Post Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction

- progress
- challenges
- way forward

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Trincomalee Ampara
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

About the report: This report aims at providing an objective joint assessment of post-tsunami relief, recovery and reconstruction interventions and the way forward. A team comprised of representatives from the government, civil society, and the international community prepared this document, with 20 government institutions, 20 bilateral and multilateral organizations and 18 national and international NGOs contributing relevant details. During October 2005, more than 100 experts and practitioners from these institutions met and prepared detailed summaries of four sectors and seven thematic areas.

Impact of the Tsunami: The tsunami killed 35,322 people, displaced 1,000,000 persons and affected over two thirds of the island’s coastline and outlying 13 districts. Besides the tremendous loss of life and injuries, the tsunami caused extensive damage to property and disruptions of fisheries and other livelihood activities and business assets. Social networks also were severely disrupted. In many cases, lives became complicated due to the loss of legal documents. The socio-economic impact was of greater consequence as the tsunami compounded previously existing vulnerabilities.

Emergency response and relief: Thanks to a quick combined response by the government, local communities, local NGOs, private sector and the international community, the country recorded no additional deaths because of tsunami related diseases or lack of delayed medical treatment. The government, with international support, carried out immediate repairs of basic infrastructure, such as major pipelines and water sources, roads, bridges, electricity, and telephone lines. National and foreign military personnel helped in the rescue operations, identification and burial of dead, and debris clearance. Nearly 600 schools and places of worship provided emergency shelter. Food aid was provided to 910,000 people and a compensation scheme for the victims was put in place. The government and LTTE cooperated in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance reached those in need.

Funding the recovery and reconstruction process: The government has projected it would take 3-5 years to complete the rehabilitation and reconstruction task and fully restore the services and livelihoods. This effort will cost approximately US $ 2.2 billion. The international community has committed US $ 2.1 billion and an estimated US $ 0.6 billion has been disbursed. In addition, debt relief/ moratorium and balance of payments support have also been received. Based on a clear assessment of the experience so far remaining gaps will be identified and corrective action will be taken to ensure the speediest recovery.

Getting people back to their homes: Displaced families were sheltered in emergency accommodations. It was recognized that the construction of more than 98,000 permanent houses would take time, and transitional shelters were required in the interim. The government declared a buffer zone of 100 meters from the high water line in the south and southwest 200 meters in the north and east, where reconstruction of permanent houses was restricted. The buffer zone has been a critical issue in the recovery process.

Out of the targeted 60,000 transitional shelters, some 54,102 have been completed and 1,948 are nearing completion allowing internally-displaced persons (IDPs) to move out of tents. This significant achievement is the result of a concerted effort of the government and development partners. However, the quality of these transitional shelters sometimes may not have been to one’s expectations. Upgrading has been underway and a programme of care and maintenance is being implemented. Simultaneously, two programmes for permanent housing to repair or rebuild damaged houses were also introduced. For people living outside the buffer-zone, under a home-owner driven programme financial support is being provided to 66,525 families. Thus far, the first of four installments has been released to 83.5% of these families. Subsequent installments are being progressively disbursed. For people previously living within the buffer zone, a donor-built housing resettlement programme is underway. Some 32,000
families will be assigned housing in new locations with the necessary facilities. As of 13 December, some 10,707 units were under construction, and 4,299 completed. In addition, a large number of shelters and houses constructed by others including Buddhist temples, individuals, private sector and other organizations remain within public knowledge although not formally reported to the center.

In spite of the progress made, notable shortcomings and areas for further improvements need to be mentioned. Accordingly, consultation and communication between beneficiaries, local governments and development partners must be improved. Some families remain uncertain about their future housing options or whether they are not eligible under the ongoing programmes. Further challenges remain such as undersupply in certain areas, additional demands for housing with the recent revision of buffer zone regulations, construction capacity, time constraints and rising prices of building materials. These issues are being addressed.

Restoring livelihoods: About 150,000 people lost their main source of income. About 50% of them were in the fisheries sector and the rest were in agriculture, tourism, public sector, small and micro enterprises and in other areas. While the available information suggests that 70-85% of the families have regained their main sources of income, restoring livelihoods requires a more sustained effort.

Families were assisted through cash grants, food assistance, cash for work, and microfinance programmes. Over 250,000 households received two installments (of a planned four installments) of Rs. 5,000 plus food worth of Rs. 375 per week and about 165,000 received the third installment as well. Cash for work programmes have spent an estimated Rs. 700 million. Under the two main microfinance and SME support schemes, more than 13,000 subsidized loans amounting to Rs. 3.8 billion have been disbursed. Towards restoration of livelihood in the fisheries sector, about 90% of all boats destroyed have been repaired or replaced. For those engaged in agriculture, seeds and fertilizer were distributed to approximately 80% of the affected areas. Desalination of affected lands has also been undertaken. In tourism, 41 out of 52 damaged hotels are back in business. However, tourism is yet to fully recover as evident from the decline in total earnings by 10% as of September despite an increase in the number of arrivals. A number of small hotels, guesthouses and related services in the informal sector are facing problems of finding necessary funding.

Restoring livelihoods is beset with issues relating to a better balance between supply and demand; unavailability of comprehensive information, transparency on the targeting of beneficiaries, consultation with affected community members, clarifying decision-making mechanisms, and improving operational integration particularly at the local level.

Health, education and protection: The displacement of thousands of survivors from their homes, coupled with lack of safe water and sanitation increased vulnerability to the spread of communicable diseases. In addition to destroying education and health facilities, the tsunami made a deep psychological impact and created a void due to the loss of parents and relatives, school friends, teachers, doctors and health and educational personnel. Thanks to the concerted and coordinated effort, response was quick to protect the vulnerable groups.

Health: No outbreak of water borne diseases or additional deaths was recorded. Primary health care facilities and routine immunization nutrition surveillance system were established. In mental health, 500 community support officers have been trained and deployed. Some significant policy changes have been introduced in terms of disaster preparedness, mental health and nutrition. Funds have been allocated for the rehabilitation of 97 damaged institutions and construction is in progress.

Education: Over 95% of school-aged children in tsunami-affected areas have returned to school. Progress has been made in integrating psychosocial care into the education system. A Child-Friendly School approach for rehabilitation/construction has been adopted. Funds have been provided for the rehabilitation of 180 damaged schools and their construction work is in progress.
Protection: Numerous initiatives were undertaken to protect and prevent the vulnerable, particularly women and children from being subject to abuse and violence. Probation officers assessed 6,538 affected children orphaned or without one of their parents. Community-based approaches were successfully adopted. The Human Rights Commission monitored the operation of laws, policies and practices relating to tsunami displacement and has received and acted upon more than 19,000 complaints. Several legal documentation clinics in affected areas were conducted, but a continuously-sustained effort is required in this area to ensure continuity of this important service.

While social services have been largely restored, only a low percentage of education and health facilities have been fully repaired or rebuilt. The traditional problem of shortages and mal-distribution of human resources exists and requires a long-term response to address the geographic imbalance.

Upgrading national infrastructure: After attending to emergency repairs the government has entered into the phase of rehabilitation and reconstruction of national infrastructure in the affected areas with the support of many development partners. In some cases, contracts have been awarded and rehabilitation work is in progress, whereas other contracts are being finalized. The national construction industry does not have the necessary number of contractors, equipment, skilled workforce, modern management practices and access to finance needed to maintain the required speed of the tsunami reconstruction work. The cost of construction material is experiencing upward pressure. Further challenges include procurement delays, ensuring environmental safeguards, security concerns in the uncleared areas and capacity constraints.

Cross-cutting issues: Strengthening of capacity has emerged as a critical element of the recovery and reconstruction process. It is required at all levels – i.e. the government, the NGOs, the private sector, local communities, and development partners. Gender sensitivity is critical for the recovery process. Whereas protection issues have been addressed and basic training and awareness provided, significant challenges remain in areas such as ownership on housing programmes, protection of IDPs and their participation in the recovery process. Regarding environmental concerns, the tsunami showed that where sand dunes, mangroves and coral were maintained, the impact was limited. Any coastal protection project to be cost effective should be treated as a medium to long-term issue. A more effective environmental protection strategy during the recovery process is needed.

Guiding principles: While the guiding principles of recovery and reconstruction were laid-down in consultation with the development partners, implementation of these may have been uneven across regions as well as across sectors due to practical difficulties. Developing a disaster management and early warning system is making good progress. Equity among regions, ethnic groups and sectors remain critical and should be closely monitored. Whereas progress on issues such as subsidiarity, consultation, transparency and accountability can be noted, significant challenges remain specifically in regard to communication and coordination.

Macro-economy: The macroeconomic impact of tsunami manifested in reduced GDP by about 0.5-0.6 percentage points from the expected 6 percent growth, reflected in the first quarter of 2005. The economy has started to rebound and is poised to register 5.6 percent in 2005 whilst the tourism and fisheries sectors are yet to fully recover. Central Bank took immediate steps to arrest any tsunami-related adverse impacts on the financial markets, and the foreign assistance in post tsunami relief and recovery including the debt relief provided the necessary fiscal space for prudent macro-economic management. Despite the severe cost impact, the Government was able to reduce inflation to below 10 percent by November 2005. The post-tsunami rehabilitation programme will be largely financed through foreign grants and concessionary financial assistance. Overall budget deficit will be kept at a manageable level aiming at macro-economic stability.

Way forward: In the recovery and reconstruction process equity issues deserve particular attention. It is the shared responsibility of the Government and
development stakeholders to ensure that no-one is left behind. Development partners must be ready to adjust programmes to ensure efficiency. All pledges must be converted into commitments and all commitments into disbursements and show results on the ground. Coordination should be improved and strengthening of under-resourced capacity of local and district government levels has to be continued. It is also necessary to introduce the communication strategy focusing on explaining entitlements, next steps forward, and complaints and redress procedures. Every affected family should know what their future is, in terms of housing, employment opportunities, ongoing relief support, education for their children and health care, including counseling where needed. Monitoring quantitative and qualitative progress, as well as measuring impact of recovery interventions on the ground will also be required. Finally, a sound integration of Tsunami initiatives with national development objectives and peace process will also be necessary in order to maximize the impact of Tsunami-related interventions.

The post-tsunami reconstruction and development programme is to be accelerated through the new Reconstruction and Development Authority which will function under the President’s direct supervision.
CHAPTER ONE

THE INTRODUCTION

1.1 About the Report

This Report documents the process of delivering on human expectations in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. The report attempts to provide an objective assessment of the relief, recovery and reconstruction process. It is based on information from the authoritative sources, background documents and voices of the people. The report describes what happened, the needs that emerged after the tragedy, what has been achieved, and what remains to be accomplished. The report also analyses issues and bottlenecks and presents recommendations for improvement. It also provides a basis for monitoring, evaluation and follow-up.

This is a joint report undertaken by the government and coordinated by a steering committee consisting of representatives of the government (Ministry of Finance (MoF), National Planning Department (NPD) and Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), donor community (ADB, IFRC and UN) and civil society (CHA). During October 2005, about 20 governmental institutions, departments, 20 bilateral and international organizations and 18 national and international NGOs made available more than 100 experts and practitioners (50% nationals and 50% internationals). These experts took part in different working groups, chaired by the government with support of a focal point from the international community across four sectoral groups (Get people back to homes, Restoring livelihoods, Ensuring health, education and protection for all, and Upgrading national infrastructures) and seven thematic teams (Governance/Capacity Building, Disaster Management and Early Warning, Environment, Gender, Relief, Guiding Principles and Communications/Human Stories). Additional consultations were undertaken during November 21-23 with national officials, international actors and district representatives. The detailed sectoral reports of these groups are available in a separate document.

1.2 Impact of the Tsunami

The tsunami affected about one million people initially and devastated over two thirds of Sri Lanka’s coastline (Map 1), claimed 35,322 human lives, injured 21,441, and left 1500 children without parents. Social networks were disrupted. Assets were destroyed and water and electricity supplies were severely affected. Remote coastal areas were not accessible for several days. The risk of a sizable death toll from possible deterioration of sanitary conditions, lack of clean drinking water and shelter, and delayed access to medical aid was strong, but did not occur. In this background, it was an enormous challenge to address the multifaceted problem of providing immediate relief and facilitating recovery and reconstruction. The demonstration of human solidarity and kindness in the immediate aftermath in this endeavour in Sri Lanka was exemplary.

There was a massive outpouring of assistance from civil society (private individuals, clubs, societies, local and international organizations), who provided shelter in temples, churches and other locations, mobilized to clear roads, search for survivors and transport injured to the hospitals and other safe locations. The international community responded with humanitarian aid including rescue teams, supplies, equipment and personnel.

Given the scale of the disaster, rescue of survivors and the collection, identification of remains posed major challenges for those engaged in rescue and relief work. The persons engaged in such activities had to contend with their own psychological trauma and serious logistical constraints. In situations that required disposal of remains it was done with respect to customs and wherever possible in the situation of mass burials, records were kept for future reference.
The President and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) exchanged letters on how to proceed with rescue and relief operations in the north and east. In addition, the security forces and the LTTE rescued the cadres of each other during the time of calamity. In addition to the ceasefire, vulnerable groups, such as poor fishermen who lived by the shore in simple shelters, were the worst affected. Apart from the coastal communities already being comparatively poor in the Sri Lankan context (between 25 – 33% of the affected population lived below the poverty line;), the

| Box 1 | Some of the major human, economic and social impacts of the Tsunami |
| Human | Number of people killed: 35,322 |
| | Number of people injured: 21,441 |
| | Number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs): 516,150 |
| Economic | Value of lost assets: US $900 million |
| | Number of lost livelihoods: 150,000 |
| | Number of houses damaged: 98,000 |
| | Proportion of fishing fleet destroyed: 75% |
| | Extent of salinated agricultural land: 23,449 acres |
| | Damage to tourism infrastructure: - Large hotels (53 out of 242)
| | - Small hotels: 248
| | - Related small enterprises: 210 |
| Social | Widowed, orphaned and affected elderly and disabled: 40,000 |
| | Health facilities damaged by the tsunami: 97 |
| | Education facilities damaged: - Schools: 182
| | - Universities: 4
| | - Vocational Training Centre: 15 |
| | Schools used as camps for IDPs: 446 |
| | School children affected: 200,000 |

Source: TAFREN, Central Bank, MoF - National Planning Department, Sectoral Reports.

These contacts facilitated delivery of humanitarian relief. This collaborative effort was successful. Tsunami has compounded previously existing vulnerabilities and inequalities especially in the North and East, the region worst affected by the tsunami. In addition, many thousands indirectly linked to the key sectors (tourism and fishery) lost their source of livelihood. Adding to their plight was the loss of important legal documents such as title deeds and national identity cards.

