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# Disasters Derail Development. So why aren't we doing more about them?

How better incentives could help overcome barriers to disaster risk reduction in development programming

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# Introduction

Development programmes are often undertaken in countries with significant exposure to disaster risk. It follows, therefore, that development actors – whether they be bilateral donors, multilateral actors, NGOs and civil society, or national governments – could play a useful role in reducing those disaster risks. In theory, this would be done by prioritising disaster risk reduction in development strategies, to ensure the major risks faced by developing states, communities and households are addressed. Disaster risk reduction elements would then be integrated into all development programmes, no matter what the sector.

However, the incorporation of disaster risk reduction into development programming is still far from systematic. There are a number of challenges that stand in the way, which can be grouped under three main categories:

- Contextual – factors in the overall operating environment in developing countries, that shape, and sometimes restrict, how development actors can function
- Programmatic – factors that influence how development, climate change, stabilisation and humanitarian assistance programmes are designed and delivered
- Institutional – structural factors that influence how development actors, and their staff, behave and operate

This paper will look at how those challenges are blocking more coherent action on disaster risk reduction. It will also provide a set of incentives that can help different development actors – working alone or together – to overcome those challenges. Finally, the paper will provide recommendations aimed at ensuring that the successor arrangement to the Hyogo Framework for Action, and other post-2015 frameworks, include the right incentives for a more coherent approach to risk reduction in development programming.

The paper will primarily focus on the work of international development actors. Where possible, the experience of national and sub-national authorities will also be documented, but this is not the main focus of the work. Private sector efforts in support of development programming, for example through corporate social responsibility, are outside the scope of this work.

# Chapter 1: Disaster risk reduction in development: far from systematic

Under the Hyogo Framework for Action, development actors committed to *mainstream disaster risk reduction measures appropriately into multilateral and bilateral development assistance programmes including those related to poverty reduction, natural resource management, urban development and adaptation to climate change* (UN, 2005).

## How much DRR funding is provided through development co-operation?

This question is difficult to answer, as disaster risk reduction investments are not specifically identified in most donor statistical systems, and thus the amount of funding allocated is very difficult to track. However, all respondents to a joint UNISDR/OECD survey in 2013 reported that their disaster risk reduction funding has either slightly, or significantly, increased since the launch of the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005 (UNISDR/OECD, 2013). This trend is reflected in OECD data (note that this data is potentially under-reported[1]) – refer Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness reported to the OECD/DAC 2005-2011**




Source: OECD OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System, current prices

Disaster risk reduction investments make up a growing percentage of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements each year (Figure 2), although the overall percentage remains quite low – with disaster risk reduction comprising just 0.4% of of total ODA in 2010 and 2011. Australia reports the highest proportion of disaster risk reduction within its ODA of any individual donor – although this rate is rarely higher than 2%.

**Figure 2: DRR as share of total ODA**




Source: OECD OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System

## Many donors see disaster risk reduction as a humanitarian issue

OECD/DAC donors[2] are beginning to recognise the importance of disaster risk reduction in their strategic frameworks and programming; however, many donors continue to see this important area as a purely humanitarian issue (OECD, 2012a).

Different contextual, programmatic and institutional challenges have made it easier for OECD/DAC donors to approach disaster risk reduction as a separate "sector", often within their humanitarian programme, rather than attempting to mainstream this important area across all development programming. However, there has been some important progress. Australia, the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, Finland and the United Kingdom have developed disaster risk reduction policies or strategies to guide investments. Denmark and Switzerland have established disaster risk reduction as one of the priority areas of their overall development strategies, and include risk reduction in partner country poverty reduction strategies, as does Poland. Switzerland has developed guidance on disaster risk reduction in the project management cycle, and Australia has a useful toolkit to support the integration of risk reduction into sector strategies. A number of donors, including Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, have budget earmarks for risk reduction, often focused on disaster preparedness. New Zealand, Poland, Portugal and Sweden fund their domestic civil protection mechanisms to build the capacity of similar systems in partner countries.

