

Programme Evaluation of Disaster Risk Reduction Commissioned by Cordaid



Overall Report

Version 2.30 (Final) 01 February 2010

John Cosgrave

With input via the country studies from:

Hussein Wata, Pierson Ntata, Yulia Immajati and Mihir Bhatt

Acknowledgements

The team would like to acknowledge the assistance that they received from the Cordaid evaluation department (Rens Rutten) and from the other members of the Reference Group (Sasja Kamil, Inge Leuverink, and Marlou Geurts). The high quality of (and the amount of thought that had gone into) the of the Terms of Reference was much appreciated.

Assistance from the Cordaid staff dealing with the DRR programme in the field (in Ethiopia and Indonesia - there are no Cordaid staff in Bangladesh or Malawi) was also much appreciated.

The team are very grateful for all of the assistance provided by the many Cordaid partners that they visited. We are especially thankful for the time that the hundreds of people we interviewed took to answer our questions and to explain their projects.

We appreciate the comments that have been made from the External experts, both on the draft and at the presentation of the evaluation in the Hague January 2010.

Finally we would like to thank the many communities that gave the team a very warm welcome and patiently answered our queries.

Note: The cover Image shows a collage of images taken during fieldwork in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Bangladesh. (Images from Indonesia are presented on the summary version of this report).

Executive Summary

This is the summary evaluation report for the Cordaid-funded Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programme. This report is based on four country reports¹ as well as an online survey of Cordaid partners and interviews at Cordaid's headquarters.

The purpose of the evaluation is to gain greater insight into and understanding of the efficiency, relevance, and effectiveness of the Cordaid DRR programme and the best strategies for any future DRR programme.

Cordaid's DRR programme is fundamentally rooted at the community level. The Community-Managed DRR (CMDRR) process uses a community-driven approach. After partners have been trained in the method, they then engage in community mobilisation, leading to a hazard mapping by the community and a community designed plan to reduce their disaster risks. Cordaid then generally funds some element of the plan.

While the CMDRR approach is a bottom-up community-driven development approach, decisions on funding the plans developed by the community are still taken in a centralised top-down way. The community has control of planning, but not of any additional resources, thus the approach is more community-planned than community-managed.

When implemented well, Cordaid's approach works well. Communities were able to give examples of how their resilience had increased and they typically indicated that there were two critical enablers in addition to resources: being organised; and having the necessary knowledge and skills to implement the risk reduction measures.

Some of the CMDRR interventions are already clearly sustainable, despite the relatively short time that the project has been running. In general, activities that broadened livelihoods or produced an income stream were more likely to be sustainable and to be replicated outside the project area.

Many of the Cordaid DRR activities sought to reduce disaster risks by broadening livelihoods to increase community capacity to withstand shocks. These interventions took the form of risk-aware development. As disasters are commonplace in developing countries rather than being the rare events of the developed world, DRR provides a useful entry point for development initiatives with communities.

Like any good quality development approach CMDRR demands time and skilled staff. This requires strong capacity building support for partners, and also requires that partners retain their trained staff. Partners valued the training provided by Cordaid and the cross-learning which Cordaid encouraged.

Partner effectiveness was related to a number of factors including: openness to the DRR concept; recent disaster experience; strength of their links with the community; synergy with other interactions; understanding of the methodology; technical competence; and their ability to mobilise communities.

The time frame of many projects was too short to enable either project success or a good return on the capacity-building investment.

The balance between participation and benefit is ensured by the CMDRR approach. However, the community contribution on a small number of interventions was relatively low compared with the total expenditure. This raises questions about longer-term sustainability of such interventions if the community cannot meet the maintenance cost.

¹ Ethiopia, Malawi, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.

The selection of the countries for the DRR programme and of the DRR partners in those countries was reasonable given the disaster profiles of the countries and the experience of the partners.

The most successful DRR interventions were those which leveraged community and government resources. However, this was not the result of a conscious strategy, but had developed as a result of the work of particular partners and communities. Similarly, the most important linkages for the DRR projects were found to be the linkages with government. Again, although a key success factor, it was not a deliberate focus of the project.

Relief, rehabilitation, and development are linked at the community level, but not within Cordaid. This is a structural issue stemming from the current sectoral division within Cordaid. Partners said that dealing with different sectors in Cordaid was like dealing with separate donors.

Disasters affect the poor most and can deepen and entrench poverty as well as wiping out development gains. More than half the partners responding to the survey have had projects affected by disasters. However, Cordaid does not make any formal assessment of potential disaster hazards in reviewing applications for funding.

DRR is not internalised within Cordaid, or within most of their partners. However, some partners have made major strides in institutionalising DRR within their organisations. Cordaid's own lack of mainstreaming of risk-aware approaches puts it in a weak position when it comes to encouraging their partners to adopt such approaches.

While there have been some successes in promoting greater attention to DRR by others, there is a lot more scope for advocacy by Cordaid and its partners on DRR at the national level.

Summary of recommendations

The following recommendations are made in the main text of the report. They are grouped here by:

- Programme design
- Partner support
- Funding policy; and
- Mainstreaming.

Number	Page	Programme Design Recommendations
<i>Recommendation 2</i>	33	Cordaid should select DRR partners based on their likely effectiveness in implementing DRR projects.
<i>Recommendation 10</i>	47	Cordaid and its partners should give priority to DRR works with communities to which DRR is of the greatest interest.
<i>Recommendation 11</i>	47	All DRR projects with communities should contain some livelihood element, including helping to provide a broader livelihood base.
<i>Recommendation 13</i>	54	Cordaid should formally include (unless inappropriate) the building of links with local government and the mobilisation of government resources as two of the objectives for each of the projects supported under the DRR programme.

Number	Page	Programme Design Recommendations
<i>Recommendation 15</i>	54	Cordaid should formally include the creation of a favourable local regulatory environment towards DRR as a formal objective of DRR projects (where applicable).
<i>Recommendation 21</i>	60	Cordaid should adopt, as a formal objective for its DRR interventions, the building of strong credible community organisations that can influence government policies so as to reduce the risks the community faces from hazards, through discouraging policies that increase risks, encouraging policies that reduce risk, and leveraging resources for DRR.

Number	Page	Partners Support Recommendations
<i>Recommendation 1</i>	32	Cordaid should continue to provide training for partners and opportunities for study visits by partners and community groups.
<i>Recommendation 3</i>	33	Cordaid should continue to support networking by partners and encourage joint advocacy by them, both at local and national levels.
<i>Recommendation 7</i>	38	Cordaid should pay more attention to staff retention by DRR partners and should take steps to support this.
<i>Recommendation 8</i>	39	Cordaid should invest more resources in project accompaniment for DRR as it brings many advantages apart from the purely monitoring function.

Number	Page	Funding Policy Recommendations
<i>Recommendation 4</i>	38	Cordaid should consider establishing a guideline ratio between community inputs and Cordaid inputs for specific community projects.
<i>Recommendation 5</i>	38	Cordaid should increase the maximum length of funding for DRR projects to five years.
<i>Recommendation 6</i>	38	Cordaid should cede control of at least some funding decisions to the communities planning the interventions.
<i>Recommendation 9</i>	47	Cordaid should continue funding its current DRR pilot for at least another five years to allow more learning by Cordaid and its partners about how the risks that disasters pose to the poorest can be minimised.
<i>Recommendation 14</i>	54	Cordaid should only undertake large investments where there is a significant community contribution, to indicate that the community have the resources to maintain the structure.


Number	Page	Mainstreaming Recommendations
<i>Recommendation 9</i>	47	Cordaid should continue funding its current DRR pilot for at least another five years to allow more learning by Cordaid and its partners about how the risks that disasters pose to the poorest can be minimised.
<i>Recommendation 12</i>	53	Cordaid should include the adoption of a risk-aware approach by partners for their whole portfolio as one of the objectives of the Cordaid DRR programme.
<i>Recommendation 16</i>	57	Cordaid should take a strategic decision to take a risk-aware approach in all of its work.
<i>Recommendation 17</i>	57	Cordaid should develop a simple manual to help its own programme officers to assess whether project proposals adequately consider disaster hazards to which they may be subjected.
<i>Recommendation 18</i>	58	Cordaid should subject all of its own project funding decisions to a review of the hazards to which they may be subjected.
<i>Recommendation 19</i>	58	Cordaid should promote the assessment of disaster hazard by all partner organisations in their whole portfolio (even for partners with no Cordaid DRR funding).
<i>Recommendation 20</i>	58	Cordaid should continue to support a separate DRR programme so that Cordaid and its partners can continue to learn about DRR while trying to mainstream it.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	2
Executive Summary	3
Summary of recommendations	4
Table of Contents	7
Map	9
Acronyms and special terms	10
1 Introduction and methodology	11
Introduction.....	11
Biographies for the evaluators	11
What is in this report?	12
Methods.....	13
The selection of countries and sites.....	15
The selection of partners and projects within countries.....	16
Generalisability	17
Constraints.....	18
Some definitions	18
2 An overview of Cordaid DRR	21
The scale of the Cordaid DRR programme	21
Background	21
Cordaid's DRR approach.....	22
3 Effectiveness.....	28
Conclusions	32
Recommendations	32
4 Efficiency.....	34
Conclusions	37
Recommendations	38
5 Relevance	40
Conclusions	46
Recommendation	47
6 Sustainability	48
Conclusions	53
Recommendations	53
7 Coherence	55
Conclusion	57
Recommendation	57
8 Impact.....	59
Conclusions	60
Recommendations.....	60

Appendix 1 Terms of Reference	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Appendix 2 Terms of Reference Cordaid programme evaluation	61
A2.1 Disaster Risk Reduction	61
A2.2 Cordaid DRR Evolution and Policy	63
A2.3 Proposed evaluation questions	66
A2.4 Planning and organisation evaluation	68
A2.5 Evaluation team.....	70
A2.6 Budget	70
A2.7 Minimal requirements for proposals	70
Appendix 3 DRR Project List	72
Appendix 4 The results of the Web Survey	75
A4.1 Introduction.....	75
A4.2 Survey responses	75
A4.3 Data analysis	76
A4.4 The survey results	77
Appendix 5 Checklist for partners selection.....	81
Appendix 6 Bibliography	82

Map



Locations visited for this evaluation

Acronyms and special terms

Acronym	Meaning
CADECOM	Catholic Development Commission of Malawi
CCoGG	Catholic Church of Gemu Gofa
CIDSE	Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (<i>International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity</i>)
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product (now largely replaced by GNI for statistical purposes)
Haor	Large saucer-shaped flood plain depressions located mostly in north-eastern region of Bangladesh covering about 25% of that region.
INSIST	An NGO network in Indonesia
ODA	Official Development Assistance

1 Introduction and methodology

Introduction

This is the summary evaluation report for the Cordaid-funded disaster risk reduction programme. This report is based on:

- Interviews at Cordaid's headquarters in the Netherlands.
- Four country studies, in Ethiopia, Malawi, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.
- Attendance at Cordaid's Global CMDRR conference in Malawi.
- A trilingual survey of Cordaid's partners which attracted 349 responses.

The purpose of the evaluation is to gain greater insight in and understanding of:

- The efficiency, relevance and effectiveness of the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programme on the lives of vulnerable groups.
- The most efficient, effective and sustainable strategies for Disaster Risk Reduction.

It was intended that the evaluation should contribute to the development of the Cordaid strategy for the next four years from 2010.

Biographies for the evaluators

TEAM LEADER: JOHN COSGRAVE

John Cosgrave is an independent consultant based in Ireland. He has more than 30 years of experience of humanitarian action and development in nearly 60 countries. John has lead numerous evaluations, mostly of humanitarian action, for a wide variety of clients including donors, the UN, and NGOs, as well as for consortia conduction joint evaluations. He was the Evaluation Advisor and Coordinator for the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.

John combines training with evaluation and brings examples from evaluation practice into the classroom. He trains on evaluation for the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and for the International Program for Development Evaluation Training (IPDET). His summary of lessons learned from 30 years of responding to earthquakes was downloaded over 3,500 times from the ALNAP website after the Haiti Earthquake.

DRR AND BANGLADESH EXPERT: DR MIHIR BHATT

Mihir Bhatt is one of the leading figures in Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Asia region. Educated in architecture and city planning in India and in the US (MIT), he has won numerous fellowships including the Russell E. Train Institutional Fellowship, Eisenhower Fellowship, and the Ashoka International Fellowship. In 1989 he initiated a project on disaster risk mitigation which is now the 63 member strong All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI) working in 5 states of India and 3 countries in South Asia. He has led work with risk transfer initiatives in the region.

Mihir is an experienced evaluator, and has conducted reviews of many disaster responses, including the Tsunami, as well as of DRR work. He was a member of Core Management Group of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, is a Senior Fellow at Humanitarian Initiatives at Harvard, a full member of ALNAP and a member of the advisory committee of the ProVention Consortium.

ETHIOPIAN EXPERT: HUSSAIN WATTA

Hussein Watta Kaliyo has more than 20 years experience with Humanitarian Aid, Relief, Rehabilitation, and Rural Development Projects in Africa with experience in Ethiopia, Namibia, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Sudan. Hussein Watta Kaliyo has participated in the terminal evaluation of World Vision Ethiopia and Evangelical Makane Yesus, Afar Area development Program and in the terminal evaluation of South Wollo Emergency/Rehabilitation Program implemented by ZOA Refugee Care in Ethiopia.

Mr. Kaliyo is Ethiopian with comprehensive knowledge and experience of Ethiopia and speaks Afan Oromo, Amharic, English and Swahili.

MALAWIAN EXPERT: DR PIERSON NTATA

Pierson Ntata, a sociologist, is the Head of Sociology Department at Chancellor College of the University of Malawi. He is a graduate of the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom and an Affiliate Fellow of the Centre for Social Research of the University. He is an experienced researcher and evaluator and has carried out research work on the social impact of HIV/AIDS, food security, beneficiary participation in aid projects and other topics.

Pierson has extensive research and evaluation experience throughout the region and conducted evaluations for the Disasters Emergency Committee in Sudan and Malawi, as well as a range of other studies for assorted UN organisations, Donors, and NGOs. Pierson is a Malawian National and speaks a range of languages.

INDONESIAN EXPERT: DR YULIA IMMAJATI

Yulia Immajati graduated from Australia National University in 2007 with a PhD in the situation of women in Aceh in the period 1999-2003. She was a Senior Consultant in the Evaluation of Assistance to IDP's in Indonesia, a project that was part of a global exercise undertaken by a network of donors. She also worked as special advisor to the UNFPA representative on Emergency & Humanitarian Affairs in Indonesia and East Timor, which involved overseeing the implementation of UNFPA projects in emergency areas through different NGO partners.

Yulia recently covered the Social Fabric aspects of the Joint Evaluation of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development of the Tsunami Evaluation Commission, funded by Sida. She is a specialist in action research and gender in development, and has a strong track record of working in large evaluation teams in sensitive areas. Yulia is an Indonesian national who speaks fluent Bhasa Indonesia, Javanese, Basic Achenese and fluent English.

What is in this report?

This report sets out the findings and conclusions from the work of the evaluation team. This report is supported by the four country reports each of which gives more details on the individual country programmes. This main report also draws on interviews in the Netherlands as well as the online survey conducted of Cordaid partners.

The report is structured around the questions posed in the terms of references with the following sections:

- An overview of the Cordaid DRR approach
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Relevance
- Sustainability

- Coherence
- Impact

Methods

The main methods used for data gathering for this report were:

- Key informant interviews with partners
- Key informant interviews with Cordaid staff in the Netherlands and elsewhere
- Focus group discussions with partners
- Community meetings
- Observation of both the environmental context and of project activities
- Participation in and observation of workshops
- Document review, including Cordaid project records
- An online survey in which 341 Cordaid Partners provided answers to the survey questions (43% of those getting email requests). The survey is described in Appendix 1 at the end of this report.

TRIANGULATION

Triangulation was the chief means used by the evaluation team to ensure the validity and reliability of the research². The team used the following forms of triangulation in the research:

- Method triangulation: Comparing the results from different methods e.g. comparing between:
 - Key informant interviews
 - Observation
 - Survey
 - Focus group interviews
 - Group interviews
 - Partners Workshop
 - Documentary review
- Source triangulation: Comparing information from different sources e.g. comparing information from beneficiaries with that from Cordaid staff, with partner staff, with other stakeholders.
- Researcher triangulation: Comparing the analyses developed by the team leader and the four locally-based researchers.
- Partner triangulation: Comparing the projects of different partners to see to what extent issues are partner-specific rather than attributable to the Cordaid programme.
- Geographic triangulation: Comparing the programmes in different regions of different countries. This highlights whether issues are limited to a specific context.

In general, there was very little conflict between different sources. The one area where there was some conflict was between how partners represented projects, and the

² See Golafshan (2003) for a discussion of the role of triangulation in ensuring the validity and reliability of qualitative research.

evidence offered by the community. For example, partners sometimes characterised their interventions as sustainable, but the community made it clear that they were not.

For example, in Malawi, one interviewee from a partner spoke highly of a range of livelihood interventions including mushroom farming. However, it became clear at the community level that mushroom production had been dropped as direct support ended for a variety of reasons, including the lack of market access.

This report presents the evaluation teams findings - based on the available evidence. Where there were conflicts, the test applied to them was:

- Where does the weight of evidence lie? If one sources say "Black" and ten other different sources say "White" then the answer is probably "White" (subject to the other factors listed below).
- What agendas do the informants probably have (communities looking for more assistance, all informants trying to portray themselves in the best possible light etc.)?
- Who is closest to the issue, and therefore most likely to be best informed about it? For example, partner staff were best placed to be reliable sources about changes in agency policy, whereas the community were generally best placed to comment on the appropriateness, effectiveness, and sustainability of interventions.
- What reliance can be placed on the different sources? Clearly interviews can be regarded as being more reliable than agency promotional material. Observation is regarded

CONTROLLING BIAS

The team interviewed partner staff in the absence of any Cordaid staff to avoid any bias that might arise from their presence. However, the site visits were normally conducted with partners and even if partner staff were not present, the team would still be associated with the partner.