1.3 Damage, International Response and Planning

The total cost of the required relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction effort has been estimated at approximately US$ 2.2 billion. The Government has projected that it would take 3-5 years to rebuild
destroyed structures and achieve full recovery.\(^3\)
The largest financing needs were identified in the east (45%), followed by south (25.9%), north (19%) and west (10.1%) (Graph 1).

The response of the domestic and international community was impressive and over 70% of pledges and non-governmental organizations all rushed to reach distraught and desperate fellow citizens.

Recognizing the seriousness, urgency and magnitude of the problem coupled with the lack of experience (the word tsunami never even existed in the popular vocabulary), the government created

<table>
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<th>Needs</th>
<th>Pledges</th>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.8 (1)</td>
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Source: MoF/ERD (pledges and commitments) and TAFREN, Development Assistance Database\(^5\) (disbursements) (1) 3.3 billion $ including debt relief/moratorium and IMF support.

have been converted into firm commitments (Table 1).

Broadly, the information available on commitments does not show a funding gap (US $ 2.2 billion of needs compared with US $ 2.1 billion of commitments). However, a sectoral analysis provides somewhat of a different picture. Gaps might still develop because of (i) driving up costs of materials, (ii) some issues (e.g. capacity building) were not included in the original scope of the needs assessment and (iii) additional financing needs of the tourism sector. It is worth noting that these figures do not include contributions from domestic resources (around US $ 150 million)\(^4\) that partially filled gaps on critical interventions through Government Agents and the provision of critical basic services. Also this table cannot capture the plethora of NGOs and private sector interventions in permanent housing or fisheries sectors. Finally, as part of the international response, many donors have provided a debt moratorium to the country following the Paris Club offer (see Chapter VIII) as well as some exceptional trade benefits after the Tsunami.\(^5\)

1.4 Institutional Arrangements

Immediately after the tsunami, positive collective actions were taken on a scale never known before. Individuals, small groups, the government, religious institutions, private sector organizations, the media, an institutional mechanism to efficiently coordinate assistance. This mechanism built upon donor delivery of assistance and had agreed upon guiding principles for the recovery process {e.g. transparency and accountability, subsidiarity, coordination, consultation (Chapter VIII)}.

In the aftermath of tsunami, the President set up three task forces:

1. Task Force for Rescue and Relief (TAFRER)
2. Task Force for Law and Order and Logistics (TAFLOL)
3. Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN)

Relief coordination mechanism. At the national level, the Center for National Operations (CNO)\(^6\) was established under the President to coordinate relief operations and to gather and disseminate information. It was supported on a voluntary basis by a number of professional representatives from local government and development agencies, I/ NGOs and other organizations. Within two months, the provision of immediate relief was streamlined and the relevant government officers at the national, provincial, local and village levels began to play key roles. The CNO was disbanded in February when TAFRER and TAFLOL were merged to form TAFOR (Task Force for Relief) with a mandate for looking after the well-being of affected groups
Implementing agencies established several innovative mechanisms at the sectoral level such as permanent housing and education, which are discussed in detail in the sectoral reports. It is worth mentioning that the National Human Rights Commission (HRC) set up a Disaster Relief Monitoring Unit (DRMU) to monitor, record and act upon all issues pertaining to the human rights of the affected population.

The MoF developed a system of sectoral coordination through the identification of a national agency counterpart, together with a donor focal point agency and one INGO representative for each of the 16 primary activities/interventions. The level of activity of each of these sectoral mechanisms varies, but government ownership has been identified as the critical element of success. Finally, the government recently launched four leadership councils for each of the four key areas of the recovery process.

The coordination mechanism also includes a high level group, consisting of high-level government officials and key representatives of the donor community that meets bi-weekly. The bilateral and multilateral donor community has several arenas for coordination. In addition to these arenas, the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) facilitates the coordination of NGOs through its network.

Coordination at the district and divisional level varies. However, the Government Agent is the critical actor who works closely with the different governmental ministries and departments. District

Box 2 Promoting Good Governance in the Recovery and Rebuilding

The tsunami is perceived by many actors in Sri Lankan society as an opportunity to improve trust in public institutions and amongst different stakeholders. In order to ensure transparency and accountability some measures have been adopted: appointing outside auditors and the Auditor General of Sri Lanka, high level committee meetings and other coordinating meetings, media publicity, and regular exchange with donors, NGOs and INGOs. Donor nations and NGOs have been requested to undertake and complete specific projects rather than issue of funds and the government has agreed to empower them to call for tenders themselves. The reconstruction and rebuilding process is inclusive, with participation from government, the private sector, NGOs, and affected communities. A suitable monitoring system will be designed and implemented to ensure that programmes are results-oriented, timely and appropriately carried out.

It is worth mentioning that the government and LTTE cooperated to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the uncleared areas. At the same time, the government formed a high-level committee comprised of political parties, organized a special audit through the Auditor General’s Department, and appointed a Parliament Select Committee on natural disasters under the chairmanship of the Chief Opposition Whip, which made significant progress to pass a Disaster Management Act (Chapter VIII).

Recovery and reconstruction mechanism. TAFREN was created as the primary institutional mechanism in recovery and reconstruction to coordinate, facilitate and assist implementing organizations, to coordinate donor assistance and fund raising activities, to expedite the procurement process, and to enable implementing agencies through capacity building. Initially TAFREN had a flat organizational structure that included public and private sector officials and counted on international support. A new structure to more effectively manage the rebuilding exercise was introduced in September 2005 when TAFREN reorganized itself focusing on four thematic areas namely:

1. Getting people back into homes
2. Restoring Livelihoods
3. Health Education and Protection for All
4. Upgrade National Infrastructure

| (including provision of food, cash allowances, transitional accommodation matters, and other duties formerly performed by the CNO). The international community has actively supported this coordination, both at central and local level. |
staff capacity is critical for coordination at the local level.

With respect to the north and east, working arrangements were discussed between the government and the LTTE (see Chapter VIII).

A new institutional mechanism for post-tsunami recovery and reconstruction is being finalized under the newly created Ministry for Reconstruction and Development that functions under the President (November 2005). The Cabinet has approved the establishment of one authority combining all organizations under various ministries that carry out relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction work consequential to man-made or natural disasters. This new authority will ensure the implementation of post-tsunami recovery and reconstruction through the Jaya Lanka programme.

**Box 3 The Tsunami and the Peace Process:**

P-TOMS - The agreement that never was

When the tsunami hit Sri Lanka, it came at a time when the peace process was at low ebb. There was little dialogue between the two parties to the conflict and political killings were increasing in number. The response to the tsunami was powerful: Tamils, Muslims, Sinhalese helped each other; Christians helped Hindus; Buddhist priests opened the temples to all. No one asked who belonged to which group. From the tragedy emerged the hope of a silver lining: that the tsunami could re-start the peace process. In the early stages of the relief and recovery effort, this belief was reinforced as the Government and the LTTE worked together to address immediate needs. Negotiations between the Government and the LTTE Peace Secretariats began in January for the creation of a joint mechanism to oversee the recovery and reconstruction process. By May, President Kumaratunga had put all her authority behind such an agreement. This led to the signing of the “Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)”, between the Government of Sri Lanka’s Ministry for Relief Reconstruction and Reconciliation, and the Planning and Development Secretariat (PDS) of the LTTE. P-TOMS provided a structure of three committees at the national, regional and district levels to oversee the distribution of assistance and mandated the creation of a Regional Fund to finance recovery and reconstruction projects that would be accessed by these committees. Committees would be made up of representatives of the Government, the LTTE and the Muslim community. P-TOMS would have been the first joint working system between the parties to the conflict since the collapse of the SIHRN in 2003. While it was clearly stated that the responsibilities of these committees were limited to the tsunami affected coastal belt, it was anticipated that this mechanism could create an environment conducive to the revival of the peace process. It was for this reason that many external partners expressed their support for the mechanism and their willingness to put resources into the regional fund.

The constitutionality of the P-TOMS was immediately challenged in the Supreme Court. While it was deemed to be constitutional, certain elements were put on hold by the Supreme Court pending clarification, specifically the regional fund and the location of the regional committee in Kilinochchi.
CHAPTER TWO
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND RELIEF

2.1 Introduction

Nearly one million people (234,000 families) were affected in 13 districts namely, Puttalam, Gampaha, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matura, Hambantota, Ampara, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and Jaffna. These persons required urgent assistance in terms of emergency shelter,

Box 4

A Three wheeler mechanic takes control

“This was the first day I knew the meaning of fear,” says K.G. Nadeeka Dilan, a three wheeler “tuk tuk” mechanic recollecting the events of December 26. “In a matter of minutes, my precious daughter, the house I had built and furnished so proudly and my business was reduced to rubble.”

As the waters receded, Dilan stepped in. “I did the best I could to help. My grief was lessened as I helped the people”. Thirteen families related to Dilan gathered at a nearby temple. They had lost everything. Dilan’s next task was to seek assistance to clear rubble and set up tents for temporary shelter. During the process, the number of families seeking shelter in this camp grew to 63.

“There were no racial or caste issues and no cases of rape in the camp, — 14 families were Muslim and the rest Sinhalese; five were Christians” says Dilan. The families unanimously appointed him the “Camp Coordinator,” and he formed a small committee with two ladies whom he felt could best address the needs of the women in the camp.

Dilan consulted the assembled people to find out their needs, prepared documents to register community members to receive aid and coordinated assistance from state officials and Non Governmental Organizations. “This is my community and I tried to do the best for them. I just didn’t ask for anything and everything – what I got was targeted to the needs of specific people”.

Speaking of his efforts to get the community back on its feet Dilan is reflective and says the tsunami was destructive but it brought the different communities together in Galle. “I paid scant attention to my neighbors before the tsunami. The Muslims hardly stepped out of their houses — It is not like that now, they visit us now. The tragedy brought us closer together. There are no differences between Sinhalese Tamils and Muslims here. We are very united now,” says Dilan.

Only ten families now remain in the camp. Two of them are Muslim families who did not want to locate to an area where there wasn’t a mosque. Others feel the houses that were built for them are unlucky since builders did not take into consideration the traditional accepted positions of beams and doors.
food, health care, trauma counseling, water and sanitation, non-food relief items, and basic infrastructure services. Other urgent tasks included identification, recording and disposal of the dead bodies.

2.2 Rescue, Relief and Emergency Support

The country recorded no additional deaths due to tsunami-related diseases or delayed medical treatment, thanks to a quick combined response by government, local communities, local NGOs, private sector, and international assistance. The government carried out immediate repairs of major pipelines and water tanks, bowsers, and purification tablets were supplied, mitigating potential water-sanitation related health hazards. Private bottling companies switched from soft drinks and beer to bottling drinking water. The Ministry of Health established a tsunami operation cell with coordinators in every district.

International aid arrived at the airport, delivered by over 350 flights, supplying medicine, food and non-food items, and tents. The main road connecting the south to Colombo was made motorable within 2 days of the tsunami. Immediately after the disaster, 910,000 people received food rations’ (food assistance continued to be provided through vulnerable group feeding programmes to 350,000 beneficiaries). The military of several countries contributed to the rescue operations of those in inaccessible areas, and later in the cleaning up of debris and identification and burial of the dead.

The government also initiated a compensation scheme for the victims to partially cover the costs of funeral expenses, cooking utensils, food relief

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**Box 5 Government Agents remember – Tsunami response at the district level**

*In the aftermath of the Tsunami, Government Agents (GAs) acted as administrators for relief operations. For many GAs, this was on-the-spot learning about disaster management, but across the country they showed their mettle and their commitment to their communities through efficient, competent response to the tragedy. The GA in Jaffna was serving out the last days of his tenure when the tsunami hit. “I rushed to the scene when I heard the news. The sea had come in about one kilometer... There were no police officers, no army officers - a large number of soldiers got caught in the tsunami while on guard duty in the coastal area.” As an experienced senior member of the administrative service, his was a text book response to a massive scale disaster. “True, we are in the public service, but if we follow rules and regulations we can’t do anything”. What stood the GA in good stead was his first-hand experience of carrying out rescue and relief operations in Jaffna during the war years. In 1995, 400,000 people were displaced and he led the support operation, providing temporary shelter, food and other necessities. “We trained the people, and they know now how to help, to react immediately - not only the officers, but also NGOs, and Cooperatives too.”*

Post tsunami, the GA rounded up the Grama Sevakas [village level government officers]. He closed roads to prevent looting; grouped volunteers into clusters and started combing the devastated areas for survivors. Entrenched in Sri Lanka’s rich community traditions is the sharing and giving of food. The GA sent messages via three wheeler “tuk tuks” calling for food and clothing. The temples in Jaffna also have large cooking utensils used for meal preparation during religious festivals. These too were brought in to prepare food for the displaced families. For all who survived the tsunami there was a total sense of loss. People were left without money, possessions, documents of identification, and had the gigantic task of carrying out final religious rituals for their dead loved ones. Understanding this need the Jaffna GA did not wait for banks to open or for government approvals. He moved swiftly to raise money from known shop owners to give Rs. 10, 000 to every family member removing a dead body from the hospital so as to cover funeral costs.*
(per person/per week - Rs.375) and an emergency resettlement allowance.

Fifty-one internally-displaced persons (IDP) welfare centers were set up. On 7 January 2005, a total of 597 schools and places of worship were used to provide shelter for the affected population. In the second week of January the government made a request to the international community for 50,000 tents to be utilized during the emergency phase. District and Divisional Secretaries, managed these camps, with onsite management by the Grama Niladari. Private companies offered their support for logistics and camp management. Government officials and a number of agencies set up child-friendly spaces within camps and in villages and conducted numerous psychosocial activities that included training public health workers, strengthening family support workers, financing community support programs, and counseling the needy.

Initially there were fears that thousands of children would have been orphaned and a rapid registration system was put in place to locate children who had been separated from their parents. This registration process was completed in all IDP locations within a week. Thereafter, immediate steps were taken to trace the children’s closest relatives, in order to reunite them as quickly as possible.

Infrastructure repair was also prompt. The government with the assistance of various partners repaired most of the damaged bridges and roads (or made them temporarily motorable) within the first two weeks in order to provide access to devastated areas. Telephone lines and electricity supply were restored within a short period. Likewise, the railway transport system completed its emergency repairs within the first month.
CHAPTER THREE
GETTING BACK HOME:
FROM EMERGENCY SHELTER TO PERMANENT HOUSING

3.1 Introduction

Displaced families initially found shelter in emergency accommodations such as tents, public building, and religious institutions or sought refuge with friends and relatives. It was recognized in the early stages that emergency accommodation could be only a temporary solution, since the reconstruction of approximately 98,000 houses would take time. Therefore, transitional shelters were required to bridge the gap between emergency accommodation and permanent housing.