## Operational actors are engaged in disaster risk reduction projects

The United Nations agencies say that they are adapting and scaling-up their commitment to reducing disaster risk. A biannual survey of UN agency practices concluded that the UN was supporting disaster risk reduction through a variety of different projects in developing countries, with support channelled through UN country assistance development frameworks (known as UNDAFs). The survey also gave credit to the increasing number of UN Resident Co-ordinators who are championing disaster risk reduction through leadership and bringing multiple partners together around a common agenda (UNISDR, 2013).

Certainly there are a number of useful UN projects underway, for example, in the provision of early warning systems, capacity-building for effective risk governance, and the mainstreaming of disaster risk into the agriculture, health and education sectors. There are also guidelines for integrating disaster risk reduction into UN planning tools, focusing on mainstreaming disaster risk reduction within poverty alleviation programmes[3]. The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium, often cited as good practice in bringing together different development actors to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters, was established on the initiative of its then Resident Co-ordinator, Mr Robert Piper[4].

However, in 2012, only 0.72% of the core funding to multilateral organisations was then directed by those organisations to disaster risk reduction programming[5]. Most of these projects were linked to emergency preparedness. There are inherent problems in the reporting of disaster risk reduction statistics (Chapter 4), which mean that these figures are probably under-reported, however this figure seems low. Allocations from core funding can be seen as a useful proxy for the importance accorded to a certain priority by the reporting organisation.

The UN Office for Disaster Reduction received only USD 44.6 million in funding for 2010-2011, a quarter of which came from the World Bank, to cover its activities in both developed and developing countries[6].

Development banks are a significant player in disaster risk reduction. The World Bank's disaster risk management portfolio has grown about 20% annually for the last four years to nearly USD 4 billion in fiscal year 2013[7]. The Asian Development Bank has approved nearly 190 projects with disaster risk reduction components since 2010, with a total value of USD 3.1 billion[8]. The Inter-American Development Bank also has a growing natural disaster portfolio[9]. All of these banks take an integrated approach to disaster risk management, integrating disaster risk aspects into context analysis and programme design, no matter what the sector.

Civil society – international and domestic – also plays a key role in disaster risk reduction, both in raising awareness of disaster risk issues, and in working, often at community level, to build resilience against disaster risks. A global survey of civil society organisations cited lack of resources as the most significant barrier to more effective disaster risk reduction funding (GNDR, 2013).

## And yet, disaster risks and losses in developing countries continue to increase

Over the 12 years to 2011, disasters caused USD 1.3 million in damage, killing 1.1 million people and affecting 2.7 billion others[10]. The Hyogo Framework for Action mid-term review recognised that efforts to reduce underlying risk factors account for the least progress (UNISDR, 2011).

Developing countries, with high levels of vulnerability and limited coping capacities, are especially at risk; shocks and stressors are playing a major role in pushing households below the poverty line and keeping them there. 95% of people killed by disasters are from developing countries (IPCC, 2012). 57% of the respondents to the Views from the Front Line 2013 survey report that disaster losses are still increasing. Amongst the poorest groups this figure rises to 68% (GNDR, 2013). These trends are set to continue.

Disasters derail development. They are increasing in number and intensity, climate change is making them more unpredictable, and a major catastrophe can wipe out decades of development gains overnight. The global development community is making efforts to reduce disaster risks in developing countries, but clearly current efforts are not enough.

The next three chapters will review the barriers to more effective risk reduction programming, and propose some incentives for overcoming these challenges.

# Chapter 2: Contextual challenges restricting disaster risk reduction

The following factors impose limits on how development actors can work to reduce disaster risks in partner countries:

***Partner country does not prioritise disaster risk reduction:*** Under the Busan partnership agreement, development actors reaffirmed their commitment to align their assistance to partner country objectives (HLF4, 2011). This has unintended consequences; if disaster risk reduction is not a priority for the partner country government, it will not be a priority for development actors. In Niger, the President heads an initiative – 3N – to protect food security, especially from drought[11], this has allowed development partners to line up behind this priority. In other countries, promoting disaster risk reduction, when the government is clearly focused on other objectives, is much more problematic. Government priorities may also shift over time, especially around elections, meaning that political support for disaster risk reduction programming is not necessarily sustainable.

