Pastoralists’ Vulnerability in the Horn of Africa: Exploring Political Marginalization, Donors’ Policies, and Cross-Border Issues

Literature Review

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Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................................................ - 3 -
Section 1  Introduction .............................................................................................................. - 4 -
  1.1  Aim and structure of the literature review .................................................. - 4 -
  1.2  Scope and limitations of the review ........................................................ ... - 4 -
  1.3  Sources and search methodology ................................................................. - 5 -
Section 2  Pastoralists’ Vulnerability and Political marginalization ..................................... - 6 -
  2.1  Understanding livelihoods, vulnerability and political marginalization of pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa ................................................................. - 6 -
  2.2  Why pastoralists continue to be politically marginalized? ................................ - 9 -
  2.3  The impact of political marginalization on pastoralist societies ................. - 12 -
  2.4  Addressing pastoralists’ political marginalization: lessons for NGOs .......... - 14 -
Section 3:  Cross-border issues and approaches .................................................................... - 22 -
  3.1  Cross-border conflicts .................................................................................... - 22 -
  3.2  Cross-border livestock trade ......................................................................... - 24 -
  3.3  Addressing cross-border issues: lessons for NGOs .................................... - 26 -
Section 4:  Donor policies and funding approaches ............................................................. - 30 -
  4.1  Drought management and response ............................................................. - 30 -
  4.2  Funding approaches and mechanisms ........................................................... - 34 -
  4.3  Promising initiatives ..................................................................................... - 35 -
  4.4  Policy engagement: lessons for NGOs ......................................................... - 36 -
Section 5:  Key Lessons ................................................................................................................. - 37 -
References ...................................................................................................................................... - 40 -
Annex 1  Terms of Reference (ToR) .................................................................................... - 44 -
## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Arid and semi-arid lands</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBfE</td>
<td>Capacity Building for Empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Drought Cycle Management</td>
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<td>DMI</td>
<td>Drought Management Initiative</td>
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<td>FIC</td>
<td>Feinstein International Center</td>
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<td>HPG</td>
<td>Humanitarian Policy Group</td>
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<td>HoA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>HSNP</td>
<td>Hunger Safety Net Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIED</td>
<td>International Institute for Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Livestock Policy Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU-IBAR</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>PASC</td>
<td>Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIPs</td>
<td>Policies, institutions and processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Pastoralist Communication Initiative</td>
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<td>PLI</td>
<td>Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPGs</td>
<td>Pastoral Parliamentary Groups</td>
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<td>KPPG</td>
<td>Kenya Pastoral Parliamentary Group</td>
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Section 1  Introduction

1.1  Aim and structure of the literature review

The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) was commissioned by CARE International (CARE) to provide a review of the literature on the nature of pastoralists’ vulnerability in the Horn of Africa (focusing specifically on Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia) and chart ways in which agencies have responded, specifically focusing on CARE International (CARE) responses and identifying best practice. This literature review is part of a broader project that HPG is undertaking to provide learning support to CARE and document and strengthen best practices around drought cycle management in the Horn of Africa (HoA).

The learning support and the literature review focus on three key areas:
1. Pastoralists’ political marginalization;
2. International donors’ policies and approaches to drought management and response;

The literature review is structured as follows:

- **Section 1** describes the aim, scope, limits of the review and outlines the search methodology;
- **Section 2** discusses the relationship between pastoralists’ vulnerability and their political marginalization and points to key lessons and practical recommendations to address pastoralists’ political marginalization in the HoA;
- **Section 3** reviews opportunities and challenges of adopting cross-border approaches to pastoralists’ livelihoods interventions;
- **Section 4** discusses the relationship between pastoralists’ vulnerability and international donors’ policies and approaches to drought management.

1.2  Scope and limitations of the review

This review recognises that addressing pastoralists’ political marginalization, adopting appropriate cross-border approaches and improving donors’ policies to drought management is only part of broader efforts to address pastoralists’ vulnerability in the HoA, which may include efforts to improve access to markets, support viable economic alternatives, enable sustainable resource management to arrest or limit environmental degradation and so on. However, for the purpose of this analysis, this review is limited to the literature that discusses the above three key focus areas in relation to pastoralists’ vulnerability. In addition, this review recognises that pastoralists are a highly diversified group with widely different needs, backgrounds and levels of vulnerability. While there are pastoralists who are relatively wealthy and still able to profitably engage in pastoralism, in recent years an increasing number of pastoralist groups across the HoA have been confronted with a series of livelihoods shocks and have suffered from the progressive weakening of their livelihood systems and increased levels of vulnerability and food insecurity. Many have also been forced to drop out of pastoralism. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the discussion in the following sections mainly refers to pastoralists groups
in the HoA who have faced and continue to face significant levels of hardship and increasing levels of vulnerability.

The review has three main limitations. First, by its nature it does not offer policy prescriptions, but simply outlines the approaches and recommendations that have emerged from the review of the literature without seeking to judge the validity and appropriateness of the various approaches referred to. Second, both the published and grey literature that was studied did not point to CARE’s specific responses and therefore it has not been possible at this stage to shed light on CARE’s areas of best practice and areas for learning in programme policy and practice. It is envisaged that best practices and areas for learning will emerge during the subsequent phase of this project (see Output 2 of the ToR in Annex 1). Third, this review does not examine in-depth country case studies, but points to brief examples of interventions, or components of programmes in the three countries of focus – Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia- by way of illustration of more general lines of analysis.

1.3 Sources and search methodology
The documents for this literature review were collected from the following English-only sources:

Published literature. Papers were identified through Internet and search engines, and a systematic search in the websites of organizations and international forums concerned with pastoralists issues in the Horn of Africa such as WISP, PARIMA, PCI, IIED, ALRMP. The website of UN agencies and NGOs, such as UN OCHA, UNDP, Oxfam GB and CARE, were also searched. Key words that were used in the search include: pastoralists, pastoralism, pastoral, vulnerability, political marginalization, pastoralists’ voice, cross-border, trans-border, donors’ policy*, donors’ approaches, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa. In addition, experts in pastoralists’ issues were contacted via e-mail to request documents on pastoralists in the HoA that focused on the three focus areas for learning for this project.

Grey literature. Documents provided by CARE were reviewed and (where appropriate) included.
Section 2  Pastoralists’ Vulnerability and Political marginalization

2.1 Understanding livelihoods, vulnerability and political marginalization of pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa

A livelihood is defined as ‘the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with, and recover from, stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihoods opportunities for the next generation’ (Chambers and Conway, 1992). The livelihoods approach provides a dynamic and holistic framework for understanding the interaction between the bundle of assets – human, natural, financial, social, physical 1, that people own, control or have access to, and broader systems of governance or PIPs to determine if and how people are able to use these assets to pursue their livelihoods strategies to achieve positive livelihoods outcomes (as illustrated in Figure 1 below, positive outcomes include more income, increased wellbeing, reduced vulnerability and so on). A livelihoods analysis helps to understand the livelihoods options that people have over time by exploring the linkages between people’s livelihoods assets and strategies, and how these strategies are influenced by formal and informal institutions and processes (PIPs) within the ‘vulnerability context’ in which people operate.

According to Chambers ‘[v]ulnerability of households or population groups to particular disasters has two aspects. The first is the external shock and the second is people’s capacity to cope with the shock (Chambers, 1989). Vulnerability may be related to particular livelihood systems, to wealth status, or people’s social or political status’. Vulnerability is often seen as the other face of resilience: a group of people is vulnerable when it lacks the resilience to resist to an external shock.

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1 Some adaptations of the livelihoods framework add a sixth asset to the capital assets pentagon to include political capital, seen as the ability to use power to further political or economic positions (see for example Concern Worldwide at http://www.concern.net/docs/LivelihoodSecurityPolicy.pdf).
For pastoralist communities the five livelihood assets can be identified as:
1. human: education, health, nutrition;
2. natural: grazing land, water sources;
3. financial: livestock\(^2\), credit;
4. social: livestock, intra-community social support;
5. physical: livestock herd, infrastructure.

To attain positive livelihoods outcomes pastoralists rely on specific livelihoods strategies to manage their livestock effectively. Their livelihoods strategies have evolved over centuries in response to the local environment and the hot and dry climate with low and erratic rainfall typical of the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). Key strategies include accessing and managing natural resources, mainly grazing land and water sources, and maintaining high levels of mobility across large tracts of land to make the most effective use of scarce resources and in response to environmental conditions (Desta et al, 2008; Markakis, 2004). These sophisticated and dynamic strategies have allowed pastoralists to effectively cope with the threats and risks that characterize their environment and to maintain a viable production and livelihoods system. Drought is a major external shock and a primary trigger of livelihood crises in the HoA\(^3\). Cyclical droughts are a defining feature of pastoralists’ way of life in this region and ‘local livelihoods are sensitively adapted to the certainty that drought will come and can be overcome’ (UN OCHA, 2006). Indeed, pastoral livelihoods systems have progressively evolved to optimize the use of natural resources and to deal with the effects of cyclical droughts and have ultimately ensured pastoralists resilience to risk for centuries.

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\(^2\) Livestock is a key asset for pastoralists, and is both a financial asset - as a source of food, income, and storage of wealth, and a social asset - as it forms the basis of social relationships through gifts, exchanges, fines etc (Watson and Catley, 2008).

\(^3\) Other important shocks for pastoralists in this region include recurrent closures of Gulf markets to livestock from East Africa, crackdowns on informal trade, animal diseases, banditry and conflict (Morton 2008, UNOCHA, 2006).
In recent decades however, it has become increasingly clear that pastoralists’ strategies have been significantly strained and pastoralists’ adaptive capacity to resist or recover from drought-related shocks has been progressively undermined. There is a general consensus in the literature that the chronic vulnerability that characterizes many pastoral groups in the HoA today is not merely related to environmental stresses but is the result of complex and multi-dimensional political, economic and social processes (WISP, 2008; Morton, 2008; HPG, 2006; UN OCHA, 2006; Oxfam, 2008; Markakis, 2004; Kandagor, 2005). In particular, the long-standing political marginalization of pastoralists’ communities in the HoA is widely recognized to be a primary factor in their chronic vulnerability (Oxfam, 2008/7; Morton, 2008; Makakis, 2004; HPG, 2006). The PIPs in the livelihoods framework is especially relevant here. As highlighted above, the relationship between the PIPs and people’s assets is mutually reinforcing. The assets that pastoralists own, access and control determine their ability to influence the PIPs; in turn, the nature of the PIPs - both formal and informal, influences the way pastoralist groups access and govern their livelihoods assets and the strategies that they adopt to pursue their livelihoods. Adverse policies and practice, unresponsive formal institutions and persistent negative perceptions of pastoralism have progressively weakened pastoralists’ livelihoods strategies. Their mobility and access to key natural resources has been severely restricted, their ability to manage their livestock effectively has been repeatedly undermined. As a result, their livelihoods system is now increasingly vulnerable to external shocks.