Through all three housing phases, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) provided the overall policy, guidelines and the framework for house reconstruction. Relevant line ministries and departments such as the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, Urban Development Authority (UDA), National Water Supply and Drainage Board (NWSDB), Ministry of Power and Energy, Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), Ministry of Highways, Road Development Authority (RDA) and other relevant government institutions worked together with TAFREN on house building. The government received the support of international organizations, including major international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), multilateral and bilateral donors, and civil society organizations to construct transitional shelters and permanent housing.

3.2 Transitional Shelter

3.2.1 Institutional Arrangements The Task Force for Relief (TAFOR) established the Transitional Accommodation Project (TAP) to build transitional shelter. TAP national and district offices were set up with donor assistance. Specific arrangements were made for the uncleared areas of Vadamarachchi East and Mullaitivu in dealing with coordination of transitional shelters.

3.2.2 Policy A transitional shelter must not only provide protection from the environment but should provide secure habitable living space and a platform for re-establishing livelihoods.

3.2.3 Targets/Achievements Following the decision to move people living in tents and schools to transitional shelter (rather than immediately into permanent housing), the initial target was to complete 10,000 shelters by 15 April and 30,000 shelters by the end of May. Both targets were achieved, but throughout the process it became evident that the total requirement was closer to 60,000 shelters in order to cover the needs of approximately 50% of the 500,000 people displaced (the rest are assumed to live with friends and relatives or have returned to their original dwelling while repairing it). As a result of a concerted effort of government and development partners, 54,102 transitional shelters were completed by November 2005 and 1,948 are in progress. This construction marks a significant achievement in a relatively short period of time. Treated water is being supplied to IDP camps and temporary settlements using 80 water bowsers and pipelines. More than 5,000 toilets have been constructed and 65% of camps and transitional shelters have bathing facilities. In addition, development partners conducted numerous hygiene promotion awareness and training programmes in the camps. However, the quality of these transition shelters was not always up to the standards. Upgrading is underway and a programme of care and maintenance is currently being developed for implementation.

3.2.4 Issues, Problems and Possible Solutions

Transitional shelter is almost complete and it can be considered a success story by the government and all the donor agencies and NGOs involved. However, there are some issues in relation to coordination, database information, the situation of
host families, de-commissioning of transitional shelter sites, and disaster risk.

Coordination: In the process of expediting the construction of shelter normal planning processes were waived and some of the shelters were sub-standard and prone to flooding. In some instances, construction took place with little community participation. Beneficiaries as well as agencies were often unsure of entitlements and rights due to lack of public information campaigns.

Construction Materials: On 9 February 2005, TAFOR requested all agencies to adhere to a ceiling of US$300-US$350 (including labour) in building a transitional shelter. Escalation of raw materials for construction and labour charges led to construction of sub-standard shelters. Subsequently, the government raised the ceiling to US$ 500.

Host Families: To date there are no statistics on the number of families staying with friends and relatives.

De-commissioning: Many of the transitional shelters are being built on land that is private and therefore is only available on a temporary basis. A TAP circular on decommissioning transitional shelter sites has been forwarded to all district secretaries.

Risk: It is noted that on some sites shelters are at risk of fire and flooding. Mitigation and preparedness measures such as construction of proper drainage or placing sand bags on the roof might be helpful. It may be necessary to replace some shelters after the 2005-2006 monsoon season.

Database: A comprehensive national database is required to track each family’s progress from transitional shelter to permanent housing.

3.3 Permanent Housing

3.3.1 Buffer Zone or Setback Zone – Phase I
A buffer zone (set-back zone) existed before the tsunami, but was not fully enforced. Following the disaster, the government made a decision to introduce a buffer zone of 100m in the south and southwest, and 200m in the north and east as the damage to life and property was higher there than in the south. Whereas the buffer zone was conceived as a preventive measure, it has become a serious issue because of the scarcity of land. Due to this, the buffer zone has been revised. The introduction of buffer zone has led to two types of housing programmes.

3.3.2 Policy

a) Donor-built reconstruction programme – Relocation of affected families from the buffer zone. All affected families are entitled to a house built by a donor agency in accordance with GoSL standards. The donor will provide each new settlement with an internal common infrastructure while GoSL provides the services up to the relocation site. The beneficiary remains the legal owner of his/her property within the buffer zone and receives a full title to the property in the resettlement site.

b) Home Owner driven housing reconstruction programme: damaged houses (partly/fully) outside the buffer zone. The GoSL is providing a cash grant – reimbursed by different development banks and bilateral donors – to an affected homeowner for the reconstruction of his/her house. (i) The owner of a partly damaged house receives a cash grant of Rs.100,000 and (ii) The owner of a fully damaged house receives a cash grant of Rs. 250,000. The policy was also extended to co-financing arrangements through I/NGOs.

3.3.3 Institutional Arrangement for Donor-Built Reconstruction Programme. A dedicated Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU) was created under the Ministry of Urban Development and Water Supply. THRU offices were established in the Tsunami Unit of all tsunami-affected District and Divisional Secretariats and works with Village Rehabilitation Committees operating at village level.

3.3.4 Institutional Arrangements for Home Owner-driven programme. The southwest Housing Reconstruction Unit (SWHRU) functions under TAFREN and the North East Housing Reconstruction Unit (NEHRU) operates under the
“Getting people back into their homes” is a major aspect of the entire post Tsunami reconstruction effort. The Government of Sri Lanka has responded to the loss of approximately 100,000 houses.

Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation. At the local level, focal points for coordination and implementation in the respective districts are the District Secretaries and the Divisional Secretaries. Coordination meetings at these levels include all donors involved in the reconstruction process and the relevant agencies of the line ministries with different levels of success.

3.4 Targets and Achievements

Normally Sri Lanka builds nearly 50,000 houses per year – public sector and private sector combined. However, rebuilding the housing stock damaged or destroyed together with the construction of hospitals, schools and other public buildings and other infrastructure within a short period and in a limited area posed a challenge to the government, donors and the local construction industry.

3.4.1 Donor-built Housing Programme

Table 2 indicates that the total number of housing units to be built under the donor built programme is 32,000. As of December, 29,640 of these housing units have MoUs signed for. Donors also purchased land for house construction (Gampaha and Puttalam) without MoU process. Some 10,707 are in various stages of construction including completed units 4,299. Due to limited or non-availability of land to relocate displaced families, the buffer zone was revised after consultations with the District Secretaries in affected areas (Phase II). This new arrangement will shift the number of housing units between the two programmes (see Table 3).

Under the donor-built housing programme some districts indicate rapid progress while in others (such as Ampara) the number of houses assigned to donors is significantly lower than the requirement. In contrast, the home owner driven programme in the east has registered significant progress accounting for 60.7% of total disbursements.

3.4.2 Home Owner Driven Programme

This housing programme is funded by a consortium of four donors. Under this programme, a house is either classified as a partially damaged house (numbering 32,497) or a fully damaged house (numbering 23,028). An estimated additional 11,000 houses will fall within a new phase II of the home owner driven programme (see Table 3).

Table 4 provides an overview on the status of disbursement of grant installments in the home owner programme as of November.

Though the first installment has been released to 55,525 beneficiaries, the subsequent installments have to go through verification and approval process. Monitoring visits and discussions with housing unit officials in the Divisional Secretariats found that there were too few Technical Officers, and this situation was rectified by the temporary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Donor built housing programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Houses Damaged Within the Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RADA, December 2005. This table does not include the number of houses built by individuals, and private sector on lands purchased privately. (1) From the foundation stage through completion
Table 3: Estimates of damaged housing units and status of rebuilding under respective programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District / Province</th>
<th>Donor Driven Housing Reconstruction Programme (Inside the Buffer Zone)</th>
<th>Home-Owner Driven Programme (Outside the Buffer Zone)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No of Damage Houses (From DS)</td>
<td>Housing Requirement Phase I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ampara</td>
<td>24,438</td>
<td>7,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batticaloa</td>
<td>17,948</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trincomalee</td>
<td>8,074</td>
<td>3,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Prov.</td>
<td>50,460</td>
<td>12,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffna</td>
<td>5,109</td>
<td>3,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullaitivu</td>
<td>5,556</td>
<td>3,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilinochchi</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Prov.</td>
<td>10,953</td>
<td>6,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galle</td>
<td>12,781</td>
<td>2,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matara</td>
<td>7,464</td>
<td>1,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hambantota</td>
<td>4,084</td>
<td>2,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Prov.</td>
<td>24,329</td>
<td>5,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>5,984</td>
<td>5,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalutara</td>
<td>6,124</td>
<td>2,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gampaha</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Prov.</td>
<td>12,783</td>
<td>7,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98,525</td>
<td>32,218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RADA, December 2005 (1) Houses affected by the recent revision of the buffer zone

The release of Technical Officers from the government. The status of 5,200 second installments in September 2005 was increased to 13,018 as of December 2005 and the disbursement of the 3rd installment has shown a progress from a 421 to 1,449.

3.5 Issues, Problems and Possible Solutions

Key challenges jointly identified by stakeholders are related to the sustainability of post-tsunami housing resettlement and livelihood development. In this respect the application of guiding principles provides a clear approach on how to achieve sustainable housing and livelihood development for the affected.

Table 4: Installments of the home owner driven programme disbursed

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total No of 1st installment</td>
<td>55,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No of 2nd installment</td>
<td>13,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No of 3rd installment</td>
<td>1,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No of 4th installment</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total payment made – US $ 35 Million (Approximately)  *Estimated Funding – US $ 58 Million

Source: RADA
For Beneficiaries

- A lack of communication among beneficiaries, governmental and non-governmental organizations on the next stage of accommodation has been noted; there is a need for a concerted effort to inform people of their entitlements.

- Selection criteria for the donor driven programme is humanitarian based and that for the owner driven programme is ownership based, therefore a policy decision needs to be made with regard to tenants (outside the buffer zone) who reside in transitional shelter.

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Box 6  Snapshots on the road to housing recovery - building better

Umendra Janaki’s elder daughter, Gayathra is sweeping their new house. The other two children are watching television with the neighborhood kids. The house as it stands now in Beruwela is a far cry from the rubble left after the tsunami. “We have built better,” says Umendra as she shows us the provision to add another floor to the house and the new furniture.

“We’ve just received the electricity connection and I have started taking sewing orders. I do bridal outfits,” says Umendra showing us her sewing machine. “We made the living space bigger by using the kitchen space also as a living area.

The kitchen and bathroom in provincial houses are separated from the main house. Meals are often prepared on open wood fires. Villagers used to what they see as a very logical division have not been happy with the standard plans drawn up for post tsunami reconstruction that included attached toilets and a kitchen. As in this instance, occupants have quietly modified most of these housing plans to suit their needs.

****************************************

Kanthi Wirasinghe, in Godagama has not been able to pick up the pieces of her life as smoothly. Her close family survived the tsunami. But she and her husband, Lesley, have not been able to get their home-based tailoring business going again.

Kanthi and Lesley lost their 6 bedroom house in Godagama when the tsunami struck. “We are fed up living in this [temporary] house, we have no piped water – the water line was cut. We can’t sleep here because of the mosquitoes and would like to move into our new house,” Kanthi is waiting hopefully for the last installment to the housing grant to put the finishing touches to their new house.

Her husband is struggling to cope with the impact of the tsunami and the recent death of his mother. “My husband was a well respected tailor who sewed for everyone in this community. He did work for free for friends. Everyone came here to get outfits stitched for weddings... This blouse I am wearing he sewed for me,” says Kanthi. “He keeps asking for his mother’s sewing machine, and cutting table, and has not been able to settle down to do work. We salvaged the table from the rubble and put it aside by the road, but someone stole it. He walks around the village aimlessly and has taken to drinking with his friends,” says Kanthi.
CHAPTER FOUR

RESTORING LIVELIHOODS

4.1 Institutional Arrangements

TAFREN is tasked with the overall coordination of all livelihoods programmes in cooperation with the line ministries. About 8 ministries and 100 international and national organizations are involved in livelihood restoration activities. This large number initially made coordination difficult. Private sector initiatives, although significant, have largely gone unreported and unrecorded with no coordinated information bank on the initiatives undertaken.

4.2 Targets

- Restoration of livelihood of 150,000 persons employed in the fisheries sector, between 4-5% in agriculture, and the remaining 45% in tourism related services, small business and trading, public sector and self-employment.

- Progressive phasing out of cash grants and food assistance (see relief section), cash for work programmes, and microfinance.

- Complete economic recovery before the end of 2006. Undertake activities such as replacement and repair of assets (to replace 11,158 traditional fishing crafts and repair another 2,435) to achieve this.

4.3 Achievements

As a result of the combined effort of the government, private sector, civil society and international community, achievements in restoring livelihoods are remarkable. Available information suggests that between 70-85% of households affected by the tsunami have regained their main source of income as of November 2005. On the other hand, at least 15% of the tsunami affected is living off an income (foreign remittances, government welfare) or from temporary relief work, not necessarily an income earned through regular work. The percentage of persons living off other sources is presumably higher in areas with lower economic activity.

4.3.1 Cash grants Over 250,000 households received the first two instalments of a SLR 5,000 cash grant, supplementing the Rs. 375 per person per week food-ration program. After an assessment showed inclusion of non-affected families in the order of 25%, closer targeting reduced the number of recipients to 165,000 for the third payment. The fourth round is ongoing.

4.3.2 Cash for work INGOs, through local NGOs and community based organizations, conducted cash-for-work programs that were estimated at more than Rs 700 million. An additional Rs 350 million is planned, shifting from the initial focus on clearing debris to road and irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation. Approximately 80-85% of the funds are spent in wages and the balance for tools and materials.
Ensuring continuity of service and support for customers, while maintaining its visibility after disaster event is absolutely vital for any business. The tsunami reduced this couple’s home and restaurant to rubble, but within a week they were back in business thanks to cash grants and determination to support their children’s education.

4.3.3 Financing the Recovery of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises The main instrument used by the government for promoting enterprise recovery is concessionary loans for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).

Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) Susahana Scheme This concessionary loan scheme for restarting livelihoods is implemented by the CBSL through participating financial institutions (PFIs) which include all licensed specialized banks, licensed commercial banks, registered leasing companies, and registered finance companies recognized by the CBSL. The scheme has disbursed approximately Rs. 3.6 billion (US $ 36 million) to date (end September 2005) to 8,000 borrowers in the tsunami-affected areas. But reports from the ground show that many businesses cannot apply, as banks are reluctant to relax their collateral requirements, and affected business within the buffer zone are hit especially hard.