***No natural 'home' for risk management:*** Risk assessment and management in the partner country, if it happens at all, is likely to be siloed between different national and local ministries and authorities – prohibiting a coherent overall vision of the risk landscape and thus of how programming should be prioritized. Risk management actors in developing countries – often co-ordinated through the civil protection services of the Ministry of Defense – do not usually have high level political representation, and this limits their voice in budget and development planning negotiations. This fragmentation will also complicate accountability – no single national authority will be responsible for delivering results in this important area.

***Lack of absorption capacity:*** Capacity in central government, local government and/or civil society in developing countries may already be severely stretched – and donors may be reluctant to overload these structures with additional, or re-focused, programming objectives. Absorption capacity is especially a problem in fragile contexts, and in countries recovering from a recent crisis – two contexts where disaster risk reduction is likely to be of key importance. The 2013 review of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium found that lack of capacity was a key factor hindering further progress on disaster risk reduction in Nepal:

> *The Review Team was impressed by the level of attention afforded to the NRRC by representatives of the Government of Nepal. A full and genuine sense of ownership and institutionalisation, however, requires additional dedicated capacity and greater engagement overall. Staff turnover in key roles is common, contributing to inconsistent Government capacity. Numerous international actors expressed the view that DRM issues were not prioritised within Government planning processes, as reflected by the relative lack of involvement of the Ministry of Finance in NRRC structures. While the Review was prompted, at least in part, by the need to align the NRRC with the proposed new DRM structures within Government, no concrete details or timeframes were offered to the Review Team during the visit. The NRRC has clearly bolstered Government capacity for disaster management overall, but much more work needs to be done.* (Taylor et al, 2013)

***Fragmented legal structure and patchy application:*** Many developing partner countries have made significant progress in developing a legal framework for dealing with risks, particularly for disaster, climate and environmental hazards. However, a number of factors can prevent these laws from being applied, including local politics and competing business interests, corruption, and the lack of capacity to enforce policies such as building codes. For example, the Philippines has put in place an ambitious set of laws and initiatives on risk management, but these have not always been matched with sufficient financial and human resources at the local government level. As a result, local government is overwhelmed with at least 30 different risk related directives covering a range of sectors and themes, which are impossible to implement, slowing planning and decision-making (Mitchell, 2013).

***Cultural factors:*** The fatalism attached to strong religious beliefs can translate into high levels of tolerance for disasters as 'acts of god'; this may prevent active risk management. The recent India Disasters Report called on the Indian government to recognise that disasters are not just as acts of god or acts of nature, but instead to understand how national development policies are increasing deaths and devastation from disasters, and thus to actively seek to reduce disaster risks (Parasuraman and Krishnan, 2013)

In addition, some cultures place a high value on family and patronage systems; here, it is difficult to implement risk reduction actions that prioritise the 'common good' of society as a whole. Finally, some cultures cope with disasters by using traditional practices that have a damaging impact – for example in some cultures the sale of child brides is a financial coping mechanism in times of hardship[12]. These households and communities may be able to 'cope' with disasters, but this coping comes at a high cost for certain vulnerable individuals.

***Problematic access to risk information:*** Access to risk information can be difficult and transaction heavy in many developing countries, and the information itself may be difficult to use or out of date. Risk information is often spread across different government bodies and is not always made available to the international community, local authorities or the public. In addition, risks are often analysed in isolation, failing to recognise the inter-connectedness of disaster, conflict, economic, climate and other risk factors. This may severely complicate efforts to obtain a coherent picture of the broader risk landscape. The OECD and UNICEF conducted a resilient systems analysis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in April 2014. During this process, a heatmap of the risk landscape for that area was produced, bringing together information on geo-political, economic and natural hazards for the first time, despite humanitarian and development actors having been present in that area for several decades (OECD, 2014a).