Pastoralists are the most politically marginalized group in the HoA and East Africa (Oxfam, 2008). According to Morton, ‘there is an increasing acceptance that the major issues in pastoral development are related to policy and governance: issues such as conflicts and insecurity, livestock marketing, land rights, inadequate provision of services and infrastructure, drought and dependence on food aid’ (2005: 1). In this analysis pastoralists’ political marginalization is understood as the result of an imbalanced power relation between the state and pastoral civil society – understood here as community-based organizations, local associations, and pastoral groups. On the one hand, the political marginalization of pastoralists’ communities is the result of long-standing governance failures, non-responsive and unaccountable institutions, and politicians and policy-makers lacking the will and incentives to include pastoralists’ interests in national policy debates. On the other hand, pastoralists often lack the ability to organize themselves and sustain collective action required to exert political leverage in policy-circles. In addition, the members of the pastoralist civil society groups who should represent the needs and interests of pastoralists and support their rights and voices in modern governance institutions have in some cases become detached from pastoral lives and systems. An increasingly common phenomenon in the HoA is the emergence of ‘pastoral elites’: while they can be a force for good as those pastoralist representatives have gained a formal education and have easier access to decision-making circles, at the same time they have lived in urban centres for a number of years, some of them have become progressively alienated from pastoral settings and ‘may not have the interests of pastoralists at heart’ (McGahey and Davies, 2007: 18).

To be sure, policy-making is a highly political process which involves dealing with and attempting to reconcile the interests of different parties. Interests are often conflictual and issues of power are of crucial importance here. Those who are backed by political and/or economic power will succeed in pushing forward their interests, while the poor and
marginalized will almost inevitably struggle to make their voices heard and have their interests and priorities addressed in decision-making circles.

2.2 Why pastoralists continue to be politically marginalized?

The exclusion of pastoralists from the national political, economic and social life dates back to the colonial era. The colonial enterprise interfered with the pastoralists’ system and led to the progressive deterioration of their livelihoods and social fabric. Pastoralists’ mobility became constrained within the newly created states boundaries, and their internal movement within new states became increasingly restricted by district, and sometime location-boundaries, natural reserves, tribal grazing zones etc. Their land and water resources started to be confiscated to pave the way for agricultural expansion and eco-tourism projects. Virtually no investments in technological innovations, infrastructures or social services were made in pastoralists’ areas (Markakis, 2004). With independence and African self-rule, already strained pastoralists’ livelihood systems were further undermined by national economic development strategies that closely followed colonial blueprint and priorities (Ibid.). In the post-independence years, recurrent civil conflicts, forced displacement and progressive impoverisation of African countries have contributed to further erode the social and material base of pastoralism. In turn, the potential for pastoralists’ civic and organizational capacity and inclusion in formal systems of governance has been, once again, significantly weakened.

With the fall of authoritarian regimes and the widening of the political space in many African countries during the early 1990s, a number of pastoral civil society groups started to proliferate. A more recent step forward is the establishment of Pastoral Parliamentary Groups (PPGs) in a number of countries including Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia and this represents a good foundation for pastoralists’ representation within national policy circles.

The Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee (PASC) was founded in 2002 within the Ethiopian Parliament to promote sustainable pastoral development and represent the interests of pastoralists. The members of the PASC are drawn from different ethnic groups and regional states. The PASC has three main roles (Morton, 2005):

- Legislative- Assessing issues that require policy decisions and ensuring that policy reflects the interests of pastoral communities;
- Oversight- Supervising activities such as various aspects of governance, infrastructure development, food security, early warning systems;
- Representation- Focusing on advocacy activities to promote pastoralist skills, and attitudes, values and knowledge towards pastoralists.

The Kenya Pastoral Parliamentary Group (KPPG) is a legislative advocacy group open to any member of the Kenyan Parliament with an interest in pastoral development (Wario, 2004; Livingstone, 2005). The KPPG main policy objectives for pastoral areas are: advocating for community-based property rights; lobbying for the right to food, education, and health; and advocating for pastoralists’ inclusion in national poverty alleviation policies (Wario, 2004).
While the creation of PPGs and other pastoral civil society groups, such as the Kenya Pastoralists Forum, Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia carry the potential to bring pastoralists issues closer to national policy-making circles and may amplify pastoralists’ voice, the literature points to a number of shortcomings. The PPGs are generally weak and often co-opted by powerful urban elites, and so far they have had a limited impact on pro-pastoralists policy-making and implementation (Morton, 2005; Oxfam, 2008; Grahn, 2008; UN OCHA, 2008; Wario 2004). According to Markakis, to date none of these organizations have ‘been able to initiate a single piece of legislation of significant benefit to their constituencies’ (2004: 24). The disappointing track record of these groups and their limited success in bringing about significant change can be understood in relation to issues of representation, internal capacity and broader processes of democratization at the national level.

Despite the PPGs stated objective of promoting the interests of pastoralists’ communities and enhancing their voices, questions can be raised about the effectiveness of their representation. For example, several members of the PPGs belong to the so-called ‘pastoralist elite’: people of pastoralist origin who, for various reasons, end up being detached from pastoral realities (McGahey and Davies, 2007: Oxfam, 2008). Within the KPPG the well-educated parliamentaries are called ‘the Nairobians’ and are those who ‘have not lived the pastoralist life and hardly ever go back home’ (Livingstone, 2005: 29). As such ‘their effectiveness as representatives of the pastoralist communities is minimal’ (Ibid.). In addition, the PPGs like many other civil society groups are often faced with limited financial resources and have poor management and technical skills (Oxfam, 2008). For instance, despite the fact that some members of the KPPG are well-educated, others ‘are illiterate and sign (documents) with their thumbs’ (Livingstone, 2005: 29). Similarly, some members of the PASC have only elementary or secondary school education and as a whole the committee ‘lacks technical know-how to challenge the policy-makers and influence policy in favour of pastoralists’ (Mussa, 2004: 24).

The PPGs operate within the national political context and a discussion of their failures and successes needs to take into account the national political landscape, existing balances of power and various hidden agendas (Morton, 2005). The establishment of the PPGs and other civil society organizations has coincided with broader decentralization trends in the South in recent decades. By bringing decision-making closer to the people, decentralization is widely perceived to have the potential to better meet local needs while enhancing the voice of poor and marginalized communities. As many advocate, the on-going process of decentralization in many African countries carries the potential to ensure better inclusion of pastoralists’ interests in local decision-making and to allow pastoral customary institutions to work more closely with the government (WISP, 2008). But it is also important to consider the problems that may arise with decentralization processes. The issue of elite capture at the lower, rather than at the central level, represents a real threat to meaningful decentralization and may significantly hamper the ability of minority groups to defend their interests within their own communities (UN OCHA, 2008). In addition, decentralization becomes effective only if it is accompanied by the transfer of resources from the central to the local level. But this is not always the case and central governments often show little willingness to grant the control of land and natural resources to local level institutions. Situations where ‘local government bodies have little independent revenue raising capacity, and are heavily dependent on fiscal transfers from the centre’ are not unusual in the HoA as well as in other contexts in the South (Markakis, 2004: 24 see also Hesse and Odhiambo, 2006; UN OCHA,
Therefore, it is important to pay attention to the challenges that decentralization poses in different contexts and acknowledge that there is no ‘quick fix’ for enhancing the voice of the poorest in the South.

A review of the literature points to a number of reasons for the ongoing political marginalization of pastoralists’ in the HoA.

Geographical remoteness. The pastoralist system and way of life requires high levels of mobility over large tracts of land and pastoralists’ communities in the HoA have always been highly mobile. Pastoralists’ groups live far away from national capitals where economic activities are concentrated (Morton, 2008). Their lands are generally perceived by national governments as ‘marginal …with little economic potential’ (Oxfam, 2008: 14). The fact that pastoralist groups usually represent a low proportion of the national population and are dispersed across different parts of the country means that politicians often consider pastoralists a ‘minority vote’ and consequently have little interest in including pastoral areas in their electoral campaigns (Hesse and Odhiambo, 2006). In addition, the isolation and dispersal of pastoralist communities across vast areas of the country, and the poor infrastructures of pastoral areas, make collective action inevitably problematic and social organizational capacity difficult to build (Grahn, 2008). This significantly hampers the ability of pastoralists’ communities to formulate a coherent and collective demand and to transmit their requests and preferences in a convincing manner to policy-makers. Ultimately, the weak civic capacity of pastoral communities in the HoA means that those groups ‘lack the means to hold the powerful to account, and too often their rights are not addressed relative to the rest of the population’ (Oxfam, 2008/7: 1)

Cross-border identities. The ethnicity of many pastoralist groups spans across national borders. For example, the Afar group are found across Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti; Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia, and Kenya; the Borana are spread between Ethiopia and Kenya; and the Karamoja in Kenya, Uganda and Sudan (Morton, 2005). For centuries pastoralists have ignored national borders and have engaged in activities, such as transhumance, related to their livelihoods and lifestyle, that are characterized by high levels of trans-border movements. The cross-border identities of many pastoralist groups and their cross-border political and economic activities are seen in the literature as contributing to their marginal and politically vulnerable status (Morton, 2005; Oxfam, 2008; Markakis, 2004) For example pastoralists are often accused of having divided loyalties, especially when such accusations can be used to suit other political interests. In addition, their disregard for state borders, their long-standing struggle to make their voices heard, and their negative experience with unresponsive and unaccountable formal institutions, has not contributed to develop ‘a robust sense of nationality and citizenship’ among those groups (Markakis, 2004: 23).

Pastoralism misunderstood. The protracted isolation and lack of representation of pastoralists within the national political arena is also owed to deeply rooted misconceptions of pastoralism among national decision-makers. The chronic vulnerability of pastoralists in the HoA has often been perceived as an indicator that pastoralist systems and livelihoods are ultimately unsustainable. Pastoralism is often seen as an outdated way of living and a form of land use which is unviable and even irrational (HPG, 2006; Oxfam, 2008). Decades of inappropriate and biased national policies have contributed to pastoralists increased
vulnerability: governments have often encouraged pastoralist groups to settle and engage in agriculture, promoted private land ownership over communal land ownership in pastoral zones, or assigned fixed grazing lands (Oxfam, 2008). Over the past two decades there has been a profound change in thinking around pastoralists’ issue among international policy circles, academia, and national and international NGOs (Morton, 2008). Rather than viewing pastoralism as an outdated and unsustainable livelihoods system, there is now widespread consensus that pastoralism is indeed viable and sustainable. Numerous initiatives on the ground, studies, and advocacy activities stress the importance of supporting the adaptive skills of pastoralists and point to the need to implement flexible drylands management strategies (WISP, 2008). However, this shift in thinking has yet to fully trickle down to national governments and the negative image of pastoralism has yet to be fully dispelled among national policy-makers (Morton, 2008; WISP, 2008). National policies continue to fail to support pastoral livelihoods and in some cases even contribute to further undermine pastoralists’ resilience. Despite the surge of attention in pastoral development and the proliferation of pastoral civil society groups, pastoralists continue to be marginalised and lack the political clout to influence national policy decisions and implementation.

