not informed correctly on the donations being received.

It has therefore been suggested that the United Nations, over and above its consolidated role of reporting internationally on the relief efforts, could assist the Government of the affected country in regularly providing information on the assistance being provided by both national and international actors

Working Group 4 discussed issues such as how the affected population and the national public were informed about the response efforts, how were the contributions made by various actors quantified, how were international donors informed about the use made of their contributions, and especially what role UNDAC (or the United Nations in general) could play in providing accurate and balanced information to the affected population.

The Group came to the very important conclusions that:

1) During emergencies, information management is as important as the provision of actual relief assistance.

- It should be clear what information is needed for the different audiences and at the different stages of the relief operation, and through which means it should be communicated;
- Four possible target groups for information were identified:
 - The decision makers
 - The relief workers
 - The national and international public
 - The affected people
- Consolidated information should in any case be provided by the national authorities, who should also be responsible for the quality, accuracy and timeliness of the information provided;

2) Informing the affected population in the immediate aftermath of the disaster (and even before) is extremely important.

- The population in disaster-prone areas should be informed and trained about possible disasters and how and where they can receive help as part of disaster preparedness programs, i.e. *before* the disaster actually strikes;

- After the disaster, it is essential to provide accurate and balanced information, so to limit the spreading of rumors and false information. This can be achieved through:

- Local community members like city council representatives or religious leaders;

- Radio broadcasts (distributing “no batteries” radios to the population as part of the standard relief items).

3) The Terms of Reference for UNDAC missions should be expanded in order to include a function of supporting local authorities in providing information to the affected population.

- The UNDAC disaster management information system should target the local authorities and at the same time donors and supporting actors in the field;

- Web-based information centers should be established, with input from all actors in the field;

- National as well as international information campaigns should be organised;

- Consideration should be given for the establishment / improvement of inter-agency and at the same time intra-agency information sharing, monitoring and reporting systems.