***Insecurity:*** Zones affected by conflict are often those most vulnerable to disasters and shocks. However, development actors are often reluctant to engage in insecure areas, meaning that short-term humanitarian responses are favoured over development approaches in these high risk environments. This severely reduces the scope for longer-term risk reduction actions. A review of the literature on aid in insecure environments found that most aid was humanitarian, although the resilience agenda did provide scope as a potentially unifying framework bridging humanitarian, disaster risk reduction, and development goals in insecure areas (Schreter and Harmer, 2013).

***Economic barriers:*** Market risk transfer mechanisms, such as insurance, will be reluctant to operate in countries with informal economies, incomplete risk information, and uncertain land ownership. Many developing economies are not able to sustainably support risk transfer mechanisms or social protection systems. Economic barriers to more effective risk reduction mechanisms need to be overcome. (OECD, 2014b).

## What incentives can help address contextual challenges?

***Pressure from civil society:*** in many contexts, civil society could be a useful ally in advocating for the prioritisation of disaster risk reduction – especially for messages targeted to governments and local authorities. Civil society could also be a better channel for messages aimed at mitigating traditional cultural practices that increase exposure to risk.

***Coherent messages:*** Developing a set of coherent messages about the risks in a context, and about the need for investing in disaster risk reduction, will help lend weight to the importance of this issue.

***Money:*** In many contexts, the hint of potential new funding can provide a powerful incentive for changing attitudes about risk. Disaster risk reduction needs to be mainstreamed across all development programming, rather than creating a raft of new, stand-alone projects and new money. However, some seed funding will be necessary, especially to ensure that risk assessments are properly resourced; donors should communicate their willingness to fund provide these funds. Development actors could also highlight the importance of including disaster risk reduction in existing programmes, and/or set out potential new funding sources, perhaps including concessional loans, and engaging with risk financing mechanisms, where appropriate. Finally, the development community could communicate messages about how reducing disaster risks can smooth the way for foreign businesses to invest in a particular country or area, bringing with them jobs and other economic benefits.

***Timing:*** Messages about disaster risk reduction will probably be easier to pass during (or just after) a crisis, in the run-up to national and local elections, and at key points in development and partner country planning and budgeting cycles. The devastating 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami put disaster risk reduction firmly on the agenda of everyone living or working in that area (IFRC, 2012).

***Incentives focused on the interests of key stakeholders:*** A clear understanding of the interests of key decision makers will help target the right type of incentives. In certain circumstances, friendly competition between neighbouring local authorities, or between different cities, has proven useful in focusing attention on reducing disaster risks. Economic incentives can also be useful (WEF, 2011).

***Using aid as a catalyst*:** Development actors will not be able to cover all aspects of disaster risk reduction. In some contexts, development funds could be more usefully applied as a catalyst (HLF4, 2011) – for example by addressing the issues that prevent market risk transfer mechanisms from operating at scale in a particular country or area, or by providing risk information that will encourage private sector involvement in disaster risk reduction.

# Chapter 3: Challenges that limit DRR in development programming

The following challenges can prevent disaster risk reduction programmes from achieving their objectives, or, worse, could cause these programmes to do harm:

***Lack of tools to translate policy commitments into programmes:*** At the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2009, states agreed to strive towards investing 1% of their national development budgets on reducing disaster risks. Since then, the magnitude of economic losses has propelled the issue of disaster risk management up the international political agenda. Disaster risk reduction was one of eight topics featured in the Rio+20 agenda, and was discussed by Finance Ministers at the G-20 meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico in 2012. Disaster risk reduction has also been discussed at successive Conferences of the Parties (COP). It also featured as part of the drive for effective development cooperation at the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. Taken together, these provide firm political commitments for disaster risk reduction investments. However, disaster risk reduction is not yet a clear policy priority for most development actors, and issues such as how risk reduction results can be implemented and measured, and the value that DRR will add to a crowded development agenda, have become a major sticking point in translating international commitments into coherent action on the ground.

***Focus on centralised programming:*** Risk analyses conducted by development actors often focus only on the national level, resulting in an assessment that does not look at the risk landscape for individual communities and people. This may result in incomplete analyses, and programming that could inadvertently do harm by building the capacity to deal with risks in one layer of society at the expense of another (OECD, 2011).