2.3 The impact of political marginalization on pastoralist societies

The main effects that centuries of marginalization have had on pastoral livelihoods and social systems are outlined below:

*Access to Productive Assets.* The access and use of an extensive area of land coupled with high levels of mobility are ‘the double imperative of pastoralists mode of production’ (Markakis, 2004: 5). Pastoralists need seasonally varied grazing lands and water sources for their different livestock species. Freedom of movement over large areas is a crucial element of the pastoralists’ resource management system in the drylands. Land issues, including use, access and property rights are a well-known determinant of pastoralists’ vulnerability and in the literature they are widely discussed in relation to their political marginalization (Markakis, 2004; Morton, 2008; Helland, 2006). As discussed above, formal institutions have systematically failed to recognize pastoralists’ rights to the land since the colonial era. For example in Kenya ‘land tenure is based on English property law, which does not recognize the communal system as understood and practiced by pastoralists’ (Markakis, 2004: 22). Similarly, customary tenure arrangements in Ethiopia have been increasingly ‘subordinated to unitary national land legislation …on the basis of issues relevant primarily to the arable agriculture in the highlands. The …pastoral areas [are] either ignored or very superficially treated’ (Helland, 2006: 2). The ongoing appropriation of land for commercial, tourist, environmental and conservation projects, in many cases without consultation or even communication to pastoralists living in the area, has deprived those groups from a key productive asset and has often rendered pastoralism unsustainable. Many pastoralist groups have been unable to defend their land rights and as a result many have dropped out of pastoralism or have been forced to migrate. The progressive loss of their productive assets is partly due to the fact that pastoralists are in many cases unaware of their rights, often unable to articulate their demands collectively, and ill-equipped to make their voices heard within formal institutions. In addition to the difficulties in accessing productive assets, access to markets – a precondition for growth and efficiency of livestock production- is another
challenge for pastoral communities in the HoA. For example cross-border livestock trade has been a vital market for pastoral communities for centuries. However, as discussed in section 3, adverse policy decisions and lack of governments’ support and regulation are among the key factors that significantly restrict pastoralists’ ability to engage effectively in cross-border trade.

**Access to Basic Services.** Pastoral areas have long been neglected by central governments in the provision of basic services, such as health and education. In the HoA education participation rates among pastoralists are lower than national averages (Trench et al, 2007). In Kenya, primary schooling enrolment in the Central province is up to 91.2%, while in the Northern Eastern province, where the majority of pastoralists’ communities live, the enrolment is only 20.5% (Markakis, 2004). In Ethiopia, while the national average gross enrolment for the primary level is 64.4%, in the Afar and Somali pastoral regions the enrolment drops to 13.8% and 15.1% respectively (Ibid). A similar disparity can be observed also in relation to health statistics. Lack of education among pastoralists’ communities is a key determinant of pastoralists’ political marginalization as it significantly reduces their ability to engage in advocacy activities and ‘to understand and speak out for their rights’ (Oxfam 2008: 15).

**Dependence on aid.** As discussed above, there is a growing awareness that the resilience of pastoralist communities has been progressively weakened and that pastoralists are increasingly unable to cope with environmental shocks. In the last few decades, droughts in the HoA have triggered widespread and severe livelihoods crisis and have plunged millions of pastoralists into humanitarian crisis. For example, the increased frequency and severity of droughts in Kenya is leaving pastoralists more and more exposed to shocks as the time needed to rebuild the herd (15-20 years) is longer than the intervals between the occurrence of drought (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). Unable to recover, pastoralists become trapped in a downward spiral of vulnerability and destitution and are increasingly dependent on international aid. Their dependency on relief assistance however can also be seen as related to ‘years of neglect and misunderstanding by central governments’ (Grahn, 2008: 2). Rather than addressing pastoralists’ vulnerabilities with social protection mechanisms, such as the provision of safety nets or any rapid responding mechanism with compensatory protection, all too often national governments can ‘get away with the neglect [of pastoralists areas] in the knowledge that the international community will step in as a guarantor of last resort of the lives of the very poorest’ (Ibid).

**Food crises.** Food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition continue to plague pastoral areas in the HoA. The Neo-Malthusian arguments that dominated theory until the early 1980s and which understood food crises as the inevitable result of over-population or natural calamities have long been challenged. The seminal work of a number of scholars has pointed to the need of understanding food crises as long drawn out political processes (De Waal, 1989; Rangasami, 1985; Sen, 1989; Keen, 1994). A focus on the process that leads to malnutrition and culminates in starvation is especially useful as it helps to focus the analysis on the reasons why those crises happen. There is plenty of evidence that food crises occur even in times of plenty and that people starve because they lack the political power to secure access over an adequate amount of food. Amartya Sen’s famously argued that ‘[s]tarvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It is not the characteristic of there not being enough to eat’ (Sen, 1981: 1). The political, social and economic marginalization of
pastoralist groups is a primary cause of the food crises that recurrently engulf pastoral areas in the HoA.

Conflict. Competition for scarce natural resource is widely understood to be a primary cause of conflict in the region and is in part related to the inability of pastoralists to assert their land rights. In addition to loss of grazing land to irrigation schemes, conservation projects, natural reserves and so on, trends in land use also indicate a shift towards converting rangelands to croplands. This even if the potential of the rangelands for sedentary agriculture under the low production system and the variability and unpredictability of rainfall is marginal (Lautze et al, 2003). In some regions these trends are alarming. As shown in Figure 2 below, the land under crop production in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia amounts to an estimated total of 2,030,172 hectares:

![Figure 2](image_url)

**Figure 2 Land under crop production in pastoral areas in Ethiopia**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Region</th>
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<th>Source</th>
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<td>Regional HoA (1999)</td>
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<td>1,332,900</td>
<td>Zonal DoA</td>
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<td>South Omo</td>
<td>58,103</td>
<td>SNNPR (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambela</td>
<td>32,452</td>
<td>Socio-economic study (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benishangul</td>
<td>38,717</td>
<td>WARDIS, 1998</td>
</tr>
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Loss of communal grazing land to increased farming activities or to environmental degradation has fuelled conflicts in a number pastoral area across the HoA. For example in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia, home of the Afar pastoralists for centuries, the irrigation potential of the Awash river has been attracting the attention of the Ethiopian state since the 1950s. The gradual appropriation of large areas along the river for cultivation purposes by the state has led to the progressive exclusion of Afar pastoralists from some of the most important resources of the Valley (Helland, 2006). Having lost access to key livelihoods resources, the Afar started to utilize larger tracts of the open rangelands. The competition for scarce resources with the neighboring clan, the Somali Issa, has led to the conflict between the two clans, with raids and counter-raids being a regular feature. Ultimately, ‘the lack of attention to the needs of pastoral producers has created a highly volatile security situation and a continued need for food security emergency interventions in the area’ (Ibid:15).

2.4 Addressing pastoralists’ political marginalization: lessons for NGOs

The discussion so far has pointed to the fact that chronic vulnerability of pastoralists in the HoA is strictly related to an imbalanced relation of power between pastoralists and their governments. Addressing pastoralists’ political marginalization therefore needs to be seen as a two-way process which entails strengthening the capacity and representativeness of pastoral civil society organizations on the one hand, and addressing the accountability and responsiveness of formal institutions to pastoral communities on the other.
The section below outlines a number of lessons and recommendations that have emerged from the literature review to address pastoralists’ political marginalization in the HoA.

**Strengthening pastoralists’ resilience.** An essential prerequisite of pastoralists’ engagement and assertiveness in the political life of their countries is their ability to attain a minimum level of food and personal security (Hesse and Odhiambo, 2006). As discussed above, recurrent conflicts and famines, chronic underdevelopment and environmental degradation in pastoralists’ areas have repeatedly weakened pastoralists’ resilience and undermined their livelihoods systems. Pastoral areas have increasingly become places of poverty and political unrest, and pastoralist groups recurrently suffer from high levels of malnutrition rates, persistent morbidity, and massive livestock losses. These factors ‘severely limit the capacities of pastoral communities to invest time and resources on what are perceived them often to be [sic] long-term and intangible processes of empowerment’ (Ibid: 8). Indeed, high levels of insecurity and chronic vulnerability severely restrict pastoralists’ ability to engage in political life. A first step for NGOs wanting to address pastoralists’ political marginalization is therefore to support their livelihoods systems with timely and appropriate interventions aimed at protecting and strengthening pastoralists’ livelihoods assets and strategies. Initiatives designed to ‘saving lives through livelihoods’ are - most fundamentally- important in their own right as they can enhance pastoralists’ well-being and contribute to building their resilience for the next, inevitable shock. In addition, by freeing individuals from severe deprivation, livelihoods interventions can open up opportunities for a more substantive engagement in political life.

**Supporting education services in pastoral areas.** In order be able to make their voices heard and exert political leverage, pastoralists need to be able articulate the rationale of their livelihoods systems and land use, identify and understand a specific policy failing, and use the ‘language’ of policy-makers to influence decision-making circles (Hesse and Odhiambo, 2006; Grahn, 2008). Access to education services is first and foremost a basic human right, but is also of fundamental importance for developing the skills that citizens need to participate in the political processes of their nations. In addition, education is key to livelihood diversification as it equips pastoralists with the skills and knowledge required to engage in alternative livelihoods. Some communities may be left with little option but to drop out to pastoralism altogether: in this case literacy and education may enhance their possibilities to pursue different livelihoods and attain alternative sources of income when pastoralism is no longer viable (Morton, 2008; Trench et al, 2007). The provision of education services to pastoral areas in the HoA is notably inadequate and often not tailored to the specific needs of these communities (Ibid, see also Morton, 2008 and Wario, 2004). As Morton argues (2008), both primary and secondary education should be promoted and initiatives should be devised to address the educational needs of pastoralists’ children as well as adults. Most attempts to provide education and especially secondary education to pastoralists’ children have involved boarding schools. Like other schools, boarding schools may offer a curriculum which is irrelevant to nomadic pastoralists’ life and even worst, teaching material and teachers may be highly critical of the system and lifestyle of pastoralists. Mobile schools can also be a way to provide education especially primary education to pastoral communities. In Iran for

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This review recognizes that education is only one dimension that facilitates the participation of citizens in the social, economic and political life of their nation. However, given the focus of this analysis, only education services are discussed here.
example, teachers from a nomadic pastoral background, trained and equipped with a school tent and school equipment, join and follow a group of nomads. Attempts have also been made to incorporate formal education into mobile Quranic schools, which are common among Muslim pastoral groups in Africa, for example in Somalia (Bishop and Catley, 2008). Quranic teachers however may lack the skills and desire to teach secular subjects (Kandagor, 2005). When deciding how to best support pastoralists education, agencies should keep in mind that ‘perhaps the most important feature for successful schooling for nomadic pastoralists is the school culture and the way teachers and other pupils view pastoralism’ (UNDP, 2003: 14).

**Strengthening pastoral civil society groups.** Initiatives to strengthen PPGs and other pastoral civil society groups should be aimed at building the capacity of those groups to effectively lobby for pro-pastoralist policy changes and policies implementation. In turn, capacity-building efforts can positively impact on the legitimacy and overall representation of those groups. As discussed above, despite the mixed levels of education among the PPGs members, they lacked the technical know-how and the skills required to influence policy as a group. Support of education and training on pastoralism and policy can be an important intervention here. For example, the IIED jointly with the Resources Conflict Institute (RECONCILE) has promoted an initiative in East Africa aimed at strengthening the capacity of pastoral civil society leaders and senior policy makers, including members of Parliaments (Hesse and Odhiambo, 2008). As part of this initiative, a training course has been developed ‘to equip pastoral leaders with skills to engage with policy processes in an informed and confident manner’ (Ibid.: 3). The interactive and highly participatory training course consists of two modules: Module 1 challenges the negative image of pastoralism and provides evidences to support the viability and rationality of this livelihoods system; Module 2 analyses policy challenges and options for supporting pastoralism in East Africa.

Morton 2005 has pointed to three key areas where NGOs can play an important role in strengthening the capacity of the PPGs:

1. Building and strengthening the linkages between the PPGs and the broader civil society including pastoralists themselves, community-based organizations, local NGOs and the media;
2. Supporting the access and use of detailed, comprehensive and timely technical support and information (rather than information delivered in isolation) to aid the development of policy positions. For example, crucial information for the PPGs relate to water resources, land tenure and livestock marketing issues;
3. Supporting the PPGs to link and communicate regularly with their constituencies. Given the geographical remoteness of pastoral communities this is clearly a challenge and NGOs working with local communities can help in bridging this gap.