Controlling bias on field visits

In general, the team avoided asking the community any direct questions about the performance of partners, but used indirect evidence to form a view on:

- *The relationship between the partner and the community – based on such factors as how the partner was greeted; the extent to which the partner was familiar with the leading personalities in the community; and the turnout for the meeting.*
- *The effectiveness of the partner – based on what had been achieved in the community, and of the community's understanding of DRR.*
- *Ownership of the planning process – based on who physically held the plans (in some cases the plans were held by partner staff); who presented the plans; and the community's description of the planning process.*

The selection of countries and sites

THE SELECTION OF COUNTRIES



Figure 1: Countries with Cordaid DRR programmes shown in green. Countries visited are outlined. Fieldwork was confined to four of the ten countries³ where Cordaid is piloting DRR. Country-specific expenditures in these four countries accounted for only 27% of the Cordaid DRR budget (Figure 2). These countries also benefited from some of the multi-country expenditure (33% of the whole), such as the development of the training manuals and other support, as well as some joint projects. The selection of the four countries was made by Cordaid and was set out in the Terms of Reference.

The largest single country for DRR programme expenditure was Kenya (Table 1). Kenya was not visited by the evaluation team as the programme there was recently evaluated and Cordaid were concerned about evaluation fatigue for the partners. While the team did not visit Kenya they still got a view of the programme from:

- Attending a regional workshop in Addis Ababa and listening to some of the partners implementing the Kenya programme.
- Seeing the presentations by the Kenya programme at the Cordaid global DRR meeting in Malawi.
- Reviewing the videos produced by the Kenya and Uganda programmes.
- Seeing similar communities (marginalised pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities) in a similar environmental context (threatened by climate change, other changes, and drought) in South Omo in Ethiopia.

³ The ten countries are: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, and Zambia in Africa (Ethiopia and Malawi were visited); India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia, in Asia (Bangladesh and Indonesia were visited), and Honduras and El Salvador in Central America (neither of which were visited).

What part of the Cordaid DRR budget '04-'08 was spent in the countries visited by the evaluation team?




Figure 2: Cordaid's DRR expenditure as distributed between the countries visited and those not visited. The multi-country expenditures were partly for the countries visited.

Evaluations place demands on partners and it is perfectly acceptable to avoid visiting countries or projects to avoid placing too heavy a burden on them. In general, the features of the Kenya programme as seen in the meetings at Addis Ababa and Lilongwe, and in their documents and videos reinforced the lessons from the countries visited.

Similarly the team did not visit the second highest area for Cordaid expenditure, India. However the team gained an insight of this from the workshop in Malawi, and from the similar environmental context with Bangladesh. Bangladesh also represents a country with a more severe disaster profile than India, in part due to its geography, and where there has been a longer history of international support for DRR than in India.

While two of the five African programmes and two of the three Asian programmes were visited, neither of the two Central American countries was visited. It was clear from the workshop in Malawi that the partners in Central America were adopting some innovative and effective approaches. However, a visit to Central America would have significantly increased the cost of the evaluation, and the expenditure in Central America represented only 1.6% of the total Cordaid DRR expenditure.

Taking all of these factors into account, the team considered that the selection of counties to be a reasonable balance between the coverage and the cost of the evaluation.

The selection of partners and projects within countries

The mechanism for the selection of partners and projects varied between countries. Generally, the selection was developed by Cordaid or by their partners with some input from the consultants. Excessive time cost ruled out some projects (projects in Papua, Indonesia), and others were excluded because they had recently been evaluated (for ECHO, in the case of some projects in Ethiopia).

The sample of projects visited was therefore a purposive sample of adjacent clusters of projects rather than a random sample. However the projects visited were drawn from across each country. Reaching the different projects usually involved significant travelling with long hours on the road together with internal air travel⁴. Travel in Bangladesh involved 29 ferry and boat trips. Partners everywhere were proud of what

⁴ Internal air travel was used in three of the four countries visited with one round trip in Ethiopia, a four sector circuit in Indonesia, and three sectors in Bangladesh.

they had achieved and were keen to show it off, and the evaluators had to curtail the programme on one or two occasions.

The projects visited generally represented a range sample of the projects in each country. The projects visited generally included the most successful projects, but also included projects which had been less successful. Overall the team considered that, compared with the project portfolio in each country, the projects visited represented a fair sample of the Cordaid-funded DRR projects.

This evaluation is based on extensive research. During the fieldwork the team met and interviewed 238 people between the four countries and the Netherlands. More than 500 others were met in group meetings held by the team and another 100 at meetings that the team attended.

The team visited multiple partners and typically two to six projects for each of the partners visited.

<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>Malawi</i>	<i>Indonesia</i>	<i>Bangladesh</i>
Farm Africa	Dedza Dioceses	Insist and partners	PDIM
EPaRDA	Mangochi Dioceses.	Bina Swaradaya	INDAP
CCoGG	Zomba Dioceses.		DAM CU
JeCCDO	Blantyre Dioceses.		Caritas VARD

It should not be thought that the team visited the easiest to reach partners, or that the results are biased by convenience. In Ethiopia, three of the partners were a two day drive away, and one small project was a full day's drive over very bad roads. Malawi was the only country where the team did not have to use air transport to visit the wide range of sites. While only two partners were visited in Indonesia, one of these was a network with a range of sub-partners with their own very different programmes. Even this programme required extensive air and road travel.

Generalisability

It is sometimes suggested that the use of purposive sampling, rather than of random sampling, leads to conclusions which are not generalisable by statistical means. This is true for statistical generalisation. However, it can be argued that:

- Case studies can generalise theories (analytical generalisation) rather than expected frequencies (statistical generalisation) by demonstrating that the same mechanism has occurred across a wide range of instances (Yin, 2003, pp. 10-11).
- There is so much variety, of partner types, intervention types, and of implementation arrangements in the Cordaid DRR programme that any statistical patterns emerging from random sampling would have been submerged in the noise generated by the enormous variety within the programme.
- Case study results can be generalised to the whole programme where a consistent pattern emerges across a wide range of case studies as happened with this evaluation.

Therefore a case study approach based around purposive sampling is the most appropriate way to generate generalisable conclusions about the Cordaid DRR programme.

Constraints

The main constraints were those imposed by the time available for the fieldwork. Cordaid projects were generally widely dispersed in the countries visited. This meant that logistics was a dominant consideration in planning the fieldwork. It also meant that a random sampling of projects was not feasible, because project selection had to be based on what was logistically sensible.

Obviously, with more time and money it would have been possible to visit more countries and more projects. However, there the law of diminishing returns applies quite rapidly and even during the limited fieldwork available, visits later on in each particular disaster context in a country only served to confirm what had been found earlier in that disaster context in that country.

Some definitions

The definitions used in the evaluation will normally be those drawn from Annex 1 of *Living with Risk* (United Nations, 2004). However some terms will be used in a different sense.

Vulnerability will be used in the restricted sense adopted by Cordaid for partner training, so that it refers to geographical vulnerability to hazards. The social, economic, and environmental aspects of vulnerability are treated in this evaluation as shortages of specific capacities rather than as vulnerabilities.

Is Cordaid's use of a restricted sense of 'vulnerability' a problem?

The use of the term vulnerability in this restricted way is controversial. The reason why Cordaid has adopted this use stems from the experience of training partners in the overall project approach. It was difficult to get some partners to focus on disaster-related vulnerabilities rather than on much broader social vulnerabilities.

In practice, the evaluation team found that this restricted use of vulnerability was not a problem in practice. Partners who had DRR funding from multiple sources were sophisticated enough to be able to cope with this different use by Cordaid compared to some other donors. The evaluation team also considered that using the term in a restricted sense helped partners to focus on capacities.

Cordaid's restricted use of vulnerability fitted much better with its empowerment approach. Treating the factors that increase exposure to hazards as vulnerabilities would have served to promote the concept that those affected by disasters were passive victims, whereas treating such factors as a lack of capacity emphasises that communities can act to reduce their exposure to hazards.

However, some partners used a more conventional definition of vulnerability. For example, the CADECOM CMDRR manual uses Anderson and Woodrow's (1989) definition of vulnerability as "a set of prevailing or consequential conditions, which adversely affect the community's ability to prevent, mitigate, prepare for or respond to hazard events". Interestingly, Anderson and Woodrow's key contribution in this 1989 text was encouraging agencies to think about a community's capacities and not just their vulnerabilities as had been the practice previously.

Although Cordaid's restricted use of the term vulnerability is more correct than the general usage, in that it focuses attention on capacities, it does lead to the situation

where the word had a different meaning for Cordaid than for the rest of the DRR community. This may not be sustainable in the longer term.

The *served population* is the population at risk from disaster hazards that are being assisted by the partner's DRR projects.

Programme will be used to refer to the evaluated Cordaid programme only. Other groups of projects will be referred to as portfolios of projects rather than as programmes.

Partner will be used in the following discussion to refer to organisations that are implementing projects with funding from Cordaid.

Disaster Risk Reduction: The conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development.

The disaster risk reduction framework is composed of the following fields of action:

- Risk awareness and assessment including hazard analysis and vulnerability/capacity analysis;
- Knowledge development including education, training, research and information;
- Public commitment and institutional frameworks, including organisational, policy, legislation and community action;
- Application of measures including environmental management, land-use and urban planning, protection of critical facilities, application of science and technology, partnership and networking, and financial instruments;
- Early warning systems including forecasting, dissemination of warnings, preparedness measures and reaction capacities.

It should be noted that the five elements of this DRR framework are essentially the same as the components of the *Hyogo Framework for Action* (UNISDR, 2005). The Hyogo Framework for Action resulted from the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in the third week of January 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. The conference adopted a framework for ten years to 2015 for both the international community and national governments to build the resilience of nations and communities for disasters.

During the evaluation we found that the Cordaid DRR projects could be divided into two types depending on their primary focus:

- The first type are what we call *conventional risk reduction*, where the primary focus is on reducing disaster risk through early warning, preparedness, awareness, physical risk reduction, and disaster knowledge. Such projects typically focused around a predominant hazard (e.g. earthquakes in Indonesia), and were readily recognisable as DRR projects.
- The second type of projects concentrated most of their efforts on development interventions that increased the resilience of communities to disaster (such as winter-cropping in Malawi). These projects often had little or no early warning or hazard awareness components. However, they still reduced disaster risks because the development interventions were designed by communities to address the livelihood shocks that they suffer from disasters. We call these interventions *risk-aware development*.

The difference between the two types is subtle, but the second type focus primarily on one element of the risk reduction framework, that of building resilience through economic development in a hazard aware way.

Risk-aware development or a conventional livelihoods focus?

Some commentators have asked whether risk-aware development is not just a new name for livelihood-focused development. There are certainly some similarities. Because the CMDRR process empowers communities to decide the shape and focus of the DRR intervention, they focus on their primary concern, which is their livelihood, so that at this level it is similar to a livelihoods approach.

The difference lies in the starting point; for the community-driven project design is an analysis by the community of the disaster hazards that they face. This encourages communities to design livelihood interventions which take the risk of disasters into account, thus increasing their resilience to them.

This contrasts with conventional development projects which often operate on the implicit assumption that the trajectory of development will not be upset by disaster. Thus the risk-aware approach is a type of community-driven livelihood approach which takes the risks posed by disasters to development into account.

2 An overview of Cordaid DRR

The scale of the Cordaid DRR programme

DRR has been a programme of growing importance in Cordaid in the last five years.

Table 1: Cordaid DRR programming by year and country

Country	Sum of grants by year in thousands of Euros					Total
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
Multi-country	62	70	1,387	442	4,629	6,589
Kenya	2,431			927	564	3,922
India				568	1,804	2,372
Ethiopia		765	291	935		1,991
Bangladesh				1,123	526	1,650
Uganda		346	65	388	705	1,505
Indonesia			69	308	650	1,027
Malawi	252		122		500	873
Central America					330	330
Total	2,745	1,181	1,934	4,690	9,709	20,259

Background

Two major routes seem to have led Cordaid to Disaster Risk Reduction:

- An intellectual approach driven by a consideration of the need for linkage between development and relief interventions.
- A pragmatic approach driven by an analysis of hazards faced by the marginalised pastoralist communities assisted by Cordaid. This is reflected in the Drought Cycle Management approach pioneered by Cordaid (IIRR et al., 2004).

The relief community has been struggling with the concept of Linking Relief to Recovery and Development (LRRD) for nearly two decades. However, LRRD may be more about how donors differentiate between development and relief assistance budgets rather than about the perspective of the affected population. In their review of the LRRD literature, Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri note that:

Almost all the literature on LRRD has been written from the point of view of the aid industry which has organised itself over the years according to these particular categories. The debate has been concerned with organisational mandates; with labels given to different types of aid and the differing objectives, conditions and funding regimes associated with each of those different labels; with the way that institutions organise themselves and with clashing cultures and priorities. ... Although the perspectives of local people whom the aid industry sets out to assist are occasionally mentioned – usually in the context that neat categories of relief, rehabilitation and development mean rather little to people involved in the day-to-day struggle to survive and build their livelihoods – there has been remarkably little research done, or reports written on LRRD from their perspective. (2005, p. 4)

However, Cordaid's approach to LRRD was driven not by concerns about how donors allocated their funding but about practical considerations about how disasters and development interact with each other. This is reflected in the definition of linkage adopted by Cordaid:

Linkage implies a holistic approach to development with eye for risks of disasters and internal social, political and economical tensions. The situation should be regarded as a complex interlinked system where interventions have both direct and indirect effects². Different types of approaches, i.e. emergency aid and structural poverty reduction strategies, should be used simultaneously where necessary. The transition between the approaches needs to be smoothed. (Cordaid Working Group Linkage, 2003, p. 2)

Cordaid's learning from both the linkage project and from the Drought Cycle Management approach led to Cordaid initiating the current Disaster Risk Reduction pilot. Again, this was not a dry academic approach, but one based on the knowledge and experience of the affected population.

Cordaid's DRR approach

Effective risk reduction requires work at all levels of a society. For example, in the case of tsunami preparedness, you need an international or regional warning system, coupled with national preparedness and warning, down to awareness of the hazard at a family and individual level. Different hazards require action and risk reduction at different levels. In the case of the hazards associated with climate change this demands action at an international level as well as at other levels.

Cordaid's DRR programme is fundamentally rooted at the community level. The Community Managed DRR process uses a community driven approach with the following elements:

- A facilitated process with the community which:
 - Introduced the DRR Concept.
 - Assists the community to develop an analysis of the hazards that they face, identifying the main hazards and ranking them in terms of priorities for action.
 - Assists the community to identify an existing structure or to create a new one that can manage the DRR process.
- The development of an action plan by the community DRR structure that takes into account:
 - The hazards that the community face and their ranking.
 - The capacities that the community has.
 - The resources that the community may be able to access.
- Cordaid may then decide to fund some parts of the action plan developed by the community.

The process is sometimes a little messier than this, with a DRR structure emerging earlier on that effectively leads it or the process in a wider area than that first targeted.

It should also be noticed that the final stage represents a transition from what is a community managed decentralised process, to a top-down process that is managed from The Hague. This contradiction will be discussed in the section on efficiency below.

Training the community

The following headings for community training modules from the CADECOM DRR training manual (2008) give some idea of how the approach is applied in the field. This is an idealised representation, and the actual process can vary.

- *Understanding disaster risk reduction*

- *Understanding and managing risks*
- *Livelihood analysis*
- *Hazard assessment*
- *Vulnerability assessment*
- *Capacity assessment*
- *Disaster risk analysis*
- *Community organization*
- *Community empowerment and participation*
- *Community-oriented plans*
- *Mainstreaming HIV and AIDS issues in DRR*
- *Mainstreaming gender in DRR*
- *Good governance and human rights*

While there have been some activities on the national, regional, and international levels, most of the effort of the Cordaid DRR programme is concentrated at community level as shown in Figure 3. This picture varies by country, with very effective interaction with the district level in some projects in Ethiopia and Indonesia, some interaction at this level in Bangladesh, and relatively little in Malawi. Interaction at the national level is weaker, but there are still some good examples such as the CADECOM CMDRR manual that is under consideration for adoption as a standard approach by the Government in Malawi.




Figure 3: The distribution of Cordaid's DRR effort. Darker colours show a greater concentration of effort.

On the Global level, Cordaid is working with other Caritas partners in CIDSE (*International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity*) on the issue of climate change and on climate justice.

DRR is normally presented as a combination of actions in five areas: institutions; preparedness and early warning; public awareness; disaster knowledge and physical risk reduction. All five elements are evident in the Cordaid programme but some elements are stronger than others (Figure 4). Figure 4 represents what the evaluation team would constitute the ideal for the contexts of the projects visited. Thus, for Malawi, the team




Figure 4: Spider diagram showing how the six of the different DRR elements in the four country programmes. (The closer the points are to the ideal, the better).

considered that preparedness could usefully have been a larger focus in the projects seen.

Figure 4 should be interpreted with caution as there was significant variation between the focus of different projects within countries. Early warning played a very significant part in some projects in Ethiopia, but was not very strong in others. The figure shows that the Indonesia programme is closest to the ideal. This is a combination of the presence of quite sophisticated partners with previous experience in community driven approaches and the high level of accompaniment provided specifically for DRR.




Figure 5: A spider diagram summarising the overall Cordaid DRR programme.

Figure 5 represents the average rating of the five DRR elements over the four countries visited. This emphasises that overall, the creation of DRR structures and institutions at the community level is consistently the strongest area of performance of the Cordaid DRR programme across all four countries.

At the start of the evaluation the expectation of the team leader was that the Cordaid DRR programme was a technical DRR programme concentrating on these five DRR areas. It soon emerged that the programme was more complex than this and more sophisticated. Figure 6 shows the logic model used by the team to describe and analyse the programme.