***Perverse incentives from the availability of humanitarian funding*:** Governments, communities and people are less likely to invest in risk reduction measures if they know that the international humanitarian community will come to their rescue in times of crisis (Mitchell, 2013).

***Unclear programming landscape***: Partner countries rarely have a clear and complete picture of the international community's programming and budgets. This problem is compounded when programming is undertaken on both local and national levels – national authorities may not be aware of work at local level, and local authorities may not be aware of what is happening in neighboring areas – leading to incoherent programming and the potential for gaps in key areas[13].

***Unintended consequences:*** Some programming, even with the best of intentions, may in fact cause harm. For example, programming after a crisis may, if not properly planned, keep people living an at-risk area, and thus exposed to future crises. Similarly, programmes that shield people from risk, for example by compensating them for all potential losses, could inadvertently encourage overly risky behaviour.

## What incentives can help reduce these programming challenges?

***Counter fears of the need for radical changes to programmes and mandates:*** Actors who are reluctant to engage with disaster risk reduction may change their mind if they are aware of what this will actually mean for their programmes. It may also be useful to counter misperceptions about the need for new funding tools, or for other changes to how the aid system works.

***Shared risk analysis:*** Analysing risks together will allow different development actors to share information (and thus increase access to new information) about risks, trends, and programming intentions. A shared analysis of risks will also increase ownership and buy-in for the need for disaster risk reduction, and lead to more honest discussions about how risks should be mitigated, transferred or shared. A common picture of the risk landscape could also lead to natural synergies between different development, climate change and humanitarian actors, perhaps leading to joint programmes or other risk reduction activities. Finally, a shared and more complete analysis of the risk landscape will decrease the potential for unintended consequences (OECD, 2012b).

***Leveraging of new funding mechanisms*:** A coherent, shared, understanding of the risk landscape could also open up opportunities to seek additional funds for risk reduction programming. This could also help raise the profile of high risk countries on the international stage – potentially attracting new donors.

***Highlighting existing political commitments:*** References to the need to honour existing commitments to disaster risk reduction could be useful incentives – including those made at Busan[14], under the Hyogo Framework for Action[15], for Human Security[16], and in other fora, including commitments made by individual donors.

***Creating opportunities for building on existing relationships:*** Different donors, different parts of government, and different operational actors work under different mandates in different ways, and address development challenges at different layers of society – targeting individuals, communities, and/ or states and their institutions. Bringing these actors together to conduct and act on a shared disaster risk analysis will help increase access to potential development solutions, and uncover new ways of working together. Shared analysis could also promote joint learning across the different actors involved, especiall about what works, and what doesn't work, in a particular context.

# Chapter 4: Institutional challenges that block disaster risk reduction

The way that development actors plan and implement their programmes can also hinder coherent disaster risk reduction programming:

***Un-coordinated planning cycles:*** Different policy communities, and different individual agencies, have different planning cycles, complicating the design of joined up approaches to reduce disaster risks, and limiting the possibility to align with partner country cycles. The humanitarian community and partner country governments usually plan and budget on an annual basis[17]. Development actors will often plan on a longer-term timeframe – usually 3-5 years – but these periods will seldom be harmonised.

***Centralised vs. decentralized authority:*** Many development programmes are approved in far-off capitals; this complicates efforts to share risk assessments, and design coherent disaster risk reduction programming, in-country. OECD/DAC members all committed to "deepen and accelerate efforts to address the problem of insufficient delegation of authority to their field staff" (HLF4, 2011), but the results have been unequal. There are large variations in terms of financial authority, which ranges from none to unlimited within country budget, and in the share of field staff in a donor organisation, which ranges between 16% and 80%. Different forms of aid are decentralised to different extents: most OECD/DAC members report that their country programmes are partially or very decentralised, while humanitarian aid and aid to NGOs is generally more centralised (OECD, 2013)

***Separation of humanitarian and development programmes:*** In most donors and operational actors, humanitarian and development funding pots and programmes are kept separate. While this helps to ensure that humanitarian principles are respected, it also limits opportunities for the two programmes to work alongside each other to reduce disaster risks. In many donors the problem is more pronounced, with development colleagues often believing that risk and resilience should be a purely humanitarian concern (OECD, 2012a).