**Strengthening local institutions and organizations.** For centuries pastoralist communities have relied on customary institutions to regulate their day-to-day affairs, patterns of mobility, and manage natural resources and conflicts (WISP, 2008). National governments have however often failed to recognize the legitimacy of those institutions. The literature points to the importance of building upon customary institutions to strengthen the relationship between pastoralists and formal institutions (UN OCHA, 2008). In particular, a mix of formal and

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5 For a more in-depth discussion of the training see Hesse and Odhiambo, 2008.
informal or customary institutions and rules is widely seen as an effective way for strengthening the social contract between the state and pastoralist civil society (UNDP, 2003; UN OCHA, 2008). NGOs can play a key role in this regard and their initiatives should be designed so as to engage with customary institutions and mechanisms. For example, existing social protection mechanisms like indigenous safety nets could be integrated with modern insurance schemes. The indigenous welfare system of the Borana pastoralists of Ethiopia protects pastoralists from becoming stockless destitute (Qolle). This customary system allows the very poor to build up their livestock on the basis of various community support mechanisms and reciprocal labor contributions. Even if this system is becoming increasingly under strain due to the progressive impoverishment of the community, a stockless person appealing for restocking would be rarely turned away (Desta et al, 2008). Similarly, pastoralists’ communities in Somalia have been relying for centuries on consolidated indigenous mechanisms, such as free gifts (xologoyo) and loans (maalsin) to ensure social protection of poor families (Bishop and Catley, 2008). One way of supporting those customary institutions could be for example the introduction of a formal insurance mechanism for livestock deaths during drought (Desta et al, 2008). This would also take off the burden from those indigenous safety nets mechanisms which are increasingly under strain (UN OCHA, 2008). In discussing strategies to increase food security among pastoralists in Somalia, Bishop and Catley (2008:145) argue that interventions will succeed ‘only if they include rebuilding local institutions and traditional support networks, reinforcing local knowledge, and building on people’s ability to adapt and reorganize’.

In addition, it is important that international NGOs engage and partner with indigenous NGOs or community-based organizations. In insecure environments engaging with those organizations may be especially valuable as local NGOs can ‘operate at higher levels of insecurity and [have] a more thorough understanding of local conflict and politics’ (Ibid). In the case of Somalia for example, working with Islamic NGOs may be useful, given their success in providing access to vital services and the fact that they represent ‘a popular vision of a political alternative to Somali clannism, violence and state collapse’ (Ibid.:46). A final remark here relates to the need to develop a thorough understanding of the functioning and dynamics of customary institutions and mechanisms. For example ‘poorly informed consultation with an unrepresentative group can have a particularly distorting effect on the way these institutions function…. overt consultation with elders and neglect of the rights of women can lead to a shift in internal power relations and could damage the very functions that the engagement seeks to develop’ (WISP, 2008:18)

**Engaging in advocacy activities.** Addressing pastoralists’ political marginalization requires systematic efforts to influence decision-makers to adopt appropriate policies, strategies, legislations and other actions to reduce pastoralists’ vulnerability. Pointing to gaps in current policies and approaches, using evidences and action research to promote beliefs, and practices that work well and changing those that do not, are among the main goals of advocacy activities. NGOs can play a crucial role in this regard. Working to change the negative perceptions towards pastoralism that are still entrenched among government institutions is one way to positive influence decision-makers. Targeted media and group specific campaigns through documentaries, and presentation of evidence on the importance and viability of pastoralism in brochures, pamphlets and other easy to read material are all important advocacy strategies. Stimulating greater appreciation of pastoralists and dispelling their negative image is one of the objectives of the ‘Influencing Policy and Practice to
Support Pastoral Livelihoods’ (REGLAP) project, funded by ECHO and currently implemented jointly by ODI and Oxfam GB. In addition, activities that advocate for the rights of pastoralists need to be supported by a sound analysis and evidence-base to inform good practice. In this regard, the recent ‘Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards’ (LEGS) is a useful tool. LEGS is founded on a rights-based approach and links two key international human rights: the right to food and the right to a standard of living (Watson and Catley, 2008). In addition, LEGS provides standards and guidelines for best practice and assistance in decision-making for livestock interventions on the basis of experiences and best practices from around the world in responding to emergencies (Ibid).

Linking civil society and state. It is important that NGOs programmes are designed from the outset to work simultaneously on the two-way process that the discussion has addressed so far: strengthen and build the capacity of civil society groups while working with state institutions to change the dominant paradigm driving national policies that keeps pastoral communities on the margin.

For example Oxfam GB sees the lack of effective representation of pastoralists’ interests and the lack of responsiveness on the part of governments at the root of pastoralists’ vulnerability. The Capacity Building for Empowerment (CBfE) approach is a two-way complementary process which involves civil society as well as the formal institutions and aims to (Oxfam, 2008/7):

- Support pastoralists in building or developing their own organisations through which they can represent themselves and their values and come to understand and articulate their rights;
- Work to influence decision-makers to become more responsive to pastoralists’ needs and concerns.

Figure 3 Key elements of the CBfE approach
1. Facilitating the strengthening & building of truly representative pastoral organisations for voice.

2. Influencing policy and practice.

3. Changing attitudes and beliefs.

4. Facilitating engagement between government, communities & other institutions to bring pastoralists into the mainstream & encourage government to be more responsive.

5. Women's empowerment.

6. Empowerment of marginalised groups within pastoral communities.

7. Participation for popular movements.

8. Responsibilities & obligations to ensure accountability through appropriate checks & balances.

Source: Oxfam, 2005: 9
The Kotido Pastoral Development Programme that Oxfam GB has implemented in the Karamoja region of Uganda is based on the CBfE and follows a twin track approach. “On the one hand, fostering strong, representative organisations through which pastoralists can better understand, articulate, and claim their rights; on the other, influencing institutions (such as government) to become more responsive to pastoralists’ interests and concerns” (Oxfam). Oxfam GB works closely with the district government in Kotido to strengthen the district planning structures that have been set up through the national decentralisation process. Oxfam provides capacity building to government staff at different levels (from district down to parish) to strengthen participatory planning. Through this collaboration Oxfam facilitates the production of Community Action Plans (CAPs), drawn up by community groups and their Parish administrators. This highly participative planning process involves identifying local resources and capacities, including those of the government, and using these to address the prioritised needs of the community. Pastoral communities are assisted in setting up management committees, which oversee the development interventions arising from the CAP process and which ensure that all partners to individual development projects (government, community and NGOs) fulfil their obligations. These management committees are further trained to manage resources after their construction, such as through the collection of user fees and organisation of maintenance and repair. In addition, the project supports a number of Community Based Organisations and Civil Society Organisations.

A study commissioned by the Pastoralists Livelihoods Initiative (PLI) to identify how NGOs can support customary institutions and bridge existing gaps between customary and government systems in the pastoral lands of Borana and Gujji in Ethiopia has pointed to the need to work across the following three areas (Muir, 2007):

1. **Constituency and representation (including gender):** providing training and support to customary institution to develop effective consultation structures and mechanisms. Support should focus especially on strengthening existing structures and mechanisms of women engagement in local institutions.

2. **Enhancing engagement with government structures:** capacity-building of customary institutions should be carried out through the adoption of 'action learning approach' where capacity is built by a process of learning-by-doing in which stakeholders are helped by facilitators to examine their experiences and to jointly work out ways of improving practices in governance;

3. **Legal recognition for customary institutions as natural resource management bodies** is seen as key for preventing further degradation of the rangelands. A first step for legitimizing customary institutions is to identify the boundaries of natural resource management units and identify and map the actual responsible management units. This identification and mapping exercise should be premised on norms of inclusion and participation so that the interests of all social and ethnic groups are taken into account.

The study concludes that achieving legal recognition of customary institutions in pastoral lands of Ethiopia ‘requires a collective approach on the part of a range of development agencies, the Ministry of Federal Affairs, pastoral development departments…local NGOs and donors and international NGOs’ (Ibid.).

To ensure government’s support of livelihoods-based interventions to enhance pastoralists’ resilience it is important that significant efforts are directed to develop close partnerships.
between state institutions and operational agencies. The Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative (PLI) is implemented by a consortium of NGOs, managed by CARE Ethiopia, in partnership with the Government of Ethiopia. The PLI aims to strengthen pastoralists livelihoods through a variety of interventions including early market purchase of stock before severe drought; restocking with improved breeds of small ruminants (sheep and goats) while improving productivity of existing breeding stock; exploiting immediate opportunities for long term livestock market development (including policy reform and public/private partnerships for systems improvement)\(^6\). As part of this initiative, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Ethiopia has established a Livestock Policy Forum (LPF) with technical support from the Feinstein International Center (FIC) at Tufts University. The LPF represents an important avenue to discuss and influence policy change with the government. In addition FIC is working with IIED and others to develop a Pastoralism and Policy course for key decision makers (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008).

\(^6\) http://www.america.gov/st/health-english/2008/June/200806160000549xjyrrep3.794497c-02.html
Section 3: Cross-border issues and approaches

The pastoralist zone in the HoA spans the boundaries of nation-states. Pastoral communities are found in the lowlands of Ethiopia, in the whole of Somalia, in the Northern and Eastern part of Kenya and on the borders of Tanzania and Uganda (Abdulrahman, 2006). The ethnicities, idioms, and livelihoods activities of pastoral groups are also often transboundary. Whether to follow the changing availability of the scarce natural resources of the region, to trade livestock, or to access better services, cross-border movement represents a key livelihood strategy for pastoralists groups. There is growing recognition that the traditional cross-border livestock movement and trade should be supported and that forging regional cooperation and implementing cross-border initiatives are of key importance for reducing pastoralists’ vulnerability in the HoA (Abdulrahman, 2006; Pastoralist Voices, 9). Indeed, ‘[d]roughts, livestock diseases, peace initiatives, marketing and trade transcend national boundaries so regional perspectives need to be developed’ (Akilu and Wekesa, 2002: 33).

The two main cross-border issues that have emerged from the review of the literature relate to cross-border conflict and livestock cross-border trade. These two dimensions are discussed below.

3.1 Cross-border conflicts

Tensions and violent conflicts have long affected pastoral areas in the HoA. Pastoralists are involved in violent conflicts at different levels, ranging from cattle raiding; conflicts over natural resources, and political rebellion and secessionist movements (Markakis, 2004). For example droughts often spark or escalate conflicts over natural resources. Pastoral groups move over larger tracts of land in search of available grazing and water sources. This movement often leads to fierce competition over scarce resources and in many cases it becomes a source of tension or overt conflict between different communities, both nomadic and settled. For example in normal times the Pokot only use about three-quarter of their territory to avoid clashing with the neighboring Karamajong groups. However during drought periods they are forced to take the risk and rely quite heavily on the contested areas (Abdulrahman, 2006).

Cattle raiding have been another source of conflict for centuries, but in recent years the intensity and frequency of cattle raiding have intensified. In the past cattle raiding ‘was a communal venture, organized and sanctioned by community leaders whose goal was to ensure optimal size of the group’ (Markakis, 2004: 26). However, this customary ‘communal venture’, traditionally carried out with spears and bows, has increasingly been replaced by a new form of gang raiding, carried out with modern warfare equipment and as a lucrative source of income (Markakis, 2004; Abdulrahman, 2006). In December 2008 the media in Kenya sounded alarm on the increase in the number of pastoralists killed in cross-border cattle raids in the Kenya/Uganda, Kenya/Sudan and Kenya/Ethiopia borders (Pastoralists Voices, 12).