National Development Trust Fund (NDTF) Scheme This concessionary loan scheme is targeted exclusively at damaged micro enterprises in the affected areas. The NDTF works with 52 partner organizations islandwide.15 About Rs. 700 million (US $ 7 million) is available for immediate disbursement. As of October 2005, some 5,570 loans had been disbursed.

Other schemes In addition to the above mentioned loan schemes over 40 bilateral, international NGOs and private banks operate microfinance schemes.

4.4 Achievements: A Sectoral Look at Restoring Livelihoods

4.4.1 Fisheries Sector Approximately 75% of the fishing fleet were damaged or destroyed by the tsunami with almost 5,000 fishermen losing their lives.16 Projects funded by international actors to support recovery include a large variety of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Number of Boats Repaired &amp; Replaced</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boat Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-day boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One day boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRP boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional crafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beach seine crafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

activities17. About 90% of the crafts have been restored (FAO, October 2005), and the fisheries industry, which comprised 2% of the total GDP in 200318, is gradually recovering.

4.4.2 Agriculture Sector Approximately 8,000 persons with agriculture-based livelihoods lost their main sources of income, but many other people’s agriculture-related livelihoods both full-time and seasonal were affected due to the loss of home gardens and livestock. Activities so far have consisted mainly of provision of emergency inputs to help farmers resume their agricultural activities. It is worth noting that this sector was not included in the needs assessment. Consultations undertaken
by the Human Rights Commission (HRC) revealed that insufficient attention has been paid to this sector in the initial months.

4.4.3 Tourism Sector The tourism industry has benefited from a significant recovery since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement in 2002, moving guesthouses. Furthermore, a number of smaller businesses that rely on the tourism industry such as souvenir shops, batik shops, water sports and gem/jewellery shops were destroyed. Approximately 210 enterprises were destroyed; 190 of them were not registered with the tourist board,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 7</th>
<th>Boatyards support local economic recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The development of boatyards which provide both primary and secondary support to the local economy has allowed many families to obtain a fiscal gain. Employment of women who have become the primary income generator for their family unit has been a focus at some boatyards in the north and east. Women have been provided with training and employment. Some have become the primary source of income for the family as they make boats. These boats are in turn provided to fisherman, through grants or small loans, they have then been able to resume their fishing business. Parents have been able to resume, or start, to work knowing that children are also able to continue their education through temporary schools and preschools. After school care has been jointly provided by various agencies with child protection and development in mind.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from 337,000 visitors in 2001 to 566,000 in 2004. To date, only 11 of the 53 tsunami-damaged hotels are still closed and 11,815 rooms (compared with 13,001 rooms in 2004) in 203 tourist hotels are in operation in Sri Lanka. In the first nine months of this year, 406,000 tourists arrived in Sri Lanka, an increase of 8% over the same period last year (376,000).

However, it is still premature to say that the tourism sector has fully recovered. First, trends are not solid enough. Second, earnings per tourist have decreased by 10% due to discounts given by the hotel industry and the changing demographic profile of tourists. Third, these figures do not reflect the complexity of the tourism sector (in particular the informal sector). Whereas hotels and guesthouses have tried to keep on their full-time employees (albeit on reduced pay) or transfer them to other hotels, the informal sector linked to tourism does not have such a mechanism.

The government anticipates that all of the 53 large hotels damaged by the tsunami will be repaired by December 2007 (financed largely by the private sector). With respect to small hotels and guesthouses, recovery is more complex to measure recovery among the 240 known to-be-damaged which affects their ability to raise funds for reconstruction.

4.4.4 Capacity Building Innovative cluster-based livelihoods approaches have been formulated by a number of organizations and various commercial chambers.

4.5 Issues and Possible Solutions

4.5.1 Overarching sector issues
- **Unavailability of Baseline information on projects undertaken by both the I/NGO and private sector**
- **List of beneficiaries and identification cards.** Greater communication and clarity is needed on eligibility and criteria
- **Consultative process.** Fair targeting with transparency, clear direction, and community involvement to ensure that livelihood programs reach the most appropriate families
- **Decision making.** Lines of responsibility and authority are not clear.
- **Improved local planning.** A consultative, planned approach would improve efficiency in the livelihood recovery process especially with respect to supply and demand issues.
Specific issues and solutions

- The cash grant programme has in some cases created disincentives for seeking permanent employment.
- When the cash grant programme is replaced with cash for work, it would be important to ensure that vulnerable groups are absorbed into the regular safety nets such as Samurdhi.
- Cash for work activities needs to be planned in accordance with supply, demand and pricing issues within the construction sector in order to avoid exacerbating already-existing wage problems.
- Cash-for-work schemes increasingly should be integrated into the sector programs, such as rural roads programs, which also will provide significant employment in the near future.
- SME/Micro Finance. Key issues include: (i) uneven regional distribution - 75% of Susahana scheme disbursements are in the south and west while the NDTF scheme has 40% of its funds going to the north and east and 60% to the south. Needs assessment identified far larger reconstruction needs for the tourism industry in the southern regions of the country, (with housing and infrastructure being far more severely affected in the east), which might account for the seeming bias towards the south; (ii) there is a considerable number of entrepreneurs that have no access to credit (be it because of lack of collateral, proven bad track record of repayments or situated in the buffer zone); (iii) very few new customers were reached by the subsidized schemes; and, (iv) the leisure industry continues to lag behind though efforts are being made to address this issue.
- Replacement of multi-day boats, accounting for 30% of fisheries sector output, is critically important. Government introduced a part grant/ part Susahana scheme for 87 (out of the destroyed 198) boats in August 2005 financed by the treasury and international support.
- Coordination amongst the multitude of NGOs and other agencies remains an area for further improvement.
- A recovery assessment to study the impact of activities done so far and identify gaps should be conducted by the end of 2005.

Tourism Sector

- Business operations previously not licensed by the Sri Lankan Tourist Board, hence not in the mainstream, claimed that they had difficulties accessing Susahana loans through normal banking channels. A national special committee to screen all such cases and to grant certificates on case-by-case basis has been set-up.
- Slow recovery might seriously tax the survival mechanism of smaller guesthouses. Larger hotels are affected too. With respect to large hotels, the related informal services industries suffer, ranging from souvenir shops (and those that produce handicraft for them) to tour guides, to transport and diving shops.

Private Sector Capacity Building

- Initiatives initially were uncoordinated and at times competing for the same source of funding. While Chambers of Commerce should not try to replicate the work of microfinance institutions, they can play a critical role in identifying affected entrepreneurs who are not covered by existing schemes and help them get back on track.

Fisheries Sector

- Low supply capacity of spare parts to repair inboard engines, fishing nets and accessories leading to considerable delivery delays and preventing resumption of fishing or forcing fishers to fish at low capacity.
- Numbers replaced and repaired for certain categories of crafts seem to be higher than the numbers damaged and destroyed.
CHAPTER FIVE
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND PROTECTION

5.1 HEALTH

The displacement of thousands of survivors from their homes, coupled with lack of safe water and sanitation, made tsunami-affected areas vulnerable to the spread of communicable disease. The health infrastructure was largely disrupted, with 97 health clinics and hospitals completely or partially damaged by the disaster. After the relief-stage activities led by the Ministry of Health and its development partners, other priorities were to attend to the immediate health needs of affected populations by distributing essential medical, shelter and other supplies. The medium and long-term objectives are to restore and improve the basic health and nutrition services and interventions and to address mental health and psychological needs of the population. The health practices and knowledge of the people contributed to reduce health risks.

5.1.1 Institutional Arrangements

The Ministry of Health initially established a 24-hour tsunami operation cell in each district, organized special committees, teams and working groups to oversee the distribution of medical donations and supplies, treat the injured and deploy medical teams. Coordination also occurred at the central level with regular meetings between all health partners.

All resources were mobilized for relief medical assistance and rehabilitation, augmented by international assistance, community-based organizations and faith-based organizations. Psycho-social and mental health interventions occurred, as well as relevant capacity building programmes.

5.1.2 Targets

- Restoration of all services and construction or renovation of 97 damaged health facilities.
- Provision of essential medical supplies and drugs, strengthening the cold chain, and ensuring mobility for medical teams and health personnel.
- Health protection and disease prevention of over 500,000 IDPs.
- Addressing the mental health and psycho-social needs of the affected communities.
- Developing an early warning system and disaster management unit in MoH.

5.1.3 Achievements

- No outbreak of water borne diseases and other related disorders or dengue or malaria.
- Not a single child died due to tsunami-related disease or displacement, and deaths due to communicable disease were no higher than normal.
- Supply of over 90,000 mosquito nets, 10,000 malaria rapid diagnostic kits and over 100,000 tablets, emergency kits and first-aid kits, first aid training, over 100,000 chlorine tablets, 500 chlorine testing kits, 30 bacteriological testing kits and 900 sanitation kits in 10 tsunami-affected districts. 384,885 children between 6-months to 5-years of age received vitamin “A” mega dose supplementation.
- 19 vehicles were lost or destroyed; 48 vehicles were given. Further, 10 Mother and Child (MCH) clinics and 1 Central Dispensary were completed. 8 projects have begun construction.
- MoUs were signed with 45 organizations for rehabilitation of 97 damaged institutions and more than 100 non-damaged health care institutions were identified for improvement.
- Production of a draft national health sector emergency preparedness plan, revised mental health policy and action plan approved by the Cabinet, a national nutrition policy submitted for Cabinet approval, establishment of clear guidelines on infant and young child feeding and revised breast feeding policy, and the
national code of marketing for breast milk substitute.
• Over 500 community support officers in all 13 districts trained to address mental health needs in the affected population. Responding to gender-based violence (GBV), 27 women’s centers were set up in four districts to strengthen local coping mechanisms.
• Hospital Information System/Multi Disease Surveillance (HIS/MDS) is now operational in four district hospitals. Additionally, the MoH set up a web site with tsunami health information and statistics.

5.1.4 Future Plans

Future plans include complete rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure, further strengthening health services and prevention programs, and empowering communities towards more active participation in maintaining their own health, improving human resources for health development, and management and improving health financing, mobilization and allocation of resources.

5.1.5 Issues and Possible Solutions

• Coordination. Coordination of health activities at all levels between all health partners should be improved.
• Sphere standards. It is vital that Standards-Based programming with Sphere Standards is developed and communicated to all stakeholders.
• Construction and Rehabilitation of Health facilities. Land issues, time constraints, building standards and geographically needs-based construction complicate construction and rehabilitation activities. Regular dialogue between stakeholders is necessary to resolve these issues.
• Emergency Preparedness System and Plan. Capacity should be at national, local and community level.
• Human Resources Shortages. Severe shortages are reported of specialist doctors, medical teachers, nursing and para-medical tutors and paramedics. Solutions include support and development of staff and resources, including revising recruitment policies.
• Logistics and Distribution. Medical Supply Division of MoH and other related institutions should be trained to cope with logistical demands during disaster and recovery.
• Monitoring of IDPs Health and Quality of Life. Although basic services are present in most transitional shelter sites, actual standards of access and quality are uncertain and IDPs remain highly vulnerable.
• Sustainability of services, including financial sustainability. Increased consultation and participatory planning of the affected populations at all levels is necessary for sustainability.

5.2. EDUCATION

5.2.1 Background Equal access to free education is a priority in Sri Lanka, particularly among the poorer strata of the population where education is seen as a key to achieving social mobility. The tsunami had a devastating impact on the education sector - the waves leveled or damaged 182 schools, directly affecting 100,000 children; a further 446 schools used as camps for tsunami-displaced populations that affected a further 100,000 children require upgrading and rehabilitation. The loss of a large number of students, teachers and other educational personnel created a deep psychological impact and void, worsened by the personal loss of many tsunami survivors and the damage sustained to infrastructure and equipment.

The Ministry of Education (MoE) envisions building child-friendly schools and creating an environment that prioritises psychological comfort and safety of students, parents and teachers so that some 200,000 children are quickly back to learning. The MoE has requested the support of numerous donors, international and local NGOs to meet this goal in line with standards and guidelines that outline the need to design a school for the future.

5.2.2 Institutional Arrangements To meet the urgent requirements of the entire system with speed and precision, and ensure children were back at school as quickly as possible, the MoE formed a
Technical Sub-committee (TSC) of the National Monitoring Unit (NMU) on School Reconstruction and Relief comprising representatives of the MoE and the private sector. The MoE assumed the lead role and TAFREN, as lead agent in the overall reconstruction process, was invited as an observer.

Working Committees (WC) were planned for each of the 18 affected zones, headed by the Zonal Directors of Education (ZDEs) and represented by the District Secretary’s office, District Coordinators office, Divisional Secretaries and two nominated community representatives. However, most WCs were not formed and there was a lack of interest in the process that delayed the planned needs assessment. The eventual assessment was provided to donors two months after the scheduled date, and even then the accuracy of information was questionable due to the random data collection methods used. At this point the MoE and TSC/NMU recognized that the only way to handle such a substantial task of coordination was to set up a dedicated monitoring unit. The Tsunami Education Rehabilitation Monitoring (TERM) Trust, a local NGO, was created specifically for this purpose and a MoU was signed between TERM and the MoE to formalize this arrangement for a period of two years.

5.2.3 Targets

The MoE and its key partners identified two priorities for the initial emergency response:

1. Support the Government of Sri Lanka in the return to learning of up to 200,000 children

2. Provide a staggered approach to the reopening of schools housing displaced families.

5.2.4 Achievements

Immediate emergency activities included distribution of school supplies (school-in-a-box kits, recreation kits, school uniforms, text books, school bags, furniture), nutrition programmes, cleaning of schools, providing psychosocial support, and planning for the reconstruction/recovery phase (temporary teaching facilities, identification of land). Over 95% of school-aged children in tsunami-affected areas have now returned to school.

5.2.4.1 Psychosocial support through Education

A plan has been developed for mainstreaming psychosocial care into the education system and the MoE has drawn up guidelines for donors engaged in psychosocial activity to ensure a coherent approach across tsunami-affected areas. Children and teachers were provided with activities and tools, including recreation kits, to help begin the recovery process. Assessments have been conducted to identify the number of psychologically affected students in schools.

5.2.4.2 Reconstruction of school buildings

Currently some 30 donors are involved in rebuilding and reconstruction. MoUs have been signed for all but two of the 182 partially and fully-damaged schools. The MoE has adopted a child-friendly school design as the standard for the construction/rehabilitation of tsunami affected schools.
**Box 8** Providing a helping hand

S. Subattheepan is team leader for a group of volunteers involved in providing psychosocial support to tsunami-affected families in a temporary camp in Karaitivu in Ampara district. Subattheepan is typical of hundreds of volunteers across the country trying to help people cope with the traumatic psychological effects of the tsunami.