***A perception that risk is complicated*:** Development personnel are often specialized in their particular area, and may have a limited understanding of risk in other domains. Sector specialists will be unlikely to understand disaster risk, and may believe that it requires scientific training and inputs that fall outside their own skill-sets. Disaster risk may, therefore, be parked in the 'too hard' basket for staff who are focused on their own particular goals.

***Contradictory career incentives:*** Staff are often rewarded for actions that discourage programming to reduce risks. There is often pressure to deliver quick and visible results – something that may be difficult given that the ultimate result of good disaster risk reduction programming is that 'nothing happens'. There may also be pressure to design bigger programmes to counter the problems of fragmentation and managing multiple projects[18] – this may complicate efforts to reduce disaster risks at community level, and deter development actors from submitting smaller-scale risk reduction programme proposals.

***Political pressures***: Development actors may come under pressure from donor country parliaments or from the public, questioning the effectiveness and results of the aid budget; there could also be negative media coverage of costly or risky programmes. Value for money does have benefits for development co-operation, but it also has limitations if poorly applied, including focusing on short-term timeframes and promoting risk aversion (Jackson, 2012). Development actors who are largely risk averse may have difficulties in moving towards programmes to reduce disaster risk, which may involve new, and thus inherently more risky, ways of working.

## What incentives might be useful to reduce institutional challenges?

***Political support:*** Senior management should ensure that the rationale for engaging in disaster risk reduction is properly communicated to major stakeholders, including donors, parliaments, partner country governments, the public, and staff.

***Risk reduction as an overall goal of development programmes*:** There are two possible routes to ensuring that disaster risk reduction is systematically taken up by development actors – establishing it as a cross cutting issue, or specifying that disaster risk reduction is an overall programming goal. Ireland, for example, has taken this approach, by making building resilience one of its three development priorities (GoI, 2013). Each actor will need to take the approach that best fits with its own organizational culture. Lessons from integrating gender and environment into programming could be useful.

***Focusing on implementation in the field*:** Field personnel often take a more pragmatic approach to programming, and may be more open to working on issues such as disaster risk reduction. The proximity of field staff to the actual risk environment may also help them understand why risk reduction is important. Designing disaster risk reduction programmes in the field will, therefore, often mean less work is needed to change mindsets. To enable programming in the field, development actors will have to continue current good practices including: decentralizing planning and decision making authority to country offices, providing flexibility in programme design to adapt to evolving contexts and lessons learnt, and donors will need to increase allocations of country programmable aid (the portion of aid donors programme for individual countries, and over which partner countries could have a significant say)[19].

***Provide staff with guidance for advocacy, programme design and implementation:*** Staff will need guidance and support, perhaps from a dedicated team that can be deployed from capitals or regional offices, and through working guidance. The Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative, which supports United Nations country teams, is one example of a useful model[20].

***Money and technical resources:*** Undertaking a disaster risk assessment – the first step to coherent disaster risk reduction programming – will require some funding and technical support – development actors should ensure that these resources are provided.

***Contestability:*** A culture of contestability – where the design of all new programmes is subjected to peer review or systematic quality control mechanisms – should help promote innovative approaches by staff and help develop a culture of disaster risk reduction

programming within the organization. Peer reviews may be more useful than other quality control mechanisms, as they are aimed at being respectful and helpful, not as another administrative 'checklist'. Staff whose programmes have undergone peer review will likely feel more comfortable in their programming decisions, and less personally exposed to the consequences of trying new approaches.

***Appropriate career incentives*:** Development staff will most likely react positively to a shift in their individual performance incentives to favour disaster risk reduction programming. This could mean the incorporation of disaster risk reduction objectives in job descriptions, and rewarding this programming through the performance management system.

***An appropriate results framework*:** Monitoring and reporting on the impact of disaster risk reduction may require new results frameworks, to cope with the difficulties of measuring disaster risk reduction results. Results targets and monitoring systems should be developed in a way to encourage staff to work on disaster risk reduction, not deter them with unrealistic results indicators.