Since the second half of last century pastoralists have also been involved in larger conflicts in the region and many have joined the various armed opposition groups struggling for independence. For example the presence of the Oromo Liberation Front in northern Kenya
has provoked several Ethiopian military incursions into Kenya. Ethiopian incursions into Somalia have also been brought about by the presence of the Ogaden National Liberation Front and the Itihad el Islami groups on both sides of the Ethiopia-Somalia border (Markakis, 2004).

Recurrent tensions and violent strife in pastoral areas negatively affects the well-being of pastoral communities, destroys the social fabric and causes death and much sufferance. In addition, widespread conflicts in the region further contribute to pastoralists’ vulnerability. The discussion so far has pointed to the importance of mobility as a key livelihoods strategy. The movement of livestock and herders very often transcends national borders and pastoralist groups across the region depend on the same natural resources communal pool. Endemic conflict represents one major obstacle to the free movement of pastoralists and their livestock and therefore greatly contributes to pastoralists’ chronic vulnerability in the region.

As shown in Figure 4 above, conflicts and tensions in the HoA are mainly concentrated across the borders. There is growing consensus that conflict-resolution and peace-building efforts are urgently needed and that in order to be effective and lasting these efforts need to
have a regional focus (Pastoral Voices; Adan and Pkalya, 2006). For example, disarmament of pastoral communities has been the primary response of some government to the growing problem of violent conflict in pastoral zones. As noted by Dr. Abdulahi Wako, chair of the Kenya Pastoralist Week, ‘[d]isarmament cannot be implemented in one country alone; it has to be a regional initiative to be effective’ (Pastoral Voices, 9). The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) promoted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is an initiative with a regional focus. Through Field Monitors located in different areas, CEWARN observes cross-border and internal pastoral conflicts, and provides information related to potentially violent conflicts, their outbreak and escalation (specifically in the three Clusters: Karamoja, Somali and Afar-Issa). In addition to their reporting tasks, Field Monitors coordinate their efforts, liaise with local administrations and communities within and across borders to avert an impending crisis, and promote and participate in peace initiatives.

For example in January 2007 the CEWARN Field Monitor was notified by an International Rescue Committee Officer from Moroto district in Uganda of an impending raid from the Matheniko warriors. The CEWARN Field Monitor passed the information onto the Pokot local leaders who organized and prepared themselves for the attack. When the Matheniko warriors came and realized that the Pokot warriors had organized themselves they decided not to go ahead with the raid.

In January 2006 the Turkana warriors of Kenya approached the CEWARN Field Monitor in the area because they were experiencing a serious drought and had no water and pasture for their animals. They wanted to reconcile with the Dodoth group of Uganda so as to share water and pasture with the Dodoth who had been less affected by the drought. After reaching a peace agreement, the Turkana and the Dodoth started to engage in cross-border trade, mainly exchanging livestock with cereals, which greatly benefited the Turkana who were experiencing significant losses of livestock and high levels of food insecurity.

### 3.2 Cross-border livestock trade

For centuries pastoralists have traded their livestock across borders and many cross-border markets were flourishing even before colonial times (Little, 2007). Cross-border livestock trade follows the logic of the region’s natural economy and pastoralists’ traditional migratory routes. Even in very insecure environments, the specific characteristics of livestock – a mobile and high-value commodity that can be transported overland rather than on roads – make it especially amenable to cross-border trade (Little, 2005). For centuries pastoralists have relied on cross-border trade, which has always been remarkably important for the economies and societies of the region (PARIMA/ENABLE, 2007; Little, 2005).

Kenya is currently the main destination of cross-border trade in the HoA: ‘[t]he markets at Mandera and Moyale are supplied from the Somali and Borana regions in Ethiopia, and the

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9 Ibid.
10 Cross-border trade in the HoA involves many more commodities than livestock. However for the purpose and scope of this analysis, this study primarily focuses on cross-border livestock trade.
Garissa market from Lower Juba in Somalia. Animals are also trekked from Monduli and Ngorongoro in Tanzania … to Nairobi’ (Markakis, 2004: 17). Today, cross-border livestock trade is still a vibrant, albeit unofficial activity. According to Little (2007) more than 95% of the regional trade in eastern Africa is carried out via unofficial channels. Approximately 26% of Kenya’s meat consumption comes from cross-border trade (Markakis, 2004). A recent study conducted by the PCI estimates that ‘informal cross-border exports from the Northern Somali Region alone exceed by a factor of 3.2 to 6.5 the Ethiopian Customs Authority’s statistics for the number of live animals exported from the whole of Ethiopia’ (Umar and Baulch, 2007: 7 see also Little, 2006). Little estimates that cross-border trade with Somalia alone encompasses an estimated 16% of beef consumed in Nairobi (Little, 2003 in Little and Mahmoud, 2005).

While cross-border trade carries a huge potential for meeting national, regional, and even international demands for livestock and contributing to food security in the region, governments in the HoA have often adopted a hostile and punitive stand towards this specific trade. Cross-border activities in the HoA are widely considered informal and illegal. The Government of Ethiopia for example considers trade across the border as illegal and the term used to describe it is ‘contraband’ (Umar and Baulch, 2007). Most governments in the HoA ‘rely on official exports of primary commodities to earn foreign exchange’ (Little, 2006:1), and therefore see unofficial cross-border trade as a lost public revenue. In addition, governments’ concern with tax evasion means that transboundary trade is seen as undermining national and regional revenue raising efforts (Umar and Baulch, 2007).

A review of the literature has pointed to the following challenges that pastoralists and traders are confronted with when engaging in cross-border livestock trade:

Adverse national policies: Adverse policy decisions and governmental crack-downs on cross-border trade seriously impact on prices and pastoralists’ livelihoods and some see them as devastating as the impact of recurrent droughts in the region (Umar and Baulch, 2007). The lack of governments’ support and regulation of cross-border trade means that traders are forced to operate without formal finance and credit, or official legal mechanisms. For example trade across the Ethiopia/Somalia border has become increasingly difficult since mid-2006 where border trade restrictions have been intensified and closures enforced with unpredictable frequency and strictness. Because cross-border trade is illegal, the goods and livestock that are traded are often liable to confiscation (Ibid). Indeed, ‘legal constraints are stifling trade rather than maximizing the potential of … cross-border trade to generate household incomes and government revenue’ (UNOCHA, 2006: 2).

Insecurity: As discussed above, recurrent conflicts and tensions in pastoral border areas seriously restrict the movement of pastoralists and their livestock. Insecurity on trekking routes, livestock thefts, violence, banditry and so on represent major challenges and threats for those engaged in cross-border trade (Little and Mahmoud, 2005; Abdurahman, 2006). In addition, the absence of security often leads to significant market distortions, livelihoods disruptions and greatly impedes the much needed investments in communication facilities, infrastructures and veterinary services in these areas (Little, 2005).
Poor market information: Updated and reliable information on supply and demand in the nearest livestock market, prices, and weather forecasts are crucial for guiding pastoralists’ marketing decisions. However, this information is very difficult to obtain in pastoral areas, especially in remote border areas, and pastoralists and traders often rely on informal means, such as local market brokers (dilaal) to obtain market information (Little, 2006; PARIMA/ENABLE, 2007).

Poor infrastructures: The lack or very poor infrastructure and communication facilities in border areas and in the region in general significantly increases transaction costs, leads to market inefficiencies and poor dissemination of market information (Little, 2005).

Unregulated trade: In the absence of a formal recognition of cross-border livestock trade, local institutions, practices and informal traders’ networks allow the trade to exist and function (Little, 2006). However, ‘while these networks facilitate the trade, they also can be highly exclusive and distort supply and price conditions’ (Little, 2007: 10; see also Devereux, 2006). The marketing system of cross-border trade is a network of personal and clan-based relationships- which includes pastoralists, brokers, middlemen, trekkers, loaders etc. Especially during periods of violent conflict these clan-controlled networks protect their trade and favor market and financial transactions with members of the same clan or with trusted people (Little, 2007). The unregulated livestock trade also leads to distorted prices, such as overpriced forage and water along trekking routes. While acknowledging the importance of customary institutions and informal traders’ networks (Little, 2006), it is also important to keep in mind that cross-border trade is also ‘marked by monopolistic characteristics, high barriers to entry, and excessive gains for merchant and transporters with only minimal benefits to producers. In fact in most [cross-border trade] herders receive less than 50% of the final price’ (Little, 2007: 19 see also Abdurahman, 2006). However, given the very limited market alternatives, pastoralists have few options but to engage in the unpredictable and dangerous cross-border trade, in many cases with low income levels and small profit margins (Umar and Baulch, 2007).

3.3 Addressing cross-border issues: lessons for NGOs
There is growing recognition that the traditional cross-border livestock movement and trade should be supported and that forging regional cooperation and implementing cross-border initiatives are key in reducing pastoralists’ vulnerability in the HoA (Abdulrahman, 2006). When thinking of cross-border approaches for supporting pastoral livelihoods systems it is important to keep in mind that many of the challenges that pastoralists are faced with, such as poor infrastructure, lack of access to services, the hazards of illegality, conflict in pastoral areas and so on, are closely linked to their political marginalization. A conflict prevention agenda therefore should be seen as intimately linked to a governance agenda since political marginalization and lack of access to key natural resources are important contributors to some of the conflicts in which pastoralists are involved in the region (Morton, 2008).

Promoting peace and reconciliation initiatives. Peace and security make cross-border movement and interaction possible and allow pastoral communities to access vital natural resources and engage in trading activities. The promotion of peace-building initiatives in conflict-affected
communities in the HoA should therefore be prioritized in interventions aimed at strengthening pastoralists’ resilience.

In 2001 the Organisation of African Unity Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (OAU-IBAR) implemented a cross-border peace initiative in north-east Uganda, south-east Sudan, south-west Ethiopia and north-west Kenya. This intervention used animal health to facilitate peace and reconciliation meetings between antagonistic pastoral groups, decrease cattle raiding and banditry and make resources more accessible (Akilu and Wekesa, 2002). Under this initiative five border meetings among influential elders from different tribes were organized, and transport, food and accommodation were provided for those attending the meetings. The initiative succeeded in improving relations, reduced tensions at the borders and consequently helped to restore mobility and access to water and pastures. Greater freedom of movement also made it easier to carry out cattle vaccination on either side of the borders. The lessons learnt from this initiative point to the importance of improving relationships and implementing reconciliation initiatives as a way to improve pastoralists’ resilience. The fact that the elders were able to meet without external interference, was seen as a key strength of the meetings. Thanks to the peace initiative and the ability of pastoralists to move freely across the border, at the height of the 1999-2001 drought, around 100,000 cattle were migrated to Uganda. It has been estimated that without this timely migration, 20,000 cattle could have died (Akilu and Wekesa, 2002).