The key differences between what was found and what was expected were:

- There was a great deal of variability within the programme, not only between the different country programmes, but also between different partners within countries. The variability between partners allowed cross-learning in Indonesia. There was a third layer of variability within partners, with wide variations in performance between parts of partner programmes.
- Generally, the Cordaid DRR programme was not concentrated on technical DRR measures, but more on risk-aware development. If anything, the most successful interventions were akin to the "Training for Transformation" approach.
- Building community structures and developing their ability to influence government played a large part in the most effective interventions.
- The partnership modality was not a single model, but represented a very wide range of approaches, from working with a single partner in Malawi, to working with partnership networks in Indonesia. All of the different variations in partnership brought different strengths and weaknesses with them.

- The capacity building required by partners was more significant than had been expected as it included not only DRR concepts, but also training in using community-driven development approaches.

All of these issues will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections of the report.




Figure 6: Logic model for the Cordaid DRR programme

All of the Cordaid DRR interventions shown in Figure 6 are described as being investments in DRR capacity. Cordaid uses the general hazards and capacities model, except that Cordaid treats most of the conventional vulnerabilities as lacks of capacity.

$$\text{Disaster risk} = \text{Hazard} \times \frac{\text{Vulnerability}}{\text{Capacity}}$$

Under the Cordaid model, as vulnerabilities are essentially related to geographical factors, almost all DRR interventions (other than resettlement, which none of the projects visited had engaged in) are related to capacities. Even activities such as preventing construction in areas that are vulnerable (in the Cordaid sense) can be represented in the Cordaid model as increases in the capacity to control development.

The investments in DRR capacity in the programmes of partners shown in the logic model (Figure 6) refer to investments of capacity at the community level. In order to achieve this, Cordaid has also invested on three levels:

- Investment in the capacity of partners so that they can implement the CMDRR approach. This often requires significant training for partners, not just in the DRR approach itself, but also in the community-driven aspects of the CMDRR.
- Investment in the mobilisation work of partners at the community level. CMDRR works best when there is an effective community mobilisation process that cedes control of the project to the community during the mobilisation phase. This investment in mobilisation was supported by investment in cross-learning by communities.
- Investment in the DRR activities selected by communities.

The mix and balance of these investments varies between partners and between country programmes.

3 Effectiveness

The following were the main questions that the evaluation team was asked to answer about effectiveness⁵. This section will address not only these questions, but also broader issues of effectiveness which arose during the evaluation. The same policy will be adopted in the subsequent sections.

What are the mechanisms to strengthen the linkages between the different actors at different levels (Cordaid – partners – communities) and do these linkages contribute to the results for DRR?

What are the factors that enable the implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction interventions at the level of partner organisations?

To what extent have the DRR capacities of groups that face disaster risks been strengthened?

Which (combination of) levels of intervention are the most effective to reach the before mentioned results.

Has Cordaid, in cooperation with its partners, succeeded to increase donor attention and support for DRR with other stakeholders like large donors, INGOs (Caritas network) and governments?

Effectiveness addresses whether a project or a programme achieves its objective or not. Many of the projects carried out by partners had differing objectives, but the overarching one was that of reducing the potential impact of disasters on communities.

Does the Cordaid approach work?

Before turning to the specific questions, comes the more general one: does the Cordaid approach work?

The approach consists of a community mobilisation effort to engage the community in doing an analysis of the hazards that they face. This is followed by the community identifying their priorities for action, some of which the community can do itself, and some of which require assistance from partners.

The approach is very much community-driven, and the evaluation team saw several examples of where the approach had worked very well in all four countries visited. However, there were also sites where the approach had not been applied, or been poorly applied, and where as a result, it had not worked well. Partners noted that the approach was time consuming, and demanded high skills of their staff.

This is a feature that Cordaid's DRR work shares with all good community development work. It is not easy, it takes time, and it demands skilled staff to make it happen. Partner staff need knowledge of DRR and skills in community-driven development. This requires strong Cordaid support for building the capacity of partners.

When the approach is applied by partners who have a good track record in community mobilisation, the approach worked quite well. In all of the four countries it was clear that the most effective projects were those where the partner had the ability to mobilise the community and then step back into a supporting role.

Any project has large numbers of potential linkages, cross-linkages between community and partners, and linkages to government and other stakeholders. It soon became clear that whether dealing with early warning in Ethiopia, local authority by-laws in Indonesia, or enhanced flood protection in Bangladesh, one of the most important

⁵ One question – on fostering capacities to influence – has been shifted to the impact section, and another question on the factors enabling implementation has been shifted from the efficiency section.

linkages was with government. The most effective projects were those where partners were able to influence government.

Where partners could influence government, they could often leverage large amounts of resources for their DRR work. This was just as true whether communities were mobilising resources for an animal disease outbreak in Ethiopia, influencing planning and quarrying in Ethiopia and Indonesia, or influencing flood protection work in Bangladesh. However, this focus had developed from the grass roots rather than being a strategic focus of the Cordaid programme. This issue is discussed further in the section on impact.

What strengthened the linkages most was success. Where projects delivered real benefits to the community, this strengthened the linkages. In Bantul in Indonesia, the success of the DRR group in managing a local water project led to much stronger links with local government and access to much greater resources.

Another factor that tended to strengthen linkages with government was where local government officials were also the target for training on DRR. This approach worked very well in Ethiopia, and it was noticeable in Malawi that government extension officers played a strong role in some of the DRR activities. Partners regarded the training provided by Cordaid very highly and partners staff turnover meant that there was a continuing demand for training.

While partners strongly appreciated funding from Cordaid, all partners also referred to the training provided by Cordaid in the DRR approach. Partners with a more sophisticated approach, such as INSIST and several others in Indonesia, appreciated the opportunity to debate and discuss the approach with Cordaid. This was also a feature in the other country with a Cordaid office; Ethiopia. This suggests that local accompaniment can lead to a richer exchange with partners. In countries without a Cordaid office (such as Bangladesh) this role is partially filled by networking workshops.



Figure 7: On the coast of Sumatra, concerns about the mining of sand accelerating coastal erosion led to a project partner successfully influencing local government to ban sand-mining on one part of the coast.

Cross learning – a key strategy for Cordaid

Partners identified support for cross-learning and cross-linkages as one of the aspects the distinguished Cordaid's support from that of other donors.

Cross linkages between partners and between communities were a strong feature of the Cordaid programme. These included workshops for partners in all the three countries with more than one partner. Partners in Bangladesh were part of a cross-learning network as were those in Indonesia. The strongest cross-linkages were in Indonesia, where active accompaniment supported cross-learning. In both Bangladesh and Indonesia some partners had assumed a formal role in assisting others.

Opportunities for learning and sharing experience through study visits were universally popular, not only with Cordaid's partners, but also with communities. Community members rated study visits highly because they saw particular approaches being used in practice and had the opportunity to ask about the implementation and decide how the approach might work in their own contexts.

Across all the countries there were a set of key factors that influenced the ability of partners to carry out DRR work effectively. These included:

- The openness of the partner to the DRR concept and their willingness to commit to it. The programme worked best where partners were strongly committed to it (Merapi Volcano in Indonesia, or Dire Dawa in Ethiopia).
- The partner's disaster experience. The more direct and recent experience of disasters the partners had, the more interested they were in DRR.
- The strength of the linkages of the partners with the communities. Partners that had very good links with the community were able to implement more effectively (Farm Africa in Ethiopia and some of the Bina Swadaya interventions in Indonesia).
- The synergy with other interventions. Where partners had other projects with communities these sometimes led to long engagement or many other activities with the community (the Catholic Church of Gemu Gofa in Ethiopia, and some CADECOM projects in Malawi).
- The understanding of the Cordaid DRR methodology. Where partners understood the methodology and applied it, this worked well. Sometimes this was not the case where there had been significant staff turnover or where partners adhered to their former methodology.
- The technical competence of the partner. Partners with technical competence in the technical aspects of the disaster hazard were well placed to guide communities into effective action (JECCDO in Dire Dawa).
- The competence of the partner to mobilise communities using a community-driven approach. In Indonesia it was the partners with the greatest experience of community-driven development that were the fastest at applying the CMDRR approach.

The above are partner factors for effectiveness. Another key issue for partners was the extent to which communities had recently been exposed to hazards. Communities that had recently faced either sudden-onset or slow-onset disasters were far more interested in DRR than others. For example, the communities who had suffered during the May 2009 Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh were very interested in DRR. Communities at continuing risk of drought in Ethiopia and Malawi were also very interested in reducing their risks.

The best evidence for the strengthening of the DRR capacities of groups came from the groups themselves. In all countries the community groups supported by project partners said that the project had increased their capacity to face disaster risks⁶. Communities gave specific examples of how project interventions had increased their resilience. Their examples included: irrigation, soil conservation, and goats in Ethiopia; improved cropping practices and irrigation in Malawi; volcano eruption preparedness in Indonesia; and flood and cyclone preparedness in Bangladesh. Many of the projects seen increased the resilience of communities to disaster.

In all cases, communities identified two critical enablers for their increased resilience, in addition to whatever physical input was provided. These two enablers were:

- Knowledge of the hazard and of techniques for minimising risk.
- Being organised.

In some cases, the creation of a functioning community organisation had development implications far beyond DRR. This was the case in Bantul, where the DRR group effectively became a local development committee. It was the case also in Ethiopia,

⁶ In Malawi, this was in reference to the previous Disaster Risk Management project rather than to the current DRR one.

where the community groups in Dire Dawa told how they now had influence because they were listened to.

The importance of the DRR group for organising the community depended on what structures already existed. In the Hamar communities in Ethiopia, the DRR group made little difference as the communities were already cohesive. Here, it was the ideas, the knowledge, and the support that the project brought that made the largest difference.

DRR provides a good entry path for organising the community, as Cordaid's approach allows communities to identify their own priorities and to make plans. This approach validates the community's existing knowledge and promotes self-organisation.

The ways that partners used to engage with communities varied greatly. The approach that any partner used depended on a number of factors including:

- The cultural norms and existing community structures
- The partner's previous relationship with the community
- The partner's interest and capacity in a community-driven approach

Communities were often quite knowledgeable about the hazards that they faced. However, they often cited knowledge about how to minimise the hazard as one of the biggest impacts of the project, and groups in all countries referred to how they had gained in useful knowledge and skills from the project.

In all countries, but especially in Malawi and Indonesia, partners made the point that they needed an adequate budget to implement the priorities identified by communities. This issue will be discussed further under efficiency below.

In Malawi, the programme faced budget problems because CADECOM has spent funds on the basis of the original proposed budget and ignored the fact that the budget was only part funded. This meant that the available funds were consumed by staff costs and training with nothing left for the implementation of activities by communities. In Indonesia, the project began with a scoping phase with budgets only for community mobilisation and a limited budget for implementation.

Gender and DRR

In many of the community DRR groups, women were playing a leading role. However this seemed to be a function of the background position of women in society in general, or in the self-help networks, rather than because of any changes brought about by the project.

The extent to which Cordaid succeeded in increasing attention to DRR by other NGOs, donors, and government, varied between the countries. In Ethiopia, Cordaid is well-known for its work on drought cycle management and has played a key role in developing DRR there. In Malawi, the government is expected to adopt CADECOM's DRR training manual as a national standard, but CADECOM is not otherwise seen as a major player in DRR.

The most significant impact in getting increased attention to DRR has been the way in which partners and communities have managed to attract government resources for DRR. This has been a strong feature in Ethiopia and Indonesia.



Figure 8: This group in Ethiopia made the point that before they were organised they were like grains of sand flowing in the stream, now that they are organised, the government has to listen to them.

In Indonesia, Cordaid selected partners for advocacy that had been involved in the development of the Disaster Management Act. These partners were then in a position to cross-link other Cordaid partners with the continuing process for implementing the legislation. Elsewhere, partners and community groups are engaged in local advocacy for risk reduction or for the use of government resources for DRR. While these have been successful, there is often little national level advocacy on DRR by Cordaid and its partners.

Conclusions

When well implemented, Cordaid's approach works, but like any good quality development approach it demands time and skilled staff. This requires strong capacity building support for partners.

The most important linkage for the projects was the linkage with government. This was often a key factor in project success, but this was not always a strategic focus. What strengthened linkages with government were successful project outcomes in the early stages, and joint training with partner and government staff.

Partners valued the training provide by Cordaid, and the opportunities that Cordaid provides to network as well as Cordaid's openness to discussion of DRR projects. Communities and partners both appreciated the learning and networking opportunities provided by study visits. Partners also valued accompaniment visits by Cordaid. Partners identified the willingness to support cross-learning as one of the key differences between Cordaid and other donors. Countries with a Cordaid office had an advantage in terms of greater support for cross-learning.

Partner effectiveness was related to the a number of factors including: openness to the DRR concept; recent disaster experience; strength of their links with the community; synergy with other interactions; understanding of the methodology; technical competence; and their ability to mobilise communities.

The DRR programme has led to the strengthening of communities' resilience to face disaster risks. Communities identified two critical enablers for increased resilience: knowledge and skills; and being organised. Some partners concentrated more on building knowledge and skills rather than on building strong community-led organisations. However, communities generally rated being organised as the most important impact achieved by the project.

While there have been some successes in promoting greater attention to DRR by others, there is a lot more scope for advocacy by Cordaid and its partners for DRR at the national level.

Recommendations

A number of later recommendations refer to the need to include building linkages with local government as a key aim of the DRR programme. This aim could be written into the CMDRR manuals and training materials, as well as providing DRR groups with an understanding of what assistance might be available from government.

Recommendation 1. Cordaid should continue to provide training for partners and opportunities for study visits by partners and community groups.

The continuing demand for partner training arises partly because of issues of staff turnover. This will be discussed below under efficiency. Cross-learning is a powerful tool especially when introducing new concepts such as CMDRR.

Recommendation 2. Cordaid should select DRR partners based on their likely effectiveness in implementing DRR projects.

Appendix 4 A3.1 presents a short checklist for partner selection.

Recommendation 3. Cordaid should continue to support networking by partners and encourage joint advocacy by them, both at local and national levels.

Cordaid is already supporting the development of DRR partner networks, but could not encourage these networks to engage in joint advocacy on specific DRR issues, such as on land erosion in Bangladesh, or the creation of local disaster response funds in Indonesia. This advocacy could be both at the national level for the creation of favourable policies and at the local level for the implementation of existing or new policies in a favourable way.

4 Efficiency

This section strives to answer the following questions

How well do programme benefits balance the costs of participation for the community?

What impact would varying the level of funding have on the outputs?

What is the desired level of accompaniment of the partners by Cordaid and of the groups that face disaster risks by partner organisations?

The balance between programme benefits and the community varies between countries and projects. The best judges of the balance were the community themselves. In most of the projects visited by the evaluation team the community were enthusiastic about the DRR programme activities, indicating that they considered it well worth their time to participate⁷. As the Cordaid DRR methodology is based on active community management of the process, this helps to ensure that there is a balance between participation and benefit.

The issue in some country programmes was that while there was funding for supporting the capacity-building of partners and community mobilisation there was relatively little for the activities that the community planned. This was a clear issue in Malawi (because of spending based on the budget, rather than on the actual funding) and in Indonesia (because of relatively limited funding for partners working over an extensive area).

The balance of community contribution, participation, and benefit at the level of physical inputs into projects varied a lot. Some projects were effectively built around inputs (e.g. flour milling groups in Ethiopia) and some projects with very limited inputs (some examples in Indonesia and Bangladesh). However, several groups made the point that, while they could have done what they did without any inputs, it would have taken many years more. This was particularly the case with aspects of projects, such as community DRR capacity building elements that did not have any immediate livelihood impact

The evaluation team had the biggest concerns about efficiency in those projects where there was the greatest difference between the community contribution and the cost of the asset. The maintenance of assets for which there has been a relatively small community contribution is always a concern. This issue is discussed further in the section on sustainability.

One community contribution that was not costed by partners was the time spent by communities in training and meetings. This sometimes led to an underestimation of the community contribution.

Another efficiency concern was the short time frame attached to the project. The CMDRR approach takes time for the following:



Figure 9: This water storage tank in southern Ethiopia is an example of a high cost project input with relatively low community input.

⁷ There were a few exceptions to this, most notably in Zomba Dioceses in Malawi, where the community were so unhappy with Cordaid's partner that they did not even engage in traditional sung greetings.

- Developing the capacity of the partner to implement the CMDRR approach.
- Building the trust of the community and developing the community's capacity to manage DRR.
- Implementing the interventions chosen by the community.

One interviewee in Ethiopia noted how the community had not trusted a Cordaid partner there for the first two years. However the Cordaid DRR projects were for only three years, two years, and even less in some cases. The time needed for community structures to become established varies, and such short periods of funding mean that only the most quickly developing structures can survive. This means that the investment in setting up community structures may not be repaid in results.

Developing the capacity of partners is expensive, and short-time frames mean that there may be little return for this investment. This is a system-wide problem and does not just apply to Cordaid, but is particularly acute where projects seek to introduce new concepts and methods.

When asked about variations in funding, partners quickly pointed out that their funding could be divided into two parts, the cost of mobilising communities, and the cost of implementing projects. Partners often said that additional funding would allow them to support the more ambitious plans developed by the community planning exercise. The ratio between these two types of costs varied a great deal, depending on the extent to which the partner could offset its operating costs against other funding. However, it should be clear that in some cases, the investments needed were far beyond what Cordaid could reasonably provide. This was the case with the raising of embankments in Bangladesh.

Large-scale investment by Cordaid also tended to reduce community control of the project. This was the case with water storage facilities in Ethiopia and Kenya which were executed by contractors. The most successful projects seen were those where the government and not Cordaid was providing the largest investment. Some partners also drew on funding from other donors for their DRR work. This was particularly the case in Bangladesh where there seems to be greater willingness by donors to fund DRR interventions.