***Knowledge management:*** Knowledge management will likely play a key role in supporting staff embarking on a new way of working. This could include establishing communities of practice on disaster risk reduction within development organizations, monitoring progress and results and sharing these lessons widely, promoting success stories, and helping staff to share experiences.

***Success breeds success:*** Actively promoting positive results and good news stories could help inspire other staff to re-focus on disaster risk reduction programming.

# Chapter 5: How the post-2015 development framework can help

Over the last 20 years, the global community has come together around three historic development efforts, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development – meeting today's needs without sacrificing our future; the Hyogo Framework for Action – building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters; and the Millennium Declaration and Development Goals (MDGs) – galvanising unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world's poorest.

During those 20 years, the world has undergone unprecedented change. Today, shocks and stressors are playing a major role in pushing developing country households below the poverty line and keeping them there. Dramatic events, including the financial crisis, renewed conflict in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, and large natural disasters sometimes linked to climate change, have altered the course of global progress in unpredicted ways, and demonstrated the need to revisit long-accepted political assumptions and economic models (IRF, 2013).

On top of this, many people in developing countries are unable to cope with everyday shocks – losing a job, getting sick, dealing with changing weather patterns, or falling victim to crime – so these risks pose just as big a threat to their development as poverty itself. The battle against risk, including disaster risk, and for sustainability, is far from over.

The Millennium Development Goals set out, for the first time, a global vision of development with commonly agreed priorities, but they did not prioritise risk management. However, development actions are never risk neutral – development either increases risk and vulnerability, or it reduces them. And we now know that dealing with risk is critical, if the hard-won gains of development are to be protected.

Building resilience, including to disasters, is also in the national interest of many developed countries. Decreasing disaster risk reduces the risk in globalised supply chains, sustainable shock-proof development can also mean increased trade and jobs, it may help reduce migration, and it could contribute to national security by helping communities living in difficult circumstances to cope with risks that might exacerbate social pressures, and lead to conflict and unrest. Finally, disaster risk reduction is value for money – investments in mitigating disaster risk are less costly than the escalating cost of responding to disasters, even if the precise cost-benefit ratio has proven hard to measure (UNISDR, 2007).

To make development shock-proof and sustainable, development partners will need to break away from silos, maximise potential synergies and minimise potential trade-offs, take informed decisions, and broaden partnerships for on-the-ground delivery – optimising the use of resources and achieving greater, and more sustainable, impact. They will need the right contextual, programmatic and institutional incentives to make sure that disaster risk reduction becomes a priority for sustainable development.

Firstly, this means that the development community will have to be coherent about the messages, policies and measurement frameworks that will emerge from the main post-2015 development instruments – the sustainable development goals, the successor to the Hyogo Framework for Action, the World Humanitarian Summit, and COP 21[21].

There is also a solid opportunity to capitalise on the political momentum of the resilience concept[22]. There is clear political buy-in to the idea that resilience to shocks is critical, if we are to protect hard-won development gains[23]. Embracing resilience in the post-2015 frameworks should recognise the importance of resilience in all layers of society, especially for the most vulnerable people; and to all shocks – economic, geo-political and natural; this should be a coherent theme throughout all the post-2015 instruments.

A further step would be to adopt a growth model that is sustainable, and that decreases inequality and risks. Growth is important for development, but current economic growth models for developing country contexts ignore important environmental and social costs that are critical for sustainable development. Economic growth may also expose countries and communities to increased disaster risk, for example when development happens in flood plains and along coastlines. The model will need to avoid creating or increasing risks, while also maximising opportunities for the poorest. For that reason, growth will need to be measured in terms that go beyond pure economic indicators. This should be reflected in all the post-2015 frameworks.

In terms of measurement of development results in the post-2015 frameworks, saving lives is not enough – it is equally important to limit the economic impact of shocks and stressors. Measurement of results should therefore focus on outcomes and impact, rather than processes; it should be workable at the global level, while still making sense when applied to national, local and community contexts[24].