The website of the PCI (www.pastoralists.org) lists and describes a number of meetings\footnote{\url{http://www.pastoralists.org/pages/posts/pastoralist-gathering-in-hudet-somali-region2.php}} that have been attended in recent months by different clan elders and representatives in different regions of the HoA to decrease tensions and reduce violence in their areas. A recent peace meeting mediated by the Oromiya Pastoralists Association was attended by the elders of two different clans and was based on the use of traditional peace methods. Like in the OAU-IBAR initiative above, government officials did not take part in the negotiations. ‘Ten local government officials opened the meeting and were present when the results were announced, but did not take part in the peace process. The meeting opened with a traditional ritual in which both sides pledged to accept the facts of any claims made by the other group\footnote{\url{http://www.pastoralists.org/pages/posts/peace-meeting-between-kerayu-and-afar-mediated-by-the-oromiya-pastoralists-association12.php}}. The groups have agreed to a solution and ‘[l]ocal governments on both sides have agreed to abide by the decisions made in the peace meeting\footnote{\url{http://www.pastoralists.org/pages/posts/pastoralist-leaders-from-ethiopia-and-kenya-forge-agreements-to-decrease-conflict4.php}}. This example points the importance of linking peace meetings with government authorities and structures. While direct participation of government officials in peace meetings is seen as counterproductive as it may interfere with negotiation processes, it is important to ensure that these initiatives are linked with local systems of governance, so that the outcome of negotiations is taken into account by local authorities. Fostering these linkages can also lay the basis for the collaboration and integration of customary institutions and mechanisms into formal systems of governance.
District Peace Committees have been established in a number of districts in the ASALs in Kenya and play an important role in early warning and conflict-prevention. These Committees are community-driven conflict-management structures which have been created following the model of the successful Wajir Peace Committee. The Wajir Committee was established in the aftermath of the bloody clashes that were engulfing the pastoral areas between Kenya and Ethiopia during the 1990s. Local professional women took the initiative to form a peace committee, which later enlisted elders, traders, youth etc. from different ethnic communities. In addition, the members of the committee reached up to the District Commissioner for support and extended their activities across the border in Ethiopia (Markakis, 2004; see also http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/4/4_womenk.htm).

District Peace Committees function with a highly decentralized structure and have representatives responsible for preventing conflicts in every location. When conflict occurs, customary methods of conflict-resolution and dialogue are used to reconcile the warring parties and to encourage the equitable sharing of scarce resources. Crucially, Peace Committees ‘integrate both traditional and modern conflict intervention mechanisms to prevent, manage or transform …conflicts’ (Adan and Pkalya, 2006: vi). Despite the instrumental role that Peace Committees have played and continue to play in peace building activities, a recent study has identified a number of challenges that these organizations are faced with, such as poor support from government agencies, limited financial resources, and logistical constraints (Ibid). The study provides several recommendations for strengthening the work of these organizations, including NGOs support with regular funding and capacity-building activities such as training. Training can provide Peace Committees members with the necessary skills to promote transboundary natural resource management. In addition, by incorporating basic elements of human rights, criminal and civil law in these training, members can be better equipped to deal with government officials and structures (Ibid.).

Engaging in advocacy activities. Advocacy activities that focus on improving the policy environment are essential, and in particular efforts that advocate for the support of pastoralists livelihoods, facilitate conflict resolution, lift livestock bans, enable internal and cross-border movement, and support trade of livestock and other goods (Hedlund, 2007). In relation to cross-border issues, advocacy activities should specifically focus on the need to support and understand cross-border livestock mobility and trade. Improved understanding of cross-border trade and acknowledgement of its positive dimensions is a first important step for the development of a more predictive and supportive regulatory system to address many of the challenges that livestock traders and pastoralists currently face.

New legislation in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Mauritania has recognized the rights of pastoralists to move their animals within and across national borders. Advocacy efforts could draw on the West African experience to prompt governments in the HoA to learn from these countries and adopt policies and developing regulatory frameworks that enable pastoralists to engage in cross-border activities. While the slow and uneven implementation of this recent legislation means that pastoralists are still faced with considerable difficulties in moving their livestock across borders, it still represents a good step forward in the recognition and facilitation of pastoralists’ freedom of movement as a key livelihood strategy. Similarly, advocacy efforts could point to the benefits that cross-border trade could attain.

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from the establishment of a ‘tax free’ trade zone between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia for example through the regional Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Agencies may also significantly contribute to convincing national policy and decision-makers of the positive role that cross-border trade plays in meeting national and regional food demands, in raising incomes and business activities, and as a form of international commerce that brings value added to exporting countries (Little and Mahmoud, 2005; Little, 2005). According to Little (2005: 19):

Policies that … encourage regional trade across borders-rather than discourage it- would capitalize on comparative advantage for different local and national economies; strengthen local food security; increase collection of state revenues and investments in key market and transport infrastructure; and reduce price volatility and market imperfections.

In particular, Little (2006) suggests that policy discussions of cross-border trade and its importance should be encouraged at three institutional levels:

1. **At border sites:** among customs and local government officials, given the key role that local officials on the ground play in encouraging or discouraging policies;
2. **At national level:** involving national officials and diplomats, given the international agreements and dialogue that need to be undertaken with other states and because domestic policies directly impact on cross-border trade;
3. **At regional level:** involving regional bodies such as IGAD, given their regional involvement and cross-border mandate.

**Supporting pastoralists-led cooperatives:** A PARIMA/ENABLE (2007) study in the Oromia region in Ethiopia, recommended the support of pastoralists cooperatives to improve livestock marketing efficiency in the region and in particular to address the problem of poor market access of pastoralists. These cooperatives might be especially helpful in reducing transaction costs, in dealing with information asymmetries, and in improving the dissemination of market information. Through collective action and resource pooling, pastoralists cooperatives may be able to overcome some of the challenges that pastoralists’ face when engaging in cross-border livestock trade, and attain a competitive edge and better prices for pastoralists.
Section 4: Donor policies and funding approaches

The discussion so far has pointed to the huge impact that policy and practice has on pastoralists’ livelihoods systems and strategies. Persistent negative perceptions of pastoralism and unfavourable national policies, often ill-informed of the importance, viability and economic value of pastoralism, significantly contribute to the chronic vulnerability of pastoralists in the HoA. Given the central role that policy plays in informing pastoral development practice and in mobilizing funding and resources for pastoral areas, this final section investigates international donor policies and funding approaches to drought management and response\textsuperscript{15} and discusses the relationship between these policies and pastoralists’ vulnerability.

4.1 Drought management and response

Natural disasters and in particular droughts of increasing intensity and frequency, have long been the focus of debates on pastoralists’ vulnerability and food insecurity in the HoA. Arguments that saw adverse climate changes as the primary cause of pastoralists’ vulnerability have long been challenged. Today, droughts are increasingly seen as a trigger of livelihoods and food crisis in the region, but the underlying causes of pastoralists’ vulnerability are perceived to be social and political, and not natural (UNOCHA, 2006, Devereux, 2006; Morton, 2008; HPG, 2006). For example, as discussed in Section 1 above, political marginalization is widely seen as a key determinant of pastoralists’ inability to recover before another drought hits and is thus central to the analysis of pastoralists’ chronic vulnerability in the region.

The idea that drought in the HoA is a major disaster of exceptional nature has also long been challenged. This thinking has widely informed drought management and response, which, in many cases has been \textit{ad hoc}, relief-based and disconnected from development activities. The Drought Cycle Management (DCM) model was developed during the 1980s following the realisation that rather than an exceptional and exogenous event, drought is a cyclical and recurrent phenomenon in the HOA. The DCM points to the importance of a disaster management approach to drought. As shown in Figure 5 below, this model has been designed to identify appropriate activities for each phase of the drought cycle- normal, alert, emergency and recovery- given the situation on the ground (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). Crucially, the DCM model identifies four stages of drought cycle management – preparedness, mitigation, relief assistance and reconstruction – and recognizes that these stages may occur simultaneously. In turn, DCM, which has become increasingly accepted as the dominant drought management model in the HoA, points to the importance of ensuring that the response to drought is flexible and that it integrates relief and development activities in a holistic way (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{15} This review recognizes that drought management and response is only one area of donors’ engagement and efforts aimed at strengthening pastoralists’ resilience in the HoA. However, given the focus and scope of this analysis (see Annex 1, point 2), only donor policies and approaches in relation to drought management and response are discussed here.
A holistic and multidimensional approach to drought is increasingly perceived to be of crucial importance to address pastoralists’ vulnerability in the HoA. Lessons learned from evaluations of relief and recovery responses to past slow-onset disasters, particularly drought, food and livelihoods insecurity—clearly indicate that the most effective way of saving lives in such situations is through protecting people’s livelihoods (Hedlund, 2007). It is increasingly clear that there is a need to complement emergency responses that merely aim to save lives with strategic interventions that support livelihoods and promote the resilience of local populations (Longley and Wekesa, 2008; HPG, 2006, Lind, 2005; Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008; Akilu and Wekesa, 2002). Strategic livelihoods interventions (see Box 1 below) ‘can equip communities and vulnerable households with the means to manage the oncoming shock before they collapse into crisis’ so that ‘massive deliveries of food aid are often unnecessary’ (Barrett, 2006 in Longley and Wekesa, 2008).

**Box 1 Examples of livelihoods interventions**

More recently CORDAID has moved to the concept of Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR) which focuses on enabling communities to increase their capacity to reduce risk and cope with the impact of hazards.
Livelihoods interventions aim to protect or enhance livelihoods assets, strategies and outcomes, or the context, structures and processes that influence these three elements. Livelihoods interventions can contribute both to saving lives and to building resilience and addressing vulnerability.

Livelihoods support is often considered to be distinct from relief aid, in that it is more ‘developmental’ and usually implemented over a longer period. Such an either–or distinction between ‘development’ and ‘relief’ modes of assistance is particularly misleading in the Horn: the form of urgent, large-scale livelihoods support required fits neither paradigm well, and requires new ways of thinking about the problems that people are actually facing.

In the water sector, livelihoods approaches should focus on maintaining existing water sources and building local capacity to monitor and respond to changing patterns of demand for water. Examples might include:

- Emergency water supplies to prevent distress migration and loss of life/livestock.
- Establishing strategic water sources. This requires a detailed understanding of livelihoods and population movements.
- Providing storage or transport facilities to reduce time spent collecting or queuing for water.
- The subsidised provision of fuel and pumps.

Livestock interventions could include:

- Destocking: early off-take when terms of trade for livestock are still favourable.
- Supplementary livestock feeding, which is more cost-effective than restocking or buying fresh animals after a drought (supplementary feeding should be done only for reproductive animals).
- Emergency veterinary programmes, which can prolong the life of vulnerable animals for several months, even where pasture and other conditions remain unchanged.
- Transport subsidies to support the off-take of large numbers of animals from drought-stricken areas to markets.
- Restocking, with a focus on those who have not dropped out of the pastoral system.

The concept of ‘saving lives and saving livelihoods’ has challenged the provision of emergency aid, in particular food aid, as the predominant response to drought-affected areas in the HoA. While the provision of food aid represents an appropriate response in terms of meeting basic food needs and saving lives in the face of deteriorating food security and rising vulnerability, food aid is simply not designed to support pastoralists’ livelihoods and is not geared to increase pastoralists’ resilience. In their review of the response to the 1999-2001 drought in Kenya, Akilu and Wekesa (2002: 33) state that ‘rather than being the first response, food aid should be seen as a last resort…when all else has failed, or when nothing else was done to address the emerging crisis’. They conclude that when food aid is used when livelihoods assets have been depleted, or because of a failure to implement timely and effective livelihoods interventions, then ‘it becomes counterproductive, creating dependency and eroding local initiative and coping capacity’ (Ibid.). The idea that the provision of food aid alone cannot protect and support livelihoods so as to strengthen the resilience of crisis-affected communities has long been recognized. More than 20 years ago, a study investigating the large food aid relief operation that took place in Turkana, Kenya in 1984 already highlighted that that outside relief interventions contributed to the sedentarisation of the Turkana pastoralists in camps, which made them dependent on food aid and made them even more vulnerable to drought (Hogg, 1985 in Lind, 2005). More recently, a study
concluded that years of food aid in Turkana have failed to address structural problems related to poverty (Levine and Crosskey, 2006a in Longley and Wekesa, 2008). In North Eastern Kenya, a recent household economy assessment and nutritional study revealed a rise in poverty and a decline in basic diets, despite almost continuous emergency support since the drought of 1997-98 (Browne et al, 2008 in Longley and Wekesa, 2008).