“After the tsunami, I met children who didn’t want to play or go to school. They just stood apart from the rest. We came here every week, started speaking to them and involved them in games, art work and dance classes”. A year on and the difference is evident. “Now, the same children are back at school and playing together. Their fear seems to have gone away and we see that as a major victory”, explains Subattheepan.

Subattheepan’s personal experience helps him to understand the problems and trauma that others face. He uses that knowledge to find the best way to help them. “I lost my mother in the tsunami, this has helped me to understand other people’s grief,” he says. His loss makes him more determined to help the thousands of others like him who have lost family members. “The pleasure I get from seeing the positive effects of our work helps to ease the pain of my own loss”.

Psychosocial support is not an attempt at providing a substitute for professional psychiatric help. It serves as a means for trained volunteers to help create an environment where people can slowly return to normalcy and their daily routines. Psychosocial support could mean simply sharing someone’s concerns or bringing laughter back into a child’s life through a game. It could also mean basic support such as providing a widow with a handloom to generate a small income or helping a beneficiary fill in forms to secure their entitlement to government assistance. 26

Architectural and master plans have been approved for 92 schools so far. The MoE expects that within the month of December 2005 master plans will be received for all damaged schools. Construction of 18 schools has started.

**5.2.5 Future Plans** Future plans for the transitional phase? now focus on:
- Return to learning of remaining children not in school
- Improving school attendance
- Reconstruction of schools
- Streamlining psychosocial support within the education system
- Effective coordination of various stakeholders
- Building capacities of MoE

Other plans include provision of computers and related improvement of IT skills development, teacher training programmes, and pursuing the idea of “twinning” schools with appropriate overseas educational institutes.

**5.2.6 Issues, Problems and Possible Solutions**

While attendance in tsunami-affected schools now stands at around 95 per cent, evidence suggests that some children are dropping out of school during the day in order to work. Some families are reluctant to send their children to damaged or temporary school environments or to attend schools that may not have been damaged, but are not receiving vital supplies. Other families have moved out of the local area altogether. Teacher attendance is also an issue with some areas reporting attendance at less than 75 per cent.

Donor commitment, financial and otherwise, has created an opportunity to utilize available resources
to improve the school system through the introduction of the Child Friendly School criteria, to increase the capacity of human resources engaged in education sector and to improve the quality of the education system.

**Land identification and acquisition:** Reconstruction was delayed due to the scarcity of land and problems in identifying appropriate relocation sites. The result of these land issues has been a delay in planning and withdrawal of support by some donors.

**Co-ordination:** Proper co-ordination and communication is needed between donors, school principals, and zonal directors in order to supply adequate relief items to the schools.

**Unavailability of adequate infrastructure facility:** In the North and East, access roads, electricity and proper water supply facilities are inadequate and not easily provided within a short period of time.

**De-mining reports for the un-cleared areas:** In un-cleared areas reconstruction is constrained by delays in obtaining de-mining certificates required for reconstruction work.

**Finding Donors:** A major problem is to find donors for rehabilitation of the remaining 193 affected schools and reconstruction of four damaged schools.

### 5.3 Protection

It was immediately clear that the affected children in particular urgently needed protection. The protection response focused on three main issue areas:

**Box 9 Finding fit carers for tsunami orphans**

Sitting in their garden, Parashakthi holds a protective arm around her niece Vithusa, 8. The girl holds onto her aunt’s leg. With no other way to contact family when the tsunami hit, Parashakthi immediately left her home in Trincomalee, travelling south to Batticaloa to find her sister-in-law, Vithusa’s mother. Vithusa was the family’s only known survivor. She survived by holding onto a TV antenna and was rescued by friends.

When Parashakthi, a mother of five grown children, found Vithusa, there was no doubt in her mind that she would bring the girl back to live with her. “Since all my family has already grown up, taking Vithusa is no burden. Other people have been asking to take her too, but she needs to be with our family, we didn’t want her going away. She has settled in well. She doesn’t ask for anyone, and she’s doing well at school.”

Parashakthi’s home is modest and her husband earns a low wage, so bringing Vithusa home has been a slight financial burden. The family receives support however through the Sri Lankan Government’s Fit Persons Scheme – a project established by the Department of Probation and Child Care Services before the tsunami.

Under this scheme, suitable foster parents are identified and nominated by probation officers. After receiving approval from a magistrate, they are eligible to receive Rs. 500 (US$5) a month for each child fostered.

Families participating in the Fit Persons Scheme receive regular monitoring and support by trained local Child Protection Officers. Following the tsunami more than 200 children in the Trincomalee district have been kept out of institutions and placed with carers through the Fit Person’s Scheme.
• Identifying and supporting separated and unaccompanied children and single headed households
• Preventing abuse including sexual and gender based violence and exploitation and neglect of children and women, focusing particularly on IDP camps/sites in the emergency phase
• Monitoring laws, policies and practices relating to tsunami displacement to prevent discrimination and other human rights violations

5.3.1 Institutional Arrangements

The responsible government institutions – Department for Probation and Child Care, and the National Child Protection Authority (NCPA) – in cooperation with the relevant UN agencies and other INGOs made arrangements for providing support to the affected children.

5.3.2 Targets

The target group consisted of 979 children orphaned, 3,954 children without one of their parents30 in addition to some 615 children who had lost both their parents previously, and another 2,121 children who were in one parent families. The aim was to identify and register unaccompanied and separated children to reunite them with parents, siblings, extended families or home communities in order to ensure that these children remain in safe environments, protected from violence, exploitation and abuse.

5.3.3 Achievements

Identification and Registration Probation officers evaluated 6,538 affected children (12 unaccompanied, 1,539 separated, and 4,987 children who had lost one parent from the tsunami, conflict or for other reasons). Gift packs, bicycles and family kits of basic household necessities were given and allowances were paid. The task of identification and registration of unaccompanied and separated children31 was successfully completed. Options including adoption, fostering, or, as a last resort, a home for children were considered only after every opportunity to locate family members had been exhausted.

Protection and Prevention Community-based approaches were successfully adopted, and institutionalization of children in orphanages was avoided in almost all cases. More than half of the children who lost both parents in the tsunami or as a result of the conflict and were affected by the tsunami have been processed for fostering by magistrates through the Department of Probation and Child Care.

A number of initiatives were undertaken by key protection agencies to protect and prevent abuse and violence against children and women. They raised awareness about the heightened potential for abuses against children and women (distribution of leaflets etc.). Other initiatives included data collection on the needs and concerns of women in the camps and in transitional centers, tracking and documenting of any discrepancies in the post tsunami relief to women and any incidences of human rights violations, popular media programmes, gender task forces at the district level to raise protection issues and make recommendations to the relevant authorities, and advocacy groups.

Recovery of Lost Documentation Several legal clinics were conducted in all tsunami affected areas, where individuals were provided with certified copies, or new documentation, such as Identity Cards, birth certificates, marriage certificates, and other personal documentation. So far over 120,000 documents have been issued.

Legal Aid and Mediation Efforts Several international agencies, as well as the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs set up structures to assist tsunami victims with free legal aid. In addition, a new law was passed in May 2005 to set up a Special Mediation Boards to assist survivors to resolve disputes without having to resort to expensive and prolonged court procedures.

Tsunami Bill A special “Tsunami Bill” regarding the care and custody of children and young persons who were orphaned or left with a single parent was brought before Parliament. The Tsunami
(Special Provisions) Act came into operation on 13 June 2005. However, there were a number of challenges in making the Tsunami Bill operational.

**Disaster Relief Monitoring Unit** A DMRU was established by the Human Rights Commission to monitor laws, policies and practices relating to tsunami displacement to prevent discrimination and other human rights violations. By October 2005, the unit had received and acted upon more than 19,000 complaints from affected persons. This initiative also helped to bring a rights-based perspective to reconstruction and recovery planning, engaging in regular dialogue on policy issues with senior government officials, international agencies and NGOs. The DMRU held public meetings in affected districts, as well as a program of more than 1,100 “People’s Consultations”.

**5.3.4 Future Plans**

Over the next two years, the Ministry of Social Welfare will seek international assistance to develop 60 social development centres in tsunami affected areas – divisional-level hubs that house child protection officials in one central location. Capacity-building opportunities including critical skills such as database management, information-sharing and basic computer literacy – will be provided through the centres.
CHAPTER SIX

UPGRADING NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

6.1 Impact

The tsunami further damaged coastal infrastructure that was already in a seriously debilitated condition due to the recent conflict, maintenance neglect, lack of development investment and the effects of high rainfall and flooding in recent years.

Specific impacts on the coastal infrastructure included:

- **Roads** Erosion damage occurred on sections of the coastal highway network and a number of bridges were damaged or completely washed away. A total length of approximately 800 kms of national road was damaged together with about 1500 kms of provincial and local government roads.

- **Railways** Sections of track work, bridges, signaling and communications systems, buildings and some rolling stock were severely damaged on the 160km long coastline between Colombo and Matara.

- **Electricity** The electricity distribution system and service connections suffered damage throughout the tsunami-affected areas.

- **Water Supply and Sanitation** Potable water treatment and reticulation systems suffered damage, and local supply systems, mainly ground water sourced, suffered damage and salt water intrusion.

- **Ports** Facilities and vessels were damaged at the ports of Galle, Trincomalee, Kankasanthurai and Point Pedro (Jaffna), and the perimeter wall and some equipment was damaged at the Oluwil Port Training Centre.

6.2 Institutional Arrangements

Institutional arrangements for infrastructure are well defined in Sri Lanka and involve a line ministry as the executing agency and a government authority or government owned corporation as the implementing agency.

**Sri Lanka Railways (SLR)** is responsible for the operation and maintenance of all railway lines in Sri Lanka. Significant refurbishment projects are carried out by outside contractors, under the supervision of SLR.

**Electrical Power** management, generation, transmission and distribution is under the authority of the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB).

**Water Supply and Sanitation** National Water Supply and Drainage Board (NWSDB) is the responsible agency. At the district level, the Deputy Provincial Director of Health Services (DPDHS) and Medical Officer for Health (MOH) are responsible for providing sanitation services in each district, working with Divisional Secretory (DS) offices and Municipal / Urban Councils.

**Ports** are the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Ports and Aviation – Ports & Harbours with the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) as the implementing agent.

6.3 Targets

The Government of Sri Lanka recognizes that more thorough and permanent infrastructure rebuilding measures form a vital part of the tsunami-recovery process. Immediate targets have been to temporarily and quickly restore services, wherever affected, and to provide services to transit camps and sites for transitional shelter. This will be followed by restoration of all services to pre-tsunami levels and the servicing of sites for permanent shelter.
The specific targets for each infrastructure sector are:

**Roads:** Over 1000 km of national roads, together with 1500 km of provincial roads and unclassified local government and municipal roads are targeted for rebuilding and rehabilitation. The cost is estimated at US$ 317 million for the national roads and US$ 39 million for the provincial and local government roads. Financing needs have been met through pre-tsunami grants and loans savings from ongoing projects, and new grants and soft loans.

**Railways** The total cost of damage to rolling stock is estimated at Rs.175 million, Rs.360 million for tracks and bridges, Rs.900 million for the signal and communications network and SLR 50 million for the staff quarters. In the East, a desired upgrade of the Batticaloa–Valaiichchenai line is estimated to cost Rs.2,400 million.

**Electricity** CEB has set itself the goal of restoring electricity supply to all tsunami-affected areas. Under the “Sri Lanka Tsunami Affected Areas Recovery and Takeoff” (STAART) project, the CEB aims to provide electricity to 23,000 tsunami-affected homes in 2005, in addition to rehabilitating the damaged electrical network and replacing damaged buildings and other assets.

**Water Supply and Sanitation** With an overall goal of providing sufficient and sustainable water supply and sanitation services to the tsunami-affected areas, targets spread over three phases were identified:

- **Phase 1- Emergency repairs**
- **Phase 2- Restore services to pre-tsunami levels**
- **Phase 3- Expand service capacity to meet medium-term needs**

With the above strategy in mind, the government’s estimate for the overall cost of rebuilding water supply and sanitation facilities following the tsunami was US$ 201 million. Of this, approximately US$ 36 million was for direct tsunami damage, while the balance is to “build back better”. Current donor commitments amount to Rs. 16.5 billion, leaving about Rs. 6.8 billion unfunded.

**Ports** The ports of Galle, Trincomalee, Kankasanthurai, and Point Pedro, together with the Oluwil Port Training Centre are in need of significant improvements, partly as a result of tsunami damage, but mostly due to years of conflict and neglect. These improvements involve equipment, vessels, buildings and structure such as breakwaters. The Ministry aims to carry out the required repairs/replacements by June 2006.

### 6.4 Achievements

Emergency water and electricity supplies to the affected areas was restored a few days after the tsunami. Wells have been cleaned, and transitional shelter where feasible connected; work has begun to restore water services to pre-tsunami levels. The coastal railway services resumed on 21 February, with tracks and bridges repaired. The track was reconstructed on newly built embankments and the signal system reinstalled. The complex preparatory work for the rehabilitation of roads, involving many development partners, has been completed and is one of the key showcases for government-donor coordination. Improving on the emergency repairs of bridges and the worst roads carried out immediately after the tsunami, began mid 2005. Rehabilitation of the Kalutara to Matara road started in October 2005. Foreign assistance for over US $ 350 million has been successfully negotiated, and the ground is prepared for construction work to start by early 2006. Temporary repairs have been carried out in Galle and Trincomalee ports to bring both back into operation. Work is underway in Oluwil to repair the damaged perimeter wall and equipment, with completion expected by early 2006.

### 6.5 Issues and Possible Solutions

The national construction industry does not have the number of contractors, equipment, skilled workforce, modern management practice and access to finance needed to maintain the required speed of the entirety of tsunami reconstruction work. The government plans to solve this by engaging large-scale contractors through international bidding and teaming up with and providing on the job training to local contractors. Community-based organizations and small contractors should be trained in labor-based
construction skills to (i) reduce pressure on contractors and (ii) improve the quality of roads and other infrastructure projects implemented under cash for work schemes by NGOs that often have no experience in road reconstruction.