There should be a solid accountability mechanism, and a clear division of roles and responsibilities. In the Busan partnership agreement, the global development community said that *developing countries will lead in integrating resilience to shocks and measures for disaster management within their own policies and strategies*, and then that we would all work together to 'manage' those risks (HLF4, 2011). The Hyogo Framework does outline responsibilities of different development actors, but these are mostly process or activity based, there is no attribution of responsibility for outcomes. The post-2015 frameworks need to provide clarity over who is responsible for what, if disaster risk reduction is not to fall between the cracks.

In addition, as this paper has shown, there are a significant number of challenges and disincentives that need to be overcome before we can all work together to reduce disaster risks and build resilience. If different actors in the development community knew what their roles and responsibilities are in relation to disaster risk reduction, they could help put in place appropriate incentives to ensure that they delivered on those commitments.

Disasters do indeed derail development. And we are not doing enough about them. The post-2015 discussions provide a huge opportunity to start to put that right – to be coherent about how disaster risk reduction should be prioritised and integrated into all aspects of development. And what greater incentive than that?

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# Notes

1 The OECD Disaster Prevention and Preparedness reporting code records development programmes that have DRR as a primary objective, and thus misses programmes that are coded under another sector but with a disaster risk reduction component

2 The OECD's Development Assistance Committee currently has 29 members. Candidate countries are assessed in terms of the following criteria: the existence of appropriate strategies, policies and institutional frameworks that ensure capacity to deliver a development co-operation programme; an accepted measure of effort; and the existence of a system of performance monitoring and evaluation. A list of members can be found at www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm

3 The guidance can be found at www.undg.org/docs/9866/UNDG-DRR-Guidance-Note-2009_DUP_08-07-2009_11-43-02-734_AM.PDF

4 More on the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium at www.un.org.np/coordinationmechanism/nrrc

5 Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, current prices

6 Source: www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/donors

7 Source : www.worldbank.org/en/topic/disasterriskmanagement/overview

8 Source : www.adb.org/projects

9 Refer www.iadb.org/en/topics/natural-disasters/natural-disasters,1441.html

10 A disaster refers to Natural Disasters as categorized in EM-DAT. Data source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, data version: 10 January 2012 - v12.07. Infographic available at: www.preventionweb.net/files/25833_20120318disaster20002011v2.pdf

11 The 3N initiative is shorthand for *Les Nigériens Nourissent Les Nigériens* (translated as "Nigerians feed Nigerians"). More: www.initiative3n.ne

12 There has been an increase in child marriages in Syrian refugee communities as families strive to deal with that crisis, see for example www.irinnews.org/report/95902/jordan-early-marriage-a-coping-mechanism-for-syrian-refugees

13 Refer www.publishwhatyoufund.org/issue/problem/

14 Article 27 of the Busan Partnership Agreement committed development actors to respond *to the needs articulated by developing countries, we will work together to invest in shock resistant infrastructure and social protection systems for at-risk communities. In addition, we will increase the resources, planning and skills for disaster management at the national and regional levels*. (HLF4, 2011)

15 Hyogo Framework for Action: 2005-2015 www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/1037

16 UN General Assembly resolution A/66/L.55/Rev.1

17 Note that the humanitarian community is now moving to multi-annual planning cycles under the Strategic Response Plans www.unocha.org/cap/appeals/by-year/results

18 Refer www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/fragmentation-orphans.htm

19 Refer www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/cpa.htm

20 Refer www.cadri.net/

21 This was a major conclusion of a meeting of thirty global experts at King's College London on 25 March 2014, to discuss disasters targets and indicators in the post-2015 development framework.

22 Resilience involves increasing the capacity of societies to absorb, adapt to, and transform in the face of risks and opportunities – helping people get out of poverty, and stay out of poverty, no matter what obstacles are placed in their way (Mitchell, 2013).

23 Refer, for example, www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2012/04/16/helen-clark-putting-resilience-at-the-heart-of-the-development-agenda.html

24 Further discussion of options for measurement can be found at www.odi.org.uk/publications/6815-options-disaster-resilience-post-2015-development-goals