As noted earlier there is an inherent contradiction between the CMDRR process itself and the way in which funds for community projects are managed. While the CMDRR process is a bottom up process, the funding of projects is a top-down one with decisions being taken at The Hague. Partners complained that these decisions sometimes took a long time and slowed implementation⁸.

Ceding control not just of planning but of resources is the most empowering intervention of all, and the most dynamic DRR groups were seen where the community



Figure 10: Detail of a cyclone resistant roof built by one Cordaid partner in Bangladesh with funding from another donor. Partners were generally keen to showcase all their relevant work to the evaluation team, and not just the Cordaid DRR part of it.

⁸ Cordaid managers pointed out that many of the delays were due to partners not providing all the needed information for processing.

had significant control of resources as at Bantul in Indonesia. It was also notable that DRR groups that had small early successes quickly gained in authority in the community and developed far faster than other groups. There is an efficiency question here – DRR groups that were seen as successful by the community attracted more investment from the community itself.

Providing an envelope of seed money that communities could decide how to use for small scale investment would significantly increase empowerment of the DRR groups. This approach has been successfully used in a number of community-driven development projects. Obviously there has to be a balance between community empowerment and responsible financial management, and a strict protocol would be needed for the appropriate control of any such funds.

The Cordaid DRR approach demands staff who are familiar with DRR and the hazards faced by the community, and have the skills to manage a community-driven development process. They must also be modest enough to step back and let the community take the lead. Altogether, this is quite a demanding skill set. Cordaid's partners often work with marginalised groups in what are essentially rural backwaters. This combination of challenging working conditions and a demanding skills set means that staff retention is a major issue for many partners.

Staff turnover is often a problem for national NGOs as staff move on to more lucrative jobs with international NGOs, the UN, or the government after developing their skills and contacts working for national NGOs. Staff turnover is expensive for the project as the investment in training staff is quite high. Some partners seem to have much higher turnover than others. Research by people in Aid identified a number of factors as being responsible for low motivation and high turnover in NGOs. These were:

"... low salary, restructuring and job insecurity, increased employment opportunities elsewhere, issues of personal safety and security, lack of respect and appreciation, under employment, lack of development opportunities, work culture within the workplace and non alignment of values." (Frontera, 2007, p. 1)

Clearly, the human resource policies of partners and the way in which they value their staff have an impact on their staff turnover. While this is a broader strategic issue, Cordaid can still improve efficiency in the DRR projects through its own policies including:

- Making staff retention an overt selection criteria for partners.
- Provide some support to help partner retention through non-monetary rewards like acknowledging good performance.
- Increasing job security for partner staff through longer funding cycles.
- Increase accompaniment visits to indicate that the work of partner staff is valued.

Cordaid's DRR programme was implemented through a range of mechanisms, in some cases with partners who worked directly with the community. In other cases partners did not implement directly themselves but were only the first step in the chain. The most extreme example of this was in Indonesia, where one of Cordaid's partners was INSIST, an NGO network. Within the INSIST




Figure 11: In Indonesia some projects had a long chain down to the community.

network, LTPT managed the project, and Mitra-Aksi (Project Action) executed the project through their local partner WCC. WCC in turn implemented the partner through community groups.

The advantage that INSIST brings is that it is a network, and implementing with INSIST gives a lot of exposure to the Cordaid DRR concept, and INSIST partners are using the DRR approach in a wide range of settings.

The disadvantage is that each step in the chain brings additional costs with it, and it is difficult to achieve effective transfer of the approach through so many partners.

While this means of implementation gives a better chance that the project will be implemented as intended, it also reaches far fewer beneficiaries than the INSIST approach. The evaluation team found that there is no one right approach, but that Cordaid needs to be aware of the implications of the implementation approach used.

Partners appreciated monitoring and other accompaniment visits to their project. Monitoring visits not only helped with cross-learning, but were generally regarded as a validation of their work by partners.

Especially in the two countries where Cordaid had an office, partners frequently cited Cordaid as being their most frequent project visitor, and compared Cordaid favourably with other partners⁹. Partners generally regarded project visits as being a validation of their work. The evaluation team were exposed to this when partners set the agenda, with hectic programmes to visit a wide range of partners and activities¹⁰.

In Bangladesh Cordaid is using a third party, ASK, a Cordaid partner from India to conduct monitoring. Partners in Bangladesh were also positive about this form of monitoring, but regarded it as second best to visits from Cordaid staff.

Communities also appreciated receiving study visits, which they saw as an opportunity to demonstrate the good work they had done. On several occasions, communities (and in some cases partners) took advantage of the visit of the evaluation team to showcase work that they had done under other projects. This was generally done in an open way because communities and partners were proud of what they had done and there was generally no attempt to misrepresent activities as belonging to the project when they did not¹¹.

Conclusions

The balance between participation and benefit is ensured by the CMDRR approach. There were wide variations in the balance between community contribution (including participation) and project benefits. The evaluation team had concerns about the long-run efficiency of spending on more expensive assets when coupled with a relatively small community contribution.

The time frame of many projects was too short for a good return on the expensive capacity building elements, given that the project was introducing both new concepts and methods.

⁹ And in one case even with their own headquarters.

¹⁰ In Bangladesh, this involved a completely full schedule with one project visit by boat at night to a group that were not available during the day.

¹¹ The only possible exception to this was in Malawi. There, delegates at the Global DRR Conference were taken to see CADECOM field activities without it being made clear to them that the activities shown were a result of the previous Disaster Risk Management programme (which had ended more than a year earlier) rather than the current DRR programme.

There were wide variations in the balance between the investment in the community mobilisation process and subsequent investment in the projects that the community planned once they were mobilised. There was a contradiction between the bottom-up community-driven planning approach and the top-down nature of funding decisions. The community has control of planning, but not of any additional resources.

Staff turnover in partners is a major factor that leads to inefficiency through increasing costs and reducing the effectiveness of interventions. Cordaid could encourage improved retention by partners by: focussing on staff retention as an important issue; more overtly valuing the work of partner staff; and increasing their job security.

There was also wide variation in the implementation route, from working with large networks and small NGOs, from working through short chains to the community, and through long chains to the community. The first brought more accurate replication of the Cordaid DRR approach, while the latter brought broader dissemination. Using different approaches is positive in that they will eventually allow Cordaid to identify which is the most efficient.

Partners and communities were generally positive about accompaniment and wanted more of it, in part because it validated what they were doing. It also validated the work of partners' staff working in sometimes difficult conditions in the field. Partners' staff and community members also wanted more opportunities for learning, for networking, and for showcasing what they had achieved.

It should be noted that accompaniment is particularly useful in innovative approaches like CMDRR, where partners need to develop their skills to use new knowledge and new approaches.

Recommendations

Recommendation 4. Cordaid should consider establishing a guideline ratio between community inputs and Cordaid inputs for specific community projects.

This guideline figure would not be a strict cut-off, but would suggest that a project needed to be reviewed very carefully to determine if it represented an efficient use of funds. As an initial figure it is suggested that any project where the cost of the community input is less than 10% of the total cost of the project, needs very careful review to determine if it is justifiable.

Recommendation 5. Cordaid should increase the maximum length of funding for DRR projects to five years.

Increasing the length of funding would not only increase efficiency by allowing more time to get a return on the initial capacity building and mobilisation, but would also do so by providing partners with more secure funding that would help to improve the job security (and therefore retention) of their staff.

Recommendation 6. Cordaid should cede control of at least some funding decisions to the communities planning the interventions.

This could be done through establishing a modest envelope for funding which the community could decide how to use. This approach would also need a clear protocol of checks and balances for such a funding envelope to encourage its appropriate use.

Recommendation 7. Cordaid should pay more attention to staff retention by DRR partners and should take steps to support this.

Such steps could include:

- Beginning a broader dialogue with partners on staff retention issues.

- Making staff retention an overt selection issue for DRR partners.
- Provide some support to help partner retention through non-monetary rewards like acknowledging good performance with, for example, a DRR Mobiliser of the Year award.
- Increasing job security for partner staff through longer funding cycles for DRR.
- Demonstrating that the work of partner staff is valued by visiting their projects.

Recommendation 8. Cordaid should invest more resources in project accompaniment for DRR as it brings many advantages apart from the purely monitoring function.

5 Relevance

How was the process of selection done? What were the criteria for the selection of countries, areas, and partners?

To what extent has Cordaid's selection of countries and partner organisations been relevant?

It is useful to first look at a broader area of relevance. Is DRR relevant to Cordaid's mission at all? Is it relevant to Cordaid's partners? To what extent do disasters disrupt the regular work of Cordaid's partners? To answer the questions of relevance to Cordaid's broader mission and to partners, it is necessary to consider the nature of poverty and disasters, and the role that disasters play in maintaining groups at the margins of society or in situations of structural poverty. The available evidence suggests that:

- The poor are more likely to suffer disasters. Some of the communities interviewed in Bangladesh for this study explicitly identified their poverty as the source of lack of capacity to confront disasters, and all recognised that the poor were more likely to be affected by disasters. *"More than half of disaster deaths occur in low human development countries even though only 11% of people exposed to hazards live there, and these countries suffer far greater economic losses relative to their GDP than richer countries"* (White et al., 2004, p. 1). Thus one would expect Cordaid's partners, who work with the poor, to suffer from disasters. More than half of those responding to the survey questions said that disasters had affected their project work in the last five years with delays (Figure 22), reduced outputs and cost increases being the most common impact (Figure 12). This suggests that DRR is very relevant to Cordaid, as the survey was for all Cordaid partners and not just for DRR or humanitarian section partners.

The impact of disasters on the work of Cordaid partners




Figure 12: More than half of the Cordaid partners responding to the survey question about the impact of disasters on their projects had projects which had been impacted by disasters. Increased costs was the most common impact.

Poverty and disasters are intertwined and feed off each other: "... poverty plays a big role in keeping people vulnerable to disasters. In the same fashion disasters serve as a powerful downward trigger to poverty by continually destroying the few assets of the poor and wiping out investments in infrastructure and services that serve the poor" (Kreimer and Arnold, 2000, p. 2). Of course in the Cordaid model, the quote would need to be phrased as *poverty reduces people's capacity to deal with disasters*.

- Disasters are part of everyday experience in many developing countries, not the exceptional events that they are in developed countries. Thus the community groups interviewed for this evaluation face flooding on an annual basis, drought every three to five years, or volcanic eruptions every five to fifteen years. This has to be compared with the developed world where personal experience of a major disaster is a once-in-a-lifetime event if it happens at all. Fafchamps notes that "*the magnitude and range of shocks that affect rural populations of the Third World is without comparison in developed economies. Perhaps the only way to compare it ... is to a war economy...*" (2004, p. 196). Cordaid partners saw a range of disasters affecting their projects, with flooding as the most common (Figure 13).

What types of disaster affected your project or projects?




Figure 13: The types of disasters affecting Cordaid partners' projects.

- Disasters do not affect people equally but are contingent on vulnerability¹² which varies with social class, gender and other factors (Neumayer and Plümper, 2007, p. 27). It is no surprise that the communities the Cordaid partners work with were severely or moderately affected by the disasters that impacted on the partners' projects. *People living in poverty are the hardest hit by disasters. The mud houses of the poor are the first to be washed away. Lower income groups invariably suffer the most from Bangladesh's annual floods*" (Oxfam International, 2007, p. 2). Even where both rich and poor are injured, the poorer are more likely to die from their injuries. After the 1999 Taiwan earthquake, those earning less than US\$620 a month

¹² In the Cordaid model this would be regarded as a lack of capacity rather than vulnerability.

were more than twice as likely to die from their injuries as those earning more than US\$1,240 a month (Chou et al., 2004, p. 690).

- Recovery programmes are not neutral. Where there was significant post-disaster assistance by governments, communities interviewed for this evaluation noted that those with more influence got more post-disaster assistance than they did. Even in what was probably the best funded disaster response of recent years, the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the better-off benefited more than the poor (Cosgrave, 2008, p. 8).

Thus, disasters widen the gap between rich and poor (Tearfund, 2005, p. 14) and any agency that is serious about addressing marginalisation and poverty must pay attention to reducing disaster risks as disaster responses do not fully compensate for the poverty created by disasters. Eighty two percent of Cordaid's partners said that the communities they worked with had been moderately or severely affected by the disaster which had had an impact on their projects. Therefore DRR is of great relevance to Cordaid.

Did any Disaster Risk Reduction or preparedness work that you had done reduce the impact of any later disaster on the community that you are working with? (Note: we are asking about disasters that have happened, not ones that may happen in the future).




Figure 14: 43% of partners (59 out of 138) responding to this question said that DRR work that they had done reduced the impact on the community of later disasters.

Although DRR is a very young programme in Cordaid, some Cordaid partners consider that they have already seen some impact from DRR and from peace-building initiatives (Figure 14).

The most common interventions cited as reducing the consequences of subsequent disasters were disaster preparedness and work around conflict prevention and peace-building.

Table 2: Analysis of the means by which partners said that the impact of disasters was reduced.

<i>Intervention type</i>	<i>Times cited</i>
<i>Preparedness</i>	14
<i>Peace-building and conflict reduction</i>	11
<i>Awareness</i>	7
<i>Physical DRR works</i>	5
<i>Livelihoods</i>	5
<i>Water supply</i>	5
<i>Early Warning</i>	4
<i>Other</i>	2

Partners also considered that there were DRR interventions that they could have done that would have reduced the impact of disasters that the community experienced Figure 15.

Looking back at any disasters that have happened, can you think of any Disaster Risk Reduction work that you did NOT do, but that might have reduced the impact of the disaster on the community that you are working with?




Figure 15: Almost all partners saw some potential for having taken action that could have reduced the impact of disasters.

Table 3: Analysis of the means by which partners thought that DRR work could have impacted disasters that they experienced

<i>Intervention type</i>	<i>Times cited</i>
<i>Preparedness</i>	24
<i>Peace-building</i>	14
<i>Awareness</i>	11
<i>Institutionalisation of DRR measures</i>	10
<i>Advocacy</i>	5
<i>Livelihoods</i>	5
<i>Water</i>	4
<i>Early warning</i>	3
<i>Livestock</i>	2
<i>Other</i>	4

The selection of countries for the Cordaid DRR pilot includes some of the most disaster prone countries in the world (Figure 18). They all feature in the World Bank's natural disasters hotspots study (Dilley et al., 2005). However, there are disaster hazards in all developing countries, even in those which don't qualify as hotspots because of their low population density, so almost any choice of countries could be justified.

The selection of DRR partners by Cordaid varied greatly between the different countries. In Ethiopia, the DRR partners were partners already working with pastoralist communities, the communities that are most affected by climate change. In Indonesia ten partners with disaster response experience were invited from the total group of 57 Cordaid partners. This was a much more structured approach than the approach taken earlier in Ethiopia. Similarly the approach taken to selecting partners in Bangladesh was also more structured.

The evaluation team did not consider any of the partners selected to be out of place as all the partners visited had something to offer the DRR programme, either through their extensive networking, their technical competence, links with the community or mobilisations skills.

It was clear from comments from community groups interviewed, that for most of them, disasters were a sufficiently serious concern to make risk reduction a good entry point for development initiatives. This was especially the case for communities facing problems with their livelihoods due to the more erratic rainfall patterns associated with climate change.




Figure 16: The impact of disasters on development

Several interviewees, including elders in Malawi and partners in Ethiopia, made comments clearly supporting the conceptualisation of the trajectory of development as a sawtooth pattern, where disasters destroy years of development gains (Figure 16). In Dire Dawa in Ethiopia, Cordaid's partner JECCDO referred to how years of their development had been washed away in a flash flood. This had led to a complete change in their approach.

Elders in Malawi talked about how the 2002-3 drought led to big development setbacks with families forced to sell productive assets like oxen and ox-carts to survive. Here again, the impact of a disaster in undoing years of development was very clear. Beneficiaries saw DRR as appropriate because they saw it as a means of:

- Reducing the severity of disaster (Figure 17). This was the case with communities in Indonesia dealing with earthquakes, or with communities facing flooding in Bangladesh. Most of the Cordaid DRR activity fell into this category where the emphasis was on reducing the impact of hazards. Limiting the frequency of hazards is impossible with current technologies for hazards such as tropical cyclones or earthquakes. Even where it is possible, it often requires large investment, such as in river embankments.

- Reduced the frequency of disasters. This was the case in Malawi, where communities reported that winter cropping had reduced their exposure to the hunger hazard.
- Reduced both severity and frequency. This was the case with the flood flash interventions in Dire Dawa in Ethiopia where some risk reduction measures decreased the severity of flooding events, and other measure such as phone nets, reduced the likelihood of the community being caught unawares thus hopefully reducing the frequency of catastrophic flash floods.




Figure 17: The ways in which DRR can reduce the impact of disasters and development.

While most countries had around ten partners, Malawi had only one. However, even here, although there formally was only one partner, there were in fact eight as each of the seven dioceses operates more or less independently of the central CADECOM. Some partners were small organisations with little more than a single project, others were

large networks. Some like Farm Africa in Ethiopia, or CRS in Indonesia, or Concern Universal in Bangladesh are themselves international NGOs but most of the partners were national NGOs.

Similarly, all of the geographic areas visited faced some hazard. However, communities facing more frequent hazards, such as flooding in Bangladesh, were much more interested in Disaster Risk Reduction. In Indonesia communities around the Merapi volcano which erupts every two to seven years were much more interested in disaster preparedness and risk reduction than communities around the Kelud volcano which erupts every 20 years or so¹³. The community group in Kelud was more interested in livelihood issues and dealing with the problems caused by their marginalisation¹⁴ than just with volcano hazards.




Figure 18: Cordaid's DRR pilot countries (outlined) overlaid over the global pattern of multi-hazard mortality risks - shown as dark grey (Source WB Hotspot study data from <ftp://ftp.ciesin.columbia.edu/pub/hotspots/gdmhzmrt.zip>).