The spiraling cost of construction material even before the peak of tsunami reconstruction (expected in 2006/2007) is a reason for concern. A shortage of sand (even pre-tsunami) and crushed aggregate increases the risk of illegal (and environmentally damaging) sand mining in rivers and seashores. Procedures for rapidly awarding quarrying licenses while paying due regard to environmental safeguards will be important. Contractors are reluctant to work in the north and east and in areas under LTTE-control that further increases reconstruction costs. Given the shortage of rock in Jaffna and the Vanni, arrangements must be developed to allow construction materials to transit through Government-LTTE checkpoints free of taxes and of the need to unload, search, and reload.

The capacity of government implementing agencies is stretched and will probably be overstretched once all projects start, unless a significant capacity building program takes place. Effective coordination mechanism to facilitate the partners in housing schemes, and among water/electricity and road restoration at all levels of government (central, province, district and local) has not yet been created. This is crucial to ensure that new housing schemes have access to roads, electricity and water, and the transitional shelters are also fully provided for with facilities.

In the water sector, other than general infrastructure challenges, several particular problems were identified including sustainable maintenance of water/gully bowsers and packaged water treatment plants; securing local counterpart funding; commencement of sanitation studies and development of sewerage for new settlements; further improvement of hygiene practice; and strengthening significantly the sanitation sector, particularly in IDP camps.
CHAPTER SEVEN  
CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES:  
CAPACITY BUILDING, ENVIRONMENT AND GENDER  

7.1 Capacity Building

Sri Lanka has had the experience of dealing with natural disasters such as floods, landslides and occasional cyclones. The tsunami took everyone by surprise, and in the aftermath elucidated weaknesses in the country’s response management capacity. Post-tsunami management poses huge challenges that underscored the need to pay attention to the issue of capacity building.

Two major fronts need to be mentioned:

• The need to strengthen the participatory approaches to deal with the affected communities
• The need to further improve utilization of foreign assistance

Traditionally in Sri Lanka, absorption capacity of foreign funds has been slow. While action is being taken to improve aid coordination, further progress in this effort including the coordination and monitoring of NGO programmes is needed.

7.1.1 Capacity Issues within Government Agencies Areas requiring attention include: lines of authority, delegation and devolution, training, communication, coordination, power imbalances, lack of clarity in policy directives, community consultation, guiding principle of subsidiarity, use of indigenous knowledge and people’s participation, information management systems, attention on legal and judicial aspects, and awareness raising. Capacity building for the government at central and local levels (strengthening the district secretariat with about 250 additional professional staff) is underway.

7.1.2 Capacity Issues with NGOs, Multilateral and Bilateral Agencies The issues identified include: the mismatch between the large inflow of funds relative to extant absorptive and processing capacity, using the usual donor deadline requirements in an unusual implementation environment, the general anxiety over accountability to the donor public on money raised for tsunami emergency, burn rates or the need to spend funds quickly, the generic approach adopted and informed by international agencies and actors, lack of decentralization in decision making, the rapid expansion of INGOs, the lack of experience among local NGO staff, and competition between INGOs and local NGOs resulting in local communities and peoples’ organizations being negatively affected.

7.1.3 Capacity Issues in the Private Sector A limited understanding of disaster response and social development issues and a lack of regular coordination between private sector and government agencies and other players were the key issues identified. Ensuring representation of the District and Regional Chambers of Commerce in the disaster management committee, analyses of livelihood options, conducting feasibility studies, creating markets and other activities in which they have a clear comparative advantage is suggested. Fiscal and tax incentives available to the private sector need to be disseminated more widely to encourage the sector to be more actively involved in the tsunami-recovery process.

7.1.4 Capacity Issues at the Community Level Effective response and recovery depends on how well communities (as claim holders) on the ground internalize and exercise their rights and responsibilities. A mechanism to ensure effective and inclusive aid delivery, reconstruction and development should aim at empowering communities in guaranteeing bottom up accountability. Some innovative efforts are being undertaken in this direction.

7.2 Environmental Issues

The areas ravaged by tsunami are the coastal regions of the country that already were “fragile
environments.’ Coastal areas are exposed to monsoons that bring increased wave action with a force of 18-20 km per hour from May through September causing erosion. Such natural erosive forces have been exacerbated by human activity.

**Damage to the Environment** The damage caused by the tsunami includes salinization of paddy and agricultural lands and wells. The tsunami showed that where sand dunes, mangroves and coral were intact, the impact of the waves was greatly diminished. The government had already passed environmental legislation and charged institutions with the responsibility of ensuring that environmental concerns are incorporated into development projects. However implementing this legislation is complicated by the large number of people utilizing coastal resources on a daily basis.

**Institutional Arrangements** A Tsunami Environmental Response Common Platform has been created by the three agencies in Sri Lanka (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Central Environment Authority (CEA), and TAFREN), supported by the “Environmental help desk” at the national and district levels. Government Agents in the districts of the North, East, South and Western Provinces of Sri Lanka have been included in the implementation process to encourage and enable a ‘bottom-up’ approach.

**Targets**

An implementation work plan, with the involvement of local institutions and communities, will address the following:

- Management of debris and waste
- Restoration of ecosystems (restoration of affected lagoons, estuaries, land drainage channels, sustainable sourcing of sand)
- New drainage systems
- Capacity building and information dissemination

**Achievements**

- **Housing**: Implementing environmental sustainability measures, initially for 400 resettlement sites. Identifying, mapping and stock taking of sand deposits.
- **Power, Railways, Roads & Ports, Water & Sanitation**: Implementing debris and waste management measures, initially in 19 sites. Implementing land drainage measures, initially in nine sites.
- **Education**: Disseminating information on priority environmental recovery themes.

The challenge now is to foster the need for environmental awareness while tackling development issues and implementation issues, which underscores the need for participatory planning, capacity building and education.

**7.3 Gender Issues**

A gender perspective is essential to support an accurate understanding of priorities, inequalities and needs, to facilitate the design of more appropriate responses, to provide a link between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development assistance, and to highlight opportunities and resources for women’s involvement. Effective disaster preparedness, response and reconstruction processes must recognize and support women’s as well as men’s skills and potential for contribution. In many cases, women’s courage and initiative has contributed significantly to family survival and community service after the Sri Lankan tsunami crisis.

Preliminary analysis of a survey of 53,613 tsunami-affected households conducted in seven tsunami affected districts indicates that 70% more females than males died; up to three times as many females than males died in the 16-30 age group; 1 in 5 affected households is now headed by a female and 91% of females above 15 years who have been engaged in economic activities now find it hard to revive economic ventures due to loss of equipment (47%), financial difficulties (53%) and lack of place (24%).

Women’s groups formed into coalitions (e.g. Coalition for Assisting Tsunami Affected Women-CATAW) and mobilized relief for affected women and their families, sought expertise to provide counseling to survivors, monitored incidents of domestic violence in welfare camps and temporary
shelters, advocated for gender responsive programmes and policies related to health, land (including land titles), relief and education for children.

To date, gender disaggregated data of the affected population is missing and hampers efforts to ensure systematic gender responsive planning for recovery and reconstruction.

**Issues and challenges** Conditions in camps and temporary accommodations have been difficult for women and girls, due to the lack of security, privacy and adequate facilities. Camp management committees include only a few women, and in some instances, these women faced hostilities. In other instances, women’s names have not been included on titles for new homes. The focus of current relief schemes on the head of household, who is generally a male, excludes women from direct access to property.

A medium to longer term challenge is the rebuilding of economic systems and livelihoods, and ensuring that gender equity is priority concern. In particular, women who are the head of households, including single women providing for elderly parents or the recently widowed, must have their livelihoods quickly reestablished.

Other issues identified include domestic work affecting school returnees, trauma, unsuitability of camps for studies, non-involvement of women in the utility works, lack of attention on home-based industries by NGOs, and the absence of proper business development services and information.

**Engendering Post-tsunami Recovery Work**
The government, NGOs, INGOs and donor agencies have undertaken many initiatives with the aim of engendering tsunami responses. Building on these initiatives, supporting longer-term interventions, including research, education, information technology, advocacy and capacity building is essential including INGO-facilitated gender watch groups and task forces to monitor the situation and to conduct training programmes for camp management, Grama Sevakas and police.

**Achievements** The Cabinet has approved mainstreaming gender in post-tsunami recovery and reconstruction with a special focus on widows, livelihood assistance for women, appointing women to disaster management committees at all levels, providing land rights for women in relocation to ensure joint ownership, the security of women and girls and providing psycho social support. A special forum discussion was held to discuss land issues in resettlement, to persuade land alienation authorities to provide for joint ownership, and to allocate land in resettlement areas in the name of the woman in the event she had land ownership before the tsunami.

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**Box 10  Tsunami and AIDS initiatives**

Experience from around the world has shown a clear link between natural disasters and conflict situations on the one hand, and HIV vulnerability on the other. The recent and continuing experience with the Asian tsunami has been no exception. In Sri Lanka, and across the region, there was an increased risk of transmission of STIs and HIV due to a number of factors: (i) The breakdown of traditional social structures and family-based living arrangements that can make normal sexual relations between couples difficult to maintain and sometimes leads men to find sexual outlets outside of marriage or regular relationships, (ii) the initial disruption of medical services, in particular provision of STI diagnosis and treatment, safe blood transfusion, safe deliveries and condoms, (iii) the interruption of livelihoods that leads in some areas to an increase in alcohol use and domestic violence, and (iv) the presence of large numbers of unformed service personnel and humanitarian workers in the midst of a traumatized and often-powerless population. National and international counterparts have made significant efforts in Sri Lanka in order to keep HIV risk as low as possible (e.g. health universal precautions, social protection and dissemination of information and awareness on HIV/AIDS).
CHAPTER EIGHT

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

In January 2005, the government and development partners supporting the reconstruction effort endorsed a set of eight ‘guiding principles’ that all actors involved in rebuilding Sri Lanka should adhere to. Progress in their implementation can be summarized as follows.

Recovery must be carried out according to the identified needs and local priorities Most actors initiated and implemented their work based on needs assessments, surveys and mapping. The lack of coordination of these activities resulted in “affected-community fatigue” in the face of numerous data collection exercises. An important element in responsiveness to need is an equitable distribution of assistance across geography and ethnicity. Available but incomplete data suggest that donor commitments mirrored identified geographic needs.

Box 11 Findings of the people’s consultations on post-tsunami recovery

The Human Rights Commission (HRC) of Sri Lanka in collaboration with the Colombo University Community Extension Centre (CUCEC), with international assistance, carried out a programme of Peoples’ Consultations on Post-Tsunami Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka. Over 800 focus-group discussions were conducted in 1100 villages in 13 affected districts in Sri Lanka. The findings of the consultations are being published and circulated to all stakeholders.

Based on the consultations findings, it appears that the issues of land, resettlement and housing appear to be the most pressing issues for the affected. In fact, communities tend to define normalcy and measure performance according to the speed and efficiency by which they have or will be resettled in permanent housing. Across the board, there is a strong disappointment with regard to the slow pace of relief and recovery. In many of the districts in the North and East, communities feel that the armed conflict and the minority status of those affected has made them more vulnerable and less empowered to make demands of the local and national government. With regard to housing, there is less consistency of opinion on resettlement within or outside the buffer zone. Attitude appears to depend mostly on the level of trauma associated with the tsunami and the means of livelihood of those being resettled. There is universal consensus though about the need for consultation on the buffer zone and the need for community participation in rebuilding houses. Many believe that the delivery of assistance could have been far more efficient if it was done with prior and proper assessment and consultation. For example, certain communities have been overly-compensated with fishing equipment and gear; even persons who were not fishing before the tsunami are now going to sea. Many people also point to a mismatch between their needs and the equipment provided. The most common illustration of this has been the allocation of single-day boats to those that needed multi-day boats with storage facilities in order to spend longer periods of time in the deep sea.

There is a strong feeling across the board that the fishing industry has received adequate attention, but often at the neglect of other industries. The natural assumption between the tsunami disaster and the fishing industry has meant that other industries, most particularly the agricultural sector has been overlooked. The agricultural sector in several districts has also been indirectly affected due to salt-water contamination of the soil.36
needs, with about two thirds of the funds allocated to the north and east. However, some of the more substantial investment in the planning or early implementation stage, and therefore the initial disbursement of assistance for housing and livelihood restoration may have disproportionately taken place in the south. It will be important to continue monitoring progress in the distribution of aid including NGO and INGO contributions by district, ethnic groups and gender throughout the reconstruction process. Strengthening the cooperative approach with adequate representation of all the affected communities and the donors would be helpful to improve the monitoring process.

Subsidiarity - Recovery activities should be decentralized as much as possible Due to the magnitude of the disaster, the first few months of the recovery effort were characterized by confusion and competing lines of authority. Local government officials responded strongly and positively, but initially lacked clear guidance on matters that required centralized decision making. Under the circumstances, local institutions were sometimes uncertain on how to act without clear orders. The process of communication between the local and central levels gradually provided clearer lines of authority to national recovery planning. About 250 experts are being deployed to support the Government Agents in their crucial coordinating role. This role will be especially critical in the areas of housing and livelihoods, to ensure progress from transitional shelter to permanent housing, and to ensure fair and complete coverage of livelihood restoration needs.

Consultation with local affected communities and stakeholders The consultation mechanism with affected communities initially was slow, with most policy decisions being taken in Colombo and imperfect downward flow of information about assistance programs and policies. An extensive survey by the Human Rights Committee in more than 1,000 villages revealed that communities felt they should have been more extensively consulted about some important issues, such as the buffer zone (See Box 10). Consultation by NGOs was in some cases very strong, while in others the pressure to spend funds led to the provision of pre-arranged “packages” that were not always well suited to the local need and context. This experience highlights the need to strengthen communication and consultation that will be crucial particularly in the construction and allocation of permanent housing.

Communication and transparency must be ensured at all levels Several initiatives were taken to improve transparency and communication. A Development Assistance Database (DAD) was set up to provide information on the recovery process, both by sector and by district and is in the public domain. The government established a tsunami helpline that received thousands of calls about housing and cash transfers. TAFREN has been recently restructured to improve the transparency of its actions. To further improve an accountability mechanism that includes activities at the local level will be in place in 2006. In spite of these efforts, the government, donor agencies and I/NGOs must continue to strengthen transparency and communication, particularly with tsunami-affected populations, to combat the perception that there is a disconnect between the large sums of money that were pledged and the still-perceived limited recovery process unfolding on the ground.