In recent years, major international donors have signed to the 23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, which clearly emphasise the need to support livelihoods and not only lives. The 3rd Principle states that humanitarian action should ‘facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods’; and the 9th Principle clearly indicates that humanitarian assistance should be delivered ‘in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods’.

Despite a widespread consensus and growing emphasis on the importance of investing more resources in protecting and supporting the livelihoods of chronically vulnerable populations, donors appear to have not yet fully embraced the idea of ‘saving lives and livelihoods’. Donors also continue to see drought as an exogenous event, rather than a defining feature of the African dryland ecological system and a largely predictable occurrence for which it is possible to plan for (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). Rather than regarding drought as primarily a development problem, in many cases donors continue to see it as a relief problem and the preferred response remains food aid. A review of the emergency livelihood responses to the crisis in the HoA concluded that ‘in the face of a well-understood, analysed and accepted food system and widely available food assistance, donors were simply not convinced that livelihoods interventions stood a better chance of saving lives’ (HPG, 2006: 4). More recently, an analysis of the 2005-6 drought in Kenya concluded that the response was dominated by food aid (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). A review of the drought response in the pastoral lowlands of Ethiopia during the 2005-6 drought also found that ‘[t]he default emergency intervention was food relief, and livelihoods protection and emergency livelihoods interventions were limited’. (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 12). ‘The preference for food aid appeared to be determined by pre-existing earmarking and a preference for the ‘safe option’, with its well-understood mechanisms and expected results’ (Ibid: 29).

There is no doubt that designing and implementing livelihoods interventions is more complex and requires greater capacity than the provision of food aid (HPG, 2006). For example Catley (2007) argues that successful livelihoods interventions often involve a ‘combined package’ of different activities, which makes them more difficult to plan and implement than interventions that focus on food aid only. Furthermore, designing and planning effective emergency livelihoods interventions requires a thorough understanding of pastoral livelihoods systems, which is not an easy task, especially in emergency contexts. For example a re-stocking project implemented in north-east Kenya in 2002/03 was found counterproductive because the implementing agency failed to understand the nature of social structures (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). Nonetheless, if the aim is to strengthen long-term pastoralists’ resilience to external shocks, then the need to move away from a predominant food aid response to include protection and support to livelihoods is imperative. Indeed, 17

http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/a%2023%20Principles%20EN-GHD19.10.04%20RED.doc
‘saving livelihoods needs to be recognized as being as important as saving human lives in emergencies’ (Lautze, 2003 in Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 15).

### 4.2 Funding approaches and mechanisms

An effective and timely response to drought needs to be supported by appropriate funding mechanisms that allow agencies to implement both relief and development interventions. As shown in Figure 6 below, the response to the crisis in the HoA in 2005/06 was characterized by a much higher level of funding for food assistance than for livelihoods interventions. The main reason related to the quality of livelihoods assessments, which were perceived by donors as ‘generic and lacking the hard data that food assessments were able to provide to demonstrate potential life-saving impact’ (HPG, 2006: 4). Similarly, Longley and Wekesa (2008) argue that donors are familiar with food aid and have the confidence that lives will be saved through food distributions. Food aid is generally regarded as straightforward, relatively effective, efficient and accountable.

#### Figure 6 Funding appeals and contributions

![Figure 6 Funding appeals and contributions](source: HPG, 2006:4)

The existence of effective contingency plans and funding is crucial for the mobilisation of resources at the early stages of a crisis and for ensuring the planning and implementation of timely livelihoods interventions. Contingency planning for humanitarians can be defined as ‘[a] process, in anticipation of potential crises, of developing strategies, arrangements and procedures to address the humanitarian needs of those adversely affected by crises’ (Choularton, 2007: 3). In other words, contingency planning means making a plan to respond to a crisis so as to ensure that when ‘the next crisis breaks, everyone and everything is ready’ (Ibid.). For contingency plans to be implemented in a timely and effective way, contingency funding must be available both at central and local level. Donors’ contributions to contingency funding are therefore of vital importance.

Timely and appropriate livelihoods interventions need to be supported by flexible funding mechanisms. For example, implementing agencies need to be able to quickly reallocate and
spend funds so as to respond to a crisis in a timely fashion. An innovative aspect of the PLI initiative (see Section 2.4 above) is that ‘it allows implementing agencies to identify new types of response and re-allocate up to 10% of their total budgets without permission from USAID’ (Catley, 2007: 2). This is encouraging as it signals an important recognition of the need for flexible programming and funding grounded in ‘developmental relief’ thinking and practice (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). Longley and Wekesa (2008) state that, during the 2005-06 Kenya drought, the agencies that were best able to respond were those who were able to divert longer-term funding for emergency needs, and those who had access to contingency funding. To be sure, ‘the effectiveness of donor funding for drought response is …reduced by rigid procedures and inflexibility in an environment where the situation on the ground is often rapidly evolving’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 30). A timely response also requires that donors disburse emergency funding swiftly, without delays or sluggish procedures. For example, during the 2005-06 drought response, funds which were originally intended for destocking were received after the rains had started, when pastoralists no longer needed to sell their livestock (Ibid.). Similarly, it has been observed that during the 2005-06 Ethiopia drought, ‘interventions aimed at saving livelihoods arrived late’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 12). Among the constraints to quick action were some rigid procedures and donors’ restrictions, such as ‘sourcing drugs and vaccines only from companies with certain specifications (e.g. nationality) [which] delayed interventions’ (Ibid: 26).

Finally, if building resilience of pastoralists’ communities is the ultimate goal of donors-sponsored interventions, a long-term approach is imperative and resources need to be made available with a long-term perspective. Indeed, ‘[d]rought resilience can only be enhanced through long-term development interventions’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 29). In addition, a long-term approach also contributes to keeping the issue of pastoral areas and pastoralist communities high on the national political agenda (Oxfam, 2006). This is of crucial importance for addressing political marginalization and strengthening pastoralists’ institutions in the HoA. Donors’ funding schemes however, are still not geared to take into account the complexities of working in pastoral environments. With few exceptions, current funding cycles do not usually allow a long-term and meaningful engagement, often because they have a short-time frame. For example, the PLI two-year cycle has been defined as ‘woefully inadequate’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 30) for building pastoralists’ resilience to drought.

4.3 Promising initiatives

Within the last year or so, a number of new donor-funded programmes have either just started or have been announced. Though it is still too soon for impacts to be realized, these programmes are particularly encouraging as they promote longer-term approaches to drought response, attempt to address the underlying causes of risk and vulnerability in drought-prone areas, and provide contingency funds for more timely drought responses (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). These initiatives are briefly described below.

The EC Drought Management Initiative (DMI) provides additional money for Kenya’s Drought Contingency fund. In addition it provides coordination, policy support and institutional strengthening to drought management structures in Kenya. This initiative
consists of 4 components. For the purpose of this analysis, Component 1 and 4 are especially relevant. Component 1 is a Drought Contingency Fund of €8.5 million and Component 4 has been created to specifically link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) between the DMI and ECHO’s Regional Drought Preparedness Fund, thus providing an effective link between relief and development within EC/ECHO programming.

At the regional level, ECHO’s innovative Regional Drought Preparedness Decision aims to reducing the risks associated with drought by strengthening the resilience of local people. The programme complements other ECHO emergency operations, and provides a basis for subsequent development projects. This program, which has been designed according to the DCM model, therefore puts the principles of LRRD into practice.

USAID-funded RELPA Project – Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas – aims to provide a bridge between emergency relief and activities to promote sustainable economic development in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. The overall programme objectives are to: (i) increase household incomes and economic resiliency of the populations living in the pastoral regions; (ii) reduce the requirements for emergency assistance; (iii) set the conditions by which the pastoral areas of the Horn of Africa can participate in a broader process of social and economic development; and (iv) support COMESA in managing a policy and investment process in the region, with emphasis upon vulnerable pastoral areas (USAID, 2007 in Longley Wekesa, 2008).

DFID’s Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) will be implemented in four districts of Kenya to provide a regular, predictable and guaranteed amount of cash to chronically food insecure households. It is intended to reduce food aid dependency, protect assets and promote more resilient livelihoods in the long term. Phase 1 (2008-2012) will provide cash transfers to 300,000 beneficiaries, and Phase 2 (2012-2018) will roll out the HSNP under a national social protection system delivering long-term, guaranteed cash transfers to extremely poor and vulnerable people.

As discussed above, a significant constraint to a timely and adequate support of livelihoods interventions relates to the difficulties that donors face in understanding the technical assessments of livelihoods-based proposals. The LEGS initiative discussed in Section 2.4, fills an important gap and represents an important step forward as it provides a standard point of reference and guidance to donors when assessing proposals to respond to emergencies in pastoral areas (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008).

4.4 Policy engagement: lessons for NGOs

Improving the quality of livelihood assessments. If timely and effective livelihood interventions are to become more prominent in drought responses and management, there is a need to invest in the preparation and development of accurate and detailed livelihood assessments. As highlighted above, a major issue that hindered the support to swift livelihood interventions during the 2005/06 crisis in the HoA related to the quality of livelihood assessments. Donors were more familiar with food aid mechanisms and results and saw livelihood assessment as too generic and not backed by the hard data provided by food assessments
(HPG, 2006). One way to improve livelihood assessments could be to follow the example of the food sector where plans and templates are developed before a crisis so that putting together proposal and appeals during an emergency becomes easier and faster (Longley and Wekesa, 2008). In addition, to demonstrate the effectiveness and appropriateness of non-food interventions, it is important that proposals are backed by a robust evidence base ‘to allow for the identification of the specific interventions that are most appropriate in specific contexts and stages of drought cycle management’ (Longley and Wekesa, 2008:47). Furthermore, highlighting best practice lessons as part of the development of the evidence base can also serve to convince donors of the beneficial impacts and the life-saving potential of livelihood interventions.

**Working collaboratively for policy engagement.** This review has highlighted a number of shortcomings in donors’ policies and approaches to drought management and response in the HoA. Operational agencies on the ground are uniquely placed to influence donors’ policies in the region, and working collaboratively can enhance the effectiveness of their advocacy activities. Advocacy aimed to improving donors’ approaches and policies can focus on a number of areas such as funding - contingency funds and more flexible, long-term funding; improving understanding of drought and the need for a response that incorporates relief and development frameworks. The REGLAP project is especially relevant in this regard as one of its objectives relates to the support of a regional advocacy strategy and the development of a strategy for evidence-base policy engagement. Agencies are also well-positioned to lobby donors to engage in high level policy dialogues with national authorities on pastoralists-related issues. For example one of the recommendations of the drought response in Ethiopia in 2005-06 points to the need to influence donor representatives ‘to take up policy dialogue with the government on areas of the [Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty] which demonstrate a bias against pastoralism’ (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008: 34), and specifically in relation to pastoralists’ settlement (Ibid.).