Pastoralist communities in Ethiopia and farming communities in Malawi were keenly aware of the impact of climate change on their livelihoods. Farming communities in Indonesia and in Bangladesh were also aware of climate change and the disruption to the normal agricultural cycle. The Ethiopian pastoralist communities live in areas with marginal rainfall at the best of times, so they identified climate change as a major threat to their livelihoods, and were interested in DRR aspects such as early warning.

All communities were very interested in livelihood opportunities, even where there was relatively little interest in DRR. In some places, the community made the point that their livelihoods were so fragile that they could only engage in DRR if it had a livelihood benefit.

Conclusions

Disasters affect the poor most and can deepen and entrench poverty. DRR is therefore relevant to Cordaid's partners and to the communities that Cordaid's partners works with. More than half the partners responding to the survey have had projects affected by disasters. Increased costs, reduced outputs, and delays were the most common impacts on disasters.

This means that being aware of hazards is essential to ensure that projects can achieve their objective. Eighty two percent of Cordaid's partners said that the communities they

¹³ However, Kelud's eruptions are typically much more violent than those of Merapi.

¹⁴ Historically the community had been seen as supporters of a now defunct opposition group.

work with were moderately or severely affected by the same disasters that impacted their projects.

As disasters are commonplace in developing countries rather than being the rare events of the developed world, DRR can provide a useful entry point for development initiatives with communities. The Communities were more interested in DRR work where it was more relevant to them:

- The projects directly touched on their livelihoods, either by addressing what they identified as clear threats to their livelihoods, or by providing a broader livelihood base.
- They were acutely aware of specific disaster hazards from their own direct experience.
- The community perceived a particular hazard as being serious and likely to occur.

The selection of the countries for the DRR programme and of the DRR partners in those countries was reasonable given the disaster profiles of the countries and the experience of the partners.

Recommendation

Recommendation 9. Cordaid should continue funding its current DRR pilot for at least another five years to allow more learning by Cordaid and its partners about how the risks that disasters pose to the poorest can be minimised.

This means that Cordaid should continue to actively document all examples of where investments in Disaster Risk Reduction had paid off.

Recommendation 10. Cordaid and its partners should give priority to DRR works with communities to which DRR is of the greatest interest.

This means that the priority should be communities that are already aware of some disaster hazard that threatens their lives or livelihoods.

Recommendation 11. All DRR projects with communities should contain some livelihood element, including helping to provide a broader livelihood base.

The lesson from communities has been that communities are often more interested in the livelihood component of DRR interventions, than in other components. However, both livelihood and other elements (such as training) are necessary for effective DRR.

6 Sustainability

This section attempts to address the following questions

To what extent are the strategies for DRR embedded in local structures, will the DRR activities continue after funding will end?

To what extent has DRR contributed to improve “Linking relief, rehabilitation and development” within Cordaid programmes?

To what extent have the interventions contributed to improve the resilience of groups that face disaster risks, or will be likely to contribute to the improvement of resilience?

Which (combination of) DRR interventions are most likely to contribute to a sustainable improvement of the resilience of groups that face disaster risks?

What opportunities do partners have to get DRR funding from others?

The first point to make about embedding DRR is that in some countries the DRR programme has been running on relatively little time and this limits the potential for sustainability. This is particularly the case given that CMDRR is a demanding approach, especially for partners without previous community-driven development experience. Thus it takes time for the partner to learn to use the approach effectively to support the development of local structures in which DRR strategies can be embedded.

DRR strategies can be embedded or mainstreamed in any or all of the following:

- The Cordaid partner.
- The cascaded partner (the downstream partner of the Cordaid partner as with Diocesan CADECOM delegations in Malawi).
- The community structures.
- The local government structures.

There were clear examples of embedding DRR in each of these four categories, except for cascaded partners. However, this naturally takes longer than embedding DRR at the partner level, and some of the cascaded partners in Indonesia were moving towards embedding DRR.

Examples of embedding of DRR strategies were seen in Ethiopia (with early warning) and in Indonesia (with the adoption of DRR policies as part of official development policies at the district level). The graphical early warning system in Ethiopia is already embedded in the Hamar Woreda (District). This project meets the need of the local government for monitoring information on paper, meets the needs of the community to communicate warning signs to the authority, and is implemented by the Hamar elders, a very strong and legitimate structure.

In the case of this and of the DRR forum near the Merapi Volcano in Indonesia, embedding seemed to depend on:

- How well the intervention met the priority needs of the community.
- How well the intervention met the needs of the local government structure.
- The strength of the community structure.
- The credibility of the community structures that engaged with the local government structures. This credibility can flow from the level of activity of the structure, and its previous engagement with the authorities.

Despite the relatively short time span some programme interventions are already clearly sustainable. In Bantul for example, the work with the water supply system is sustainable because it provides an income for those working on the scheme. The water division of the DRR forum in Bantul is the part of the forum that is most active.

Other DRR activities that generated an income stream or livelihood were identified as activities that were sustainable and would not need external funding to continue. In Malawi and in Indonesia, there was evidence in some projects of replication of some of the DRR activities in other villages, or of replication by the villagers themselves within villages. Again, it was the DRR activities that produced an income stream or broadened livelihoods were the sorts of interventions that were most often replicated by those outside the project area. This is hardly surprising, as activities that bring a short term benefit are a more attractive investment than investments that only pay off when there is a disaster.

Risk reduction or income generation?

The question can be asked "If activities that generate an income stream are those most commonly replicated, why work on DRR and not just on income generation or livelihoods?" The answer is that the reason why the DRR project has been so successful is that it used disaster risk as an entry point.

The communities that Cordaid is working with are used to seeing development gains wiped out by disasters. They know that previous livelihood interventions came to nought because of subsequent disasters. With the CMDRR approach they are starting from an analysis of the hazards that they face and developing interventions which make them more resilient to disaster.

Interventions that concentrate on livelihoods, without paying attention to the disaster context, are likely to create short-term benefits that are not sustained. It is only when interventions pay attention to the disaster risk that they achieve gains that can be sustained in the face of frequent disasters.

Project activities included not only livelihood broadening activities but also simple preparedness and early warning measures that enhanced resilience to disasters. A simple livelihoods approach would miss out these important components which help to prevent development gains from being wiped out. Communities only undertook such activities because they had been engaged in an analysis of the hazards that they faced through the CMDRR process.

All types of DRR activities increased community resilience. Sustainable improvements in resilience were seen where the intervention:

- Met the felt need of the community, whether for better early warning, or for broader livelihoods; AND
- Were within the financial capacity of the community to maintain or to replicate without external assistance; OR
- Brought about a lasting improvement for a single investment, as with the case of the flood wall in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, or the raising of house plinths in Bangladesh; OR
- Where the government bore a substantial part of the cost.

Cordaid programmes are not linked. Partners with funding from three different sections of Cordaid said that it was like dealing with three different organisations. From the partner perspective there is no strategic linkage between Cordaid programmes. The linking of relief and development poses particular problems for Cordaid as its four sectors act like completely separate agencies without any linkages. In this respect the

restructuring of 1 January 2007 into four sectors¹⁵ seems to hark back to the 20th century structure when Cordaid did not exist as a single agency but as separate organisations.

This touches to the heart of linking relief and development as sector two (Emergency Aid and Reconstruction) deals with relief and the other three sectors with development approaches. Thus the DRR programme cannot really contribute linking LRRD in Cordaid's programmes. However, DRR is linked to the development needs of the communities that partners are working with. In many of these, the real issue is grinding poverty that makes families and communities vulnerable to even the slightest shock.

Many of the DRR interventions seen in Africa, and some of those in Asia were really development interventions that sought to increase resilience through broadening livelihoods. Some partners made the point that you cannot distinguish between development and DRR, as they are two sides of the same coin. Development increases resilience in that disaster hazards have to be more severe before they can derail families. In some projects the real hazard that families face is not a specific natural hazard but simply the danger of being pushed into irrecoverable poverty.

In all of the countries visited, interventions had contributed to resilience. The first category of action is that of activities which are in themselves sustainable and likely to contribute to long term resilience. Winter-cropping in Malawi is a prime example of this type of intervention.

The second category is that of activities which are not in themselves sustainable, but which have sustainable outputs which are likely to contribute to resilience, at least in the medium term. This is the case with the construction of the evacuation road built near the Kelud volcano in Indonesia, as a result of lobbying by the community with support from the partner. Other construction projects, like plinth-raising in Bangladesh, also falls into this category.

One issue noted with this second category of project was that some projects had relatively small community contributions compared with the total cost. This was the case with water tanks and cisterns in Ethiopia and Kenya. The problem is that



Figure 19: These crops being grown under irrigation in Malawi are a good example of a sustainable intervention that is likely to contribute to long term resilience.

¹⁵ The four sectors are: Participation, Emergency Aid and Reconstruction, Health and Well-being, and Entrepreneurship. The four organisations that merged to form Cordaid were Mensen in Nood (Caritas Netherlands), Memisa Medicus Mundi, the Dutch Bishop's Lenten Campaign (Vastenactie) and Cebemo. Wastenactie and Cebemo had merged about two year previously to form Bilance. It is revealing that the "About Cordaid" website page refers to the exact date at which Cordaid changed to a sector-based rather than a geographic structure but does not even mention the year (1999) in which Cordaid itself was formed (http://www.cordaid.nl/English/About_Cordaid/Index.aspx?mId=10182).

no investment is ever maintenance-free, and if the original contribution is small, there must be a question about whether the community has the resources to maintain it. Where an investment is used to support a livelihood like cattle herding, and the herds represent a large capital investment, it might be appropriate to seek a significant community contribution.

The third category is that of interventions which are not sustainable, and whose benefits will not long survive the ending of project inputs. This includes activities like petty trading on unsustainable margins in Ethiopia, or projects which may depend on hidden subsidies like assistance with transport. The end of the earlier DRM project in Malawi exposed several DRM project activities, such as mushroom production, to be in this category. However, while during the life of the project, these activities contributed to short term resilience.

For some activities, such as grinding mills or irrigation pumps in Malawi it is far too early to say whether the activity falls into the first or second category. For others it is impossible to say whether the activity falls into the second or third category.

In some of the less sustainable interventions there is a question as to whether there is an appropriate balance between the community contribution and the Cordaid contribution. One of the advantages of insisting on a community contribution to projects is that an unwillingness to contribute can flag up projects that are unlikely to be sustainable.

When asked about the DRR interventions that are most likely to bring about a sustainable increase in resilience most interviewees suggested that interventions that broadened livelihoods were most likely to do so. Partners made the point that while specific activities might reduce the risks from particular types of disaster (for example, raising the floor level reduced the risks from floods and storm surges in Bangladesh), livelihood interventions increased resilience to multiple hazards.

There is a second aspect here. The largest potential source of resources for disaster risk interventions, and the most sustainable one, is the national government. Even in a poor country like Ethiopia, the national government was playing a major role in the DRR interventions of many of Cordaid's partners. This was true also in Indonesia and Bangladesh, but the role in Malawi was a lot less significant.

The most successful interventions by Cordaid's DRR partners were those which used community resources, and leveraged government resources (Figure 20). Communities successfully advocated stopping quarrying in Ethiopia and Indonesia. One community group in Bangladesh was conducting a well thought-out strategy to secure better flood protection.

Cordaid's partners frequently mobilised government resources, whether these were cooperative advisors in Ethiopia, or agricultural extension workers in Malawi. In Indonesia, advocacy had led to three district governments establishing a fund for direct action.



Figure 20: The most successful DRR projects mobilised Government resources to maximise their impact.

Cordaid encourages its partners to make use of all funding resources, including government. However, although partners were doing this, and some programmes such as Indonesia treat this as a success indicator, accessing Government resources is not a specific strategy of the DRR programme.

Governments of the poorest countries have many demands on their resources, so is it reasonable to expect them to be a resource for community-led interventions on DRR? There are three reasons to think that it is reasonable:

- DRR can be an investment that provides a high rate of return for disaster-prone developing countries.
- The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita has grown by 19% in the least developed countries for 1987 to 2007. While Official Development Assistance (ODA) to such countries has grown by 40% over the same period, population growth means that it has fallen by 13% on a per capita basis. ODA as proportion of GNI has fallen by 26%. This means that national rather than donor resources are of increasing importance even in the least developed countries.
- The implementation of the Paris Declaration¹⁶ means that national governments will have increasing control over how donor resources are used. While the implementation of the Paris Declaration has been patchy so far (Duncan and Wathne, 2009; Wood et al., 2008) it does represent the direction in which donors are going.

A further argument is that action to reduce disaster risks will be more effective when both the community and government are engaged in the process. Accessing government resources for DRR helps to ensure the DRR remains on the agenda for the government.

Partners can also assist communities by enabling them to access resources that the government already has available, but which the community are unaware of. The DRR forum in Bantul noted that this facilitation link with government was a key part of the DRR forum's role, and communities in India report this as a key element of the DRR programme¹⁷.

Another potential source for funding for DRR is the flow of remittances to developing countries. Of the four countries visited, Bangladesh has the highest remittance income (nearly nine billion dollars in 2008 - Table 4)¹⁸. While remittance income has fallen in most countries this year due to the financial crisis, remittance flows to Bangladesh have actually increased by 16% on a year-to-year basis in the first eight months of 2009 (Ratha et al., 2009, p. 2).

This discussion of remittance flows is not academic. The DRR forum in one village in Indonesia noted that remittances were used to fund a special scholarship project for school children. The group were considering how such remittances might also be used to fund the activities of the DRR forum.

¹⁶ The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness aims to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It lays out five key principles of effective aid: a) ownership by countries; b) alignment with countries' strategies, systems and procedures; c) harmonisation of donors' actions; d) managing for results; and e) mutual accountability. (OECD, 2005). Paris declaration on aid effectiveness: Ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results and mutual accountability. Paris: OECD.

¹⁷ Comments from Marlou Geurts on an earlier draft of this report.

¹⁸ The figure for Malawi looks unlikely given the number of skilled Malawians one meets overseas. While remittances to Malawi have fallen enormously from the peak of 35% of GDP in 1975 (largely from mine-workers in South Africa) (Chipeta and Kachaka, 2005, p. 11) It seem highly unlikely that the current Malawian Diaspora is only sending home one million dollars a year.

Table 4: 2008 remittance income for the four countries visited (World Bank, 2009).

Country	US\$ mn in 2008	As % of GDP
<i>Bangladesh</i>	8,995	11.4%
<i>Ethiopia</i>	387	1.5%
<i>Indonesia</i>	6,795	1.3%
<i>Malawi</i>	1	0.0%

Conclusions

Although the DRR programme is a relatively new one, some interventions are already clearly sustainable. In general, activities that broadened livelihoods or produced an income stream were more likely to be sustainable and to be replicated outside the project area.

Embedding of DRR strategies within local structures occurred where this met the priority needs of both the community and the local government, and where the community structure interfacing with government had credibility.

Relief, rehabilitation, and development are linked at the community level, but not within Cordaid. This is a structural issue stemming from the current sectoral division within Cordaid.

Many of the Cordaid DRR activities sought to reduce disaster risks by broadening livelihoods to increase community capacity to withstand shocks. These interventions took the form of risk-aware development. Some interventions were sustainable and likely to increase long-term resilience. Others were not sustainable in themselves, but their outputs were likely to be sustainable and contribute to resilience, at least in the medium term. A third group were unsustainable interventions which contributed to short-term resilience, but which were not likely to service the end of funding. In many cases it is simply too early to say what category particular interventions will eventually fall into.

However, the community contribution on some interventions was relatively small compared with the total expenditure. This raises questions about longer-term sustainability of such interventions if the community cannot meet the maintenance cost.

The most successful DRR interventions were those which leveraged community and government resources. However, this was not the result of a conscious strategy, but had developed as a result of the work of particular partners and communities.

One key factor that led to stronger DRR groups was where they had been able to influence the local regulatory environment. Such instances greatly increased the influence of the DRR forum in the community

Recommendations

Recommendation 12. Cordaid should include the adoption of a risk-aware approach by partners for their whole portfolio as one of the objectives of the Cordaid DRR programme.

One way to address this would be to look specifically at the partners that have already adopted a risk-aware approach to see what learning points there are for encouraging other partners to do the same. An approach to achieving this is discussed under impact below.

Recommendation 13. Cordaid should formally include (unless inappropriate) the building of links with local government and the mobilisation of government resources as two of the objectives for each of the projects supported under the DRR programme.

There will be some projects where mobilising government support would not be appropriate, but in most cases government resources are essential for the longer term sustainability of the DRR initiatives. The most successful DRR projects are already doing this.

Recommendation 14. Cordaid should only undertake large investments where there is a significant community contribution, to indicate that the community have the resources to maintain the structure.

The largest investments seen were for water storage systems for pastoralists.

Recommendation 15. Cordaid should formally include the creation of a favourable local regulatory environment towards DRR as a formal objective of DRR projects (where applicable).

Partners made the point that where DRR groups and other community structures have been successful in lobbying for local regulatory change, this had significantly increased their authority within the community, in addition to any benefits that the regulatory change brought for the community. Cordaid should adopt the mobilisation of both community and government resources as a strategic target for the DRR programme.

7 Coherence

To what extent do the DRR interventions have an influence on the broader intervention strategies of the partner organisations (how well is it integrated in their interventions)?

Coherence: Is the need to consider potential disaster hazards sufficiently internalised within Cordaid to allow mainstreaming of DRR.

The CMDRR approach was seen to have influenced the broader intervention strategy of partners in two ways:

- First, some partners have begun to adopt a community driven approach for the broader development work, having seen the advantages that this can bring.
- Second, some partners have begun to mainstream DRR into their overall approach.