Future vulnerabilities ought to be reduced - Disaster management and early warning While additional deaths were avoided and relief assistance delivered, many actors and observers wonder if some of the original deaths could have been prevented if the country had been better prepared and equipped. Sri Lanka was not considered to be a country prone to large-scale natural disasters and did not have appropriate institutional capacity to deal with the impact of the tsunami. In light of this experience, establishment of a suitable early warning system and disaster management and response capability quickly emerged as an important priority. The Disaster Management Act was passed on 13 May 2005. As a result, a Disaster Management Centre (DMC) became operational in September 2005 to oversee disaster management with a multi-hazard approach. The DMC will lead a concerted effort to promote community-based disaster management programmes. An inter-institutional committee for early warning was also established in the first quarter of 2005. With an interim mechanism for an early warning system in
place, the government is working with other stakeholders for a permanent early warning system. This is a step in the right direction.

**Analysis of individual interventions** Attention to the distribution of aid across geographic region and ethnic community is an important element in peace building. With tsunami reconstruction moving into the second year, the reconstruction process should branch out to reach the previously marginalized (by conflict or poverty).

**Debt relief should be prudently managed** Altogether, Sri Lanka did not have to pay about US$ 265 million in debt service payments during 2005 (this figure increases to US$ 371 million if international financial support is included). This exemption allowed containment of the domestically financed budget deficit and an increase in external reserves contributing to macroeconomic stability in spite of increasing oil prices (GDP growth for 2005 is projected at around 5.5%). Since most of these payments have been rescheduled over the coming years, prudent fiscal and monetary management will be necessary to extract maximum benefits from this concession.

**Coordination is essential to maximize benefits and prevent duplication** Coordination mechanisms between the Government and the international community evolved along with the tsunami response. TAFREN, the Ministry of Finance, and line ministries promoted coordination at their respective levels. In some cases, this led to uniform adoption of standards and policies (as in housing reconstruction) or in close coordination of funding (as in the road sector). Regular dialogue between the Government and its development partners allowed attention to be focused on the needed policy decisions (such as the strong emphasis on transitional shelter and reconsideration of the buffer zone boundaries). At the same time, given the complexity of this reconstruction process, the magnitude of the task, and the large number of actors involved, some limitations emerged: occasional duplication of interventions, over concentration on certain sectors, communities and regions, and existing human resource capacity at the local level. In order to improve coordination, much work remains to be done.

Among the emerging challenges are (i) close coordination at the district level of housing and livelihood interventions; (ii) monitoring of the sectoral and geographic distribution of assistance and adoption of needed actions to ensure the correct balance; (iii) strengthening of the coordination between central and local levels of Government, in the context of the new *Jaya Lanka* programme; and (iv) greater involvement of NGOs in formal coordination mechanisms to ensure synergies in implementation.

Finally, the set-up of a tsunami monitoring and impact assessment seems necessary. The Transitional Result Matrix is a first step in this direction. The government and the international community have conducted some preparatory work to lay the foundations for such a system, which would be closely linked to long-term national efforts.
CHAPTER NINE
THE WAY FORWARD:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Almost one year after the tsunami, and despite some setbacks and difficulties, Sri Lanka has made significant progress in tsunami reconstruction. The response from the people and the Government of Sri Lanka — rushing to the rescue and providing relief to tsunami victims without distinction of race or creed — was truly remarkable. The enormity of the event created immense international goodwill, stimulated a large pledging of external assistance, and even signified hope for the revival of the peace process.

With the tsunami reconstruction now entering its second (and arguably more difficult) year, it is possible to learn lessons from the past year’s achievements and shortcoming, and define an agenda of actions that must be taken quickly by all partners to move the process forward. There are issues at both the programmatic level as well as sector-specific activities:

- **Equity and Gaps** The first and primary guiding principle of the tsunami programme was that of equity. While there is no evidence of intentional unequal treatment, some communities (notably those in Ampara) are well behind others, deriving notably from different local capacities and the impact of the buffer zone restrictions. As we move forward, it must be ensured that these factors are addressed and that no one is left behind. While overall funding pledges seem adequate, partners must be ready to adjust the location and objective of their efforts. All pledges must be converted into commitments and all commitments into disbursements and results on the ground.

- **Coordination** The sheer number of actors and the size of the reconstruction needs have made coordination a huge challenge, especially between state and non-state actors. While in these circumstances progress has been reasonable, an intensified effort will be needed during this major reconstruction period between agencies, partners and government authorities at the central level, and between officials, development partners and communities at the local level, including in particular representatives of all ethnic groups affected. Strengthening of under-resourced capacity of local and district government levels has to be continued, building on existing programs.

- **Communication** A clear lesson of the first year has been the need to communicate, not just through newspapers and television, but more particularly through greater direct contact with communities. A communication strategy focusing on explaining entitlements, next steps forward, publicizing the complaints and redress procedures needs to be in place by early in 2006. Every affected family in every location of a transitional shelter, and every family staying with friends and relatives should know what is their future, in terms of housing, employment opportunities, ongoing relief support, education for their children and with health care, including counseling where needed.

- **Monitoring and measuring impact** Another emerging lesson from the first year is that it is a huge challenge to monitor inputs — such as all the different sources of funding — and another to measure outputs and the results on the ground. The DAD database offers the means to improve this, and all development partners have to update and improve their inputs into the DAD to facilitate better monitoring and resulting adjustments in programmes.
to ensure equity. Information on targets together with transparency in the allocation and in the accounting for the funds spent on the reconstruction activities will need to continue to be enforced. Equally, more regular feedback mechanisms from the affected communities need to be instituted, since the value of the periodic feedback when received has been very high. The Transitional Result Matrix (Annex I) aims to provide a simple tool for periodic monitoring of progress.

• **Links to Conflict-Affected Communities, the Peace Process and the Rest of the Economy** Much of the tsunami-affected area was also conflict-affected, and reconstruction in the conflict-affected areas was only just under way at the time. In the first year of the tsunami recovery effort, it is clear that the impact on the conflict-affected areas of this massive tsunami effort needs to be carefully considered and monitored, and equity of treatment, at least with respect to standards, needs to be ensured. More particularly, mechanisms to ensure that the potential beneficial impact of the tsunami recovery on the environment for the peace process can be maximized need to be pursued, including efforts to involve representatives of all parties to the conflict and affected communities in the monitoring and oversight of the reconstruction programme. At the same time, other parts of the economy should not be neglected.

• **Gender** The first year has thrown into stark relief some of the gender issues facing Sri Lanka. Benefits, such as cash and housing grants, have gone to the head of household, generally a male. The experience emphasizes the need to address these aspects of the system, and in terms of immediate actions, make sure that ownership of land title deeds of the new land plot is held both by the wife and the husband.

**Macro Economy**

The estimates made after the tsunami indicated that economic growth would be slowed by about 0.5-0.6 percentage points from the expected 6 percent growth. The negative impact was largely reflected in the GDP for the first quarter of 2005. The economy has started to rebound and poised to register a growth rate of about 5.6 percent in 2005, with tourism and fisheries sectors are yet to fully recover from the impact.

In the immediate aftermath of the shock, the Central Bank responded positively to arrest any adverse impact of the tsunami on the financial markets by adjusting its monetary operations to ensure that the financial system remained sufficiently liquid to meet additional demand. In addition, the considerable amount of foreign assistance received in support of post-tsunami relief and recovery efforts, including in the form of debt relief provided the physical space. These flows combined with the prudent management of monetary and fiscal policies helped to contain inflationary pressures below 10 percent level by November 2005.

The post-tsunami rehabilitation programme will be largely financed through foreign grants and concessional financial assistance while maintaining overall budget deficit at a manageable level aiming at overall macro-economic stability as the country move forward with the implementation of the post-tsunami development programme.

In addition to these issues that affect the programme as a whole, there are a number of specific issues related to the four programme areas that will receive early priority to ensure that they reflect these concerns fully.

**Getting people back to their homes**

• Transitional shelters need to be maintained and upgraded until the move to permanent housing is completed.

• Ideally, all households who lost their home, including those living in transitional shelter or with friends and relatives, need to know by the first anniversary or very soon thereafter where their new home will be, how it will be financed and their role in its realization.
• To move the home owner driven housing scheme forward, more technically-trained staff have to be provided to speed up the release of installments.
• Donor funding must be reassessed and adjusted as necessary to address the high increases in the costs of reconstruction, and the ongoing redrawing of the buffer zone.
• Beneficiaries should be involved in planning and implementation process.

Restoring Livelihoods
• People might fall through the cracks of existing programs and join the long-term poor. To prevent this, outreach programs and better communication of all available options (ranging from welfare programs to asset replacement to cash for work to subsidized credit) need to be widely publicized.
• This is an area where improved monitoring, from a bottom-up basis, needs to be in place, with regular surveys of the affected communities. As of now, the distribution of support to livelihoods is unclear, as is the numbers being reached. While we know it is substantial, we do not know the gaps and that must be corrected in the coming months.

Health and education
• Funds have to be identified to rehabilitate some 200 schools used as camps for the displaced.
• As the full-scale reconstruction process unfolds, uniformity of standards will need to be monitored and enforced, and any emerging gaps or delays in construction addressed. There are many different actors undertaking reconstruction of these facilities, so programme oversight is critical.

Infrastructure
• Construction capacity constraints have been emerging as the pace of implementation has increased. Costs for infrastructure supplies are rising much faster than anticipated, especially of sand and aggregates. Identification and timely licensing of additional quarries (making sure they operate in an environmentally sustainable way) and the expansion of sand mining off shore can address this constraint. More generally, new entrants to construction should be encouraged to expand capacity, and training in both skills and project management must continue to be encouraged.

The first year of the tsunami relief, recovery and reconstruction programme has recorded many successes, but all partners have been aware of the shortcomings and the challenges for the future. The resources and the determination exist to ensure that we can move on together to restore the communities of Sri Lanka and to do so at a better standard than before this terrible event. It is the sincere hope and commitment of all the partners in this historic effort that in the second anniversary report, we will be able to record dramatic progress, and the near completion of this enormous challenge so that the affected communities will be able to look forward to a brighter future as the fitting memorial to all those who perished or whose lives were blighted on December 26, 2004.
Results Matrix 2005-2006
Sri Lanka Post-Tsunami Transitional

ANNEX I
ANNEX 1

Sri Lanka Post-Tsunami Transitional Results Matrix 2005-2006

The Government of Sri Lanka has focused on observable nation wide goals, and key deliverables for Post-Tsunami relief and recovery operations. Outcomes and targets for each one of the main four recovery/reconstruction programmes have been identified and/or revised during the preparation of the Post –Tsunami One Year Report. This Transitional Result Matrix (TRM) takes into consideration the Build Back Better approach adopted by the Global Consortium, made up of post-tsunami affected countries and key multilateral, bilateral and non government stakeholders under the coordination of UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery.

The TRM summarizes critical outcomes, targets, indicators and constraints of the recovery process. These outcomes should also contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in the Tsunami affected districts. A more details discussion about these elements is available in the sectoral reports.

This TRM is mainly conceived a simple tool for measuring progress of Post Tsunami recovery efforts. Therefore, this TRM does not include the numerous and successful humanitarian efforts conducted in the aftermath of the Tsunami by the government, local communities and international stakeholders.
### Goal 1. Get people back into their homes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Indicators (and source of information)</th>
<th>Progress to date</th>
<th>Constraints Encountered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>59, 500 required transitional shelters built and upgraded</strong></td>
<td>- All transit shelter completed - Care and maintenance plan implemented</td>
<td>Number of transitional shelter completed/ upgraded (TAP estimates, Divisional Secretariat and/or lead agency reports)</td>
<td>53,221 transitional shelter completed</td>
<td>- Upgrading around 20% of transitional shelter to the standard before the monsoon season is a challenge - Many NGO involved in construction left the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>23,028 houses fully damaged outside the buffer zone built (homeowner driven scheme)</strong></td>
<td>All first installment. Complete payment</td>
<td>Funding Agency / donors (ADB, KFW, SDC and IDA)</td>
<td>99% of first installments made</td>
<td>Putting documentation (proof of ownership etc) in order, Making sure beneficiaries utilize the money fully to reconstruct / repair their houses/ Cost of raw materials escalating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>32,497 partially damaged outside the buffer zone built (homeowner driven scheme)</strong></td>
<td>All first installment. Complete payment</td>
<td>Funding Agency / donors (ADB, KFW, SDC and IDA)</td>
<td>99% of first installments made</td>
<td>Putting documentation (proof of ownership etc) in order, Making sure beneficiaries utilize the money fully to reconstruct / repair their houses/ Cost of raw materials escalating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Goal I. Get people back into their homes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Indicators (and source of information)</th>
<th>Progress to date</th>
<th>Constraints Encountered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 32,000 houses damaged by the Tsunami within the buffer zone-donor built housing projects | All necessary MOU signed 10,610 houses commenced construction          | All units commenced construction  
Number of units MOU’s signed (THRU)  
Number of unit commenced Construction (THRU)                           | 10,707 houses at different stages of construction                         | Acceptance of the pre-engineered / pre-fabricated housing by NGOs / INGOs anticipated Buffer Zone policy changes after Election of new president delaying housing reconstruction programme of the donor built housing. |

Note: These targets will be reviewed to include 11,000 additional houses under the home-owner driven programme-Phase II.
## Goal II. Restore livelihoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Progress to date</th>
<th>Constraints Encountered</th>
<th>Indicators (source of information)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livelihood restoration programs completed for 200,000 affected persons who have lost their main source of income</strong></td>
<td>Dec-05 June-06 Dec-06</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash grants provided in four installments</td>
<td>Fourth installment of 5,000 rupees completed and phase out to cash for work</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A 5,000 grant has been delivered to 250,844 people (first), 231,752 people (second) and 165,000 people (third)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash for work provided to people in need</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.6 million work days of temporary employment generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microfinance provided for micro, small and medium enterprises and promotion of alternative livelihoods</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>13,570 loans provided (Susahana-8,000 and NTDF 5,570)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Goal II. Restore livelihoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All destroyed boats replaced</th>
<th>Number of units replaced (Ministry of Fisheries/FAO information regularly updated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>187 Multi-day boats</td>
<td>0% 30% 50% 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>276 One day boats</td>
<td>15% 60% 25% 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,480 FRP boats</td>
<td>100% n/a n/a 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,158 Traditional crafts</td>
<td>100% n/a n/a 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>818 Beach seine crafts</td>
<td>40% 60% n/a 26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All damaged boats repaired</th>
<th>Number of units replaced (Ministry of Fisheries/FAO information regularly updated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>676 Multi-day boats</td>
<td>n/a n/a n/a 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>783 One day boats</td>
<td>n/a n/a n/a 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3211 FRP boats</td>
<td>n/a n/a n/a 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2435 Traditional crafts</td>
<td>n/a n/a n/a 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161 Beach seine crafts</td>
<td>100% n/a n/a 56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Goal II. Restore livelihoods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Progress to date</th>
<th>Constraints</th>
<th>Indicators (source of information)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All agriculture land for crops rehabilitated</td>
<td>Dec-05</td>
<td>June-06</td>
<td>Dec-06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area covered through distribution of seeds and fertilizers (11,657 acres)</td>
<td>80% n/a</td>
<td>85% 80%</td>
<td>Tracking of acres recovered not possible due to lack of funds</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture/FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyed/damaged home gardens provided with inputs (27,710)</td>
<td>20% 30%</td>
<td>40% 10%</td>
<td>Funding availability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area recovered from salinity (data not yet available) 17,500 acres?</td>
<td>70% 80%</td>
<td>90% 60%</td>
<td>Funding availability and technical</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Irrigation/FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All livestock recovered (data not yet available)</td>
<td>n/a n/a</td>
<td>n/a n/a</td>
<td>Tracking of livestock loss and recovered not possible due to lack of funds</td>
<td>Ministry of Medium and Small Plantation development and Livestock/FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal II. Restore livelihoods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All hotels, guess houses and other tourism related businesses repaired and operational</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 Large Hotels (30 or more rooms)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 Small hotels, guesthouses - Registered</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158 Small hotels, guesthouses - Not registered</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small enterprises such as textile shops, souvenir shops, Batik shops, furniture shops, gem &amp; jewellery, water sports – 20 Registered and 190 not registered</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tourism sector recovered to Pre-Tsunami level</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>13,001 (by end of 2007)</td>
<td>11,815 registered rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>52.5 in August (63.6% August 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enrollement to long-term social protection for those who cannot work (21151 disabled/injured/sick due to Tsunami)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Additional vulnerable people affected by Tsunami enrolled in long-term social protection programmes such as Samurhi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Revised for consistency with information in the text of the report
**Goal III. Ensure health, education and protection for all**  
**Health**