**Section 5: Key Lessons**

In relation to the three focus areas of this review - pastoralists’ political marginalization, cross-border issues, and policy engagement, the following approaches and recommendations have emerged from a review of the literature:

1. **Addressing pastoralists’ political marginalization**

   - **Support pastoral livelihood systems** with timely and appropriate interventions:
     - ‘Saving lives through livelihoods’ to protect and strengthen pastoralists’ livelihoods assets and strategies, enhance pastoralists’ well-being and contribute to building their resilience;
     - Livelihoods interventions have the potential to free individuals from severe deprivation and opening up opportunities for more substantive engagement in political life.
Support education services in pastoral areas to help communities to develop crucial skills and knowledge to participate in national political processes and engage in alternative livelihoods:
  o Promote primary and secondary education as well as adult literacy;
  o Support mobile and/or boarding schools as appropriate, especially for primary education.

Strengthen pastoral civil society groups to enable them to effectively lobby for pro-pastoralist policy changes and policies implementation:
  o Promote capacity-building activities (e.g. technical know-how and skills to influence policy);
  o Build and strengthen the linkages between PPGs and broader civil society (including pastoralists themselves, community-based organizations, local NGOs) by facilitating access to detailed, comprehensive and timely technical support and information and helping PPGs to link and communicate regularly with their constituencies.

Support local institutions and organizations to strengthen the relationship between pastoralists and formal institutions:
  o Understand the dynamics and the working of customary institutions and mechanisms;
  o Build upon those institutions and mechanisms with initiatives designed to integrate customary institutions and mechanisms within formal systems;
  o Partner with and strengthen indigenous NGOs and community-based organizations.

Engage in advocacy activities to stimulate greater appreciation of pastoral communities and dispel their negative image; and to lobby decision-makers to adopt appropriate policies, strategies, legislations and other actions to reduce pastoralists’ vulnerability;
  o Support advocacy activities with a sound analysis and evidence-base to inform good practice.

Link civil society and state
  o Plan and design initiatives aiming to support a two-way process: strengthen and build the capacity of civil society groups while working with state institutions to change the dominant paradigm driving national policies that keeps pastoral communities on the margin.

2. Addressing cross-border issues

Promote peace and reconciliation initiatives to enable cross-border movement, access to vital natural resources and trade:
  o Support peace meetings where local decision-makers (e.g. elders, clan leaders) can meet without the interference of government officials but ensure that initiatives are linked with local systems of governance to ensure that the outcome of negotiations is taken into account by local authorities;
  o Where possible, support and strengthen District Peace Committees with regular funding and capacity-building activities.

Engage in advocacy activities at the local, national and regional level to foster understanding and acknowledgement of the positive dimensions of cross-border trade and to stimulate
support of pastoralist livelihoods, facilitate conflict resolution, lift livestock bans, enable internal and cross-border movement.

- Engage with initiatives with a regional focus: such as CEWARN and COMESA
- Support pastoralists-led cooperatives to improve livestock marketing efficiency in the region and to address poor market access of pastoralists.

3. **Policy engagement**

- **Improve the quality of livelihood assessments** to ensure that timely and effective livelihood interventions are more prominent in drought responses and management:
  - Draw on the positive aspects of the food system, for example develop plans and templates before a crisis so that putting together proposal and appeals during an emergency is easier and faster;
  - Create assessment methodologies which can build a robust evidence base for donors a robust evidence base to back assessments and convince donors of the beneficial impacts and the life-saving potential of livelihood interventions.
- **Work collaboratively for policy engagement** to enhance the effectiveness of advocacy activities to influence donors’ policies in the region.
- **Identify like-minded donors** to build strategic alliances for pro-pastoralists support.
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Annex 1  Terms of Reference (ToR)

Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought (RREAD) Programme: Learning Support

1. Background

The cross-border area of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia is one of chronic vulnerability to drought. Droughts are occurring with increasing intensity and frequency in this part of the region, and these are contributing to a gradual erosion of people’s livelihoods and capacity to cope when such shocks occur. The droughts are one factor among several that are putting increasing pressure on vulnerable livelihoods along with increasing frequency of flooding events. Conflict is another major contributing factor. Historical tensions between different ethnic group and clans are exacerbated by increasing pressure on a depleting natural resource base, in particular water and pasture. Tension between groups can significantly reduce the opportunities for trade within and between countries and also restricts the movement of herders, with certain corridors becoming closed off, limiting access to pasture and water which further undermines livelihoods and resilience to crisis of various forms.

The occurrence of droughts in the region and the resultant impact on people whose livelihoods are already fragile is largely predictable. However, despite the wealth of research and analysis into the issue of drought management and response, there is still a disproportionate focus on emergency initiatives, responses to drought-related vulnerability in this region are often inadequate, and opportunities to design and scale up livelihoods interventions that could either mitigate or help cope with the effects of drought are often missed.

CARE International (CARE) has received support from DG ECHO to fund a regional initiative, the Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought (RREAD) Programme, in the Horn of Africa area under ECHO’s Regional Drought Decision (formerly Drought Preparedness Programme or DP2). The RREAD Programme recognizes the multi-faceted nature of livelihoods vulnerability and proposes a holistic multi-sectoral, and where possible a cross-border approach. The overall aim of the Programme is to enable disaster risk reduction and resilience models relevant to the livelihoods of pastoralists in drought prone areas to be used and understood by local, national and international actors working in and beyond the Mandera Triangle. In particular, the RREAD Programme aims to enhance the capacities of local actors operating in pastoral environment to improve resilience to drought and other crises and thereby provide an evidence base to inform regional policy and practice.

The RREAD Programme aims to produce the following results:

1. Community structures and local government bodies able to implement appropriate emergency preparedness plans;
2. Local and national actors engaged to manage the natural resource to mitigate against drought and other forms of crisis;
3. Livestock based livelihoods supported to become more resilient to drought and other forms of crisis;
4. Lessons learnt captured to feed into improved policy and practice for drought cycle management at district, national and regional levels.

2. Overall purpose of the project and objectives

Within the wide scope of the RREAD Programme, the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) will play an integral part in supporting CARE with point 4) above. The overall purpose of the partnership is to provide substantial learning support to CARE with the aim to document and strengthen best practices around drought cycle management in the Horn of Africa. The HPG’s learning support role will entail the facilitation of a process of reflection and discussion on key elements of livelihoods programming and the provision of practical guidance and mentoring to facilitate learning and promote change both at policy and practice levels. Specifically, the HPG learning support will focus on three key areas where it is expected to potentially facilitate learning and effect policy and practice change. The key focus areas for learning proposed for this project are the following:

1. **Formal systems of governance.** Exploring the relationship between exclusion from formal systems of governance and pastoralists’ vulnerability. In what ways and to what extent is pastoralists’ political marginalization contributing to their vulnerability? To what extent the inclusion of pastoralists in formal systems of governance could lead to increased resilience?

2. **Cross-border approaches.** Exploring opportunities and challenges of cross-border approaches to pastoralists’ livelihoods interventions. What are the opportunities and challenges to improving agencies’ cross-border collaboration in planning and implementation of livelihood initiatives?

3. **Donors’ policies.** Exploring the relationship between donors’ policies and pastoralists’ vulnerability. Are donors’ policies, frameworks and approaches to drought management and response (e.g. short-term funding, emergency-based responses) geared to improving pastoralists’ resilience to drought? In what ways and to what extent is the aid system contributing to the continuation of pastoralists’ vulnerability of in the Horn of Africa?

This project will ultimately identify best practices and provide clear recommendations based on findings in the key focus areas. In addition, lessons specific to this project will be linked into wider debates and discussions to contribute to sector-wide learning around drought cycle management and to inform planning, communication and advocacy work.

3. Outputs and activities

The project will produce the following four outputs and related activities:

**Output 1: Literature Review**

The first area of work will be a broad review of relevant literature to document analysis on the nature of pastoralists’ vulnerability in the region and chart ways in which agencies have responded. The review will be aimed to capture best practice around drought cycle management and response. Specifically, the literature review will point to policy approaches
and practical livelihoods-based interventions that resulted in a more timely and appropriate protection and support of pastoral livelihoods in the Horn of Africa. In addition, analysis of CARE’s pastoralist livelihoods programmes documents, such as needs assessments, key meeting reports and programme evaluations will help characterize the nature of CARE’s response and help to shed light on areas of best practice and areas for learning in programme policy and practice.

Output 2: Facilitate learning and stimulate change
The HPG will conduct a series of in-country visits at CARE’s main offices in the city capitals of Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia and will engage with CARE’s country officers, key programme staff and partners to provide substantive learning support. In particular, the HPG will support CARE to improve the approach, planning and implementation of pastoralist livelihoods interventions by focusing on building capacity around the three proposed key areas for learning. Prior to the in-country visits, the HPG will send a document to each country officer requesting them to answer a short number of questions focusing on how they perceive current approaches to pastoralist livelihoods interventions, what are the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and what improvements they think are necessary to enhance pastoralists resilience, specifically in relation to the three key focus areas for learning. Their answers will inform and guide the in-country visits, which will be carried out by the Research Fellow and will last for approximately 4-5 days in each country. Specifically, the Research Fellow will lead an interactive workshop which intends to bring together country officers and key programme staff including field workers, project coordinators and partners. The workshop will aim to introduce the selected key focus areas for learning and the need to improve the approach, planning and implementation in those areas; and stimulate the reflection and moderate the discussion on practical ways to improve and change policy and practice in the focus areas. Each workshop will aim to address both general and cross-country issues of pastoralists’ livelihoods initiatives as well as country- and project-specific issues.

Output 3: Dissemination of key findings
The HPG will produce a policy brief for each focus area of learning which will include lessons learnt and point to specific recommendations to generate and document learning and improve the timeliness and appropriateness of livelihood drought-related initiatives. The dissemination of key findings and messages will take place both at a regional and international level. A feedback workshop will be organized at the head office of CARE Kenya in Nairobi to present and share the recommendations and best practices with a wide group of regional stakeholders. A special attention will also be paid to disseminating the findings to relevant government authorities. A dedicated workshop will also be organized with key representatives from the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya, and relevant authorities in Somalia. Finally, a dissemination meeting will also be organized in Brussels with ECHO and other key agencies and donors to share the findings with the wider humanitarian sector.

Output 4: Establishing linkages with REGLAP
Influencing Policy and Practice to Support Pastoral Livelihoods (REGLAP) is a 16 months project funded by ECHO and jointly implemented by ODI/RAPID and Oxfam GB. The aim of REGLAP is to reduce the vulnerability of pastoralists and ex-pastoralists through
policy and practice change in the Horn and East Africa and to initiate an urgent reform process through a strong advocacy and media campaign. The lessons captured, practical recommendations and policy advice that will be generated by the RREAD learning support project will also feed into the ongoing REGLAP project. It is envisaged that the following linkages and cross-over activities could be established:

- Support the advocacy strategy developed by REGLAP by providing policy advice and practical recommendations to improve drought cycle management and reduce the vulnerability of pastoralists in the Horn of Africa;
- Identify synergy points between the three key focus areas for learning and REGLAP’s 5 thematic areas;
- Provide further evidences to feed into and support the evidence-based policy engagement process that REGLAP is promoting;
- Involve key REGLAP partners in the in-country workshops that will be conducted as part of Output 3 above and regularly liaise with RAPID to identify cross-over activities and ways to enhance the capabilities of the sector to reduce the vulnerability of pastoralists.