CMDRR is a demanding approach¹⁹ that requires partners to have the skills necessary to mobilise communities and then cede control of the project to the community. It takes time for partners, many of whom have previously used top-down approaches where communities were consulted about decisions taken by the partners, to move to a community driven approach. It is only when partners have mastered the CMDRR approach that the broader issue of mainstreaming can be raised

In Indonesia it is hardly surprising that the partners with most experience of community-driven approaches (Bina Swadaya and INSIST) were the partners who were also leaders in mainstreaming DRR within their own organisations. Indonesia has seen the best progress with half the partners making some progress in mainstreaming DRR²⁰. Bina Swadaya is promoting the DRR approach with its other departments and is doing work for a major institutional donor based on the DRR methodology. Another partner in Indonesia is launching a master's degree programme in peace-building and DRR. In Ethiopia JeCCDO has adopted DRR as a broader approach.

Three things seemed to encourage mainstreaming within partners:

- Being at ease with the demanding CMDRR approach.
- Having DRR as a focus either through the organisations own disaster experience (as for JeCCDO in Ethiopia), or through a generally high level of background hazards, as in Indonesia.
- Frequent accompaniment and support for DRR, as is the case in Indonesia, where there is an accompaniment office specifically for the DRR programme.

The instances of mainstreaming cited above are exceptions rather than the rule. For the majority of partners DRR is just a single project, or an approach to community mobilisation, rather than a risk-aware approach. Partners generally did not subject their projects to a hazard analysis, and did not include hazard analyses in their project proposals.

Some of the DRR interventions themselves were conducted with little attention to hazards, like irrigation pumps in Ethiopia that were not well secured against flooding, or community centre roofs in Indonesia that were not secured against cyclones, or offices in seismic zones where basic precautions with securing furniture were not taken.

¹⁹ This should not be thought of as a criticism of the CMDRR approach. The evaluation team found that it was a very effective approach.

²⁰ The presence of Cordaid accompaniment in Indonesia that is specifically focused on DRR may be one factor that has encouraged the greater mainstreaming there.

As a general rule, hazards seemed not to be considered once the original hazard mapping was done.

Visiting project sites also showed a general lack of hazard awareness. Seatbelts were not always used, drivers were expected to work long hours, and some drivers were dangerous. Risky practices such as driving after dark were common.

Boats in Bangladesh were a particular safety concern. Only the very biggest ferries had safety equipment (and in at least one case the lifebuoys has been



Figure 21: The staff of a Cordaid partner on the foredeck of a boat at night. The boat had no navigation or safety equipment.

secured against theft, meaning that they would not automatically be released if the boat foundered or capsized). Most boats used by partners had no navigation or safety equipment whatsoever. Such unsafe practices indicated that risk-awareness had not been internalised in the organisation.

Interviewees from Cordaid made it clear that disaster hazards are not specifically considered in Cordaid's other programming, despite the strong inter-linkage between poverty and disaster vulnerability. As noted earlier (and in Figure 22) more than half the Cordaid partners responding to the question about the impact of disasters said that their projects had been impacted by disasters, mostly through delaying project completion, or increasing costs, or reducing project outputs.

In the last five years have any of your projects been affected (for example: been delayed or slowed down, had reduced outputs, losing staff to emergency response organisations, faced increased costs) in any way by conflict or natural disasters?




Figure 22: More than half the Cordaid partners indicated that their projects had been affected by disasters in the last five years.

Within Cordaid DRR is treated as an activity in the humanitarian response sector, whereas it is a key development issue. Disasters regularly wipe away years of development work, and unless development is carried out in a risk-aware manner, development investments may be wasted money.

Humanitarian response represents only a small part of Cordaid's total portfolio. During interviews in the Hague it became clear the some Cordaid staff viewed humanitarian response as a distraction from Cordaid's development work. This is hardly surprising given the way in which relief and development are delinked within Cordaid (although they may be linked within partners).

DRR is seen by many as part of humanitarian response, which can sometimes be seen as a neo-colonial endeavour, with a European aid-worker descending on the disaster site to dispense relief. However, DRR is really about reducing the need for external humanitarian response, about helping communities not only to reduce their exposure to disasters, but also to increase their capacity to respond. DRR helps communities to protect development gains from being wiped away by disasters.

One issue around mainstreaming is that it can quickly become away-streaming, where the issue is quickly relegated to a few paragraphs of generic text and a tick on a project appraisal form rather than being seriously considered. Away-streaming happens when the issue is not internalised in an organisation, as has happened with gender in some organisations. Cordaid interviewees made clear that Cordaid is not yet at the stage where it could mainstream DRR without the risk of away-streaming it.

Conclusion

DRR is still not internalised by most of Cordaid's partners, despite good practice by some partners. CMDRR is a demanding approach for partners who have not previously used community-driven development approaches. From the example of Indonesia, the strongest and most sophisticated partners are best placed to implement the CMDRR approach, and then to move on to learn from their work with the community to internalise the DRR approach.

Cordaid itself does not include hazard risks as a standard part of its funding decisions. This is despite disaster being a significant cause of projects over-running budgets or timelines, and achieving lower outputs than planned. This may in part be due to ethno-centricity. Disasters in the North are very rare events that many adults may never directly experience. In the South disasters are more frequent, more deadly, and for many of the poorest communities, they are part of the fabric of every-day existence.

Cordaid's own lack of mainstreaming of risk-aware approaches puts it in a weak position where it would be encouraging partners to *"do what the Imam says and not as the Imam does"* as they say in Afghanistan.

Cordaid faces the risk that mainstreaming DRR could lead to away-streaming. One approach that helps to prevent away-streaming is through continuing a separate DRR programme that generates knowledge and learning for both Cordaid and partners.

Recommendation

Recommendation 16. Cordaid should take a strategic decision to take a risk-aware approach in all of its work.

This strategic decision would be reflected in a number of ways including developing the capacity of Cordaid programme staff, and partner programme staff to analyse potential disaster risks in projects.

Recommendation 17. Cordaid should develop a simple manual to help its own programme officers to assess whether project proposals adequately consider disaster hazards to which they may be subjected.

Such a manual should be at the level that it can also be used by the staff of partners. It would probably consist of two parts: an orientation that sets out why disaster risks were important; and a simple tool for assessing whether disaster risks had been taken into account. Obviously the tool needs to be short and easy to use as disaster hazards are only one factor to be considered.

The manual would be strongest if developed in a consultative manner with programme officers rather than imposed on them. The process could begin with a short orientation to the hazards that disasters pose to development with some time for programme officers to reflect on how their own portfolios have been affected by disasters. This could then be followed by a workshop to set out what should be in the manual.

Recommendation 18. Cordaid should subject all of its own project funding decisions to a review of the hazards to which they may be subjected.

At present, while half of Cordaid's partners have had projects affected by disasters, only a handful have mainstreamed DRR in their own approaches. Clearly all of Cordaid's partners need to address disaster hazards and not just those receiving DRR funding.

Recommendation 19. Cordaid should promote the assessment of disaster hazard by all partner organisations in their whole portfolio (even for partners with no Cordaid DRR funding).

The manual referred to earlier can be part of this promotion. The manual would need to be supported by some dissemination process with workshops for partners.

Recommendation 20. Cordaid should continue to support a separate DRR programme so that Cordaid and its partners can continue to learn about DRR while trying to mainstream it.

Continuing a separate DRR programme will prevent the risks that mainstreaming presents when a DRR approach is not yet internalised within Cordaid and some of its partners.

8 Impact

Have Cordaid DRR projects led to any changes in power relations within communities or between communities and local authorities?

To what extent has the DRR process been able to foster capacities to influence policies and planning/operations and to improve accountability related to DRR at different levels?

Some Cordaid partners had successfully used the DRR mobilisation model to build the capacity of communities to influence government. Some partners were particularly successful at this. Such capacity has changed power relations with the government, where the community now has “voice”. Such changes were often cited by groups as the largest impact of the project. In Ethiopia and Indonesia, groups noted that the greatest change for them was in their relationship with the government. Similar changes have been noted in other Cordaid DRR projects²¹.

The ability to influence government is particularly important for DRR projects because:

- Communities may sometimes be far more aware of and concerned about particular hazards than government officials. This was especially the case with climate change as many rural communities were already acutely aware of its impact.
- Government action can sometimes increase exposure to hazards (Figure 23). If communities do not have ‘voice’ such decisions can increase the likelihood that they will experience disasters.
- Government represents a large pool of relatively sustainable resources. Projects in Indonesia and Bangladesh were able to access far greater resources than Cordaid could have provided.
- Government sets the policies that influence how other actors, including the private sector, behave.



Figure 23: One Cordaid-assisted community group in Dire Dawa Ethiopia successfully lobbied the government to reverse a decision to allow quarrying on this hill above the town. Quarrying here would have led to increased erosion and run off.

The strongest changes in power relations between community and the government were seen where:

- Both community and government were aware of the hazard. This mutual awareness was sometimes supported by joint training for government officials and partner staff (as in Ethiopia).
- The project led to improved communication between the community and the government, either through a strong DRR organisation (as is Ethiopia at Dire

²¹ In India, when one group was asked about the most important change “we now go directly to government with our problems” was one of the comments made (Marlou Geurts, in commenting on an earlier version of this report).

Dawa, or at Bantul in Indonesia) or through better communication tools (as with the graphical early warning reporting tool with the Hamar in Ethiopia).

- There was a strong organisation at the community level that could not only communicate with government but was seen as credible and legitimate by government.

Such credibility and legitimacy may stem from tradition, as with the Hamar elders in Ethiopia, or from the work of the community organisation. In Dire Dawa, Ethiopia it was successful interventions in soil conservation which gave the community group there the credibility and legitimacy to have a voice with the government.

In Bantul in Indonesia, it was the ability of the DRR group to manage the water supply that gave it credibility and legitimacy with government. The ability of a community organisation to mobilise the community can also lead to the organisation gaining legitimacy and credibility. Near Merapi, it was the ability of the DRR forum to mobilise the community that gave it authority.

Conclusions

Many of the projects likely to have the greatest impact were those that fostered the community's ability to influence government. This ability demanded not only that the community be organised, but that the organisation be legitimate and credible. This legitimacy and credibility could flow from traditional authority, or from the organisations ability to mobilise the community or deliver results.

Recommendations

Recommendation 21. Cordaid should adopt, as a formal objective for its DRR interventions, the building of strong credible community organisations that can influence government policies so as to reduce the risks the community faces from hazards, through discouraging policies that increase risks, encouraging policies that reduce risk, and leveraging resources for DRR.

Appendix 1 Terms of Reference Cordaid programme evaluation

A1.1 Disaster Risk Reduction

A1.1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE EVALUATION

The motivation for this programme evaluation is based on Cordaid's 2007 -2010 strategy plan in which the intention is formulated to carry out programme evaluations for all 10 programmes. This evaluation deals with programme 4 'Disaster Prevention and Emergency Aid'. The evaluation will be focussed on the interventions related to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). The scope of this evaluation is the Disaster Risk Management and subsequently DRR programmes after the evaluation of the Disaster Preparedness programme in 2004. The evaluation will look at all interventions in DRM and DRR financed (partly) through the MFS and through other funding sources. The evaluation concerns the effects of this programme and explores the benefits and challenges of the different strategies used to enhance Disaster Risk Reduction. This evaluation will be used for accountability purposes as well as for further policy development.

A1.1.2 CORDAID AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

A1.1.2.1 CORDAID DRR CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING

Developing countries – and especially the most marginalised people within developing countries – are most at risk to hazards. Many of today's hazards are not the exception but the norm in many contexts, e.g.: long lasting conflicts, droughts, HIV/AIDS. Hazard events such as flood, hurricane, droughts/ climate related hazards (hydro-meteorological) and other human induced hazards are dealt squarely by Cordaid through community-managed disaster risk reduction approach with the idea that if the disaster risk is reduced chances of the hazard event becoming a disaster is less. There has been a shift from the old school of thought that disaster is "an act of God" to the school of thought that disaster is "act of man". Thus, the causes of disasters are the incapacity of the communities to cope with the hazard events and its incapacity is caused by the societal unsustainable pattern of development. When hazard strikes, those who least enjoy human rights are the weakest and find it hard to survive, transforming the hazard event into a disaster.

Building people's capacity to prevent and mitigate the impact of the hazards and reduce the degree of vulnerability of communities at risk from the hazard through increasing individual survivability and community readiness are components of disaster risk reduction. Building resilient communities therefore means strengthening the foundation of safety and it means enhancing disaster risk reduction measures to fully attain resilience against any eventuality. Disaster solely happens when the foundation of safety is weak and disaster risk reduction measures are not in place.

The poorest population groups are the most at risk to hazards since they have few resources to invest in prevention and extra protection. By analysing their situation themselves in terms of possible threats, by increasing their capacities like setting up early warning systems and by training on disaster risk reduction, people can reduce their disaster risk and therefore chances of hazard events turn into a disaster is less. Balance of power can also change if poor population groups become more aware of their rights in national programmes and budgets for preventing disasters. Collaboration with local governments and other organisations is a crucial factor in Disaster Risk Reduction.

The heart of Disaster Risk Reduction is the formula:

$$\text{Disaster Risk} = \text{Hazard} \times \frac{\text{Vulnerability}}{\text{Capacity}}$$

Cordaid considers the Disaster Risk Reduction formula as an emerging framework for development and a tool for development. The formula simply shows that if capacity is higher over hazard and vulnerability then, the disaster risk is low therefore the probability of disaster is lower. However, the conceptual understanding on what we mean when we refer hazard, vulnerability and capacity is crucial as point of reference to truly arrive at a conclusion if risk is

high or low. In the early stage of implementation the understanding of vulnerability and capacity was clarified through training and orientation to have a clear understanding of risk.

Evolution of the Concept	Degree of Vulnerability means	In measuring disaster risk based on the assumption, the mathematical equation is:
Early Stage of understanding	Unsafe Conditions – the gaps between the ideal and unsafe conditions of the element at risk determine the degree of vulnerability. This means the rich and poor, although living in the same location (in proximity of the hazard), have different degrees of vulnerability because they have different socio-economic and political status. In this assumption capacity is subsumed by vulnerability.	$\text{Disaster Risk} = \text{Hazard} \times \text{Vulnerability}$
Later stage of understanding: Cordaid Adopted this formula	Unsafe Location – the proximity of element at risk (people, infrastructure, etc) in relationship to the hazard is the degree of vulnerability. This means that weather rich or poor, all persons living in the same location have equal degrees of vulnerability to the hazard. Under this assumption, the socioeconomic status has no bearing on the degree of vulnerability. Capacity is recognized as a separate variable and subsumed neither by hazard nor by vulnerability. It gives weight to the economic, social, cultural and political conditions, which are viewed as elements that increase or decrease the capacity to cope with the hazard's impact.	$\text{Disaster Risk} = \text{Hazard} \times \frac{\text{Vulnerability}}{\text{Capacity}}$

The formula adopted by Cordaid means that capacities in the context of disaster risk reduction are analyzed as the interaction of forces of resources and the access to these resources by the different groups at risk and the overarching systems and structures that decrease or increase the capacities to face the hazards. Because the behaviour of a hazard and degree of vulnerability determine the capacity needed to reduce disaster risk, capacities should be analyzed in relation to the hazard and vulnerability.

Therefore there are capacities that addresses hazard and capacities that addresses vulnerabilities and the following are:

- Capacities that addresses hazard:
 - Prevention – covers measures that impede the occurrence of a hazard event.
 - Mitigation – covers measures that minimize the effects of hazard to the element at risk
- Capacities that addresses vulnerability:
 - Survivability – refers to individual (age and sexes) to manage to stay alive or continue to exist, despite the difficult situation
 - Community Readiness- group/community organization functioning as a system prepared for any hazard that going to happen.

A1.2 Cordaid DRR Evolution and Policy

Cordaid has been working on Disaster Risk Reduction since 2003. In its strategic plan 2003 – 2006 Cordaid introduced the concept of linkage: stimulating a practice in which emergency aid and structural aid are developed in an integrated way. It started as an ‘innovation trajectory’, which led in the first place to the implementation of the programme ‘Drought Cycle Management’ in the Horn of Africa and Malawi, and in the second place to the development of the strategy of ‘Disaster Risk Reduction’, through studies, workshops and support to partner organisations.

“Cordaid has chosen a holistic approach of relief, rehabilitation and development, and considers this linkage the best way to deal with the ongoing crisis situations in the world. Preparedness to respond to crisis situations, as well as the actual disaster response and recovery/rehabilitation, and disaster reduction (mitigation) are equally important.

It was accepted that activities related to relief, rehabilitation and development are being conducted simultaneously and in parallel. It is no longer a correct thought that there are stages in disaster and that activities should follow one another. Following the above approach, one step further Disaster Risk Management (DRM) or Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is a new model that is adopted within Cordaid to deal with the linkage approach: an approach that understands the need to further reduce risk when responding to crisis, as well as systematically introduced risk analysis in the ‘structural development’ work”.²²

In 2003 the concept Drought Cycle Management (DCM) has been elaborated together with partner organisations in the Horn of Africa, because drought became a structural problem. In 2004 the DCM programme has been implemented in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. Since 2005 the Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR) approach has been integrated in this programme. Organisations have been trained in CMDRR. Based on this training the partners develop plans with the communities, which describe their vulnerabilities and capacities, and elaborate on strategies to reduce their vulnerability.

In its new strategic plan 2007 -2010 Cordaid took up ‘Disaster Prevention and Emergency Aid’ as a specific programme (programme 4), within the sector Emergency Aid and Reconstruction (Sector 2). The concept of Disaster Risk Reduction has been introduced to selected partners in selected countries, and separate DRR programmes have been developed. Besides setting up separate DRR programmes, the DRR concept is being mainstreamed within other sector 2 programmes (in disaster response programmes, e.g. safe shelter, food security, water & sanitation, creation of livelihood opportunities, being focal areas in rehabilitation after disaster). Furthermore, the DRR concept is mainstreamed within other Cordaid programmes.

Beginning of 2008 a subdivision of three sub programmes was made to bring more focus within the programme. These sub-programmes are:

1. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and climate change related hazard (floods, drought, hurricanes, etc.)
2. DRR and non-climate related threats (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions)
3. Disaster Response (relief and rehabilitation) in case a disaster occurs.