*Targets are in accordance with reaching the Millennium Development Goals and GOSL Master Health Plan  
**All data from the Ministry of Health*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Targets*</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Progress to date**</th>
<th>Constraints Encountered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 05</td>
<td>Number of MOUs signed. Number of institutions in the detailed planning</td>
<td>45 MOUs signed for all damaged institutions Majority of institutions in the</td>
<td><em>Land issues</em> <em>Human resources</em> <em>Communication amongst stakeholders</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 06</td>
<td>stages. Number of healthcare institutions re-constructed.</td>
<td>detailed planning stages; Begun Construction; 3 District hospitals, 2 MOH, 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 06</td>
<td></td>
<td>base hospital, 2 rural hospital, 10 MCH complete and 1 central dispensary,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiant 40% of lost or damaged vehicles replaced</td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of lost or damaged vehicles replaced.</td>
<td>17 of 19 vehicles replaced; 48 double cabs or jeeps &amp; 260 mopeds given in total</td>
<td>1 Lorry not replaced. 8 ambulance, 2 minibuses and 3 jeeps not yet distributed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiant 20% of lost or damaged vehicles replaced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiant 13 Districts Largest Hospitals with Health Information System</td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of largest district hospitals where the Health Information System</td>
<td>4 Districts currently being installed. (Batticaloa, Galle, Kalutara and Kalmuna)</td>
<td><em>Resources</em> <em>Further development of ICDs</em> <em>Coordination of Epidemiology activities</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiant 13 Districts Largest Hospitals with Health Information System</td>
<td></td>
<td>is currently being installed.</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Low-level of computer knowledge on medical staff</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiant 13 Districts Largest Hospitals with Health Information System</td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of largest district hospitals with installed &amp; operational Health Information System</td>
<td>4 Districts installed &amp; operational (Ampara, Hambantota, Matara, Jaffna)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiant 13 Districts Largest Hospitals with Health Information System</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Goal III. Ensure health, education and protection for all
Health
*Targtss are in accordance with reaching the Millennium Development Goals and GOSL Master Health Plan
**All data from the Ministry of Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Targets*</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Progress to date**</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec 05</td>
<td>Jan 06</td>
<td>Dec 06</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Health Infrastructure Indicators (continued from previous page)

All previously identified hospitals have restored cold rooms, cold chain supplies/equipment

| Number of hospitals that have restored cold chain supplies/equip. | All previously identified hospitals are in the process of having restored and improved cold rooms, cold chain supplies and equipment |

District Health Profiles of 13 Districts

| Number of completed District Health Profiles | Galle district Profile drafted |

100% of hospitals receiving lab equipment and have received training

| Number of hospitals that have received lab equipment and training. | MOH-MDS has received lab equipment & supplies for 18 hospitals. | More lab re-agents required. |

Human Resource Indicator

| Human resource plan available | Under preparation. |

Human Resource Plan developed to address disparities in Districts and Construction of New Health facilities

| *Security | *Retention | *Recruitment |

Mental Health

| Number of districts with CSOs. Number of CSOs & SCSO trained & working | In 13 of 14 Districts, 466 total CSOs trained, 60 SCSOs trained | District decision issues |

Community Support Officers (mental health) working in all 13 Districts
**Goal III. Ensure health, education and protection for all**

*Health*

*Targets are in accordance with reaching the Millennium Development Goals and GOSL Master Health Plan*

**All data from the Ministry of Health**

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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communicable Disease Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Number of outbreaks of dengue/malaria/ Hepatitis/diarrhoeal diseases decreases** | | Number of Vector Borne disease outbreaks. | No major outbreaks occurred | *Prevailing uncertain security conditions in NE,*  
*Lack of personnel to implement and monitor activities* |
| **99% immunization coverage of children <1 in tsunami affected districts** | Immunization coverage for BCG (*Ministry of Health*) | Average immunization coverage in 11 tsunami affected districts and Kalmunai Division (vs average at National level)  
*Last quarter 2004 - 111.8% (112.2%)*  
*1st quarter 2005 - 100% (99.4%)*  
*2nd quarter 2005 - 99% (102.6%)* | | |
| | Immunization coverage for DPT 3 | | | |
| | Immunization coverage for OPV 3 | Average immunization coverage in 11 tsunami affected districts and Kalmunai Division (vs average at National level)  
*Last quarter 2004 - 94.7% (102.6%)*  
*1st quarter 2005 - 100.7% (106.1%)*  
*2nd quarter 2005 - 100.4% (107.2%)* | | |
| | | | | |
Goal III. Ensure health, education and protection for all

Health

*Targets are in accordance with reaching the Millennium Development Goals and GOSL Master Health Plan

** All data from the Ministry of Health

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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Infrastructure Indicators (continued from previous page)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 99% immunization coverage of children <1 in tsunami affected districts | Immunization coverage for Measles (9 months) | Average immunization coverage in 11 tsunami affected districts and Kalmunai Division (vs average at National level) | | |
|                                                                      |                                                                 | ➢ Last quarter 2004 - 93.3% (100.0%) | | |
|                                                                      |                                                                 | (i) 1st quarter 2005 - 100.7% (106.5%) | | |
|                                                                      |                                                                 | (ii) 2nd quarter 2005 - 104.0% (108.3%) | | |
| Human Resource Indicator | | | | |

| High % of births attended by skilled health workers | % of births attended by skilled health workers | Average in 11 tsunami affected districts(\(\text{vs. average in non-tsunami affected districts}\))  \(\text{O} \ 1\text{st half of 2004 - 99.1\% (99.4\%)}\) | 1st half of 2005 - 98.7% (99.4%) | | |
| Incidence of malnutrition among children 3-59 months decreases | % of children under five years old with malnutrition moderate | Average in 11 tsunami affected districts(\(\text{vs. average in non-tsunami affected districts}\))  \(\text{O} \ 1\text{st half of 2004 - 23.8\% (24.7\%)}\) | 1st half of 2005 - 22.1% (21.4%) | *Economics *Regional Disparity | |
| Gender Issues | | | | |

| Women’s centres for tsunami affected population being set up and operationalized | Number of women’s centres in tsunami-affected areas | 27 women’s centres are in operation in close proximities of Transitional Site Centres as of end November 2005 | 3 in Ampara 10 in Batticaloa 10 in Hambantota 4 in Matara | | |


## Education

*Targets - See Page 21, Table 6*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Indicators (and source of information)</th>
<th>Progress to date</th>
<th>Constraints Encountered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>200,000 children returning to learning with higher standards of quality</strong></td>
<td>Dec-05</td>
<td>% of school age children in the have returned to school</td>
<td>-95% of school age children in the have returned to school-100 temporary teaching facilities provided-227,000 uniforms, 52,000 desk, 480,000 textbooks, 114,000 school bags, 3, 109 school in a box provided</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June-06</td>
<td>-Number damages or destroyed of schools rehabilitated/reconstructed 0-182 (MOE?)</td>
<td>18 started</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec-06</td>
<td>Number of architectural and master plans approved by MOE 0-182</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports from MOE and UNICEF</td>
<td>Child friendly School design and standard for construction/rehabilitation adoptedGuidelines adopted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Goal IV: Improved national infrastructure constructed by end 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Progress Targets (cumulative)</th>
<th>Progress to date</th>
<th>Constraints Encountered/ Expected</th>
<th>Measures to Overcome Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31/12/05</td>
<td>30/06/06</td>
<td>31/12/06</td>
<td>30/06/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebuild 1050 km of national roads (classes A &amp; B)</td>
<td>% of original budget disbursed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of km completed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebuild 1180 km of provincial roads (classes C, D &amp; E)</td>
<td>% of original budget disbursed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of km completed</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebuild 400 km of local roads</td>
<td>% of original budget disbursed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of km completed</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return affected rail lines (Coast Line &amp; Trinco/Batticaloa) to service</td>
<td>both lines available for service</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This table indicates targets up to the end of 2007, as per the national infrastructure target set by TAFREN. However, Ministry of Highways has advised that national road work will only be completed at the end of 2008.

2 All national roads will require 30-month contracts, which means, following the design/tender/bidding process, that they will be formally completed only at the end of 2008.
### Goal IV: Improved national infrastructure constructed by end 2007

| Outcomes                                                                 | Indicators                                                                 | Progress Targets (cumulative)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31/12/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrade/dual track Colombo-Matara line, including rolling stock</td>
<td>% line upgraded</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re habilitate Batticaloa - Vatadchenai line</td>
<td>% line upgraded</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrade railway workshop facilities</td>
<td>upgrade completed</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-equip &amp; restart Galamuva Quarry for railway stone ballast</td>
<td>quarry in operation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore electricity supply to 23,000 homes in affected districts</td>
<td># of homes reconnected</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation of medium voltage distribution networks in Eastern &amp; Southern Provinces</td>
<td># districts where distribution network is completed</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; sanitation facilities in affected areas restored to pre-tsunami levels</td>
<td># of districts where work is completed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; sanitation services in affected districts expanded to meet medium-term needs</td>
<td># of districts where work has been completed</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved port facilities (equipment, vessels, buildings, harbour structures) in Galle, Matara, Trincomalee and Jaffna districts</td>
<td>% of improvement work completed</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Progress to date**
- funding being sought
- subject to availability of funds
- source of funds not identified

**Constraints Encountered/Expected**
- subject to availability of funds
- source of funds not identified
- US$ 60 million funding gap remaining
- availability of qualified personnel
- US$ 68 million required
- military use of one port-lack of sufficient financing at the moment

**Measures to Overcome Constraints**
- India is a possible source of financing
- Austria is a possible source of financing
- source of funds not identified
- proposals sent to TAFREN/ERD for external funding
- discussions ongoing with potential donors (Japan and Netherlands)

---

1 This table indicates targets up to the end of 2007, as per the national infrastructure target set by TAFREN. However, Ministry of Highways has advised that national road work will only be completed at the end of 2008.
ENDNOTES

2. NPD 2005, Department of Census and Statistics, Poverty Mapping by District, 2005
4. This figure does not include relief disbursements. There are different estimations on disbursements (e.g. MoF 408 million US $).
5. The recent inclusion of Sri Lanka in the GSP plus scheme of the EU seems to have a positive impact on international trade and the external sector.
6. Immediately following the Tsunami the GoSL declared a state of emergency and instructed the Ministry of Public Security, Law and Order to form an operational center to organize relief and rescue efforts. The Secretary of the Ministry of Public Security, Law and Order was appointed the Commissioner General for Essential Services (CGES). The Centre for National Operations (CNO) was established on December 29.
10. Ibid.
11. The government policy regarding housing is humanitarian-based. The number of houses damaged and numbers repaired or reconstructed differ because of accommodating individual families who were sharing one house now being considered eligible for individual housing units, subsequent assessment by local authorities, and differences in the definitions adopted.
13. www.humanitarianinfo.org provides a link to a list that will chronicle not all, but most of the NGO's working in livelihood recovery activities.
15. Ibid.
17. While an existing scheme financed by the ADB has a 40% quota of loans that should go to female applicants, this condition was waived for the tsunami reconstruction.
19. This includes: (i) Repairs of boats and engines, provision of fishing gear and accessories, replacement of boats and engines (ii) technical assistance to design better boats (iii) technical assistance to establish rehabilitate anchorages and small landing sites (iv) aquaculture development /promotion and integrated coastal management (v) rehabilitation of fishery associated institutes (vi) where possible, assistance with the rebuilding of fisheries infrastructure, and training in improved fish handling and processing to reduce wastage and add value and, (vii) strengthening of institutional capabilities for better monitoring and coordination
23. Arrivals for 2005 were projected to be 600,000 (Federation of Chambers of Commerce in Sri Lanka, 2005: 2).
24. Ministry of Tourism, October 2005
26. The preliminary estimated total cost of rehabilitating the health sector y was Rs. 8.8 billion ($88 million). MoUs have been signed for projects worth over USD 200 million. Additional funding will be needed as on-going assessments are carried out, national reconstruction efforts progress, and new needs are identified
27. The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, 2004
26 Source: IFRC Sri Lanka, November 2005
27 The financial requirement for reconstruction of the damaged schools without identified donors is USD 8.5 million and for the IDP affected schools USD42.5 million. According to the MoE’s plan of action schools will be built with state of the art facilities at an estimated cost of more than SLR 10 billion during 2005-2007. Rehabilitation costs for Jaffna and Ruhuna Universities have been estimated at USD 8 million; and for vocational training centres at SLR 321.4 million.
28 Uncleared area refers to an area not under the complete control of the Government of Sri Lanka and its Armed Forces.
29 Source: UNICEF, Sri Lanka, November 2005
30 An unaccompanied child is a child without parents and is residing in an institution or with non-family caregiver; a separated child is a child with the extended family, but without parents; and children in one-parent families, reflect the situation where a child has lost one parent and is with their father or mother.
31 Figures as of 13 October 2005.
35 Oxfam, 2005