Sub-programme 1 is directed towards focus countries in Asia, Eastern and Southern Africa and Central America. The climate threats are chronic and almost yearly disasters like floods, drought and hurricanes occur. The DRR approach in these countries consists of:

- Capacity building of organisations in DRR.
- Setting up DRR plans with the communities and other relevant actors (governments, other NGOs) by the partners.
- Financing pilot programmes
- Financing longer term programmes
- Policy influencing related to DRR and climate change directed towards governments, i.e. by conducting studies, launching publications, etc.

²² Disaster Risk Management Briefing – 2 February 2006.

- Linking and learning through training, organising learning events with partners and other stakeholders, evaluations, exchange visits. Documenting best practices (publications and films).

Sub programme 2 consists of the same strategies, although based on the risk analysis of non-climate hazards specific intervention logic will be developed.

Sub programme 3: in case of emergency situations support will be given (if necessary, needed and possible).

This programme evaluation will only look at the first two sub programmes.


A1.2.1 MAIN APPROACH FOR SUB-PROGRAMMES ONE AND TWO

Within the DRR programme, Cordaid has adopted the Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR) approach. CMDRR is relying on community participation which allows community to make decisions and manage DRR programs according to the varied local context. It places emphasis on the process of community conducting their own risk assessment and analysis, developing their community disaster risk reduction measures (development and contingency plan), building functional community organizations to implement their DRR measures and a monitoring, evaluation and learning system established and managed by the communities. The role of the partner organisations is to facilitate the process with the end state that community will own and sustain their DRR initiatives.

A1.2.2 DRR PROGRAMMES AND COUNTRIES

The Cordaid supported activities under sub programme One are based on (CM)DRR and climate threats/natural disasters and emergency aid.

Focus countries under sub programme One are: Kenya (drought); Ethiopia (drought); Uganda (drought); Malawi (drought); Central America (Drought, hurricanes), India (floods, drought), Bangladesh (floods, cyclones). In 2008, the CMDRR approach has also been introduced in Zambia. In 2009 Cordaid plans to start CMDRR interventions in Zimbabwe and Haiti (depending on the availability of funds). These countries have drought as the main common hazard. In Haiti hurricanes are a very important hazard.



Sub programme 2 (DRR and non-climate threats) will be mainly implemented in Indonesia, because of the vulnerability to earthquakes. Climate related hazards however also play a role in Indonesia (floods).

Year	Total amount spent programme 4	Amount spent on sub programme 1 and 2 (DRR)	MFS funds (Co-financing funds)
2004	26.402.000		
2005	50.000.000		
2006	42.000.000		
2007	19.258.780	9.700.000	6.312.872
2008	17.817.396		5.755.472

Before 2007 the DRR activities have been financed with private funds, from 2007 onwards government (MFS) funds are also used for the DRR programme.

See the next appendix for a table with countries, partners and financing.

A1.2.3 SELECTION OF COUNTRIES FOR CASE STUDIES

Criteria for the selection of countries for case studies:

- Countries where recently an external evaluation has been done related to DRR (or another external evaluation with the same partner organisations) will not be taken as a case study.
- The selected countries reflect as much as possible different type of hazards: drought, floods and earthquakes.
- Countries where the Cordaid intervention on DRR is substantial (more than 3 partner organisations) and not too recent (more than three years)
- Selection of countries in different continents.

With these criteria Kenya is no option as a case study (recent evaluation on DRR). Central America interventions are too recent. Proposed countries for case studies are: Malawi, Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Indonesia.

A1.2.4 CORDAID CORE ACTIVITIES AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

In its strategy Cordaid distinguishes between four core activities:

1. Strategic funding: the financial support of partner organisations based on an analysis of inclusion of vulnerable groups;
2. Lobby and advocacy: together with partner organisations, influencing leaders and policymakers in order to realise the inclusion of vulnerable groups;
3. Linking and learning: the promotion of new cooperation relations between partner organisations and other actors in society and of learning and innovation within the partner network;
4. Organisation of commitment in the Netherlands: increasing commitment by offering an action perspective that corresponds to the requirement: donation, collective action, deployment of knowledge.

Strategic funding can be subdivided into 3 intervention strategies:

- Direct poverty alleviation (DAB)
- Civil society building (MO)
- Policy influencing (BB)

In each programme Cordaid supports a combination of these three intervention strategies.

A1.2.5 INTERVENTION LOGIC DRR PROGRAMME:

Output	Outcome
<p><i>Direct Poverty Alleviation</i></p> <p>Partner organisations have increased capacities in Disaster Risk Reduction</p>	<p>Direct Poverty Alleviation</p> <p>Groups facing disaster risks are trained in (CM)DRR and implement strategies to prevent disasters and for reconstruction after disasters</p>
<p><i>Civil Society Building</i></p> <p>Partner organisations have increased capacities to implement a joint strategy for disaster risk reduction, and to build early warning systems and disaster risk reduction plans in communities.</p>	<p>Civil Society Building</p> <p>Communities have early warning systems and disaster management plans. DRR coalitions or coordination mechanisms are set up and function.</p>
<p><i>Policy Influencing</i></p> <p>Partner organisations have increased capacities to influence policies in the field of disaster risk reduction, climate change and conflict management, and to support community organisations and networks in their policy influencing activities.</p>	<p>Policy Influencing</p> <p>Local organisations have increased capacities to influence policy on DRR.</p>

A1.3 Proposed evaluation questions

A1.3.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation is to gain greater insight in:

1. The efficiency, relevance and effectiveness of the programme on the lives of vulnerable groups. (accountability)
2. The most efficient, effective and sustainable strategies for Disaster Risk Reduction. (learning) The evaluation will give input for further programme development in DRR

A1.3.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The most important questions for this evaluation are:

1. The efficiency of the programme
 - a. What are the factors that enable the implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction interventions at the level of partner organisations?
 - b. What is the desired level of accompaniment of the partners by Cordaid and of the groups that face disaster risks by partner organisations?
2. The effectiveness of the programme on the lives of groups that face disaster risks.
 - a. To what extent do the DRR interventions have an influence on the broader intervention strategies of the partner organisations (how well is it integrated in their interventions)?
 - b. To what extent have the DRR capacities of groups that face disaster risks been strengthened?
 - c. What are the mechanisms to strengthen the linkages between the different actors at different levels (Cordaid – partners – communities) and do these linkages contribute to the results for DRR?
 - d. To what extent has the DRR process been able to foster capacities to influence policies and planning/operations related to DRR at different levels?
 - e. Which (combination of) levels of intervention are the most effective to reach the before mentioned results.

3. The relevance of the programme
 - a. To what extent have the interventions contributed to improve the resilience of groups that face disaster risks, or will be likely to contribute to the improvement of resilience?
 - b. To what extent are the strategies for DRR embedded in local structures, will the DRR activities continue after funding will end?
 - c. Which (combination of) DRR interventions are most likely to contribute to a sustainable improvement of the resilience of groups that face disaster risks?
4. Programme development at Cordaid level
 - a. To what extent has Cordaid's selection of countries and partner organisations been relevant? How was the process of selection done? What were the criteria for the selection of countries, areas, and partners?
 - b. To what extent has DRR contributed to improve "Linking relief, rehabilitation and development" within Cordaid programmes?
 - c. Has Cordaid, in cooperation with its partners, succeeded to increase donor attention and support for DRR with other stakeholders like large donors, INGOs (Caritas network) and governments?
5. Recommendations for further programme development.

A1.3.3 EVALUATION MATRIX

Result Levels	Indicators	Sources
<i>Input</i>		
Cordaid policy on DRR	Policy priorities	Policy documents on DRR
	Partner selection	Annual plans and reports
	Strategies per region	PV's and other people involved within Cordaid
<i>Output</i>		
Partner organisations have increased capacities in Disaster Risk Management	Financial support	Plans and reports of partner organizations
	Capacity building	
Partner organisations have increased capacities to implement a joint strategy for disaster risk reduction/management, and to build early warning systems and disaster management/ DRR plans in communities.	Partner meetings	Organisation scan of partner organisations
	Technical assistance	Staff of partner organizations
	Policy support	Monitoring information on programme
Partner organisations have increased capacities to influence policies in the field of disaster management/DRR, climate change and conflict management, and to support community organisations and networks in their policy influencing activities.	Capacity of partner organizations	
	Quality and quantity of interventions by PO's on DRR	
<i>Outcome</i>		
Groups that face disaster risks are trained in DRR and implement strategies to prevent disasters	Quality and quantity of DRR interventions by groups that face disaster risks	Plans and reports of partner organizations
		Staff of partner organizations
Communities have early warning systems and DRR/disaster	Early warning systems	Monitoring information on

Result Levels	Indicators	Sources
management plans.	implemented	programme
DRR coalitions or coordination mechanisms are set up and function.	Disaster management plans elaborated	Beneficiaries Different stakeholders
Local organisations have increased capacities to influence policy on DRR.	Relevant and functional mechanisms in place for DRR Initiatives to change policies related to DRR	
Impact		
Improved resilience of beneficiaries	Change in mindset and/or behaviour related to DRR Increased economic and social development	Plans and reports of partner organizations Staff of partner organizations Monitoring information on programme Beneficiaries Different stakeholders Statistics

A1.4 Planning and organisation evaluation

A1.4.1 ORGANISATION

A1.4.1.1 REFERENCE GROUP

The department Policy & Evaluation (B&E) within Cordaid is in charge of the entire process and liaises with the reference group and external evaluator. The reference group consists of Rens Rutten, Policy officer B&E (chair) and three Programme Responsibles of programme 4: Sasja Kamil, Inge Leuverink, Marlou Geurts.

A1.4.1.2 EXTERNAL EXPERTS

Three external experts will be invited to comment on the methodology and content of the programme evaluation.

A1.4.1.3 TERMS OF REFERENCE:

B&E and the reference group have compiled the ToR. Input of field coordinators has been integrated.

A1.4.1.4 INCEPTION PHASE

The external evaluator will present an inception report, based on desk study conducted in the first month (April 2009).

A1.4.1.5 FIELD RESEARCH:

The field research will be carried out by an external evaluator and liaison is done by B&E.

The selected countries are: Malawi, Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Indonesia.

The reference group will meet with the consultant(s) to discuss the evaluation proposal of the field evaluation (inception report), the draft country reports and the draft final report.

The evaluation proposal and draft report will also be discussed with the external experts.

A1.4.1.6 FINAL REPORT

The external evaluator will produce the final report in which the results of the desk study and of the different country evaluations are integrated. This report must contain the following parts:

- Executive summary
- Report with main findings and conclusions (not exceeding 25 pages)
- Options and/ or Recommendations for programme development in the coming years
- Annexes including country reports with data per partner organization visited

The report must be written in English.

The evaluation report will be reviewed by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to a Quality Assessment List (Annex 3 Beoordelingslijst programma-evaluaties, including unofficial translation in English)

Contact person during the evaluation:

(Ms) Rens Rutten
Cordaid
Postbus 16440
2500 BK Den Haag
Lutherse Burgwal 10
2512 CB Den Haag
tel: 070 3136388
rens.rutten@cordaid.nl

A1.4.2 PLANNING

Table 5: Planning

Date/Period	Activity	Who
<i>February 2009</i>	Selection of consultant	B&E and reference group
<i>April 2009</i>	Inception Report	External evaluator, liaison by B&E. Discussion with reference group and external experts
<i>May - August</i>	Field studies: Malawi, Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Indonesia.	External evaluator, liaison by B&E
<i>8-13 June</i>	Conference on CMDRR in Malawi – presentation of preliminary findings	External evaluator and reference group
<i>15 September</i>	Draft country reports	External evaluator, liaison by B&E. Discussion with reference group
<i>15 October</i>	Draft integrated report	External evaluator, liaison by B&E. Discussion with reference group and external experts
<i>15 November</i>	Final integrated report	External evaluator, liaison by B&E

Where necessary the reference group provides further support such as relevant documentation, information for the field research and is available for interviews during the evaluation.

4.3. Expected methodological difficulties

- Multiple level analyses: Within the aid chain, Cordaid as well as the partner organizations may not have monitoring data. Some organizations contribute indirectly to the results at beneficiary level, it may be difficult to estimate their contribution.
- Multiple intervention strategies: Cordaid works through three intervention strategies that are closely linked to each other (direct poverty alleviation, civil society building and lobby & advocacy). It may be hard to disentangle these strategies.

- Complexity of determining the effects and impact, since the interventions directed to DRR are not necessarily directly making a difference in the life of people, but in the first place reducing risks. This ideally can only be 'measured' comparing a disaster struck area 'without' DRR with a comparable area, struck by the same disaster 'with' DRR.

A1.5 Evaluation team

The team leader should have expertise in managing complex evaluation processes. Experiences with evaluations which go beyond policy level; knowledge of the working conditions and contexts of local partner organisations in the South is a must.

Team leader and/or team members should have expertise in the field of disaster risk reduction. Language skills needed are Dutch and English. Preferably, the team is a mixture of northern consultant(s) with local consultant(s) in each of the four countries.

Team member should not have had a working relation with Cordaid during the period 2003 - 2008, or with one of the partner organisations that are involved in this evaluation.

It is the responsibility of the team leader to assure:

- Composition of the team
- A realistic time frame and budget for the evaluation
- The consistency of the deliverables within the ToR
- The quality of the content of the deliverables.

The team leader is ultimately responsible for the finalising the report and co-ordinating and guiding the evaluation process (including all logistic arrangements)

A1.6 Budget

A budget should give a breakdown of the expected number of days per team and their fees.

Amount need to be calculated in Euro's, excl VAT/BTW, and are maximum amount and cannot be changed during the contract. The maximum budget available for the evaluation in three countries, including the final integrated report is € 100.000,-.

A1.7 Minimal requirements for proposals

In case you are or your organisation is interested, we invite you to prepare a proposal for implementation (max 10 pages, excluding annexes). We encourage you to team up with other organisations or individuals. The proposal should be written in English. We expect a plan of approach, with at least the following information:

Understanding context and evaluation questions:

- Fine tuning of the evaluation questions, including a first draft of 'judgement criteria'. The evaluation questions need to be captured into different judgement criteria developed by the consultants. Each evaluation question should have at least 1 to 2 judgement criteria. The achievement of these criteria during the period 2003 -2008 can be assessed or judged through indicators during the evaluation.

Evaluation capacity:

- A proposal for a methodology, the way in which data will be collected and data sources needed, taking into account the expected methodological problems and data shortcomings.
- A proposal for how to analyse data in order to answer the evaluation questions.

Evaluation team:

- An overview of the roles, expertise and skills of the team members in the evaluation.

- Time table, including possible risks, and measures you may take in order to reduce those risks.

The proposal should include at least the following annexes:

- Composition of the evaluation team with cv's, showing their knowledge, skills and experiences
- List of relevant evaluations within the last 5 years

Proposals should be sent in to Rens Rutten and need to be in her receipt no later than at 23 February.

A1.7.1 SELECTION PROCEDURE

The reference group will assess the proposals based on the plan of approach in line with the ToR, on the following eight quality criteria:

A1.7.1.1 UNDERSTANDING OF CONTEXT AND QUESTIONS:

1. Understanding of context
2. Understanding of questions

A1.7.1.2 EVALUATION CAPACITY:

3. Quality of evaluation design
4. Mastery of data collection
5. Capacity to analyse data
6. Capacity to deliver conclusions and recommendations

A1.7.1.3 EVALUATION TEAM:

7. Skills of the team
8. Organisational capacity

On 27 of February you will be informed about the final selection. The evaluation is supposed to start with a kick-off meeting with the reference group and the evaluation team, preferably in week 11 (9 – 13 March).

Appendix 2 DRR Project List

Country	Project number	Partner organisation	Title project	Contribution Cordaid	Year of commitment (2004 – 2008)	Source of Funding
<i>General</i>	100/10036	Cordaid	CMDRR Course	31.500	2006	
	100/10035	Cordaid Nairobi	Droogte, hoe pakken we dat aan?	1.294.954	2006	
	100/10035 A	Cordaid	Drought preparedness program Ethiopie en Kenya	3.446.090	2008	Part MFS
	100/10037	Production CMDRR Trainer's Guide	IIRR	60.410	2006	
	100/10037 A	IIRR	Technische assistentie aan IIRR	39.263	2007	
	100/10055	IIRR	Capacity building for Part. In DRR process	577.306	2008	MFS
	600/10121	Cordaid	Risk Management/linkage – taking stock	70.000	2005	
	600/10182	ASPRODE	Proyecto regional reduccion de riesgos en CA	242.345	2007	MFS
	200/10062	ASPRODE	Proyecto regional reduccion de riesgos en CA	605.491	2008	PART MFS
	300/10063	Cordaid	KP fund for DRR team AZMO	160.000	2007	MFS
	600/10099	Cordaid	Risk Management workshop	62.085	2004	
<i>Kenya</i>	130/10129	Cordaid Nairobi	DRM	308.422	2007	MFS
	130/10143	Cordaid Kenya	DCM-DRR phase II	500.000	2007	MFS
	130/10135	Cordaid Kenya	Operational Costst	118.700	2007	MFS
	130/10118 A					
	130/10107	Cordaid Nairobi	Cordaid emergency drought response	1.324.697	2004	
	130/10106	Cordaid Nairobi	A new drought approach	1.106.534	2004	
	130/10163	RACIDA	Improved preparedness mitigate effects climate hazards	345.000	2008	
	130/10164	MIDP	DRR project	218.893	2008	
<i>Ethiopia</i>	118/10077	Cordaid Nairobi	DRM	260.000	2007	PART MFS
	118/10078	JECCDO	CBDRM	265.577	2007	MFS
	118/10080	Cordaid Ethiopia	Operational costst	90.984	2007	MFS
	118/10090	SSD	Mille integrated DRR	318.163	2007	MFS
	118/10062 A	Cordaid	South Omo DRM	55.360	2006	
	118/10068 A	Cordaid	Consultant drought cycle management	140.722	2006	
	118/10075	AFD	Capacity building DCM	41.850	2006	
	118/10076	SOS Sahel	Support DCM	53.307	2006	
	118/10062	Cordaid Nairobi	DCM Risk management	765.000	2005	
<i>Uganda</i>	158/10122	CAR GULU	Relief, Rehabilitation and DRR	387.735	2007	MFS
	158/10116	TPO	Integrating DRR	65.100	2006	MFS
	158/1333 C	SSD Moroto	Integrated community development programme	346.494	2005	MFS
	158/10058 C	KADP	DRR & Livelihood support for Karamajong	300.000	2008	MFS
	158/10132	SSD Moroto	CMDRR project Karamoja	129.015	2008	MFS

Country	Project number	Partner organisation	Title project	Contribution Cordaid	Year of commitment (2004 – 2008)	Source of Funding
			region			
	158/10125	SOCADIDO	DRR & Rebuilding livelihood	225.000	2008	
	158/10144	TPO	CMDRR in Teso	51160	2008	MFS
<i>Malawi</i>	135/10081	CADECOM	Risk Management	50.000	2004	
	135/10082	CADECOM	Risk Management	201.631	2004	
	135/10104	ECM	DRM programme 2008-2010	500.000	2007	MFS
	135/10102	CADECOM	Voedselhulp en DRM in droogte gebieden	121798	2006	
<i>Central America</i>	218/10039	ACUA UNES	Reduccion vulnerabilidad social y ambiental	330.383	2008	MFS
<i>Bangladesh</i>	342/10102	CARITAS	Strengthening the community for DRM	582.524	2007	MFS
	342/10103	CUB	DIPECHO, community based Disaster preparedness	53.945	2007	MFS
	342/10103 A	CUB	Vulnerability mapping and water& sanitation	486.706	2007	MFS + M-ALG
	342/10125	CARITAS	Construction cyclone shelters	327.639	2008	MFS + N-ADP
	342/10126	FFH	Community based DRR action plan	41.985	2008	MFS
	342/10127	PGUK	Capacity building for DRR	23.317	2008	MFS
	342/10128	VARD-SYLHET	Community managed disaster risk reduction	40.741	2008	MFS
	342/10129	ADD	DRR assessments in 9 districts, inclusion disabled	31.784	2008	MFS
	342/10130	PDIM	Community based disaster risk reduction	61.025	2008	MFS
<i>India</i>	317/10480	ASK	Study on indigenous coping mechanisms	31.500	2007	MFS
	317/10494A	HelpAge	Extended Disaster Response floods Bihar	97.205	2008	MFS
	317/10496	Cenderet	CBDRRM-Cenderet	151.928	2007	MFS
	317/10498	UNNATI	Strengthening capacities on DRR	384.655	2007	MFS
	317/10511	CARITAS INDIA	CBDP & DRR Bihar	406.650	2008	MFS
	317/10512	RUC	CMDRR	332.517	2008	MFS
	317/10513	Kalvi Kendra	CMDRR	308.538	2008	MFS
	317/10517	Bosco Reach Out	DRR in Assam	389.693	2008	MFS + NPL
	317/10518	WBVHA	DP interventions after Tsunami	75.396	2008	MFS
	317/10525	AIDMI	Mainstreaming DRR in floods affected communities	194.027	2008	N-ALG
<i>Indonesia</i>	318/10292	IDEP	Disaster Preparedness education using puppetry	24.806	2007	
	318/10299	BINA SWADAYA	Bina Swadaya Capacity building on DRR	34.272	2007	
	318/10299 A	BINA SWADAYA	Capacity building for staff and community on DRR	150.366	2008	
	318/10302	INSIST	DRR building community resiliency	33.570	2007	
	318/10302 A	INSIST	DRR Building community in six	125.000	2008	

Country	Project number	Partner organisation	Title project	Contribution Cordaid	Year of commitment (2004 – 2008)	Source of Funding
			regions			
	318/10271	Cordaid	KP fund for DRM	68.500	2006	
	318/10290	PSPP	DRR program for post earthquake community	53.937	2007	
	318/10290 A	PSPP	CMDRR and emergency response for post earthquake	156.678	2008	
	318/10295	AMAN	DRR	39.280	2007	
	318/10300	Perdhaki	DRR program	34.275	2007	
	318/10301	CUCO foundation	Community based DRR through economic emp.ment	41.463	2007	
	318/10303	MPBI	Community managed DRR and policy making	46.309	2007	
	318/10319	PUSAKA	Community managed DRR in Simeulue Island	218.269	2008	

Appendix 3 The results of the Web Survey

A3.1 Introduction

As part of the evaluation the team conducted an online survey of Cordaid partners. The survey was administered via <http://www.surveymonkey.com>. The questionnaire was prepared in English and, after editing, Cordaid translated it into Spanish and French.

The survey had 39 questions over 17 pages, but the pages were controlled by the answer logic so that respondents only saw the pages that were relevant for them based on their previous answers. The questions were generally in the form of 24 multiple choice questions supported by 15 open ended questions.

This appendix presents the results that have not been presented in the main report.

A3.2 Survey responses

The survey was placed on-line with the initial invitation to respond sent out early morning on Tuesday 26 May. The invitations and reminders were programmed to go out at different times to reflect the predominant time zones for the language group.

Reminders were sent out six and ten days after the first request leading to a spike in responses (Table 5: Levels of response to the survey). The general methodological guide for the survey design and operation was Dillman et al (2009), whose advice had previously been found to lead to higher response rates on other online surveys conducted by the team.




Figure 24: Response pattern for the online survey.

The survey was originally intended to run for two weeks by which time 319 replies had been received. However, a number of requests were received to reopen the survey to accommodate Cordaid partners who had internet access problems or who had been travelling during the first two weeks, so the survey was reopened, and a further 15 replies were received in the third week. The survey was not closed, and another nine responses were received in the following 7 weeks.

The team surveyed the whole population rather than taking a random sample because we were looking for examples where DRR had led to effective reduced disaster impact. The whole population consisted of Cordaid list of all current partners.

After removing duplicates and non-viable addresses, a total of 975 email addresses were abstracted from the partner lists supplied by Cordaid. Of these 802 proved to be good addresses and 341 valid responses were received from these, giving a 43% response rate (Table 5).

Table 5: Levels of response to the survey

Breakdown of the survey responses	English	French	Spanish	Total
<i>Number of partners invited to respond</i>	681	126	168	975
<i>Less those who had opted out of surveys</i>	3	0	4	7
<i>Less those where the email bounced</i>	116	19	31	166
<i>Number of partners getting requests</i>	562	107	133	802
<i>Number of partners responding</i>	239	43	67	349
<i>Less responses with nil data</i>	7	0	1	8
Total valid responses	232	43	66	341
<i>Responses as a % of requests</i>	41%	40%	50%	43%

A3.3 Data analysis

The data from the surveys was downloaded from the Survey Monkey site and collated in a spreadsheet. The data was plotted on a series of charts to summarise the main points.

At the same time a bubble chart was used to highlight any pattern between different answers, and the relationship between the answers to different questions was tested for statistical significance.

For example, a bubble chart (Figure 25) suggested (unsurprisingly) that there was a relationship between the years that an agency had been a partner for Cordaid and the number of funders it got funding from. However, as chi-squared test showed that the relationship was not statistically significant at the 5% level.

All of the data was subject to such testing but non-trivial statistically significant relationships were found.

Note: numbers correspond to the index number of the response, not to numerical values




Figure 25: A bubble chart showing the relationship between two questions.

A3.4 The survey results

Most of those responding had been Cordaid partners for at least four years and nearly half had been partners for at least seven years (Figure 26).




Figure 26: Partnership history with Cordaid.

Of the partners, 84% had received funding from Cordaid since 2003. Half of those partners who had not received funding from Cordaid since 2003 had received funding from four or more other donors. Partners who had received Cordaid funding were likely to have a broad base of donor support and were less likely to have a single donor than those who had not received Cordaid funding (Figure 28).





Figure 28: Pattern of donor support for partners who got no Cordaid funding since 2003 (above) and got Cordaid funding (below).

Respondents rated Cordaid higher than other donors (Figure 27).

While one would expect a certain amount of flattery for the donor in such a survey, 174




Figure 27: Partner ratings of Cordaid.

respondents gave reasons for their response. The one respondent who gave a reason for saying that Cordaid was the worst donor cited the demanding nature of reporting to Cordaid, the slow transfer of funding, and too much of a business orientation. The one response for worse than average complained about slow disbursements.

Those who said that Cordaid was the same as others commented that Cordaid has similar requirements and policies to the other donors they dealt with. Those rating Cordaid as better or the best cited reasons such as flexibility, true partnership, coincident values, generosity, and support for capacity building.

Less than one quarter of respondents has received funding from Cordaid for responding to disasters, but over one third of partners had received such funding from other donors. A total of 17% of respondents reported getting DRR funding from Cordaid, with 22% reporting getting such funding from other donors.




Figure 29: Rating of the importance of DRR in partners overall programmes.

Over half those responding rated DRR as an important part, or as the most important part, of their overall programme (Figure 29). When asked to rate the success of DRR, just over two thirds of partners rated it to be about as successful as the rest of their other projects. 17% of respondents reported that DRR was less successful than their other projects and only 14% rated it as being more successful. This would suggest that partners are to some extent struggling with DRR projects.

Similar to the responses obtained by the team in the field, partners rates funding as the most important support that they got (Figure 30). Those selecting other mostly gave the most important support as a combination of some or all of the other three elements.

What is the most important support (in terms of enabling you to begin work) that you have received for your Disaster Risk Reduction programme? (93 responses)





Figure 30: Most important support for DRR.

A total of 77 respondents claimed to be using a community managed disaster risk reduction approach and over two thirds of them rated the CMDRR approach as being very effective at mobilising communities. This needs to be treated with caution as only 40 respondents reported DRR funding from Cordaid, with 54 reporting DRR funding from other sources. Over three quarters of respondents rated CMDRR as at least better than other approaches, with fully one third rating it as the best approach.

How effective is the community managed disaster risk reduction approach at mobilising communities?



Appendix 4 Checklist for partners selection

When selecting partners for Disaster Risk Reduction it is useful to ask the following questions:

Checklist

- Is the partner open to the DRR concept?**
Only partner who are open to the concept are likely to become strongly committed to it. The DRR programme worked best where partners were strongly committed to it (Merapi Volcano in Indonesia, or Dire Dawa in Ethiopia).
- Has the partner had recent disaster experience?**
Partners Communities that had recently been exposed to hazards were far more interested (some of the communities who had suffered during the May 2009 Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh were very interested in DRR). One of the reasons for the rapid uptake of the DRR approach in Indonesia was that all partners had recent disaster experience.
- Does the partner have strong links with the community to be served?**
The strength of the linkages of the partners with the communities. Partners that had very good links with the community were able to implement more effectively (Farm Africa in Ethiopia and some of the Bina Swadaya interventions in Indonesia).
- Is there any synergy with the partner's other interventions?**
Partners sometimes had other interventions which could support the DRR (the Catholic Church of Gemu Gofa in Ethiopia, and some CADECOM projects in Malawi).
- Is the partner open to the community-managed approach?**
Partners who had previous experience of community driven development were the fastest at adopting the CMDRR approach. Where partners understood the methodology and applied it, the approach worked well. This was not the case where partner adhered to their former top-down methodology.
- Does the partner have good staff retention?**
Staff turnover was one of the biggest problems facing some partners. This was a problem for the project because of the training needed to enable partner staff to use the CMDRR approach.
- Does the partner have the technical competence need for the main hazard?**
Some hazards require specific technical competence. Partners with technical competence in the technical aspects of the disaster hazard were well placed to guide communities into effective action (JECCDO in Dire Dawa).

Appendix 5 Bibliography

The following sources are referred to in this report.

- Anderson, M. B., & Woodrow, P. J. (1989). *Rising from the ashes: Developing strategies in times of disaster*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Buchanan-Smith, M., & Fabbri, P. (2005). *Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response: A review of the debate*. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. Last viewed on 17 October 2008. URL: http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/F3802701-9EF5-4D4C-AF32-D6B12B254313/0/lrrd_review_debate.pdf
- CADECOM. (2008). *Disaster Risk Reduction Training Manual*. Lilongwe: Catholic Development Commission in Malawi (CADECOM)
- Chipeta, C., & Kachaka, W. (2005). *Role of Migrants' Remittances in an unstable Low-income Economy: A Case Study of Malawi* (Chancellor College Working Paper 2005/05). Zomba: Department of Economics, Chancellor College, University of Malawi. URL: http://www.economics.chanco.mw/papers/wp2005_05.pdf
- Chou, Y.-J., Huang, N., Lee, C.-H., Tsai, S.-L., Chen, L.-S., & Chang, H.-J. (2004). Who Is at Risk of Death in an Earthquake? *Am. J. Epidemiol.*, 160(7), 688-695. Last viewed on 5 July 2008. URL: <http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/160/7/688>
- Cordaid Working Group Linkage. (2003). *Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development: The first results of the study of 4 Linkage Pilot Programmes*. The Hague: Cordaid. Last viewed on local copy. URL: CordaidDocs/Linkage Pilot Study.pdf
- Cosgrave, J. (2008). *Responding to earthquakes 2008: Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operations*. London and Geneva: ALNAP and Provention. Last viewed on 24 December 2009. URL: <http://www.alnap.org/publications/pdfs/ALNAPLessonsEarthquakes.pdf>
- Dilley, M., Chen, R. S., Deichmann, U., Lerner-Lam, A. L., Arnold, M., Agwe, J., Buys, P., Kjekstad, O., Lyon, B., & Yetman, G. (2005). *Natural disaster hotspots: a global risk analysis: synthesis report*. Washington: World Bank Publications. Last viewed on 4 October 2009. URL: <http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/hazards/hotspots/synthesisreport.pdf>
- Dillman, D. A., Smyth, J. D., & Christian, L. M. (2009). *Internet, mail and mixed-mode surveys: The tailored design method*. (3rd ed.). Hoboken: Wiley.
- Duncan, A., & Wathne, C. (2009). *Aid Effectiveness: A Progress Report on Implementing the Paris Declaration*. Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 22 April 2009. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/39/42111907.pdf>
- Fafchamps, M. (2004). *Rural Poverty, Risk And Development*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Frontera. (2007). *Motivating Staff and Volunteers Working in NGOs in the South*. London: People in Aid. Last viewed on 5 October 2009. URL: <http://www.peopleinaid.org/pool/files/publications/motivating-staff-and-volunteers-working-in-ngos-in-the-south.pdf>
- Golafshani, N. (2003). Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research *The Qualitative Report*, 8(4), 597-607. Last viewed on 30 October 2008. URL: <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-4/golafshani.pdf>
- IIRR, Cordaid, & Acacia Consultants. (2004). *Drought cycle management: A toolkit for the drylands of the greater horn of Africa*. Nairobi: International Institute for Rural Reconstruction, Cordaid, and Acacia Consultants Last viewed on 26 March 2009. URL: http://www.iirr.org/bookstore/index.php?product_id=49
- Kreimer, A., & Arnold, M. (Eds.). (2000). *Managing disaster risk in emerging economies*. Washington: World Bank Publications. Last viewed on 4 October 2009. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/08/19/000094946_00080705302023/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
- Neumayer, E., & Plümper, T. (2007). The Gendered Nature of Natural Disasters: The Impact of Catastrophic Events on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy, 1981-2002. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 97(3), 551-566. Last viewed on 8 June, 2008. URL: <http://www.informaworld.com/10.1111/j.1467-8306.2007.00563.x>

- OECD. (2005). *Paris declaration on aid effectiveness: Ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results and mutual accountability*. Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 1 July 2007. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf>
- Oxfam International. (2007). *Sink or Swim: Why Disaster Risk Reduction is central to surviving floods in South Asia*. Oxford: Oxfam International. Last viewed on 25 March 2009. URL: http://www.oxfam.de/download/Disaster_Risk_Reduction.pdf
- Ratha, D., Mohapatra, S., & Silwal, A. (2009). *Migration and Remittance Trends 2009: A better-than-expected outcome so far, but significant risks ahead* (Migration and Development Brief 11). Washington: Development Prospects Group, World Bank. Last viewed on 20 November 2001. URL: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf>
- Tearfund. (2005). *Learn the lessons: Governments must change the way they do aid work after thousands of needless deaths in recent disasters*. London: Tearfund. Last viewed on 8 June 2008. URL: <http://www.tearfund.org/webdocs/Website/News/Disasters%20Media%20Report%20-%20SMALLER%20VERSION.pdf>
- UNISDR. (2005). *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters: Extract from the final report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction: 18-22 January 2005, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan*. Geneva: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. Last viewed on 18 November 2008. URL: <http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/docs/Hyogo-framework-for-action-english.pdf>
- United Nations. (2004). *Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives (2004 version)*. New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 1 November 2008. URL: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/bd-lwr-2004-eng.htm
- White, P., Pelling, M., Sen, K., Seddon, D., Russell, S., & Few, R. (2004). *Disaster risk reduction: a development concern: A scoping study on links between disaster risk reduction, poverty and development*. London: Department for International Development. Last viewed on 21 September 2009. URL: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/drr-scoping-study.pdf>
- Wood, B., Kabell, D., Muwanga, N., & Sagasti, F. (2008). *Evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration: Phase I: Synthesis Report*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Last viewed on 7 January 2008. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/9/40888983.pdf>
- World Bank. (2009). Workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant transfers: November 2009. In *RemittancesData_Nov09(Public).xls* (Ed.). Washington: Migration and Remittance Team, World Bank). Last viewed on 20 November 2009. URL: [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/RemittancesData_Nov09\(Public\).xls](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/RemittancesData_Nov09(Public).xls)
- Yin, R. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (3rd ed. Applied Social Research Methods Series: 5). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc.